



NIGERIA SOCIAL COHESION SURVEY REPORT



JUNE 2026

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The Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey Report #NSCS2026 [June 2026]

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PREFACE

Social cohesion remains a fundamental pillar for national stability, democratic governance, sustainable development, and peaceful coexistence. In a diverse and complex society such as Nigeria, understanding the factors that strengthen or weaken social cohesion is essential for informing policy decisions, improving governance outcomes, and fostering national unity. It is against this background that the Africa Polling Institute (API), with support from the Ford Foundation, conducted the fifth wave of the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (NSCS 2026), a nationally representative study examining citizens' perceptions and experiences across key dimensions of social cohesion.




The survey was undertaken during a period marked by significant socio-economic challenges, including rising inflation, economic reforms, unemployment, insecurity, and declining household purchasing power. These realities have placed considerable strain on citizens and institutions alike, making it imperative to assess the state of social cohesion and identify pathways for strengthening social resilience.

One of the most notable findings of the 2026 survey is the improvement in the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI), which rose to 48.8 percent—the highest level recorded since the study commenced. Although the index remains marginally below the 50 percent benchmark, the upward trend suggests that Nigerians continue to demonstrate resilience and a commitment to coexistence despite prevailing hardships. Particularly significant is the finding that, for the first time since the inception of the survey, a majority of respondents identified primarily as Nigerians rather than by ethnic, religious, or regional affiliations. This shift represents an important milestone in the country's nation-building journey and points to a strengthening sense of shared national identity. Similarly, levels of patriotism and optimism about Nigeria's future have improved, suggesting that many citizens continue to believe in the country's long-term prospects despite present difficulties.

The survey also recorded improvements in public perceptions of civic participation, gender equity, peacebuilding, coping strategies, and impunity. Notably, an overwhelming majority of respondents expressed willingness to participate in peacebuilding efforts within their communities, reflecting a strong desire among citizens to contribute to social harmony and conflict prevention. However, the findings equally reveal persistent structural challenges that continue to undermine social cohesion. Trust in public institutions remains low, highlighting a longstanding deficit in the relationship between citizens and the state. Likewise, perceptions of social justice remain overwhelmingly negative, with many respondents expressing concerns about inequality, corruption, unfair access to opportunities, and the management of public resources. These findings suggest that institutional legitimacy and accountability remain critical challenges to national cohesion.

The survey further indicates growing concerns regarding social and political polarization, even as national identity appears to be strengthening. In addition, feelings of personal insecurity remain widespread, with declining perceptions of safety posing significant risks to trust, participation, and social stability. Taken together, the findings reveal a society that is increasingly united by a shared sense of identity, shared struggles, and collective aspiration, yet continues to grapple with governance deficits, institutional mistrust, inequality, and insecurity. The coexistence of these contrasting realities underscores both the progress achieved and the work that remains to be done.



The evidence presented in this report points to several policy priorities. First, government institutions must rebuild public trust through greater transparency, accountability, equitable service delivery, and improved security outcomes. Second, deliberate efforts are required to strengthen social justice by ensuring fairness in access to opportunities, resources, and public services. Third, investments in civic engagement, peacebuilding initiatives, and community-level dialogue should be expanded to reinforce positive cohesion trends. Finally, traditional leaders, religious institutions, civil society organizations, and citizens themselves must continue to play active roles in fostering inclusion, tolerance, and national unity.

Ultimately, the 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey presents both a message of caution and a source of optimism. While significant challenges persist, the findings demonstrate that Nigerians continue to exhibit resilience, patriotism, and a growing sense of national belonging. Harnessing these strengths while addressing the structural barriers to trust, justice, and inclusion will be essential for building a more cohesive, peaceful, and prosperous Nigeria. I hope you find this report insightful, and please feel free to engage us further on it.

Professor Bell Ihuwa, *mni*

Executive Director, Africa Polling Institute (API)

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Signed,
Segun Olajonrin
Director of Research

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

API	Africa Polling Institute
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
COVID-19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCFR	Grand Commander of the Federal Republic
IDOS	German Institute of Development and Sustainability
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGA	Local Government Area
MEND	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NSC	Nigeria Social Cohesion
NSCI	Nigeria Social Cohesion Index
NSCS	Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey
NSCS2026	Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 2026
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PIA	Petroleum Industry Act
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SNAG	Social Norms and Accountable Governance
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USA	United States of America
USD	United States Dollar



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



The Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 2026 (#NSCS2026) is the fifth wave of a nationally representative survey measuring the state of social cohesion in Nigeria. The survey project was designed and implemented by the Africa Polling Institute (API), with the continued support of the Ford Foundation. The survey was conducted in February 2026 with a total sample of 5,315 respondents across all states and senatorial districts. It measures citizen perceptions across 14 key indicators that constitute the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI).

Survey Context

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey was conducted at a particularly significant moment in Nigeria's recent history. The country is in the third year of the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, GCFR, who assumed office in May 2023. The administration has pursued economic reforms, including the removal of the fuel subsidy and the unification of foreign exchange, whose impacts have been deeply felt by citizens. Nigeria's poverty rate stood at 62% in 2025, and consumer price inflation averaged at 23.01% in December 2025. While inflation had moderated to 15.69% by April 2026, following the National Bureau of Statistics' (NBS) rebasing of the Consumer Price Index, the World Bank's October 2025 Nigeria Development Update found that macroeconomic stabilization gains had yet to substantially improve the livelihoods of ordinary Nigerians. The August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests reflected the depth of citizens' frustration, and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2026 noted that the change in leadership had yet to yield positive outcomes for Nigerians. It is in this context of accumulated economic strain and tested social resilience that the findings of the 2026 survey must be read.

Key Objectives

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey sought to assess the current state of social cohesion in Nigeria, identify emerging trends across five waves of longitudinal measurement from 2019 to 2026, document citizens' perceptions of governance, identity, trust, social justice, and inter-group relations, and provide an evidence base for policy action by the federal, state and local governments, as well as ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) of government, civil society organisations, development partners and citizens. The 14 indicators assessed are: Identity; Trust; Social Justice; Civic Participation; Polarization; Tolerance; Gender Equity, Disability and Inclusion; Impunity; Corruption; Natural Resource Governance; Security and Peacebuilding; Coping Strategies; Migration; Self-Worth and Future Expectations.

Methodology

API conducted the survey using a face-to-face household interview technique between January and February 2026. Interviews were conducted in five major Nigerian languages: English, Pidgin English, Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo. All states and senatorial districts were proportionately represented. Survey state quotas were assigned and post-stratification weights applied by gender and senatorial district to ensure the sample is representative of the Nigerian adult population. The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 3 percentage points at the 95% confidence level. A total of 5,315 interviews were completed in 2026, compared to 5,363 in 2021, 5,178 in 2022, and 5,465 in 2025. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted across all six geopolitical zones to provide qualitative depth.

Key Findings

Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) 2026

The Nigeria Social Cohesion Index for 2026 stands at 48.8%, the highest recorded across all five waves of measurement, a 2-percentage-point improvement from 46.8% in 2025, and improving from 44.2% in 2021 and a low of 39.6% in 2022. Nigeria remains below the 50% average social cohesion threshold. It is important to note that this improvement reflects a shift in citizens' perceptions rather than a transformation in the structural conditions of governance and daily life. The improvement is driven most significantly by the historic breakthrough in national identity, and supported by gains in future optimism, tolerance, coping strategies, and peacebuilding.



Identity

For the first time in the survey's history, a majority of Nigerians (52%) identify primarily as Nigerian rather than by ethnicity, religion, or region, a 13-percentage-point increase from 39% in 2025. Also, the proportion who feel truly proud of Nigeria has risen from 33% in 2025 to 46% in 2026, while those who feel disappointed in the country have declined from 53% to 41%.



Trust

Trust in institutions remains critically low. Only 3% of citizens express a high level of trust, while 24% express no trust at all, 44% have little trust, and 29% have some trust. This persistent distrust, consistent across five waves, reflects structural conditions rather than cyclical events.



Social Justice

Social justice remains deeply weak. Seventy-five percent (75%) of respondents rate social justice in Nigeria as low in 2026, a marginal 4-point improvement from 79% in 2025, and indicative of a pervasive sense of unfairness in the distribution of resources and access to the law.



Civic Participation

Civic participation has grown modestly, from a high of 14% in 2025 to 16% in 2026. While the direction of movement is positive, the absolute level indicates that active, engaged, and responsible citizenship remains largely far-fetched and underdeveloped across Nigeria.



Polarization

Despite the strengthening of national identity, public perception of polarization remains a serious concern. Forty-nine percent (49%) of Nigerians agree or strongly agree that the country is more divided today than four years ago, and 55% agree that political division has increased, making political polarization the most acute of the three dimensions tracked. Forty-two percent (42%) rate overall polarization as high.




Impunity

On impunity, only 2% of citizens rate it as absent, while 64% rate it as average or high. However, the proportion rating impunity as high has declined from 43% in 2025 to 13% in 2026, the largest single-year improvement in any indicator across all five waves. Fifty-one percent (51%) rate impunity as average, suggesting that while peak impunity has declined, the everyday experience of unaccountability persists.



Corruption

Fifty-nine percent (59%) of citizens rate corruption as high, 62% rate government efforts to address it as poor, and only 16% believe that access to justice is free from corruption. These figures have shown minimal movement across five waves, confirming that corruption is perceived as a systemic and institutionalized feature of public life.



Gender Equity, Disability, and Inclusion

The proportion rating gender equity as good has risen considerably from 9% in 2021 and 28% in 2025 to 33% in 2026, while the proportion rating it as poor has declined from 30% in 2021 to 13% in 2026. However, 52% still rate gender equity as only fair, and the majority continue to hold discriminatory attitudes on earnings and political representation. Measurable improvement has not yet translated into attitudinal change.



Tolerance

Tolerance has improved from 10% high in 2025 to 15% in 2026. However, 85% of citizens remain in the low-tolerance category, making it the weakest-performing indicator in the entire 2026 survey. This persistent low tolerance level is a significant long-term risk for inter-group relations and social cohesion. It is therefore unsurprising to witness cases of jungle justice and extra-judicial killings in Nigeria.



Natural Resource Governance

Sixty-two percent (62%) of citizens rate the management of natural resource revenues as poor. Eighty-six percent (86%) express little or no trust in restructuring efforts. Although this figure has improved by 10 points from 96% in 2022. The gap between Nigeria's resource endowment and citizens' experience of its benefits remains among the deepest structural deficits in social cohesion. Citizens still wonder why crude oil revenues from southern Nigeria remain largely the country's main source of revenue, while revenues from gold, copper, lithium, and other minerals from northern Nigeria are frittered away and remain the exclusive preserve of some elites.



Security and Peacebuilding

The sense of personal safety has declined, with only 53% of citizens feeling safe or very safe in 2026, compared to 58% in 2025. On the security and peacebuilding sub-index, 26% rate the overall situation as high, up from 19% in 2022 and 21% in 2025, while 18% rate it as low. Seventy-seven percent (77%) are willing to participate in peacebuilding in their locality, and 63% believe that local community-level efforts can resolve recurring conflicts.



Coping Strategies

The coping strategy sub-index shows the most notable improvement among all indicators in 2026. The proportion rating coping strategy as low has dropped from 69% in 2022 and 62% in 2025 to 52% in 2026, while those rating it as high have risen from 14% in 2022 to 26% in 2026. Community and family networks remain the primary safety net in the country, with 48% relying on relatives and communal groups, compared with 17% relying on institutional support.



Migration

Fifty-five percent (55%) of Nigerians say they would relocate abroad if given the opportunity, driven primarily by better job opportunities (34%) and economic prospects (22%). A significant counter-movement has emerged: the proportion who say they would not relocate has risen from 21% in 2025 to 28% in 2026, a 7-percentage-point shift in a single year, suggesting a growing cohort choosing to stay in order to make the country work. Among those undergoing internal relocation, 51% are not interested in moving to another state, with Lagos (12%) and Abuja (8%) remaining the most preferred destinations among those willing to relocate due to perceived relative security.



Self-Worth and Future Expectations

Future optimism has risen from 56% in 2025 to 61% in 2026, with citizens increasingly believing that Nigeria's future will be better despite the current difficult economic conditions. This growing optimism, alongside the positive shift in national identity, is among the most encouraging dimensions of the 2026 findings.

Summary

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey presents a picture of citizens united in shared struggles of insecurity, poverty, low living standards, and other harsh economic realities, such as the high cost of petrol, transport, and cost of living. The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI), calculated at 48.8%, is the highest recorded across the five waves and approaches the average social cohesion threshold of 50%. This historic shift can be attributed to a stronger national identity (52% Nigerian-first) in the face of challenges, which is the most significant finding of this wave. It also signals that the citizen-to-citizen dimension of social cohesion is gradually and measurably strengthening. In addition, improvements in gender equity, coping strategies, the high impunity rate, and willingness to engage in peacebuilding demonstrate that meaningful change is achievable.

At the same time, the structural dimensions of social cohesion remain deeply resistant. Trust in public institutions is at a mere 3%; social justice is perceived as low by 75%; corruption is widely considered systemic at 59%; and 86% express little or no trust in natural resource revenue management, confirming that the citizen-to-institution relationship is the central unresolved challenge for Nigeria's social cohesion. The deterioration in personal safety, from 58% in 2025 to 53% in 2026, is a worrying trend that must be addressed with urgency.

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey findings describe a Nigeria in which citizens are increasingly willing to claim a shared identity and participate in civic activities within their communities, but in which the state's institutions have not yet earned the trust and confidence needed to sustain social cohesion. Closing this gap is the defining governance challenge of the moment.

Conclusions

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey leads to six overarching conclusions:

First, the breakthrough toward a stronger national identity is the most significant development across the five waves of measurement. When 52% of Nigerians identify as Nigerian-first, a 13-percentage-point increase above the 2025 figure, it represents a collective shift in how citizens relate to their country. Notably, this shift is occurring alongside rising perceptions of polarization: 49% agree that Nigeria is more divided today than it was four years ago. Therefore, social cohesion in Nigeria is not built on the absence of difference but on the capacity to maintain a collective identity despite it. This shift is fragile and must be nurtured through deliberate policy action.

Second, governance failures remain the most persistent stress on social cohesion. Across all five waves, the indicators of trust, impunity, corruption, and social justice have remained the most stubbornly resistant to change. These are not perception problems, but reflections of citizens' lived realities and governance experience.

Third, gender equity presents an instructive case of the gap between measurable improvement and lived experience. The proportion rating gender equity as good has risen sharply from 9% in 2021 to 33% in 2026, while the proportion rating it as poor has fallen from 30% to 13% over the same period. Yet the majority of Nigerians continue to believe that men should earn more than women and hold more political positions. Gender equity gains remain fragile and reversible without the attitudinal change necessary to sustain them.

Fourth, community solidarity is Nigeria's most resilient social asset. With 48% of citizens relying on communal networks to cope and only 17% on institutional support, community networks constitute what the data call **an architecture of informal social insurance**, built precisely because formal systems are largely perceived as unreliable. With 77% willing to participate in peacebuilding and 63% believing local efforts can resolve conflict, this community capital represents an enormous, underestimated, and underutilised resource.

Fifth, the migration picture is more nuanced than the '*Japa*' narrative suggests. While 55% would relocate, 28% would now actively choose not to, up from 21% in 2025. This growing 'stay' cohort is a highly important and underanalysed signal in the social cohesion data, and one that deserves greater policy and advocacy attention.

Sixth, the most important underreported finding of the 2026 survey is the scale of citizens' willingness to engage in peacebuilding initiatives. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding in their locality, and 63% believe local community-level efforts can resolve recurring conflicts. This finding represents a vast, largely untapped reservoir of civic energy. The challenge is that this energy exists primarily at the community level, while the structural conditions that generate conflict operate at the institutional level. Bridging this gap is the central challenge the 2026 survey findings place before all stakeholders. The deterioration in personal safety, from 58% to 53% feeling safe in a single year, adds urgency to this challenge: without visible security improvement, the identity and cohesion gains of 2026 remain vulnerable to reversal.

Recommendations

The Nigerian Government

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey measures the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) calculated at 48.8%, just below the average threshold of 50 points. The national identity breakthrough and improving peacebuilding outlook provide a foundation for accelerated progress. Government must now match citizen momentum with structural reforms:

1. Leverage the national identity breakthrough by adopting inclusive citizenship frameworks that reinforce shared vision and belonging across ethnic, religious, and regional lines. The 52% majority Nigerian-first identification is the country's most important social capital right now, and it must be protected and nurtured.
2. Address impunity urgently and consistently. The improvement from 43% high impunity in 2025 to 13% in 2026 is the most encouraging governance shift in this wave. Sustaining and deepening it requires visible, consistent, and non-partisan prosecution of human rights abuses and financial crimes.
3. Invest in gender equity beyond legislative compliance. With 52% still rating gender equity as only fair and attitudinal change lagging measurable gains, behaviour change programmes, economic empowerment, and enforcement of existing laws are necessary.
4. Strengthen the social safety net to close the 31-percentage-point gap between community reliance (48%) and institutional reliance (17%) on coping with poverty and insecurity. Targeted social protection programmes, expanded coverage of existing poverty alleviation schemes, and community-based delivery mechanisms can begin to shift this imbalance and reduce citizens' dependence on informal safety nets in the face of structural economic hardship.
5. Prioritise community-level security. The 5-percentage-point decline in personal safety in a single year is a significant deterioration that requires immediate attention, particularly in the North East and North West, where insecurity is most acute. Community policing frameworks, rapid-response mechanisms, and support for local conflict early-warning systems should be urgently strengthened.
6. Reform natural resource governance structures and institutions. With 62% rating revenue management as poor and 86% with little or no trust in restructuring, the full implementation of the Petroleum Industry Act and transparent revenue reporting are minimum requirements for restoring citizen confidence. Besides, the government needs to ensure that revenues from all of Nigeria's natural resources (gold, copper, gemstones, lithium, etc.) are included in the country's revenue base and reduce heavy dependence on crude oil revenue.
7. Finally, API recommends that Nigeria requires a National Social Cohesion Commission, similar to Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission, focused on fostering national identity, unity, peaceful coexistence, citizens trust, civic participation, social justice, patriotism and positive future expectations, among other components of social cohesion; or at least institute a Social Cohesion desk in every Ministry, Department and Agency (MDA) of government, to ensure that development plans and public policies are inclusive and socially-cohesive.

Traditional and Religious Leaders

The survey consistently shows that citizens place greater trust in traditional and religious leaders than in government at all levels and public institutions, making them indispensable partners in social cohesion building:

1. Champion tolerance and inter-group dialogue within and across communities. With 85% of Nigerians in the low tolerance category, traditional and religious leaders are best placed to counter divisive narratives and model inclusive values.
2. Activate the 77% peacebuilding willingness. The survey finds that 77% of Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding in their locality. Traditional and religious leaders should provide the local structures and legitimacy for this civic capacity to be deployed.
3. Model and reinforce the emerging national identity. The shift to 52% Nigerian-first identity is fragile and must be nurtured at the community level through narratives of shared nationhood and common destiny.
4. Serve as advocates for good governance, bridging the gap between the government and the governed, while encouraging the citizenry to fully embrace civic participation and trust, as well as expressing hope for citizens to embrace self-worth and positive future expectations.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

CSOs are uniquely positioned to bridge the gap between citizen capacity and institutional delivery:

1. Scale up community peacebuilding infrastructure. The 77% of citizens' willingness to engage in peacebuilding and the 63% belief in local solutions represent an enormous untapped resource. CSOs should work with communities to establish structured local peacebuilding platforms.
2. Lead on gender equity and tolerance advocacy. With attitudinal change on gender equity lagging measurable improvements, CSOs should invest in community-based behaviour change programmes that address the root causes of discrimination.
3. Monitor and document the 'Japa' counter-movement. The growing cohort of Nigerians actively choosing to stay (28% in 2026, up from 21% in 2025) is an underexplored social development that CSOs should study and amplify as a positive signal of social cohesion.

Citizens

Citizens are the primary architects of social cohesion. The 2026 survey shows that community resilience, communal solidarity, and civic willingness are the strongest assets Nigeria possesses:

1. Embrace and sustain the emerging national identity. The shift to a majority Nigerian-first identification is a collective achievement by citizens. Sustaining it requires conscious choices to engage across ethnic, religious, and regional lines in everyday life.
2. Participate actively in peacebuilding and civic life. With 77% willing and only 16% currently highly engaged in civic participation, there is a significant gap between intent and action. Active citizens should stir up passion for responsible citizenship and translate their willingness to engage in civic participation into community dialogue, conflict resolution, and other civic processes, such as voting and peaceful protests.
3. Active citizens should hold all leaders accountable and demand transparency. With only 3% trusting institutions highly and 59% rating corruption as high, citizen accountability mechanisms, scorecards, and informed participation in democratic processes are the most effective tools for driving institutional reform.



1.0 BACKGROUND

Social cohesion is among the most consequential yet underinvested dimensions of national development. A society that is united fosters peace and prosperity, gives a sense of belonging and identity to all its citizens regardless of their tribal, religious, or socio-cultural affiliations, and creates the conditions for collective action in the pursuit of shared goals. A non-socially cohesive society, by contrast, is at risk of increased social tensions, conflicts, and disconnection from the social contract, with direct consequences for security, governance, and economic development.¹

Nigeria's social cohesion challenge is acute and multidimensional. The country is Africa's most populous nation, home to over 250 ethnic groups, two dominant religious traditions, and six geopolitically distinct regions, each with distinct historical grievances, resource claims, and identity politics.² The threats to national cohesion are both long-standing and contemporary. Persistent insecurity, including the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East, banditry and kidnapping in the North West, farmer-herder conflicts in the Middle Belt, separatist agitations in the South East, and militancy in the Niger Delta, continues to place enormous strain on inter-group relations and trust in the state.³ These are not isolated crises but symptoms of deeper structural failures in governance, resource distribution, and social inclusion.

The economic context in which the 2026 survey was conducted is critical to understanding citizen perceptions. Nigeria's poverty rate stood at 62% in 2025, and consumer price inflation peaked at 34.8% in December 2024 and stabilized to 23.01% in December 2025, driven largely by the removal of the fuel subsidy, currency depreciation, and structural supply constraints.⁴ Following a methodological rebasing of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2025, which shifted the base period to 2024=100, inflation moderated substantially, declining consecutively over eleven months to reach 15.69% in April 2026, the month the survey was conducted.⁵ While the moderation in headline inflation was encouraging, the World Bank's October 2025 Nigeria Development Update noted that macroeconomic stabilisation gains had yet to substantially improve the livelihoods of ordinary Nigerians. Citizens had grappled with subsidy removal shocks, a volatile foreign exchange regime, and the erosion of purchasing power, and these accumulated economic pressures form an essential backdrop for interpreting the survey's findings on coping strategies, self-worth, future expectations, and trust.

The political dimension is equally significant. The 2026 survey is conducted in the third year of the administration of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, GCFR, who assumed office in May 2023. The administration has pursued a series of economic reforms, including the removal of fuel subsidies, foreign exchange unification, and monetary policy tightening, all of which have had direct consequences for household welfare and public sentiment. The August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests, in which

¹Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K. & Demarest, L. (2017). Conceptualising and Measuring Social Cohesion in Africa: Towards a Perceptions-Based Index. *Social Indicators Research*, 131(1), 321-343.

²Aluko, M.A.O. & Ajani, O.A. (2009). Ethnic Nationalism and the Nigerian Democratic Experience in the Fourth Republic. *An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal (African Research Review)*, 3(1), 483-499. See also: Fearon, J. & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75-90.

³Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) (2026). Nigeria Country Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Guetersloh. The BTI provides comprehensive documentation of Nigeria's security landscape across all regions. See also: Nwuke, K. (2021). Nigeria: Resolving the so-called Igbo Problem. *The Africa Report*. Available at: <https://www.theafricareport.com/95288/nigeria-resolving-the-so-called-igbo-problem/>

⁴IMF (2025). How Nigeria Can Unleash its Economic Potential. IMF Staff Article IV Consultation. Washington DC: IMF. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) (2026). Nigeria Country Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Guetersloh.

⁵National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2026). Consumer Price Index Report, February 2026. NBS, Abuja. The NBS rebased the CPI in 2025 using a new base year of 2024=100 and a revised basket reflecting current consumption patterns. World Bank (2025). Nigeria Development Update: Building Momentum for Inclusive Growth. October 2025. Washington DC: World Bank.

Nigerians took to the streets in multiple cities to demand accountability and better governance, reflected the depth of citizen frustration with the pace at which reform gains were reaching ordinary people. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) 2026 Country Report on Nigeria noted that the change in leadership had not yet brought positive outcomes for Nigerians, with economic growth remaining slow, consumer prices rising sharply, and insecurity continuing to spread.⁶ Against this backdrop, citizens' perceptions of social cohesion were measured between January and February 2026.

The Africa Polling Institute (API) has been systematically measuring social cohesion in Nigeria since 2019. The first wave of the survey (#NSCS2019) measured social cohesion across five key indicators: Identity, Trust, Equity and Social Justice, Participation and Patriotism, and Self-Worth and Future Expectations. The survey was the first nationally representative perceptions-based social cohesion measurement exercise in Nigeria and established the baseline against which subsequent waves have been tracked.

With support from the Ford Foundation, API conducted the second wave of the survey in 2021 (#NSCS2021), expanding its scope to include four additional indicators: Corruption, Impunity, Gender Equity, and Natural Resource Governance. This expansion reflected the recognition that social cohesion in Nigeria could not be adequately measured without accounting for the role of governance failures, resource management grievances, and gender inequality in shaping citizens' experience of their collective life.

The third wave of the survey was conducted in 2022 (#NSCS2022), continuing to track the established indicators while deepening the analytical focus on polarization, peacebuilding, and coping strategies. The fourth wave (#NSCS2025), conducted in 2025, further expanded the framework to include Tolerance, Migration, and a refined approach to Security and Peacebuilding, bringing the total number of indicators to 14. The 2025 survey was conducted in the second year of the Tinubu administration and captured citizen perceptions at a moment of significant policy transition and economic pressure.

The fifth and current wave, the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 2026 (#NSCS2026), was conducted between January and February 2026, with a nationally representative sample of 5,315 respondents across all states and senatorial districts. It retains the full 14-indicator framework, while incorporating qualitative depth through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) conducted across all six geopolitical zones. Now spanning five waves from 2019 to 2026, the NSCS provides a systematic longitudinal record of how social cohesion in Nigeria has evolved across political transitions, economic shocks, and security crises. It is against this backdrop of persistent challenge and incremental change that the findings of the 2026 survey must be understood.

⁶World Bank (2025). Nigeria Development Update: Building Momentum for Inclusive Growth. October 2025. Washington DC: World Bank. Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) (2026). Nigeria Country Report. Bertelsmann Stiftung, Guetersloh. The BTI (2026) specifically documents the August 2024 #EndBadGovernance protests and assesses that the change in leadership had not yet brought positive change for Nigerians.



2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Measuring Social Cohesion

Social cohesion has emerged as one of the most important yet contested concepts in development studies, public policy, and peace research. Despite its centrality to debates about governance, conflict prevention, and inclusive development, there is no universally agreed definition or measurement framework. Langer, Stewart, Smedts, and Demarest (2017), drawing on Afrobarometer survey data from 19 African countries, identified three critical dimensions for assessing social cohesion in multi-ethnic societies: the extent of perceived inequalities, the level of societal trust, and the strength of people's adherence to their national identity. Their argument is that social cohesion is fundamentally a perceptual phenomenon, captured not through objective macro-level indicators such as GDP per capita or Gini coefficients, but through how individuals experience their collective social environment:

“We argue that to begin to capture the complexity of the concept, such a measure should include three components. These are inequality (the chief feature of European approaches to defining social cohesion concerning social exclusion), trust (the chief feature of the US approach to social cohesion concerning social capital), and identity (national versus group), which is an important feature of multi-ethnic societies.”

Building on this foundation, Leininger et al. (2021) offered a revised and more universally applicable definition, proposing that social cohesion incorporates three core attributes: trust (between groups and of individuals towards institutions), inclusive identity (a sense of belonging to the nation that coexists with, rather than displaces, sub-national identities), and cooperation for the common good. Their framework explicitly distinguishes between a horizontal dimension, focusing on relationships among individuals and social groups, and a vertical dimension, focusing on the relationship between individuals or groups and public institutions. This dual-dimensional framework is particularly relevant for multi-ethnic societies such as Nigeria, where both citizen-to-citizen and citizen-to-state relations are fragile.⁷

Wortmann-Kolundzija (2023) further contextualised these concepts in the African setting, noting that social cohesion in Africa must be understood against the backdrop of colonial legacies, ethnic heterogeneity, weak state institutions and persistent inequality. The paper argues that European and North American frameworks, which tend to assume relatively stable states and homogeneous populations, require significant adaptation for the African context, where national boundaries were imposed rather than organically developed and where the relationship between the state and its citizens has historically been characterised by extraction rather than social provision.⁸

⁷Leininger, J., Burchi, F., Fiedler, C., Mross, K., Nowack, D., von Schiller, A., Sommer, C., Strupat, C. & Ziaja, S. (2021). Social cohesion: A new definition and a proposal for its measurement in Africa. IDOS Discussion Papers 31/2021. DOI: 10.23661/dp31.2021.v1.1

⁸Wortmann-Kolundzija, E. (2023). Contextualising social cohesion I: An overview of concepts in Africa. IDOS Discussion Paper 20/2023. DOI: 10.23661/idp20.2023

Owusu and Malephane (2024), drawing on Afrobarometer data from 39 African countries surveyed between 2021 and 2023, found that Africans express fairly high levels of tolerance for differences of ethnicity, religion, nationality, and political affiliation, but express widespread perceptions of unfair treatment by governments, particularly on the basis of economic status. Notably, only 13% of Africans say they feel more attached to their ethnic identity than to their national identity, while the largest share (45%) values both identities equally. This finding provides important continental context for the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey's 2026 finding that, for the first time, a majority of Nigerians (52%) identify primarily as Nigerian rather than by ethnicity or region.⁹

The OECD Development Centre (2011) characterises a socially cohesive society as one that works towards the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation. Its characterisation encompasses three major dimensions: fostering cohesion by building networks of relationships, trust, and identity among different groups; combating discrimination, exclusion and excessive inequalities; and facilitating upward social mobility. According to Eurofund and Bertelsmann

Stiftung (2014), social cohesion can be assessed across three domains: Connectedness (identification, trust in institutions, perceptions of fairness); Social Relations (social networks, trust in people, acceptance of diversity); and Focus on the Common Good (solidarity, respect for social rules, civic participation). This tripartite framework underpins the multi-indicator approach of the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey.¹⁰

Delhey and Dragolov (2016) linked social cohesion to subjective well-being, arguing that social trust and identification with one's country are the key affective bonds that translate cohesion into individual flourishing. Mann (1970), approaching social cohesion from the standpoint of justice, cautioned that shared values alone do not guarantee cohesion, since the pursuit of competing forms of social justice by rival groups may deepen divisions rather than resolve them. Burchi and Zapata-Roman (2022), in an empirical investigation of inequality and social cohesion across Africa, found that horizontal inequality among groups has a more damaging effect on social cohesion than vertical inequality among individuals, a finding with direct implications for understanding Nigeria's persistent identity-based tensions.¹¹

Drawing from the international literature, social cohesion has been defined across various national contexts. Selected national definitions compiled in OECD social cohesion literature are presented as follows:¹²

⁹Owusu, F.S. & Malephane, L. (2024). Social cohesion: An African collage of imperfect tolerance and cautious trust. Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 871/Policy Paper 18, 2 October 2024.

¹⁰OECD (2011). Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World. OECD Publishing, Paris.

Eurofund and Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014). Social cohesion and well-being in the EU. Publications Office of the European Union.

¹¹Delhey, J. & Dragolov, G. (2016). Happier together: Social Cohesion and Subjective Well-being in Europe. *International Journal of Psychology*, 51(3), 163-176. Mann, M. (1970). The social cohesion of liberal democracy. *American Sociological Review*, 35(3), 423-439. Burchi, F. & Zapata-Roman, G. (2022). Inequality and social cohesion in Africa: Theoretical insights and an exploratory empirical investigation. IDOS Discussion Papers 16/2022.

¹²OECD (2011). Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World. OECD Publishing, Paris. The national definitions presented draw from comparative government policy documentation as compiled in OECD social cohesion literature.



Canada: Social cohesion is an ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians.



France: Social cohesion is a set of social processes that help instill in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community.



New Zealand: Social cohesion describes where different groups and institutions knit together effectively despite differences, reflecting a high degree of willingness to work together, taking into account diverse needs and priorities.



Australia: Social cohesion is the bond between communities of people who co-exist, interact and support each other through material means and by sharing group beliefs, customs and expectations.



European Union: Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union includes maintaining economic and social cohesion and solidarity between all member states among the tasks of the union.

These cross-national definitions highlight recurring themes of trust, belonging, shared values and equal opportunity. What they share is a concern for both the horizontal bonds between citizens and the vertical relationship between citizens and institutions, the dual dimensions that the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey seeks to assess across its 14 indicators. For the purpose of this study, Africa Polling Institute (API) has chosen to define the concept of social cohesion as: **“The willingness of Nigerian citizens, irrespective of tribe, tongue, religion, or political affiliation, to cooperate with one another, in order to survive and prosper as a single, united country.”**

2.2 Social Cohesion in Nigeria

Nigeria’s social cohesion challenge is rooted in its colonial formation. The amalgamation of over 250 ethnic groups in 1914 brought together communities with distinct histories, languages, cultural practices and political traditions, many of whom had been rivals or competitors before the colonial encounter. According to Hofstede (1994; cited in Aluko and Ajani, 2009), any nation united by ethnicity or language agitates for independent recognition at a national or international level, and Nigeria has been no exception since independence. The colonial Indirect Rule System, introduced with the 1914 amalgamation, deepened rather than dissolved existing fault lines by administering through ethnic categories and reinforcing the separateness of groups that might otherwise have been compelled to develop shared identities.¹³

¹³Aluko, M.A.O. & Ajani, O.A. (2009). Ethnic Nationalism and the Nigerian Democratic Experience in the Fourth Republic. An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal (African Research Review), 3(1), 483-499.

Before independence, the unification of these diverse groups was characterised by what Lenshie (2014) describes as ‘ties that bind and differences that divide’, with diverse cultural and religious practices creating persistent fault lines. The 1966 mass killings of Igbos and the 1967-1970 civil war, extensively documented in the scholarly record of Nigerian political history, represent the most extreme manifestation of the failure to manage diversity and perceived marginalisation. According to Nwuke (2021), all ethnic groups are affected by the poor state of governance in Nigeria today and are protesting, with the most significant challenge being the discriminatory attitude of the federal administration to particular protests and other threats to the integrity of the country.¹⁴

Contemporary Nigeria continues to face intersecting challenges that the literature consistently links to weak social cohesion: persistent insecurity, banditry, farmer-herder conflicts, secessionist pressures, corruption, poverty and deepening Polarization. The activities of groups such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Yoruba Nation agitators, both well documented in the literature on Nigerian ethnopolitics, reflect accumulated grievances around resource distribution, political marginalisation and identity recognition. Fearon and Laitin (2003), in one of the most influential studies on civil war onset, demonstrated that ethnically or religiously diverse countries are no more likely to experience civil war than homogeneous ones; rather, it is poverty, financially weak states and conditions favouring insurgency that predict conflict risk. This finding directs attention to Nigeria’s structural governance conditions rather than to its diversity as the primary driver of instability.¹⁵

The erosion of public trust has been a defining feature of Nigeria’s governance landscape across successive administrations. Research by Oladapo (2024), examining public trust and the state management of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria, found that Nigerians trusted the government significantly more in the post-independence decades of the 1960s through 1990s, but that trust has been eroding steadily, with events between 2015 and 2023 representing a period of particularly acute deterioration. The drivers of this declining trust identified in the literature are consistent with the 2026 survey’s findings: economic hardship, rising inflation, heightened unemployment, insecurity, and the perception of widespread corruption.¹⁶

The 2026 survey is the fifth wave of the NSCS measurement programme, which began in 2019. Drawing from the worsening socioeconomic challenges facing Nigeria and with continued support from the Ford Foundation, API has progressively expanded the survey’s scope to cover emerging indicators, including corruption, impunity, gender equity, natural resource governance, security and peacebuilding, tolerance, migration, and coping strategies. The five-wave longitudinal dimension of the NSCS distinguishes it as a sustained, systematic, perceptions-based measurement exercise, rare in the African context, where comparable longitudinal social cohesion surveys are limited.

¹⁴Lenshie, N.E. (2014). Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide. *Africa Development*, 39(2), 153-212. Nwuke, K. (2021). Nigeria: Resolving the so-called Igbo Problem. *The Africa Report*.

¹⁵Fearon, J. & Laitin, D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97(1), 75-90.

¹⁶Oladapo, A.A. (2024). Public trust and state management of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria. *Frontiers in Political Science*, Volume 6. DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2024.1334827

¹⁶Oladapo, A.A. (2024). Public trust and state management of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria. *Frontiers in Political Science*, Volume 6. DOI: 10.3389/fpos.2024.1334827

2.3 Conceptualisation

2.3.1 Social Cohesion

The conceptualisation of social cohesion in the academic literature remains a site of productive contestation. Schiefer and van der Noll (2017) argue that the literature consistently criticises the notion of a lack of consensus in definitions and indicators. Dating back to sociologist Emile Durkheim and his pre-modern perspectives, the research community has yet to develop a coherent theory and definition that facilitates empirical studies. Batterman (2015), drawing on the founding sociologists of the concept, argued that social cohesion has five dimensions: common values and civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and reduced wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and attachment to identity.¹⁷

Vergolini (2011) notes inherent problems with the theme of social cohesion, notably the lack of a clear definition and its heterogeneity across disciplines and contexts. Stanley (2003) defines the concept as ‘the willingness of members of society to cooperate to survive and prosper.’ This cooperation cannot be forced; it must be done voluntarily, making the encouragement of citizens to cooperate for the greater good a fundamental policy goal. Lenshie (2014) further notes that some researchers believe ethnic differences or diversity undermine social cohesion, though the decisive role lies not in diversity per se but in how individuals in positions of power exploit ethnic divisions for personal or political gain.¹⁸

Lanzi (2011) connects social cohesion to the capabilities approach, arguing that cohesion requires not merely the absence of conflict but the positive development of human capabilities and social relationships that allow people to flourish together. Koonce (2011) argues that social cohesion can be pursued directly as a policy goal through relevant behaviours, activities, and governance institutions. Van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) demonstrated that the effect of ethnic diversity on social cohesion is not automatic but is mediated by institutional quality, economic conditions, and the behaviour of political elites, an insight that helps explain why some diverse societies achieve relatively high cohesion while others with similar demographic profiles do not.¹⁹

The literature thus converges on a view of social cohesion as a multidimensional, perception-based phenomenon encompassing trust, identity, fairness, and participation, with both horizontal and vertical dimensions. It is this understanding that informs the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey’s 14-indicator framework, capturing citizen-to-citizen as well as citizen-to-institution relations. As Leininger et al. (2021) argue, a lean but conceptually grounded definition makes it possible to study the causes and consequences of social cohesion, including its relationship to governance quality, inequality, and conflict, which is precisely the analytical purpose of the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (NSCS).

¹⁷Schiefer, D. & van der Noll, J. (2017). The Essentials of Social Cohesion: A Literature Review. Social Indicators Research. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5. Batterman, S. (2015). An Empirical Multilevel Study of social cohesion indicators and individual social capital in Flanders, Belgium. Doctoral dissertation.

¹⁸Vergolini, L. (2011). Does Economic Vulnerability Affect Social Cohesion? Canadian Journal of Sociology, 36(1), 1-23. Stanley, D. (2003). What Do We Know about Social Cohesion. Canadian Journal of Sociology, 28(1), 5-17. Lenshie, N.E. (2014). Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide. Africa Development, 39(2), 153-212.

¹⁹Lanzi, D. (2011). Capabilities and social cohesion. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 35(6), 1087-1101. Koonce, K.A. (2011). Social Cohesion as the Goal. Peabody Journal of Education, 86(2), 144-154. Van der Meer, T. & Tolsma, J. (2014). Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohesion. Annual Review of Sociology, 40, 459-478.

2.3.2 Natural Resource Governance

Natural resources are classified into two broad categories: non-renewable resources, such as oil, gas, and minerals; and renewable resources, such as forests, water, and biodiversity. This review adopts the United Nations (1997) definition, which defines natural resources as natural assets that can be used for economic production or consumption.²⁰ Nigeria's natural resource endowment is extensive, including crude oil, natural gas, gold, coal, iron ore, limestone, bitumen, and numerous solid minerals. Of these, crude oil has attracted the greatest attention due to its dominant role in government revenue and has historically accounted for the largest share of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings, as documented by Brooks and Kurtz (2016) in their analysis of the political economy of oil-dependent states.²¹

Brooks and Kurtz (2016) demonstrate that natural resource wealth, particularly oil, creates an endogenous resource curse in which revenues reduce the incentive for broad-based economic development and democratic accountability. The concentration of petroleum revenues in the federal government, without adequate redistribution to oil-producing communities or transparent management, has generated persistent grievances in the Niger Delta and has been a source of armed conflict and environmental degradation, as extensively documented by McFerson (2009) and Ukiwo (2020) in the broader natural resource governance literature. The enactment of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) in 2021 represented a significant legislative attempt to address these structural issues. As noted by Agbarakwe and Bredino (2024), the PIA signified a paradigm shift from a voluntary to a statutory community investment strategy, requiring 3% of upstream operating expenses to be allocated to a Host Community Development Trust Fund. However, oil-producing communities had sought 10%, and significant concerns remain about implementation capacity.²²

The Brookings Institution (2022) observed that the PIA, while representing the most comprehensive reform of Nigeria's petroleum governance in decades, creates new risks alongside the old ones: the 30% allocation of NNPC profits to frontier exploration diverts revenue from the Federation Account, the 3% host community allocation falls well below community expectations, and the risk of non-compliance is high given weak judicial enforcement and regulatory capture. The relationship between oil and gas host communities in Nigeria has historically been very strained, and the 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey's findings that 62% of citizens rate resource revenue management as poor and 86% express little or no trust in restructuring efforts reflect this persistent legacy.²³

2.3.3 Social Cohesion and Natural Resource Governance

Nigeria has been widely characterised in the literature as a country that has failed to manage its rich oil and gas resources effectively, in a manner that protects the environment and fosters development. McFerson (2009) argues that governance and hyper-corruption are deeply intertwined in resource-rich African countries, with resource revenues fuelling patronage networks that undermine state-citizen

²⁰United Nations (1997). Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67. New York: United Nations.

²¹Brooks, S.M. & Kurtz, M.J. (2016). Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political Resource Curse. *International Organization*, 70(2), 279-311. Agbarakwe, U.H. & Bredino, S.M. (2024). Nigerian Petroleum Industry Act 2021 & Host Communities Development: Issues and Challenges. *Saudi Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 9(2): 38-44.

²²Brooks, S.M. & Kurtz, M.J. (2016). *Ibid.*

²³Brookings Institution (2022). Nigeria's Petroleum Industry Act: Addressing old problems, creating new ones. March 2022. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/nigerias-petroleum-industry-act-addressing-old-problems-creating-new-ones/>

trust and civic participation. Ukiwo (2020) classifies Nigeria's oil governance into generational regimes, each with implications for social cohesion, from colonial appropriation through the post-civil war nationalisation drive to the contemporary era of indigenous company ownership and contested host community rights.²⁴

The poor management of natural resource revenues is thus not merely an economic failure but a failure of social cohesion. When communities hosting resource extraction perceive that they receive neither equitable benefits nor adequate environmental protection, the resulting sense of alienation and injustice directly undermines their identification with the Nigerian state and their willingness to cooperate with national institutions. This dynamic has been a recurring thread in the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey across all five waves, with natural resource governance consistently among the weakest sub-indices.

2.3.4 Social Cohesion and Gender

Gender inequality is both a consequence and a driver of weak social cohesion. Jones et al. (2010) showed that the low status of women and girls in the household results in reduced levels of educational attainment, lower employment potential, increased maternal and infant mortality rates, and increased intergenerational poverty, all of which are corrosive to social cohesion. Green and Janmaat (2016) argue that education's contribution to social cohesion is contingent on the degree to which education systems promote inclusive values and equal opportunities across genders, ethnic groups and social classes; where they reproduce rather than reduce inequality, their contribution to cohesion is limited.²⁵

Grimalda and Tänzler (2018) identified inequality as among the primary factors countering social cohesion globally. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) demonstrated that inequality has a pernicious impact on levels of trust in society, undermining social cohesion at its foundations. In the Nigerian context, gender inequality intersects with ethnic, religious and regional inequalities to produce compounded marginalisation, a dynamic consistent with what Jones et al. (2010) describe as the structural interconnection between gender inequity and broader social exclusion.²⁶ The 2026 survey finds that while the positive rating of gender equity has risen from 9% in 2021 to 33% in 2026, the majority of citizens continue to hold discriminatory attitudes toward earnings and political representation, reflecting the depth of embedded attitudinal inequality that institutional reform alone cannot address.²⁷

2.3.5 Social Cohesion and Impunity

Impunity, defined as the failure of individuals in positions of power to be held accountable for violations of the law and human rights abuses, is among the most damaging structural impediments to social cohesion. When citizens observe that powerful individuals operate above the law, their trust in institutions, their sense of social justice, and their willingness to participate in civic life are all diminished. The perception that accountability is selectively applied undermines the foundational premise of the

²⁴McFerson, H.M. (2009). Governance and Hyper-Corruption in Resource-Rich African Countries. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(8), 1529-1547. Ukiwo, U. (2020). Nigeria's Oil Governance Regime. In: *Oil Wealth and Development in Uganda and Beyond*. Leuven University Press.

²⁵Jones, N. et al. (2010). Stemming girls' chronic poverty: Catalysing development change by building just social institutions. Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of Manchester. Green, A. & Janmaat, J.G. (2016). Education and social cohesion: A panglossian global discourse. In: K. Mundy et al. (Eds.), *Handbook of Global Education Policy*. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 169-188.

²⁶Jones, N. et al. (2010). *Ibid*

²⁷Grimalda, G. & Tänzer, N. (2018). Understanding and fostering social cohesion. G20 Insights, T20 Task Force. Wilkinson, R.G. & Pickett, K.E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 493-511.

social contract and, as Grimalda and Tänzler (2018) argue, creates the conditions for social disengagement and polarization, which are among the primary drivers of social division.²⁸

In the Nigerian context, impunity has deep historical roots spanning the colonial era, successive military regimes, and into the democratic period. The UNODC (2024), in its third survey on corruption patterns and trends in Nigeria, found that public officials accepted bribes totaling N721 billion (approximately USD 1.26 billion) in 2023 alone, illustrating the scale of impunity operating at the interface between citizens and state agents.²⁹ As Chatham House (2025) notes, the failure to reduce corruption and hold powerful actors accountable has led to political clientelism and impunity, creating a perception among citizens that there is no accountability for those involved and higher risks for those who resist.³⁰

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey finds that only 2% of citizens rate impunity as absent, while 64% rate it as average or high. The high impunity rating has, however, improved from 43% in 2025 to 13% in 2026, the most measurable governance shift in this wave of the survey, which places Nigeria's overall NSC Index at 48.8%. Whether this improvement represents a structural change or a temporary perception effect remains to be determined by subsequent waves, but it constitutes an important and encouraging signal in an otherwise consistently weak sub-index.

2.3.6 Social Cohesion and Corruption

Corruption erodes the foundations of social cohesion by transferring resources from public goods to private interests, reducing the quality and accessibility of public services, deepening inequality and destroying trust between citizens and institutions. Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) argue that social cohesion depends on the combination of institutions, norms and values that promote collective action and cooperation; where corruption systematically undermines these institutional foundations, it corrodes the conditions that make social cohesion possible.³¹

Chatham House (2025), drawing on its fourth annual national household survey on social norms and accountable governance in Nigeria, found that corruption has caused a crisis of trust in Nigeria's institutions and society. Despite widespread opposition to corruption among citizens, many Nigerians feel resigned, sensing that paying bribes is the price for getting things done. Efforts to tackle corruption since the end of military rule in the late 1990s have yielded uneven results, hindered by politicisation, weak institutions, and double standards among leaders.³²

In multi-ethnic societies such as Nigeria, corruption that is perceived to follow ethnic or regional patterns is especially corrosive to social cohesion, transforming a governance failure into an identity grievance that deepens inter-group divisions, a dynamic consistent with what Chatham House (2025) describes as the politicisation of anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria that undermines their legitimacy

²⁸Grimalda, G. & Tänzer, N. (2018). Ibid.

²⁹UNODC/NBS (2024). Corruption in Nigeria: Patterns and Trends. Third national survey on corruption as experienced by the population. July 2024. Conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in partnership with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

³⁰Chatham House (2025). Taking action against corruption in Nigeria: A crisis of trust. Results from the fourth national household survey, Social Norms and Accountable Governance (SNAG) Project. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/taking-action-against-corruption-nigeria>

³¹Easterly, W., Ritzen, J. & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion, institutions, and growth. *Economics and Politics*, 18(2), 103-120.

³²Chatham House (2025). Taking action against corruption in Nigeria: A crisis of trust. Results from the fourth national household survey, Social Norms and Accountable Governance (SNAG) Project. Available at: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/taking-action-against-corruption-nigeria>

across ethnic lines.²³ The 2026 survey finds that 59% of citizens rate the level of corruption as high, 62% rate efforts to address it as poor, and only 16% believe that access to justice is free from corruption. These figures have remained stubbornly resistant to change across all five waves of the survey, consistent with the literature's finding that corruption is particularly difficult to address once institutionalised within political and administrative systems.

2.3.7 Social Cohesion and Polarization

Polarization refers to the degree to which society is divided along ethnic, religious, political, or ideological lines into distinct and increasingly hostile camps. Grimalda and Tänzler (2018) argue that social cohesion is primarily undermined by social divisions, including ethnicity, political parties, population pressures, drug abuse, poverty, and inequality. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) established that high levels of inequality, a primary driver of polarization, have a consistently negative impact on trust in society, undermining social cohesion in both developed and developing country contexts.³³

In Nigeria, polarization operates across multiple fault lines simultaneously: ethnic, religious, geopolitical, and economic. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) established, it is poverty and state weakness rather than ethnic composition that predict conflict onset, meaning that Nigeria's inter-group tensions are better understood as products of structural inequality and governance failure than of diversity per se.⁹ The 2026 survey finds that 42% of citizens perceive Polarization as high, 49% agree that Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago, and 55% agree that political division has increased, making political Polarization the most acute dimension of the three tracked.

Yet the 2026 data also reveals the first-ever majority national-identity reading (52% identifying as Nigerian first), creating a striking coexistence of rising perceptions of polarization alongside a strengthening national identity. This is consistent with Schiefer and van der Noll's (2017) observation that a society can experience specific degrees of Polarization yet still enjoy some forms of social cohesion, and with Leininger et al.'s (2021) framework in which inclusive national identity and inter-group tensions can coexist within the same social space. The challenge for Nigeria is to sustain and build on the identity breakthrough while addressing the structural drivers of inter-group tension.

Closely related to Polarization is the phenomenon of youth emigration, increasingly documented in the literature under the term '*Japa*', derived from the Yoruba word meaning 'to run' or 'to flee'. Olanrewaju (2024) describes the *Japa* crisis as a manifestation of the combined pressures of economic instability, political unrest, and social challenges that drive young Nigerians to seek opportunities abroad, with significant implications for the country's social cohesion and human capital base. Okunade and Awosusi (2023), in an empirical analysis of Nigerian migration to the United Kingdom, found that the *japa* syndrome is driven primarily by labour market frustration and the perception of better opportunities abroad rather than by political persecution alone, a finding that aligns with the 2026 survey's identification of better job opportunities (34%) as the primary driver of emigration intent.³⁴

³³Grimalda, G. & Tänzler, N. (2018). Understanding and fostering social cohesion. G20 Insights, T20 Task Force on Global Inequality and Social Cohesion. Wilkinson, R.G. & Pickett, K.E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 35, 493-511.

³⁴Olanrewaju, O. (2024). Youth Migration and the 'Japa Crisis' in Nigeria. In: *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Social Problems*. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-68127-2_421-1. Okunade, S.K. & Awosusi, O.E. (2023). The *Japa* syndrome and the migration of Nigerians to the United Kingdom. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 11(1), 27.

2.3.8 Social Cohesion and Peacebuilding

Peacebuilding gained prominence as a global policy framework following the 1992 UN document 'Agenda for Peace,' in which UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali defined post-conflict peacebuilding as 'actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict.' Johan Galtung's influential typology, developed in his foundational peace research work, identifies three approaches to peace: peacemaking (conflict resolution), peacekeeping (the dissociative approach), and peacebuilding (the associative approach), which seeks to identify structures of peace that remove the causes of conflict while offering alternatives to conflict and war in situations where they might occur.³⁵

Lederach defines peacebuilding as 'a comprehensive term that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable peaceful relations and outcomes.' This comprehensive view situates peacebuilding as simultaneously a structural, social, and cultural enterprise. For Nigeria, where small-scale and localised conflicts between farming and herding communities, between ethnic groups, and between the state and armed groups characterise a complex security landscape, Lederach's framework highlights the importance of adapted local peacebuilding mechanisms that draw on customary and traditional conflict-resolution processes alongside formal state-led approaches.³⁶

The 2026 survey finds that 77% of Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding efforts in their locality and 63% believe that local community-level efforts can resolve recurring conflicts. These figures point to a substantial and growing civic capacity for social cohesion that exists independently of state action. The challenge, as the literature on peacebuilding consistently notes, is that community willingness must be matched by enabling institutional conditions. Where structural conditions that generate conflict, including inequality, impunity, resource mismanagement, and political exclusion, operate at the institutional level while peacebuilding capacity exists primarily at the community level, the gap between potential and outcome remains the central challenge for social cohesion building in Nigeria.

³⁵Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace*. Report of the Secretary-General. United Nations, New York.

³⁶Lederach, J.P. (1998). *Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace



3.0 KEY OBJECTIVES

Nigeria continues to face multiple and intersecting challenges that are widely regarded as symptoms of weak social cohesion: persistent insecurity, farmer-herder conflicts, banditry, secessionist pressures, corruption, poverty, and deepening ethnic and religious Polarization. These challenges have far-reaching implications for the nation's identity, trust, unity, and peaceful coexistence, as well as the attainment of its developmental aspirations. The desire of citizens to work collectively for the national interest is fundamentally dependent on the level of cohesion that binds them together.

There are also issues of perceived marginalisation, allegations of nepotism, and growing concerns about the unequal distribution of resources and opportunities across the country. These issues have further deepened social, political, religious, and ethnic divisions, with direct consequences for trust in institutions and the quality of inter-group relations.

The 2026 survey is conducted at a particularly significant moment: Nigeria is in the third year of a new democratic administration led by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, GCFR. This study provides a systematic, evidence-based assessment of how citizens perceive social cohesion under the current administration, tracking changes across all five survey waves from 2021 to 2026. It is against this backdrop that this survey project seeks to achieve the following core objectives:

- 1** Conduct a national citizens' perception survey to assess the state of social cohesion in Nigeria, using 14 key indicators: Identity; Trust; Social Justice; Civic Participation; Polarization; Tolerance; Gender Equity, Disability and Inclusion; Impunity; Corruption; Natural Resource Governance; Security and Peacebuilding; Coping Strategies; Migration; Self-Worth and Future Expectations.
- 2** Calculate the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) using the same 14 key indicators, tracking changes and trends since 2021 to provide a longitudinal assessment of how social cohesion in Nigeria has evolved under successive administrations and socioeconomic conditions.
- 3** Proffer evidence-based recommendations on how to improve the state of social cohesion in Nigeria, addressed to the Nigerian Government, traditional and religious leaders, civil society organisations and citizens.



4.0 METHODOLOGY

The Africa Polling Institute (API) conducted the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 2026 (NSCS2026) to measure citizens' perceptions of the current state of social cohesion and the level of Polarization in Nigeria. The survey comprises 14 Key Measurement Indicators (KMIs), which constitute the sub-indices used to calculate the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI).

The 14 sub-indices are: Identity; Trust; Social Justice; Civic Participation; Polarization; Tolerance; Gender Equity, Disability and Inclusion; Impunity; Corruption; Natural Resource Governance; Security and Peacebuilding; Coping Strategies; Migration; Self-Worth and Future Expectations.

API conducted a general citizens' perception survey using a face-to-face household interview technique. The survey took place in February 2026. All interviews were conducted in five major Nigerian languages: English, Pidgin English, Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo. All states and senatorial districts in Nigeria were proportionately represented in the survey. The average time per interview was 30 minutes. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were additionally conducted across all six geo-political zones to provide qualitative depth and contextual richness to the quantitative findings.

A total of 5,019, 5,363, 5,178, 5,465, and 5,315 completed interviews were conducted in 2019, 2021, 2022, 2025, and 2026, respectively. All respondents were adults 18 years and above. Survey state quotas were assigned, ensuring that every senatorial district and state was proportionately represented in the sample. Post-stratification by gender and senatorial weights was applied to the data to make it more representative of the population, allow for more accurate population totals and estimates, and reduce non-response bias. The assigned weights were proportional to the 2006 population figures.

The margin of error does not exceed ± 3 percent at the midpoint, at the 95 percent confidence level. To further ensure the reliability of the sets of variables used for the index, a Reliability Test (Cronbach's alpha) was conducted to assess the internal consistency of the scale or test items that compose the index. Results were compared across 2019, 2021, 2022, 2025, and 2026 to assess possible changes in Nigerians' perceptions of the focal assessment questions over time.

4.1 The Nigeria Social Cohesion Index

The computation for the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) for 2026 was derived using 14 key indicators, which include: Identity, Trust, Social Justice & Equity, Civic Participation, Tolerance, Gender Equity/Disability & Inclusion, Impunity, Corruption, Natural Resource Governance, Polarization, Security & Peacebuilding, Coping Strategies, Migration, and Self-worth & Future Expectations.

The Nigeria Social Cohesion Index for 2026 has been calculated at 48.8%. This score remains below the average threshold of 50%, indicating weak social cohesion in Nigeria. However, the score represents a 2-percentage-point improvement over the 2025 score of 46.8% and is the highest NSC Index recorded since the survey's inception.

This improvement may not be unrelated to a gradual stabilisation in economic conditions relative to the acute shocks of 2025, and evidence of stronger community-level solidarity as citizens adapt to prevailing hardships. The data further shows that sub-indices most directly tied to governance performance, notably Trust (31%), Impunity (32%), and Coping Strategies (36%), remain the weakest in the dataset, signifying that the improvement in the overall index has not yet been matched by a recovery in citizens' confidence in government and its institutions.

NIGERIA SOCIAL COHESION INDEX 2021-2026


















Figure 1: Nigeria Social Cohesion (NSC) Index, 2021–2026

Definition of Sub-Indices

 <p>IDENTITY Recognition of being a Nigerian and the Unity of Nigerians.</p>	 <p>TOLERANCE Associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups.</p>
 <p>SELF-WORTH & FUTURE EXPECTATIONS Feelings about the future of being better.</p>	 <p>GENDER EQUITY, DISABILITY & INCLUSION Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and participation of women in political activities.</p>
 <p>POLARIZATION Current level of general polarization (division), based on ethnicity, religion, and politics, compared to the period before the current administration.</p>	 <p>TRUST Level of trust of Nigerians in the Government and Other Institutions.</p>
 <p>CIVIC PARTICIPATION Cooperation with other ethnic groups to work towards a more united Nigeria, and intermarriage between two different ethnic or religious groups.</p>	 <p>SOCIAL JUSTICE AND EQUITY Feelings of ‘equal protection under the nation’s law for everyone’ and ‘access to civil justice for all’.</p>
 <p>IMPUNITY Reduced human rights abuses, reported cases of human rights abuses, and reduced involvement of state agents such as the police and army in human rights abuses.</p>	 <p>SECURITY & PEACEBUILDING Resolving Nigeria’s conflicts through peacebuilding efforts, the FG’s deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts, & rating of the FG in the area of peacebuilding.</p>
 <p>CORRUPTION Perceived general level of reduced corruption in Nigeria, fight against corruption, and reduce corrupt practices in access to Justice.</p>	 <p>COPING STRATEGY Government effort towards assisting Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges.</p>
 <p>NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE Management of the funds/resources from the country’s natural resources, such as crude oil, etc.</p>	 <p>MIGRATION Willingness NOT to relocate with family out of Nigeria if given the opportunity.</p>

Overall, with regards to the sub-indices of social cohesion, the 2026 result revealed that 90% indicated a high level of Tolerance; 85% indicated a high level of Gender Equity, Disability & Inclusion; 84% indicated a high level of Civic Participation; 82% indicated strong support for Security & Peacebuilding; and 76% expressed positive Worth & Future Expectations. On the other hand, the lower indicators include Social Justice and Equity (31%), Trust (32%), Impunity (36%), Coping Strategies (48%), and Corruption (50%).




Figure 2: NSCI Sub-Indices, 2021–2026

**Index values were the proportion of Nigerians who perceived an 'average' and 'high' positive direction in each of the indicators.
 Values in box is the Cronbach's Alpha Value (CAV). This is a measure used to assess the reliability or internal consistency of a set of scales or test items. Values less than 0.5 are usually not acceptable.
 NA = Not Available*

4.2 Identity Sub-Index (Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians)

The 2026 survey data signal a remarkable recovery in citizens' sense of national identity, reversing a downward trend that had persisted across three consecutive survey waves. While 52% of respondents acknowledged a positive recognition of their Nigerian identity and the unity of Nigerians, 48% held a different view.

When compared with the 2021, 2022, and 2025 figures, the proportion of respondents indicating 'Negative Identity' increased from 53% in 2021 to 57% in 2022, and further to 61% in 2025, before declining significantly to 48% in 2026. Conversely, the proportion indicating 'Positive Identity' declined from 47% in 2021 to 43% in 2022, and further to 39% in 2025, before recovering strongly to 52% in 2026. This 13-percentage-point recovery between 2025 and 2026 represents the most significant single-year improvement in the Identity Sub-Index since the survey began.

'IDENTITY' SUB-INDEX I

(Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians)




Figure 3: Identity Sub-Index

The Identity Sub-Index data was further disaggregated according to the feelings Nigerians have about their country. Data revealed that 52% of Nigerians reported feeling genuinely proud of the country in 2026, compared to 39% who felt proud in 2025. A comparative analysis of the Identity Sub-Index reveals a recovery in the proportion of citizens who feel genuinely proud of the country compared to previous years, recording 47% in 2021, 43% in 2022, and 39% in 2025, before climbing to 52% in 2026.

Similarly, the data shows that 70% of citizens believe the country is much more divided today than it was four years ago, while 30% believe it is more united. This marks a notable improvement from 2025, when 76% said the country was much more divided and only 24% said it was more united, and from 2022 when the figure stood at 87%. The data suggested that, comparatively, Nigerians feel slightly more united in 2026, and also feel prouder regarding their country, pointing to a cautious but meaningful recovery in national identity. This raises optimism about the prospects for stronger social cohesion in the country.

'IDENTITY' SUB-INDEX II

(Feelings of Nigerians and Unity of the Country)




Figure 4: Questions that constitute the Identity Sub-Index

4.3 Self-Worth and Future Expectation Sub-Index

4.3.1 Self-Worth and Future Expectation Sub-Index I (*Willingness NOT to relocate with family out of Nigeria is given the opportunity*)

In 2026, 66% of respondents reported low self-worth, while 34% reported high self-worth. Comparing with previous survey waves, the proportion reporting low self-worth has declined from 73% in both 2021 and 2022, to 72% in 2025, and further to 66% in 2026. Conversely, the proportion reporting high self-worth has increased from 27% in 2021 and 2022 to 28% in 2025 and 34% in 2026, the highest recorded since the survey began. Despite this gradual improvement, the fact that the majority of Nigerians still report low self-worth reflects the continued impact of economic hardship on citizens' perception of their personal wellbeing.

‘SELF-WORTH AND FUTURE EXPECTATION’ SUB-INDEX I




Figure 5: Self-Worth Sub-Index

4.3.2 Self-Worth and Future Expectation Sub-Index 2 (*Feeling about the future of being better*)

The 2026 survey data reveal a notable improvement in Nigerians' perception of the country's future. In 2026, 75% of respondents expressed optimism that Nigeria's future would be much better than it is today, while 25% believed it would be worse. Comparing with previous survey waves, the proportion expressing a bright future has increased from 68% in 2021, 69% in 2022, and 68% in 2025, to 75% in 2026, the highest recorded since the survey began. Conversely, the proportion expressing a faded future has declined from 32% in 2021 to 25% in 2026. The data suggests that, despite the prevailing economic and governance challenges, Nigerians remain largely optimistic about the future of their country.

'SELF-WORTH AND FUTURE EXPECTATION' SUB-INDEX II




Figure 6: Future Sub-Index

4.4 Polarization Sub-Index (Current level of general polarization (division), based on ethnicity, religion, and politics compared to the period before the current administration)

The 2026 data reveal that the majority of respondents (42%) still reported a high level of polarization in Nigeria, while 34% reported an average level and 24% reported a low level. The trend since 2022 shows some progress, with the proportion indicating high polarization declining from 57% in 2022 to 40% in 2025, then marginally increasing to 42% in 2026. While the proportion indicating low polarization has grown from 13% in 2022 to 24% in 2026, polarization remains the dominant perception among Nigerians.

'POLARIZATION' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 7: Polarization Sub-Index

This is further reflected in citizens' views on the specific drivers of division. On ethnic division, 49% agreed that Nigeria is more divided on the basis of ethnicity than under the previous administration, while 37% disagreed and 14% were neither. On religious division, 49% agreed that Nigeria is more divided along religious lines, while 35% disagreed, and 16% were neither. On political division, 55% agreed that Nigeria is more divided along political lines, while 29% disagreed and 16% were neither. Notably, while all three dimensions have declined since 2022, the slight increases recorded between 2025 and 2026 indicate that progress in reducing polarization has not been fully sustained.

‘POLARIZATION’ SUB-INDEX II

(Current level of general polarization (division), based on ethnicity, religion, and politics compared to the period before the current administration)




Figure 8: Questions that constitute the Polarization Sub-Index

4.5 Civic Participation Sub-Index (Willingness of participation in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all)

The 2026 data reveals that 84% of respondents expressed a high level of willingness to participate in civic activities, while 16% expressed a low willingness. Comparing with previous survey waves, the proportion indicating high participation recorded 80% in 2021, peaked at 92% in 2022, before declining to 86% in 2025 and further to 84% in 2026. Conversely, the proportion indicating low participation has increased from 8% in 2022 to 14% in 2025 and 16% in 2026. While civic participation remains high, the gradual decline since 2022 raises concerns about citizens' continued willingness to engage in the political process.

‘CIVIC PARTICIPATION’ SUB-INDEX




Figure 9: Civic Participation Sub-Index

4.6 Tolerance Sub-Index (*Willingness to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria/support inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages*)

Notwithstanding the high levels of polarization recorded in the 2026 survey, Nigerians continue to demonstrate remarkably high tolerance at the interpersonal level. A total of 90% of respondents indicated a high level of tolerance in associating with people from other ethnic groups, while 10% indicated a low level. Compared to 2025, the proportion indicating high tolerance declined marginally from 92% to 90%, while the proportion indicating low tolerance increased slightly from 8% to 10%. The sustained high levels of tolerance across both survey waves suggest that, despite political and economic tensions, Nigerians remain largely willing to coexist peacefully with people of different ethnic backgrounds.

'TOLERANCE' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 10: Tolerance Sub-Index

Nigerians continue to demonstrate a strong willingness to associate and cooperate across ethnic, religious, and regional lines. In 2026, 85% of respondents expressed willingness to cooperate with other ethnic groups for a more united Nigeria, up from 75% in 2021, though this was a marginal decline from 90% in 2025. Support for inter-ethnic marriage remained consistently high at 89%, while support for inter-religious and inter-regional marriages stood at 62% and 84%, respectively. The sustained high levels across all three dimensions suggest that interpersonal tolerance remains one of the strongest assets of Nigerian social cohesion, even as political and economic tensions persist.

'TOLERANCE' SUB-INDEX II

(Willingness to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria/support inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages)




Figure 11: Questions that constitute the Tolerance Sub-Index

4.7 Gender Equity Sub-Index (Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and Participation of women in political activities)

Citizens' assessment of gender equity has shown a consistent and positive trajectory across all survey waves. The proportion rating gender equity as high has increased steadily from 9% in 2021 to 28% in 2025 and 33% in 2026, the highest recorded since the survey began. Conversely, the proportion rating it as low has declined significantly from 30% in 2021 to 13% in 2026. While the majority of respondents (52%) still rate gender equity as average, the overall direction of change since 2021 reflects a gradual but sustained improvement in citizens' perception of gender equity in Nigeria.

'GENDER EQUITY' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 12: Gender Equity Sub-Index

On specific dimensions of government performance on gender equity, the majority of citizens rated the federal government as fair across all four areas assessed. This pattern is consistent across promoting gender equity generally (31% fair), passing laws to protect women from discrimination and violence (27% fair), providing opportunities for women in political offices (35% fair), and punishing sexual and gender-based violence offenders (30% fair). While 31% rated government efforts on gender equity promotion as good or very good, a significant proportion across all four dimensions rated government performance as very poor or poor, indicating that government performance on gender equity is yet to meet citizens' expectations.

'GENDER EQUITY' SUB-INDEX II




Figure 13: Questions that constitute the Gender Equity Sub-Index

On women's political participation, citizens expressed broad support for women's active involvement across all five dimensions assessed. Support for women always voting during elections was the strongest at 56%, followed by participation in political rallies (41%), contesting elections (40%), holding political

appointments (40%), and holding party leadership positions (38%). Across all five dimensions, between 64% and 81% of respondents believed women should often or always participate in political activities. However, the proportion who believe women should never or rarely participate remains notable, particularly on contesting elections (21%) and holding party leadership positions (21%), suggesting that attitudinal barriers to women's full political participation persist.

'GENDER EQUITY' SUB-INDEX III




Figure 14: Questions that constitute the Gender Equity Sub-Index (Cont'd)

4.8 Trust Sub-Index (Level of trust Nigerians have in the Government and other Institutions)

Trust and good governance are mutually reinforcing, yet trust remains the most critical deficit in Nigeria's social cohesion landscape. In 2026, 68% of respondents expressed little to no trust in government and public institutions, while 32% expressed some to a lot of trust. The proportion expressing little to no trust has declined gradually from a peak of 78% in 2022 to 69% in 2025 and 68% in 2026, while the proportion expressing some to a lot of trust has improved from 22% in 2022 to 31% in 2025 and 32% in 2026. Despite this gradual improvement, the fact that more than two thirds of Nigerians still express little to no trust in government and public institutions underscores the depth of the trust deficit that continues to constrain social cohesion in Nigeria.

'TRUST' SUB-INDEX I

(Level of trust of Nigerians in the Government and Other Institutions)




Figure 15: Trust Sub-Index

The distribution of trust across government institutions, law enforcement agencies and community figures in 2026 reveals a consistent and striking pattern in which citizens express significantly lower trust in formal and official institutions than in community and religious figures. Formal government institutions and law enforcement agencies recorded the highest levels of distrust, with the National Assembly (77%), Police (76%), State Assembly (73%), Judiciary (73%), EFCC (73%), and the Government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (72%) all recording little to no trust among the majority of respondents.

Conversely, religious leaders (51% some to a lot of trust), people of other ethnic groups (47%), people of other religious faiths (47%) and traditional leaders (45%) recorded comparatively higher levels of trust. This pattern suggests that citizens continue to place greater confidence in community, religious and interpersonal relationships than in the formal institutions of governance and law enforcement in Nigeria.

‘TRUST’ SUB-INDEX II

(Level of trust of Nigerians in the Government and Other Institutions)




Figure 16: Questions that constitute the Trust Sub-Index

4.9 Social Justice Sub-Index (Feelings of ‘equal protection of the nation’s law for everyone’ and ‘access of all to civil justice’)

Citizens' perception of social justice has followed an uneven trajectory across survey waves. After improving from 34% high social justice in 2021 to 38% in 2022, the sub-index recorded a sharp deterioration to 19% in 2025, the lowest since the survey began, before recovering to 31% in 2026. While this recovery is encouraging, the 2026 figure remains below the levels recorded in both 2021 and 2022, suggesting that the sharp deterioration of 2025 has only been partially reversed. The fact that 69% of Nigerians still perceive low social justice indicates that the majority of citizens continue to feel that the nation's laws do not protect everyone equally and that access to civil justice remains out of reach for many.

‘SOCIAL JUSTICE’ SUB-INDEX I

(Feelings of ‘equal protection of the nation’s law for everyone’ and ‘access of all to civil justice’)




Figure 17: Social Justice Sub-Index

Citizens' perception of inequality in Nigeria's justice system remains deeply entrenched and remarkably consistent across all survey waves. In 2026, 75% of respondents indicated that the law does not protect everyone equally, while an equal proportion (75%) indicated that only the rich and powerful can access civil justice. What is particularly striking is the stability of these findings across all survey waves, with the proportion perceiving unequal application of the law ranging narrowly between 72% and 79% since 2021, and the proportion perceiving unequal access to civil justice between 71% and 81%. The marginal improvement from 2025 to 2026 on both dimensions mirrors the overall Social Justice Sub-Index recovery, yet the persistence of three-quarters of Nigerians holding these views across all survey waves suggests that inequality in the justice system is a long-standing concern that transcends any particular administration.

‘SOCIAL JUSTICE’ SUB-INDEX II




Figure 18: Questions that constitute the Social Justice Sub-Index

4.10 Impunity Sub-Index (Level of the seriousness of human rights abuses, unreported cases of human rights abuses, and involvement of state agents such as the police and army in human rights abuses)

The Impunity Sub-Index recorded one of the most dramatic shifts in the 2026 survey. The proportion of respondents who believe that perpetrators of human rights abuses go unpunished declined from 78% in 2025 to 64% in 2026, while those who believe perpetrators are held accountable increased from 22% in 2025 to 36% in 2026. What is particularly noteworthy is the sharp spike recorded in 2025, when the perception of high impunity stood at 43%, the highest since the survey began, before declining markedly to 13% in 2026. While this recovery is significant, the fact that 64% of Nigerians still believe that those who violate human rights, including state agents such as the police and military, largely go unpunished, indicates that impunity remains a deeply entrenched concern in Nigeria.

‘IMPUNITY’ SUB-INDEX I




Figure 19: Impunity Sub-Index

The constituent questions reveal a self-reinforcing cycle that helps explain the persistence of impunity in Nigeria. First, 77% of respondents considered human rights abuses a fairly to very serious problem, with 49% rating it as very serious. Second, 49% indicated high to extremely high levels of unreported cases, suggesting that the majority of abuses never reach formal accountability channels. Third, 43% indicated that state agents such as the police and military are themselves somewhat to very likely perpetrators of human rights abuses. Taken together, these three findings illuminate why impunity persists: abuses are widespread, largely unreported, and often perpetrated by the very institutions citizens would otherwise turn to for redress.

‘IMPUNITY’ SUB-INDEX II




Figure 20: Questions that constitute the Impunity Sub-Index

4.11 Corruption Sub-Index (Perceived general level of corruption in Nigeria, Fight against corruption, and corrupt practices in access to justice)

Citizens' perception of corruption has shown no meaningful improvement over the entire survey period. While the proportion indicating high corruption declined from 63% in 2025 to 50% in 2026, this figure is identical to the 50% recorded in 2021, suggesting that the 2026 recovery merely returns citizens' perceptions to their starting point. With half of all Nigerians still perceiving high levels of corruption in 2026 and only 8% perceiving low levels, corruption remains one of the most persistent challenges to social cohesion in Nigeria.

'CORRUPTION' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 21: Corruption Sub-Index

The 2026 survey findings on corruption reveal a consistent pattern of citizen dissatisfaction across all three dimensions assessed. On the trend of corruption, 59% of respondents indicated that corruption has increased, while only 13% felt it has decreased. On government efforts to fight corruption, 62% rated them as poor or very poor, with only 14% rating them as good or very good. On access to justice free from corruption, 38% indicated it is never free from corruption, while only 16% said it is often or always free. The 2026 findings suggest that the majority of Nigerians not only perceive corruption as worsening but have little confidence in government's ability to address it, and widely view the justice system as compromised by corrupt practices.

'CORRUPTION' SUB-INDEX II




Figure 22: Questions that constitute the Corruption Sub-Index

4.12 Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index (*Management of the funds/resources from the country's natural resources, such as crude oil, etc.*)

Citizens' perception of natural resource governance improved significantly in 2026, with the proportion indicating poor governance declining sharply from 69% in 2025 to 41% in 2026, while average governance recovered from 25% in 2025 to 53% in 2026. However, the proportion indicating good governance remains negligible at 6%, unchanged from 2025 and barely above the 4% recorded in 2021. This suggests that the 2026 improvement reflects a shift in perception from poor to average governance rather than a genuine improvement in the management of Nigeria's natural resources, and that citizens, while less dissatisfied than in 2025, remain unconvinced that natural resource governance has meaningfully improved.

'NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 23: Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index

The 2026 constituent questions reveal that despite the overall improvement in the Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index, citizens remain skeptical of government performance on specific dimensions. On the management of natural resource funds, 62% rated it as poorly managed and only 13% as very well managed. On trust in the Federal Government to restructure natural resource ownership in favour of states, 47% expressed no trust at all, and only 9% expressed a lot of trust. On efforts to reduce the consequences of climate change, 42% rated government efforts as poor or very poor and only 19% as good or very good.

Citizens' assessments of specific government actions in natural resource governance remain largely negative, indicating that the improvement has not yet translated into greater satisfaction with the management of Nigeria's natural resources.

'NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE' SUB-INDEX II




Figure 24: Questions that constitute the Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index

4.13 Security & Peacebuilding Sub-Index (Resolving Nigeria's conflict through peacebuilding efforts, FG deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts, and rotating of the FG in the area of peacebuilding)

Citizens' assessment of security and peacebuilding efforts shows a positive but modest improvement in 2026. The proportion indicating high peacebuilding efforts increased from 19% in 2022 to 26% in 2026, driven largely by a shift from average to high peacebuilding ratings. However, the majority of respondents (56%) still rate peacebuilding efforts as average, suggesting that while citizens acknowledge some improvement in the government's approach to resolving conflicts, expectations of more decisive and effective peacebuilding action remain largely unmet.

'SECURITY & PEACEBUILDING' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 25: Security & Peacebuilding Sub-Index

The 2026 constituent questions reveal a telling gap between citizens' belief in peacebuilding and their assessment of government performance. On the potential of local peacebuilding, 63% of respondents agreed that Nigeria's recurring conflicts can be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts, while only 18% disagreed. However, regarding government performance, only 25% indicated that the Federal Government always or often deploys peacebuilding approaches, while 35% said it never or rarely does so, and 42% rated

the government's peacebuilding efforts as poor or very poor. The data suggests that citizens believe in the power of peacebuilding as a tool for resolving conflicts, but have little confidence that the Federal Government is deploying it effectively.

'SECURITY & PEACEBUILDING' SUB-INDEX II




Figure 26: Questions that constitute the Security & Peacebuilding Sub-Index

4.14 Coping Strategies Sub-Index (Government effort towards assisting Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges)

Citizens' assessment of government efforts to assist Nigerians cope with economic challenges has improved consistently across survey waves, yet the majority remain dissatisfied. The proportion indicating low coping strategy has declined steadily from 69% in 2022 to 52% in 2026, while the proportion indicating high coping strategy has almost doubled from 14% in 2022 to 26% in 2026. Despite this positive trajectory, the fact that more than half of Nigerians still rate government coping strategy support as low in 2026 indicates that government efforts have not kept pace with the economic challenges citizens continue to face.

'COPING STRATEGIES' SUB-INDEX




Figure 27: Coping Strategies Sub-Index

4.15 Migration Sub-Index (*Willingness to relocate to another state within Nigeria; and willingness NOT to relocate with family out of Nigeria if given the opportunity*)

The Migration Sub-Index data across all survey waves reveal two distinct and stable periods. Between 2021 and 2022, 68% of respondents were willing to relocate, while 32% were not. Between 2025 and 2026, these figures stabilised at a markedly different level, with 40% willing to relocate and 60% not willing to do so. The 28-percentage-point decline in willingness to relocate between 2022 and 2025, which has held firm in 2026, reflects a significant and sustained shift in citizens' disposition towards relocation across the survey period.

'MIGRATION' SUB-INDEX I




Figure 28: Migration Sub-Index

The two constituent questions reveal that the significant decline in the overall Migration Sub-Index between 2022 and 2025 was primarily driven by a sharp drop in willingness to relocate within Nigeria. On internal relocation, the proportion willing declined sharply from 90% in 2021 to 46% in 2025, before a marginal recovery to 50% in 2026. On external relocation, the figures remained relatively stable at 73% in both 2021 and 2022 and 72% in 2025, before declining moderately to 66% in 2026.

The data therefore indicates that changing attitudes towards internal relocation were the primary driver of the overall sub-index shift, while willingness to relocate outside Nigeria has remained more stable and is only now beginning to show a gradual decline.

'MIGRATION' SUB-INDEX II




Figure 29: Questions that constitute the Migration Sub-Index



5.0 WEIGHTED SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS SUMMARY DISTRIBUTION

A total of 5,315 respondents participated in the 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey. This survey data collected nationwide cuts across gender, marital status, religious affiliation, age, ethnicity, and literacy levels. The weighted socio-demographic breakdown of the survey data is as follows:



Gender 51% of the respondents are male, while 49% are female.



Marital Status 27% of respondents are single, 67% are married, 3% are widowed, and 3% are divorced or separated.



Religious Affiliation 56% indicated that they are Christians, 42% are Muslim and 2% are devotees of traditional and other religions.



Ethnic Groups 28% of respondents are Hausas, 21% are Yorubas, 20% are Igbos, and 30% represent other ethnic groups.



Age Category The age categories of the respondents include 15 to 24 years (10%), 25 to 34 years (31%), 35 to 44 years (36%), 45 to 54 years (17%), and 55 and above (6%).



Education The distribution of respondents according to their level of educational attainment is as follows: No formal education (6%), Informal education (6%), completed primary school (13%), completed secondary school (47%), and completed tertiary education and above (28%).



Nationality 100% of respondents are Nigerians.



Geopolitical Zones Respondents' distribution by geopolitical zones is as follows: North Central (15%), North East (14%), North West (26%), South East (12%), South South (15%), and South West (20%).

Table 2: Socio-Demographic Information

Variables		Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
		N=5,315	%=100
Gender	Male	2,700	50.8%
	Female	2,615	49.2%
Marital Status	Single	1,457	27.4%
	Married	3,543	66.7%
	Widowed	179	3.4%
	Divorced/Separated	136	2.6%
Religion	Christian	2,970	55.9%
	Islam	2,251	42.4%
	Traditional/others	94	1.8%
Ethnic group	Yoruba	1,138	21.4%
	Hausa	1,499	28.2%
	Igbo	1,062	20.0%
	Others	1,616	30.4%
Age Category	15-24 years	531	10.0%
	25-34 years	1,632	30.7%
	35-44 years	1,927	36.3%
	45-54 years	900	16.9%
	55 and above	325	6.1%
Highest Education Attainment	No formal Education	324	6.1%
	No formal Education	323	6.1%
	Informal Education	309	5.8%
	Completed Primary School	702	13.2%
	Completed Secondary School	2,496	47.0%
Average Monthly Income (in Naira)	Less than N70,000	1,283	26.3%
	N70,001 – N100,000	1,428	29.3%
	N100,001 – N200,000	1,269	26.0%
	N200,001 – N300,000	592	12.1%
	N300,001 – N400,000	194	4.0%
	N400,001 – N500,000	66	1.4%
	N400,001 – N500,000	41	0.8%
Nationality	Nigerian	5,315	100.0%
	Non-Nigerian	0	0.0%
Geo-political Zone	North Central	771	14.5%
	North East	718	13.5%
	North West	1,359	25.6%
	South East	621	11.7%
	South South	796	15.0%
	South West	1,049	19.7%



6.0 SURVEY RESULTS

6.1 Assessment of “Identity” as a Component of Social Cohesion

The survey assessed the concept of ‘Identity’ as a component of social cohesion to gauge the extent to which Nigerians express feelings of attachment to their nation and the various ethnic groups to which they belong.

6.1.1 Feelings of Nigerians about the Nation

Respondents were asked to identify statements that best capture their feelings about their country. According to the 2026 survey data, 46% of respondents felt truly proud of Nigeria, while 41% felt really disappointed, 11% felt indifferent, and 2% were unsure. Comparing with previous survey waves, the proportion feeling proud declined steadily from 55% in 2019 to 33% in 2025, before recovering to 46% in 2026, the first year-on-year improvement in national pride since the survey began.

When you think about your country Nigeria, which of these statements best expresses your feelings?




Figure 30: How Nigerians Feel and the Nation

Across geopolitical zones, the South East (68%) recorded the highest level of disappointment, while the North Central (59%) and North West (56%) expressed the strongest sense of national pride. This regional contrast is reflected in the qualitative data. While a journalist from Borno State expressed pride in his Nigerian identity regardless of prevailing challenges:

'I am always proud to call myself a Nigerian even with the current situation. No matter what, I am proud of my country and ready to represent it anywhere I go.' (KII with Journalist, Borno State, 2026)

A youth leader from Enugu State, in the South East, expressed a starkly different sentiment:

'I am not proud of being a Nigerian. I just find myself being a Nigerian. Nothing makes me proud of being a Nigerian.' (KII with Youth Leader, Enugu State, 2026)

**When you think about your country Nigeria, which of these statements best expresses your feelings?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 31: Socio-Demographic of how Nigerians feel about the Nation by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Muslims (52%) are significantly more likely to feel proud of Nigeria than Christians (41%), while traditionalists record the lowest level of pride at 22%. There was no significant difference in findings across educational attainment levels.

**When you think about your country Nigeria, which of these statements best expresses your feelings?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 32: Socio-Demographic of how Nigerians feel about the Nation by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.1.2 Identification as Nigerian or Member of an Ethnic Group

Respondents were asked to indicate how they identify in relation to their ethnic group and their Nigerian nationality. The 2026 data shows that 44% prefer a dual identity, feeling equally Nigerian and from their ethnic group, while 29% feel more ethnic than Nigerian, 11% feel only ethnic, 11% feel more Nigerian than ethnic, and 5% feel only Nigerian. The proportion preferring a dual identity declined from 57% in 2019 to 36% in 2022, before recovering to 48% in 2025 and settling at 44% in 2026.

If you had to choose between being Nigerian and being from your ethnic group, which of the following best expresses your feelings?




Figure 33: Choices between being Nigerian and being from a Particular Ethnic Group

Across geopolitical zones, the North East records the highest level of ethnic attachment, with 38% feeling more ethnic than Nigerian and 19% feeling only ethnic, followed closely by the South East at 37% and 17% respectively. The North Central and North West both record the highest levels of dual identity at 51% each, feeling equally ethnic and Nigerian, while the South West (17% more Nigerian than ethnic) records the strongest leaning towards national identity. The qualitative data sheds light on the underlying drivers of this pattern. A youth leader and lecturer from Kwara State observed:

'I identify first and foremost as a Nigerian. The major problem tearing Nigeria apart is ethnic and regional loyalty. Many people prefer to associate only with people from their own tribe.' (KII with Youth Leader/Lecturer, Kwara State, 2026)

This is further corroborated by a barrister from Niger State, who attributed ethnic attachment to a deeper deficit of inter-group trust:

'People do not trust easily. They are more comfortable with people from the same ethnic group. They feel that person can protect their own interest. If there was trust, one would not bother about which ethnic group you are from.' (KII with Barrister, Niger State, 2026)

If you had to choose between being Nigerian and being from your ethnic group, which of the following best expresses your feelings? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 34: Socio-demographic choices between being Nigerian and being from a particular ethnic group by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Among religious groups, traditionalists express the strongest ethnic attachment, with 27% identifying as only ethnic, compared to 11% of Christians and 9% of Muslims. On educational attainment, respondents with lower educational qualifications express stronger ethnic attachment: 16% identify as only ethnic and 34% feel more ethnic than Nigerian, compared to 9% and 27%, respectively, among those with secondary education and above.

If you had to choose between being Nigerian and being from your ethnic group, which of the following best expresses your feelings? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 35: Socio-demographic on choices between being Nigerian and being from a particular ethnic group by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.1.3 What Makes Nigerians Proud of Being Nigerian

Respondents were further asked to indicate what makes them proud of being Nigerian. The country’s abundant mineral resources (58%) ranked as the top source of national pride in 2026, followed by good land, weather and agricultural resources (53%), art and cultural heritage (52%), peace-loving, hardworking and talented citizens (49%), and delicious food and culinary delicacies (43%). Other sources of pride include being a religious people (39%), Nigeria as a home of tourism (33%), the resilient and can-do spirit of Nigerians (30%), and freedom of movement (30%). Across all dimensions, the 2026 figures reflect a consistent improvement from 2022 and 2025, with art and cultural heritage recording the most significant increase, rising from 41% in 2022 to 52% in 2026.

If there was one factor that makes you really proud of being Nigerian, what would that be?

	2022	2025	2026
We are blessed with mineral resource	51%	49%	58%
Our good land, weather & agricultural resources	47%	49%	53%
Our art and cultural heritage	41%	42%	52%
Our peace loving, hardworking & talented people	43%	42%	49%
Our delicious food and delicacies	29%	37%	43%
We are religious people	28%	37%	39%
Nigeria is a home of tourism	19%	27%	33%
Freedom of movement	20%	31%	30%
Our resilience & Can-Do Spirit	19%	32%	30%

Table 3: What Nigerians are most proud of in being Nigerian

Pride in the country’s mineral resources was most strongly expressed by respondents in the South West (73%) and South East (68%), while art and cultural heritage was most cited in the South West (62%) and South-South (58%).

If there was one factor that makes you really proud of being Nigerian, what would that be?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Our art and cultural heritage	52%	52%	51%	49%	53%	52%	51%	53%	45%	51%	47%	45%	58%	62%
We are blessed with mineral resource	58%	60%	55%	52%	54%	59%	61%	64%	55%	44%	49%	68%	60%	73%
Our peace loving, hardworking & talented people	49%	48%	49%	45%	47%	47%	56%	54%	49%	33%	35%	54%	58%	66%
Our good land, weather & agricultural resources	53%	53%	52%	50%	49%	53%	57%	60%	56%	44%	42%	61%	56%	63%
Our delicious food and delicacies	43%	41%	46%	48%	42%	41%	47%	44%	48%	35%	29%	51%	52%	55%
Nigeria is a home of tourism	33%	34%	32%	31%	30%	34%	36%	37%	32%	22%	23%	33%	45%	46%
Freedom of movement	30%	29%	31%	28%	30%	29%	30%	39%	20%	24%	18%	36%	48%	40%
We are religious people	39%	38%	39%	35%	38%	37%	43%	44%	32%	31%	36%	51%	36%	47%
Our resilience & Can-Do Spirit	30%	31%	29%	31%	26%	29%	37%	35%	29%	24%	16%	39%	39%	40%
Others	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%
Our entertainment industry	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	1%

Table 4: What Nigerians are most proud of in being Nigerian by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

The qualitative data from the 2026 Key Informant Interviews offers the following perspectives. A youth leader from Ekiti State cited resilience and cultural diversity as key sources of national pride:

‘I am proud of Nigerian resilience, our cultural diversity, our entrepreneurial spirit, creativity, global cultural influence, achievements in sports, and the ability of citizens to thrive despite adversity.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Ekiti State, 2026)

Consistent with the 39% who cited being a religious people as a source of national pride, a barrister from Borno State highlighted inter-religious coexistence as a defining feature of Nigerian identity:

‘We have peace among religions. Borno is known to be a Muslim state but if I go to Anambra or Enugu they will not stop me from practising my religion. There is no place you will go that you will not find a mosque.’ (KII with Barrister, Borno State, 2026)

Contrarily, a media consultant from Kebbi State challenged the premise of national pride, linking its absence directly to government failure to fulfil basic obligations:

‘Am I proud to be a Nigerian? I am not. What has the Nigerian government done for me? If it cannot provide security, which is the fundamental obligation of government, then it is useless.’ (KII with Media Consultant, Kebbi State, 2026)

Cross-tabulation by religion shows that Christians (62%) are more likely to cite mineral resources as a source of national pride compared to Muslims (52%), while traditionalists place greater emphasis on good land and agricultural resources (67%). On educational attainment, respondents with lower educational qualifications place less emphasis on mineral resources (53%) than those with secondary education and above (59%), while higher-educated respondents more strongly cite peace-loving and hardworking people (52%) as a source of pride.

If there was one factor that makes you really proud of being Nigerian, what would that be?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Our art and cultural heritage	52%	52%	52%	33%	51%	52%
We are blessed with mineral resource	58%	62%	52%	45%	53%	59%
Our peace loving, hardworking & talented people	49%	54%	42%	40%	39%	52%
Our good land, weather & agricultural resources	53%	55%	49%	67%	50%	53%
Our delicious food and delicacies	43%	49%	35%	52%	35%	46%
Nigeria is a home of tourism	33%	37%	28%	36%	28%	35%
Freedom of movement	30%	35%	23%	30%	23%	32%
We are religious people	39%	38%	39%	38%	38%	39%
Our resilience & Can-Do Spirit	30%	35%	23%	25%	23%	32%
Others	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%
Our entertainment industry	0%	0%	0%	2%	0%	1%

Table 5: What Nigerians are most proud of in being Nigerian by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.2 Assessment of “Self-Worth & Future Expectations” as a Component of Social Cohesion

The Self-Worth and Future Expectations Sub-Index examines two dimensions of citizens’ social cohesion experience: how Nigerians feel about their lives and how institutions treat them as citizens, and the extent to which they hold optimistic expectations for the country’s future. Together, these dimensions offer a composite picture of citizens’ present wellbeing and forward-looking disposition.

6.2.1 How Nigerians Feel About Their Lives

The 2026 survey data reveal a notable improvement in citizens’ assessment of their personal wellbeing. In 2026, 45% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with their lives, 41% reported feeling somewhat or extremely satisfied, and 14% were indifferent. Comparing with previous survey waves, dissatisfaction peaked at 63% in 2022, declined marginally to 59% in 2025, and has now declined further to 45% in 2026, the lowest level recorded since the survey began. Correspondingly, satisfaction has improved from 25% in 2022 to 41% in 2026, the highest level recorded. While this is an encouraging trend, the qualitative data captures the mixed reality behind these figures. A youth leader from Katsina State expressed the ambivalence felt by many Nigerians:

‘To be honest, living in Nigeria is a joke but it’s not something we can get away from, because we are Nigerian citizens and we don’t have any other country but Nigeria. All I can say is we are just thankful and striving.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Katsina State, 2026)

A youth leader from Ekiti State offered a more cautiously hopeful perspective:

'I feel cautiously hopeful but also challenged at the same time. Nigeria is a country with great potential, yet daily realities such as economic hardship, the rising cost of living, and security issues affect our overall wellbeing.' (KII with Youth Leader, Ekiti State, 2026)




Figure 36: How Nigerians Feel About their Lives right now

Across geopolitical zones, the South East recorded the highest level of dissatisfaction at 66% (32% extremely dissatisfied and 34% somewhat dissatisfied), while the North West recorded the highest level of satisfaction at 48%. Respondents aged 55 years and above recorded the highest level of satisfaction at 51%.

As a Nigerian, how do you feel about your life as a whole right now? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 37: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about their lives by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that traditionalists recorded the highest level of dissatisfaction at 57%, compared to 51% of Christians and 39% of Muslims. Muslims recorded the highest level of satisfaction at 44%. On educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above recorded a higher level of satisfaction at 41%, compared to 37% among those with lower educational qualifications.

As a Nigerian, how do you feel about your life as a whole right now? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 38: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about their lives by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.2.2 How Nigerians Feel About How Institutions Treat Them

According to the 2026 survey data, 65% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with how the Federal Government treats them, while 24% stated they are satisfied and 11% were indifferent. This represents a notable improvement from 2025, when 77% expressed dissatisfaction and only 14% were satisfied. A media consultant from Kebbi State captured the sentiment of many dissatisfied citizens:

'Federal government is not doing anything. We should stop deceiving ourselves.' (KII with Media Consultant, Kebbi State, 2026)

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Federal Government




Figure 39: Feeling of Nigerians about treatment from Federal Government

Across geopolitical zones, the South East recorded the highest level of dissatisfaction with Federal Government treatment at 91%, while the North West recorded the highest satisfaction at 33%.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Federal Government. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 40: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from Federal Government by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that traditionalists recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 73%, followed by Christians at 72% and Muslims at 56%. There was no significant difference in findings across educational attainment levels.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Federal Government. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 41: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from Federal Government by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

State Government treatment followed a similar pattern, with 53% of respondents expressing dissatisfaction while 34% were satisfied and 13% were indifferent, an improvement from 61% dissatisfied in 2025.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? State Government




Figure 42: Feeling of Nigerians about treatment from State Government

Across geopolitical zones, the South East recorded the highest level of dissatisfaction with State Government treatment at 68%, while the North West recorded the highest satisfaction at 48%.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? State Government. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 43: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from Federal Government by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion shows that traditionalists recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 64%, followed by Christians at 61% and Muslims at 43%. On educational attainment, while dissatisfaction was similar across both groups, respondents with secondary education and above recorded a higher level of satisfaction at 35%, compared to 29% among those with lower educational qualifications.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? State Government. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 44: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from State Government by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

On how their Local Governments and officials treat them, 55% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction while 29% were satisfied and 16% were indifferent, an improvement from 61% dissatisfied in 2025.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Local Government




Figure 45: Feeling of Nigerians about treatment from Local Government

Across geopolitical zones, the South East recorded the highest level of dissatisfaction with Local Government treatment at 70%, followed by the South West at 67%, while the North West recorded the highest satisfaction at 42%.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Local Government. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 46: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from Local Government by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion shows that Christians recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 63%, followed by traditionalists at 49% and Muslims at 46%. There was no significant difference in findings across educational attainment levels.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Local Government. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 47: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from Local Government by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

A strikingly different picture emerges on citizens' assessment of how their fellow Nigerians treat them. In 2026, 51% of respondents expressed satisfaction with how fellow citizens treat them, while only 31% expressed dissatisfaction and 18% were indifferent. This gap between high institutional dissatisfaction and comparatively positive interpersonal experience is one of the defining features of the 2026 social cohesion data, and directly mirrors the pattern observed in the Trust Sub-Index, where citizens consistently express greater trust in community and religious figures than in formal government institutions.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Your fellow Nigerian citizens




Figure 48: Feeling of Nigerians about treatment from their fellow Nigerian citizens

The North Central (61%) and North West (60%) recorded the highest satisfaction with fellow citizens' treatment, while the South East recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 45%.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Your fellow Nigerian citizens. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 49: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from their fellow Nigerian citizens by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that traditionalists expressed the highest satisfaction at 57%, closely followed by Muslims at 56%, compared to 48% of Christians. On educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above recorded a higher level of satisfaction at 53%, compared to 47% among those with lower educational qualifications.

As a Nigerian citizen, how do you feel about how the following institution treats you? Your fellow Nigerian citizens. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 50: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about treatment from their fellow Nigerian citizens by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.2.3 Future Expectations for Nigeria

Despite the dissatisfaction with personal wellbeing and institutional treatment documented in previous sections, Nigerians remain broadly optimistic about their country’s future. In 2026, 61% of respondents believed the future of Nigeria would be much better than it is today, while 21% believed it would be much worse, 10% believed it would remain the same, and 8% were not sure.

Comparing with previous survey waves, optimism declined from 66% in 2019 to 56% in 2025, before recovering to 61% in 2026, suggesting a cautious but meaningful reversal of the downward trend. A barrister from Niger State, despite acknowledging the country’s challenges, offered a perspective that captures this resilient optimism:

‘Nigerians are wonderful people and the country is a good country. We are blessed despite the challenges. If we can only get leadership right, no nation on earth will be able to compete with us. If I come to this world again, I would like to be a Nigerian.’ (KII with Barrister, Niger State, 2026)

Thinking about the future as a Nigerian, which statement best expresses your feelings?




Figure 51: Nigerians’ perception of future expectations for Nigeria

Across geopolitical zones, the North Central recorded the highest level of optimism at 70%, while the South East recorded the lowest at 48%, with 29% believing the future would be much worse. Respondents aged 55 years and above were the most optimistic age group at 71%.




Figure 52: Socio-demographic analysis of Nigerians’ perception of future expectations for Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Muslims expressed the highest level of optimism at 64%, compared to 59% of Christians, while traditionalists recorded the lowest at 33%. There was no significant difference in findings across educational attainment levels.




Figure 53: Socio-demographic analysis of Nigerians’ perception of future expectations for Nigeria by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3 Assessment of Polarization as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section assesses the concept of ‘Polarization’ as a component of social cohesion in Nigeria. It examines the extent to which Nigerians perceive the country as united or divided, the sources they identify as driving conflict, and their views on ethnic, religious and political polarization.

6.3.1 Unity and Division of Nigeria

Respondents were asked to assess, compared to four years ago, whether Nigeria is more united or more divided today. According to the 2026 survey data, 48% of respondents said Nigeria is much more divided, while 20% said it is much more united, 27% said it has stayed the same, and 5% were not sure. Comparing with previous survey waves, the proportion saying Nigeria is more divided peaked at 66% in 2022, declined to 31% in 2025, and has risen again to 48% in 2026. A journalist from Borno State captured this contradiction between formal unity and lived experience:

‘Theoretically on paper we are united but to do it practically there’s division based on sentiments, nepotism, communalism and even religious wise.’ (KII with Journalist, Borno State, 2026)

Compared to four years ago, how united or divided would you say Nigeria is today?




Figure 54: Extent of unity or division among Nigerians

Across geopolitical zones, the South East recorded the highest level of perceived division at 76%, while the North West (37% divided) and South West (38% divided) recorded the lowest perceived division.

Compared to four years ago, how united or divided would you say Nigeria is today?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 55: Socio-demographic analysis on the extent of unity or division among Nigerians by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Christians expressed the highest perception of division at 55%, compared to 38% of Muslims. On educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above were more likely to perceive Nigeria as divided at 50%, compared to 37% among those with lower educational qualifications.




Figure 56: Socio-demographic analysis on the extent of unity of division among Nigerians by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

Those who said Nigeria is more united were further asked to explain why. The leading reason cited was shared struggle at 63%, followed by peaceful coexistence despite differences (55%), unity in purpose (45%), improvement in security (31%), and visible development and growth in key sectors (27%).

Those who said Nigeria is more united were further asked to explain why. The leading reason cited was shared struggle at 63%, followed by peaceful coexistence despite differences (55%), unity in purpose (45%), improvement in security (31%), and visible development and growth in key sectors (27%).




Figure 57: Reasons why people think Nigeria is more united today than four years ago

Across geopolitical zones, the North Central (84%) and North East (82%) recorded the highest proportions citing shared struggle as a uniting factor, while the South East recorded the lowest at 26%. The South West was most likely to cite visible development and growth in key sectors at 55%, compared to the national average of 27%.

Why do you think Nigeria is more united today than four years ago? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Our Shared Struggle Unites Us	63%	64%	61%	70%	61%	61%	68%	62%	84%	82%	52%	26%	41%	69%
Despite our Differences, we still Coexist Peacefully	55%	54%	56%	50%	48%	58%	62%	61%	57%	22%	56%	47%	41%	71%
We are United in Purpose	45%	50%	40%	38%	41%	47%	48%	52%	44%	16%	42%	52%	30%	66%
Security has Improved	31%	27%	33%	23%	25%	31%	36%	53%	36%	18%	23%	58%	23%	44%
Visible Development and Growth in Key Sectors	27%	25%	28%	28%	14%	30%	39%	41%	34%	7%	12%	37%	15%	55%
Others	1%	1%	1%	3%	0%	0%	2%	5%	0%	4%	0%	0%	0%	3%

Table 6: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons why people think Nigeria is more united today than four years ago by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that traditionalists were least likely to cite shared struggle as a uniting factor at 33%, compared to 64% of Muslims and 61% of Christians. Respondents with lower educational qualifications were more likely to cite shared struggle at 70%, compared to 60% among those with secondary education and above.

Why do you think Nigeria is more united today than four years ago? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Our Shared Struggle Unites Us	63%	61%	64%	33%	70%	60%
Despite our Differences, we still Coexist Peacefully	55%	54%	56%	50%	45%	59%
We are United in Purpose	45%	47%	43%	42%	34%	50%
Security has Improved	31%	37%	26%	17%	20%	35%
Visible Development and Growth in Key Sectors	27%	35%	21%	25%	12%	33%
Others	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%

Table 7: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons why people think Nigeria is more united today than four years ago by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

Those who said Nigeria is more divided were similarly asked to identify the reasons. Worsening economic conditions emerged as the most cited driver at 71%, followed by escalating insecurity (57%), perceived ethnic imbalance in governance (44%), differences in political affiliation (43%), religious differences (42%), the controversial 2023 elections (32%), and youth disenchantment (24%). A youth leader and lecturer from Kwara State attributed the persistence of division to two fundamental factors:

‘Religion and ethnicity are the major causes. These two factors have scattered the country.’ (KII with Youth Leader/Lecturer, Kwara State, 2026)

Why do you think Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago?




Figure 58: Reasons why people think Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago

Across geopolitical zones, the South West recorded the highest citation of worsening economic conditions at 81%, while the South East was most likely to cite perceived ethnic imbalance in governance (68%) and the controversial 2023 elections (54%). The North East recorded the highest citation of religious differences at 59%.

Why do you think Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Worsening Economic Conditions	71%	72%	69%	72%	66%	73%	73%	73%	67%	55%	67%	78%	74%	81%
Escalating Insecurity	57%	57%	58%	56%	57%	53%	66%	57%	70%	52%	64%	53%	58%	47%
Perceived Ethnic Imbalance in Governance	44%	45%	44%	43%	46%	43%	44%	46%	27%	43%	28%	68%	46%	53%
Difference in Political Affiliation	43%	45%	41%	42%	41%	43%	46%	48%	34%	37%	32%	56%	60%	37%
Religious Differences	42%	43%	40%	47%	40%	38%	49%	44%	44%	59%	36%	51%	34%	30%
Controversial 2023 Elections	32%	32%	32%	26%	25%	35%	36%	41%	26%	31%	25%	54%	30%	22%
Youth disenchantment	24%	26%	23%	28%	26%	21%	25%	28%	14%	21%	25%	35%	26%	22%
Others	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%

Table 8: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons why people think Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Christians were most likely to cite perceived ethnic imbalance in governance (49%) and differences in political affiliation (48%), compared to 35% and 34%, respectively, among Muslims. Respondents with secondary education and above were also more likely to cite both factors at 47% and 44% respectively, compared to 33% and 39% among those with lower educational qualifications. The qualitative data reflect these findings. A youth leader from Ekiti State, speaking to the multiple drivers of division, observed:

'I think we are becoming more divided. This is due to economic hardship, political polarization, insecurity, ethnic mistrust, and the influence of social media, which have widened existing fault lines.' *(KII with Youth Leader, Ekiti State, 2026)*

Why do you think Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Worsening Economic Conditions	71%	72%	68%	54%	70%	71%
Escalating Insecurity	57%	58%	57%	47%	58%	57%
Perceived Ethnic Imbalance in Governance	44%	49%	35%	38%	33%	47%
Difference in Political Affiliation	43%	48%	34%	30%	39%	44%
Religious Differences	42%	43%	39%	38%	44%	41%
Controversial 2023 Elections	32%	35%	26%	38%	26%	33%
Youth disenchantment	24%	27%	18%	23%	22%	25%
Others	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%

Table 9: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons why people think Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.2 Sources of Conflict in the Country

Respondents were further asked to identify which differences in their communities are most likely to lead to violent conflict. Political party affiliation emerged as the leading potential source in 2026 at 56%, followed by ethnic and tribal differences (46%) and religious differences (44%). The relatively narrow gap between these three factors suggests that political, ethnic and religious divisions are closely intertwined in citizens' perception of conflict risk. Notably, political party affiliation has consistently ranked first in the last three survey waves, rising from 51% in 2022 to a peak of 60% in 2025 before declining marginally to 56% in 2026, indicating that political competition and conflicts remains citizens' perceived concern as a major driver of violent conflict in their communities.

Thinking about your community, which of these differences is more likely to lead to violent conflict between groups?

	2021	2022	2025	2026
Political Party Affiliation	47%	51%	60%	56%
Ethnic / Tribal Difference	48%	48%	44%	46%
Religious Difference	40%	45%	44%	44%
Access to Land	22%	30%	33%	30%
Difference in Social Status	22%	25%	27%	28%
Resource Control	...	20%	24%	27%
Income Difference	19%	22%	20%	25%
Educational Difference	13%	16%	16%	20%
Gender Difference	10%	16%	10%	16%
Age Difference	12%	13%	11%	15%

Table 10: Major causes of conflicts in the Nation

Across geopolitical zones, political party affiliation was most strongly cited in the South West (72%) and South-South (68%), while religious differences were most prominently cited in the North East (59%) and North Central (52%). A youth leader from Niger State, who works in inter-tribal movement, was direct about the political root of conflict:

'The main causes of crisis in our country today, is not religion, it is not tribe, it is political. And the politicians use religion in the name of religion and tribal sentiment to divide us.' (KII with Youth Leader, Niger State, 2026)

At a deeper level, a barrister from Niger State explained that the ethnic and religious dimensions of conflict are themselves rooted in a fundamental absence of trust across group boundaries:

'If we are not from the same religion I can't trust you, or same tribe I can't trust you, if we are not from the same ethnic group I can't trust you. Had it been we considered that we are all human beings, things would be different.' (KII with Barrister, Niger State, 2026)

Thinking about your community, which of these differences is more likely to lead to violent conflict between groups? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	Total	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Political Party Affiliation	56%	59%	54%	55%	55%	56%	61%	58%	51%	31%	54%	56%	68%	72%
Ethnic / Tribal Difference	46%	46%	47%	39%	47%	46%	50%	43%	43%	45%	45%	51%	42%	51%
Religious Difference	44%	44%	44%	43%	47%	43%	42%	43%	52%	59%	39%	47%	35%	39%
Access to Land	30%	31%	30%	31%	29%	29%	32%	36%	32%	15%	20%	41%	36%	43%
Difference in Social Status	28%	29%	27%	25%	27%	28%	30%	28%	27%	17%	26%	40%	31%	29%
Resource Control	27%	28%	25%	27%	26%	24%	29%	38%	21%	16%	19%	37%	36%	35%
Income Difference	25%	24%	25%	25%	23%	25%	26%	25%	32%	28%	17%	38%	26%	18%
Educational Difference	20%	20%	20%	20%	19%	21%	23%	19%	19%	17%	18%	36%	24%	15%
Gender Difference	16%	16%	17%	12%	16%	16%	21%	13%	14%	15%	19%	28%	15%	10%
Age Difference	15%	14%	15%	14%	14%	15%	14%	14%	13%	8%	9%	33%	19%	14%
Others	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	2%

Table 11: Socio-demographic analysis of the causes of conflicts in Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Christians were most likely to cite political party affiliation at 61%, compared to 51% of Muslims and 46% of traditionalists. Traditionalists were notably more likely to cite access to land (39%) and resource control (38%), compared to lower proportions among Christians and Muslims. Regarding educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above were more likely to cite political party affiliation (60%) than those with lower educational qualifications (47%).

Thinking about your community, which of these differences is more likely to lead to violent conflict between groups? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Political Party Affiliation	56%	61%	51%	46%	47%	60%
Ethnic / Tribal Difference	46%	47%	45%	46%	41%	48%
Religious Difference	44%	47%	40%	40%	41%	45%
Access to Land	30%	35%	24%	39%	25%	32%
Difference in Social Status	28%	31%	23%	43%	22%	30%
Resource Control	27%	31%	20%	38%	21%	29%
Income Difference	25%	27%	21%	32%	22%	25%
Educational Difference	20%	23%	16%	24%	17%	22%
Gender Difference	16%	16%	16%	27%	22%	14%
Age Difference	15%	19%	9%	28%	13%	15%
Others	1%	1%	1%	3%	1%	1%

Table 12: Socio-demographic analysis of the causes of conflicts in Nigeria, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.3 Perception of Polarization based on Ethnicity

The 2026 survey assessed the extent to which respondents agreed that Nigeria is more divided along ethnic lines today than under the previous administration. A total of 49% of respondents agreed, comprising 31% who agreed and 18% who strongly agreed, while 37% disagreed and 14% neither agreed nor disagreed. Compared with 2025, when 46% agreed, the proportion perceiving greater ethnic division has increased marginally.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization? Nigeria is more divided based on ethnicity than under the previous administration




Figure 59: Perception of polarization based on ethnicity

Across geopolitical zones, the South East (60%) and North Central (59%) recorded the highest levels of agreement, while the South West recorded the lowest at 35%, with 51% of South West respondents disagreeing with the statement. Across age categories, respondents aged 45-54 were most likely to

agree at 54%, compared to 46% among those aged 35-44. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on ethnicity than under the previous administration**
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 60: Socio-demographic analysis of what citizens think about polarization on ethnicity, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Christians were more likely to agree at 52%, compared to 45% of Muslims and 48% of Traditionalists. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference between respondents with secondary education and above (49%) and those with lower educational qualifications (48%).

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on ethnicity than under the previous administration**
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 61: Socio-demographic analysis of what citizens think about polarization on ethnicity, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.4 Perception of Polarization based on Religion

On religious division, 49% of respondents agreed that Nigeria is more divided along religious lines today than under the previous administration, comprising 31% who agreed and 18% who strongly agreed, while 35% disagreed and 16% neither agreed nor disagreed. This represents an increase from 44% who agreed in 2025, suggesting a growing perception of religious polarization under the current administration.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on religion today than under the previous administration**




Figure 62: Perception of polarization based on religion

Across geopolitical zones, the North East recorded the highest level of agreement at 64%, followed by the South East at 56% and the North Central at 55%, reflecting higher perceptions of religious polarization in these regions. The South West recorded the lowest agreement at 32%, with 51% disagreeing that Nigeria is more divided based on religion. Female respondents were slightly less likely to agree at 46%, compared to 50% among male respondents. Across age categories, respondents aged 35 to 44 recorded the lowest agreement at 46%, compared to 50% among those aged 15 to 24 and 25 to 34.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on religion today than under the previous administration**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 63: Socio-demographic analysis of what citizens think about polarization and religion, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals broadly similar perceptions across groups, with Christians at 50%, Muslims at 47% and Traditionalists at 47% agreeing that Nigeria is more religiously divided. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference between respondents with secondary education and above (49%) and those with lower educational qualifications (46%).

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on religion today than under the previous administration**
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 64: Socio-demographic analysis of what citizens think about polarization and religion, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.5 Perception of Polarization based on Politics

Political division recorded the highest level of agreement among all three polarization dimensions. In 2026, 55% of respondents agreed that Nigeria is more divided based on politics today than under the previous administration, comprising 32% who agreed and 23% who strongly agreed, while 29% disagreed and 16% neither agreed nor disagreed. This is consistent with the 2025 figure of 55%, indicating that perceptions of political polarization have remained stable.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on politics today than under the previous administration**




Figure 65: Perception of polarization based on politics

Across geopolitical zones, the South East (64%) and North Central (60%) recorded the highest levels of agreement, while the North East recorded the lowest at 47%, with 36% disagreeing. The South West (56%), South-South (55%) and North West (50%) recorded broadly similar levels of agreement around the national average. Male respondents were more likely to agree at 58%, compared to 52% among female respondents. There was no significant difference across age categories.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on politics today than under the previous administration**
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 66: Socio-demographic analysis of what citizens think about polarization and politics, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Christians were more likely to agree at 60%, compared to 48% of Muslims and 56% of Traditionalists. On educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above recorded a higher level of agreement at 58%, compared to 43% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?
Nigeria is more divided based on politics today than under the previous administration**
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 67: Socio-demographic analysis of what citizens think about polarization and politics, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.6 Sources of Ethnic Tension

Respondents were asked to identify the greatest sources of tension between various ethnic groups in the country. The actions of politicians ranked first at 60%, followed by sharing of political power (55%), control of resources (46%), access to resources such as water and grazing fields (33%), and the actions of the founding fathers (32%). Compared to 2025, the actions of politicians remained the leading source, rising marginally from 59% to 60%, while the actions of the founding fathers increased notably from 21% to 32%.

In your opinion, what are the greatest sources of tension between various ethnic groups in the country today?




Figure 68: Sources of ethnic tension in Nigeria

Across geopolitical zones, the North Central recorded the highest citation of actions of politicians at 65%, followed by the South-South and South West at 62% each, while the North West recorded the lowest at 55%. The South East recorded the highest citation of control of resources at 58% and actions of founding fathers at 52%, reflecting the particular salience of historical and resource-based grievances in the region. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

In your opinion, what are the greatest sources of tension between various ethnic groups in the country today? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Actions of Politicians	60%	63%	58%	59%	59%	60%	61%	66%	65%	61%	55%	58%	62%	62%
Sharing of Political Power	55%	56%	54%	51%	56%	55%	56%	57%	48%	42%	52%	52%	65%	67%
Control of Resources	46%	48%	44%	44%	45%	45%	49%	49%	49%	45%	38%	58%	55%	41%
Access to Resources (Water, Greasing Field etc)	33%	32%	35%	32%	34%	33%	36%	31%	35%	37%	28%	48%	30%	31%
Actions of our Founding Fathers	32%	32%	33%	30%	31%	33%	34%	32%	27%	42%	25%	52%	28%	30%
Civil War	20%	20%	20%	16%	19%	20%	22%	24%	16%	8%	18%	44%	18%	20%
National Level Events	20%	21%	19%	18%	19%	19%	27%	22%	23%	13%	18%	37%	23%	16%
Coup	14%	14%	13%	10%	13%	14%	14%	17%	13%	6%	9%	24%	13%	21%
Others	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%

Table 13: Socio-demographic analysis of sources of ethnic tension, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Traditionalists were notably more likely to cite control of resources at 67%, compared to 49% of Christians and 41% of Muslims. Christians and Traditionalists were equally likely to cite actions of politicians at 62%, compared to 58% of Muslims. Regarding educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above were more likely to cite actions by politicians at 62%, compared with 55% among those with lower educational qualifications.

In your opinion, what are the greatest sources of tension between various ethnic groups in the country today? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Actions of Politicians	60%	62%	58%	62%	55%	62%
Sharing of Political Power	55%	59%	50%	54%	45%	58%
Control of Resources	46%	49%	41%	67%	43%	47%
Access to Resources (Water, Greasing Field etc)	33%	35%	31%	46%	33%	34%
Actions of our Founding Fathers	32%	34%	30%	35%	35%	31%
Civil War	20%	22%	16%	38%	16%	21%
National Level Events	20%	23%	16%	25%	18%	21%
Coup	14%	15%	11%	27%	12%	14%
Others	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%

Table 14: Socio-demographic analysis of sources of ethnic tension, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.7 Sources of Religious Tension

On the sources of religious tension, the actions of politicians ranked first at 26%, followed by ignorance about the tenets of other religions (20%), the utterances of religious clerics (18%), and inherited bias about other religions (17%). The primacy of political actors as drivers of religious tension is consistent with the broader pattern across the Polarization Sub-Index. A youth leader from Kebbi State was explicit about this link:

‘If you want me to prioritize it, I will say first is political, then ethnic. I don’t want to even take the religion as a second, because if there is good leadership, people get justice for whatever it is, then people will not be divided along their religious line.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Kebbi State, 2026)

In your opinion, what is the greatest sources of religious tension in the country today?




Figure 69: Sources of religious tension in Nigeria

Across geopolitical zones, the South West recorded the highest citation of actions of politicians at 31%, followed by the South-South at 28% and the North Central at 27%. The North East recorded the highest citation of utterances of religious clerics at 39%, considerably above the national average of 18%, reflecting the particular role of religious leadership in shaping perceptions of religious tension in that region. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

**In your opinion, what is the greatest sources of religious tension in the country today?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
The actions of politicians	26%	27%	25%	26%	25%	28%	22%	30%	27%	23%	20%	29%	28%	31%
Ignorance about the tenets (principle or belief) of the other religion	20%	20%	21%	24%	18%	22%	19%	20%	16%	13%	24%	23%	18%	25%
The utterances of religious clerics	18%	19%	17%	15%	22%	17%	18%	7%	19%	39%	17%	12%	12%	14%
Inherited bias about the other religion	17%	16%	18%	17%	16%	16%	20%	18%	17%	11%	18%	10%	19%	22%
Historical grievances	11%	11%	10%	12%	11%	10%	11%	14%	12%	7%	13%	11%	14%	6%
Events that occur in other countries	8%	7%	9%	6%	8%	7%	10%	11%	9%	7%	8%	15%	9%	2%

Table 15: Socio-demographic analysis of sources of religious tension, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Traditionalists were considerably more likely to cite ignorance about the tenets of other religions at 34%, compared to 20% each among Christians and Muslims. Muslims were more likely to cite the utterances of religious clerics at 22%, compared to 15% of Christians. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference across the leading sources.

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Traditionalists were considerably more likely to cite ignorance about the tenets of other religions at 34%, compared to 20% each among Christians and Muslims. Muslims were more likely to cite the utterances of religious clerics at 22%, compared to 15% of Christians. Regarding educational attainment, a notable pattern emerges: more educated respondents were more likely to locate the source of religious tension in the actions of politicians (28%), whereas those with lower educational qualifications were more likely to attribute it to the utterances of religious clerics (22%).

**In your opinion, what is the greatest sources of religious tension in the country today?
by National Average, Religion & Educational Level**

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
The actions of politicians	26%	29%	23%	24%	21%	28%
Ignorance about the tenets (principle or belief) of the other religion	20%	20%	20%	34%	20%	20%
The utterances of religious clerics	18%	15%	22%	17%	22%	17%
Inherited bias about the other religion	17%	16%	18%	11%	16%	17%
Historical grievances	11%	11%	11%	3%	12%	10%
Events that occur in other countries	8%	9%	6%	11%	9%	8%

Table 16: Socio-demographic analysis of sources of religious tension, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.3.8 Sources of Political Tension

On the sources of political tension, the ambition of individual politicians ranked first at 34%, followed by competition over control of natural resources (15%), lack of neutral electoral rules and processes (13%), and competition for access to public resources (12%). The persistent dominance of political ambition suggests a pervasive perception among citizens that political elites are the primary architects of division and tension in Nigeria.




Figure 70: Sources of political tension in Nigeria

Across geopolitical zones, the North East recorded the highest citation of ambition of individual politicians at 52%, considerably above the national average of 34%, while the South East recorded the lowest at 23%. The South East and South-South recorded the highest citation of lack of neutral electoral rules at 18% each, compared to 10% in the North Central. Respondents aged 35 to 44 were most likely to cite the ambition of individual politicians at 36%, compared to 28% among those aged 45 to 54. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

**In your opinion, what are the greatest sources of political tension in the country today?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
The ambition of individual politicians	34%	35%	33%	35%	31%	36%	28%	34%	30%	52%	28%	23%	30%	37%
Competition over control of natural resources	15%	15%	15%	13%	16%	15%	15%	14%	16%	15%	15%	19%	14%	13%
Lack of neutral electoral rules & processes	13%	13%	13%	11%	15%	12%	13%	17%	10%	11%	12%	18%	18%	12%
Competition for access to public resources	12%	13%	12%	12%	11%	13%	15%	13%	13%	9%	16%	14%	11%	10%
The desire to support one's identity group at all cost	12%	10%	13%	14%	13%	10%	14%	7%	14%	6%	13%	13%	13%	12%
The fear of losing and being at the mercy of one's rival	8%	9%	8%	8%	9%	8%	10%	8%	9%	5%	11%	7%	7%	10%
Partisan involvement of police & army in elections	6%	5%	6%	7%	5%	6%	5%	7%	8%	2%	5%	6%	7%	6%

Table 17: Socio-demographic analysis of sources of political tension, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Muslims were more likely to cite the ambition of individual politicians at 36%, compared to 31% of Christians. Traditionalists cited lack of neutral electoral rules and processes at 33%, considerably higher than Christians (15%) and Muslims (11%). On educational attainment, there was no significant difference across the leading sources.

In your opinion, what is the greatest sources of political tension in the country today?

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional /Others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
The ambition of individual politicians	34%	31%	36%	16%	35%	33%
Competition over control of natural resources	15%	16%	14%	11%	14%	15%
Lack of neutral electoral rules & processes	13%	15%	11%	33%	12%	14%
Competition for access to public resources	12%	12%	13%	16%	13%	12%
The desire to support one's identity group at all cost	12%	13%	11%	14%	11%	12%
The fear of losing and being at the mercy of one's rival	8%	7%	11%	0%	8%	9%
Partisan involvement of police & army in elections	6%	6%	4%	10%	7%	5%

Table 18: Socio-demographic analysis of sources of political tension, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.4 Assessment of “Civic Participation” as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines the concept of ‘Civic Participation’ as a component of social cohesion in Nigeria. It assesses citizens’ cooperation with people from other ethnic groups, their willingness to sacrifice for the collective good, their readiness to cooperate for a more united Nigeria, their willingness to participate in the political process, and their willingness to join the military in defense of the country.

6.4.1 Involvement in any Cooperation with Citizens from other Ethnic Groups

Respondents were asked whether they are in any form of cooperation with citizens from other ethnic groups. The 2026 survey data show that 72% of respondents said yes, while 28% said no. This is a marginal improvement from 71% in 2025, suggesting that cross-ethnic cooperation remains broadly stable. A youth leader and lecturer from Kwara State, reflecting on his own approach to inter-ethnic association, observed:

‘I identify first and foremost as a Nigerian. I am from Kwara State, but I see myself as belonging to Nigeria as a whole. The major problem tearing Nigeria apart is ethnic and regional loyalty. Many people prefer to associate only with people from their own tribe.’ (KII with Youth Leader/Lecturer, Kwara State, 2026)




Figure 71: Involvement in any cooperation with citizens from other ethnic groups

Across geopolitical zones, the North Central (85%) and South West (85%) recorded the highest levels of cross-ethnic cooperation, followed by the South-South at 80%. The North West recorded the lowest at 52%, with 48% of North West respondents reporting no cooperation with citizens from other ethnic groups. A journalist from Borno State, reflecting on cross-ethnic mobility and association, noted:

'I can leave here and go to Lagos or Kaduna and I can stay because anywhere I go I'll be recognized as a citizen.' (KII with Journalist, Borno State, 2026)

Respondents aged 55 and above were most likely to report cross-ethnic cooperation at 76%, compared to 70% among those aged 45 to 54. Male respondents were slightly more likely to report cooperation at 74%, compared to 71% among female respondents.




Figure 72: Socio-demographic analysis of respondents' involvement in any cooperation with citizens from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Looking at religious groups, Christians were most likely to report cross-ethnic cooperation at 78%, compared to 65% of Muslims and 63% of Traditionalists. The pattern by educational attainment mirrors this finding: respondents with secondary education and above recorded a higher rate of cooperation at 75%, compared to 63% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Are you in any form of cooperation with citizens from other ethnic groups?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 73: Socio-demographic analysis of respondents’ involvement in any cooperation with citizens from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.4.2 Willingness to Sacrifice for the Collective Good of the Nation

Respondents were asked how willing they are to sacrifice or give up something of interest to them for the collective good of the nation. A total of 71% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, while 19% were unwilling and 10% were indifferent. This represents a marginal improvement from 68% in 2025. Despite the economic hardships many Nigerians face, a majority remain willing to make sacrifices for the country. A youth leader from Ekiti State noted that such willingness is conditional on good governance:

‘Collective sacrifice is necessary for national development. However, people will be more willing to sacrifice when there is trust in leadership, transparency, and accountability in governance.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Ekiti State, 2026)

However, not all respondents shared this willingness. A senior lecturer from Ekiti State expressed a contrary position that reflects the sentiments of the 19% who said they are unwilling:

‘Everybody should run his own race. I’m a proud Nigerian, but I can’t sacrifice my life or my belongings for the nation. I cannot sacrifice my life or the life of any of my children for Nigeria despite the love I have for the nation.’ (KII with Senior Lecturer, Ekiti State, 2026)

A barrister from Niger State offered a sharper perspective, pointing to the asymmetry between the sacrifices of ordinary citizens and the conduct of elites:

‘We’ve been sacrificing for this country, especially the common man, because this elite doesn’t make any sacrifices. They are just benefitting from our tax payers money.’ (KII with Barrister, Niger State, 2026)

How willing are you to “sacrifice or give up something of interest to you” for the collective good of the nation?




Figure 74: Willingness of Nigerians to sacrifice or give up their interest for the collective good of the country

The North Central recorded the highest willingness to sacrifice at 83%, followed by the South-South and North East both at 73%. The South West recorded the lowest at 63%. Among age groups, older respondents aged 55 and above were most willing at 76%, while those aged 35 to 44 recorded the lowest at 68%. Willingness did not vary significantly by gender.

How willing are you to “sacrifice or give up something of interest to you” for the collective good of the nation? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 75: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness of Nigerians to sacrifice or give up their interest for the collective good of the country, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

The most striking religious finding is among Traditionalists, who recorded a willingness of only 38%, considerably below Christians and Muslims who both recorded 71%. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were more willing at 72%, compared to 64% among those with lower educational qualifications.

How willing are you to “sacrifice or give up something of interest to you” for the collective good of the nation? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 76: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness of Nigerians to sacrifice or give up their interest for the collective good of the country, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.4.3 Willingness to Co-operate with other Fellow Citizens to Work for a More United Nigeria

Respondents were asked how willing they are to cooperate with people from other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria. A total of 77% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, while 13% were unwilling and 10% were indifferent. Comparing with previous survey waves, willingness to cooperate for national unity increased from 63% in 2021 to a peak of 79% in 2025, declining marginally to 77% in 2026. A youth leader from Niger State expressed this spirit of national commitment:

‘I’m ready to make sacrifices for my country Nigeria. We don’t have any country to call our own. Nigeria is our country irrespective of how bad it is.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Niger State, 2026)

A journalist from Osun State similarly reflected on his own choice to remain and contribute to Nigeria rather than seek opportunities abroad:

‘I love Nigeria so much. I had an opportunity to migrate to some other country when I graduated in 2011. But I am someone that love Nigeria so much though I am not really comfortable. I don’t like the idea of contributing to the development of some other country.’ (KII with Journalist, Osun State, 2026)

How willing are you to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria?




Figure 77: Extent Nigerians are willing to work with fellow citizens for a more united Nigeria

Geopolitically, the North Central recorded the highest willingness to cooperate for national unity at 89%, followed by the South-South at 82% and the North East at 80%. The South West was least willing at 70%. Older respondents aged 55 and above were most willing at 82%, compared to 74% among those aged 35 to 44. There was no significant difference by gender.

**How willing are you to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 78: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent Nigerians are willing to work with fellow citizens for a more united Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

A notable gap emerges by religion: while Christians (78%) and Muslims (76%) recorded broadly high levels of willingness to cooperate, Traditionalists recorded only 51%. Respondents with secondary education and above were more willing at 79%, compared to 72% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**How willing are you to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 79: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent Nigerians are willing to work with fellow citizens for a more united Nigeria, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.4.4 Willingness to Participate in the Political Process to Make Nigeria a Better Place

Respondents were asked how willing they are to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all. A total of 73% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, compared to 76% in 2025. The proportion unwilling stands at 16%, with 11% indifferent. While willingness to participate has declined marginally from its 2025 peak, it remains considerably higher than in 2021 (62%) and 2022 (65%), indicating a sustained increase in civic engagement over time. A legal practitioner from Katsina State cautioned that individual willingness is not sufficient without collective action:

'Of course, I'll be willing to do so, but the problem is if you as an individual give up something of importance to you and other members of the society didn't do same, the effort will be in vain. If most Nigerians are willing, we will do it together.' (KII with Legal Practitioner, Katsina State, 2026)

How willing are you to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all?




Figure 80: Extent to which Nigerians are willing to participate in political processes

The North Central stood out with the highest willingness to participate in the political process at 86%, followed by the North East at 78% and the South-South at 77%. The South West and South East recorded comparatively lower levels at 68% and 69% respectively. Respondents aged 45 to 54 were most willing at 76%, compared to 71% among those aged 15 to 24. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

**How willing are you to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 81: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent to which Nigerians are willing to participate in political processes, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Among religious groups, Traditionalists recorded the lowest willingness to participate in the political process at 48%, compared to 75% of Christians and 72% of Muslims. Educational attainment also matters: those with secondary education and above were more willing at 75%, compared to 67% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**How willing are you to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 82: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent to which Nigerians are willing to participate in political processes, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.4.5 Willingness to Join the Military to Defend the Nigerian State

Respondents were asked how willing they are to join the military, if called upon, to defend the Nigerian state. A total of 48% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, while 40% were unwilling and 12% were indifferent. This is the only civic participation question where a substantial proportion of respondents are unwilling, reflecting the particular nature of military service as a sacrifice. Willingness has declined marginally from 50% in 2025 to 48% in 2026, returning to the same level recorded in 2019. An Osun State community leader spoke directly to this willingness:

‘Of course, I will be able to do it. What people don’t understand about life is that people feel war is bad. War is not bad. Every nation went through these challenges and people of that time took part in those things including picking up arms.’ (KII with Community Leader, Osun State, 2026)

Among those less willing to join the military directly, a religious leader from Rivers State articulated an alternative form of civic defence:

‘I wouldn’t join the police force or the military, rather I can offer credible or valuable information regarding what’s happening in my locality. If they need support in terms of shelter, that’s as much as an average man can do.’ (KII with Religious Leader, Rivers State, 2026)




Figure 83: Extent to which Nigerians are willing to join the Military to defend the Nigerian State

The North Central recorded the highest willingness to join the military at 60%, followed by the North East at 57%. The South East recorded the lowest willingness at 40%, with 47% of South East respondents unwilling. A youth leader from Enugu State offered a sharp explanation for this reluctance in the South East:

'I am Biafra by blood and Nigerian by birth. I can give up my life in support of Biafra but you see that Nigeria, I can not.' (KII with Youth Leader, Enugu State, 2026)

Male respondents were more willing than female respondents at 50% and 46% respectively. Across age categories, respondents aged 15 to 24 were most willing at 51%, declining to 44% among those aged 55 and above.




Figure 84: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent to which Nigerians are willing to join the Military to defend the Nigerian State, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Willingness to join the military was broadly similar across religious groups, with Christians and Muslims both recording 48% and Traditionalists recording 41%. Educational attainment produced no significant difference, with both secondary educated (48%) and lower educated (48%) respondents recording the same level of willingness.

**How willing are you to join the military, if called upon, to defend the Nigerian state?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 85: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent to which Nigerians are willing to join the Military to defend the Nigerian State, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5 Assessment of “Tolerance” as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines ‘Tolerance’ as a component of social cohesion in Nigeria. It assesses citizens’ regular association with people from other ethnic groups, the nature of those associations, their support for inter-ethnic, inter-faith and inter-regional marriages, their willingness to coexist peacefully, to vote across identity lines, and to accept people from other states as equals.

6.5.1 Associate Regularly in your Daily Life with People from other Ethnic Groups

Respondents were asked whether they associate regularly in their daily life with people from other ethnic groups. The 2026 survey data shows that 89% said yes, while 5% said no and 6% declined to respond. This represents a marginal decline from 91% in 2025, though the overwhelming majority of Nigerians continue to associate across ethnic lines in their daily lives. A youth leader and lecturer from Kwara State, who described himself as identifying first as a Nigerian, observed:

‘As for me, I have friends from different tribes, including Igbo and Hausa. We have worked together on research and contributed to national development. I do not limit myself to my ethnic group.’ (KII with Youth Leader/Lecturer, Kwara State, 2026)

Do you associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups?




Figure 86: Daily life association with people from other ethnic groups

The North East recorded the highest rate of cross-ethnic association at 99%, followed by the North Central at 96%, the South West at 94% and the South-South at 93%. The South East recorded the lowest at 75%, with 11% reporting no cross-ethnic association. Male respondents were slightly more likely to associate at 90%, compared to 88% among female respondents. Respondents aged 25 to 34 were most likely to associate at 91%, compared to 87% among those aged 15 to 24 and 45 to 54.

Do you associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 87: Socio-demographic analysis of the daily life association with people from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the lowest rate of cross-ethnic association at 61%, considerably below Christians at 91% and Muslims at 87%. This is a notable gap that warrants attention. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above recorded higher cross-ethnic association at 91%, compared to 84% among those with lower educational qualifications.

Do you associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 88: Socio-demographic analysis of the daily life association with people from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

Among the 5% who said they do not associate regularly with people from other ethnic groups, the leading reasons cited were: geographic distance (38%), communication challenges (21%), perceptions of insecurity (19%), cultural incompatibility (12%), and personal dislike (10%).

Why don't you associate regularly with people from other ethnic groups?




Figure 89: Reasons for not associating regularly with people from other ethnic groups

Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were more likely to cite cultural incompatibility (26%) and personal dislike (19%) than older respondents. Traditionalists were notably more likely to cite communication challenges at 45%, compared to 14% among Christians and 26% among Muslims.

**Why don't you associate regularly with people from other ethnic groups?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
They reside far from my location	38%	38%	37%	26%	36%	41%	41%	51%	70%	77%	36%	34%	39%	37%
We experience communication challenges	21%	24%	19%	16%	14%	22%	31%	25%	10%	23%	28%	19%	11%	17%
I perceive them as unsafe	19%	17%	21%	13%	25%	20%	13%	18%	0%	0%	25%	28%	11%	0%
I do not appreciate their cultural practices	12%	15%	10%	26%	11%	9%	10%	6%	20%	0%	5%	7%	23%	29%
I have a strong personal dislike toward them	10%	6%	13%	19%	14%	8%	5%	0%	0%	0%	6%	12%	16%	17%

Table 19: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons for not associating regularly with people from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**Why don't you associate regularly with people from other ethnic groups?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
They reside far from my location	38%	39%	36%	37%	42%	35%
We experience communication challenges	21%	14%	26%	45%	22%	20%
I perceive them as unsafe	19%	17%	22%	18%	21%	18%
I do not appreciate their cultural practices	12%	16%	9%	0%	7%	15%
I have a strong personal dislike toward them	10%	14%	7%	0%	8%	12%

Table 20: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons for not associating regularly with people from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.2 Capacity to Associate Regularly in your Daily Life with People from other Ethnic Groups

Among the 89% who reported cross-ethnic association, respondents were asked in what capacity they associate. Business emerged as the leading mode at 69%, followed by work at 61%, living as neighbours at 56%, and hanging out as friends at 46%. Compared with 2025, working together recorded the largest increase, rising from 49% to 61%, suggesting growing professional integration across ethnic lines. Marriage as a mode of cross-ethnic association remains low at 2%.

If yes, in what capacity do you associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups?




Figure 90: Capacity of regular association with people from other ethnic groups

The sharpest contrast is geographic. The South West led on work (82%) and neighbours (72%), while the South-South recorded the highest friendship association at 60%, followed by the South West at 55% and the North Central at 54%. The South East recorded the lowest on all three, with neighbours at 40% and friendship at just 26%, suggesting cross-ethnic ties there are narrower and less socially embedded. Males were more likely than females to associate through business (71% vs 66%) and work (64% vs 59%). By age, the oldest respondents led on business (76%) and neighbours (65%); the youngest were most likely to associate as friends (50%).

If yes, in what capacity do you associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
I do business with them	69%	71%	66%	58%	67%	69%	75%	76%	69%	56%	62%	65%	79%	79%
I work with them	61%	64%	59%	52%	61%	64%	60%	63%	62%	63%	49%	45%	62%	82%
I live beside them	56%	54%	57%	57%	56%	52%	59%	65%	64%	47%	48%	40%	53%	72%
I hang out with them as friends	46%	46%	45%	50%	43%	45%	49%	48%	54%	40%	35%	26%	60%	55%
We are married to them	2%	1%	2%	3%	2%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	2%	1%	2%	2%

Table 21: Socio-demographic analysis of the capacity of regular association with people from other ethnic groups, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were most likely to associate through business (79%), but least likely to associate through work (49%) and friendship (43%), suggesting their cross-ethnic ties are predominantly transactional. Christians were most likely to hang out as friends at 50%, compared to 40% of Muslims. Regarding educational attainment, those with secondary education and above recorded a higher rate of work-based association at 63%, compared with 58% among those with lower educational qualifications.

If yes, in what capacity do you associate regularly in your daily life with people from other ethnic groups? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
I do business with them	69%	71%	66%	79%	62%	71%
I work with them	61%	63%	60%	49%	58%	63%
I live beside them	56%	57%	53%	54%	48%	58%
I hang out with them as friends	46%	50%	40%	43%	38%	48%
We are married to them	2%	1%	2%	0%	1%	2%

Table 22: Socio-demographic analysis of the capacity of regular association with people from other ethnic groups by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.3 Support of Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Religious Marriages

6.5.3.1 Support of Inter-Ethnic Marriages

Respondents were asked whether they would support marriage between two people from different ethnic groups. A total of 89% expressed support in 2026, compared to 91% in 2025. The trend remains broadly positive, rising from 79% in 2019 to a peak of 91% in 2025 before declining marginally.




Figure 91: Willingness to support inter-ethnic marriages

The North East recorded the highest support at 99%, followed by the South-South at 95% and the North Central at 93%. The South East recorded the lowest at 74%. Male respondents were slightly more likely to express support at 91%, compared to 88% among female respondents. Respondents aged 55 and above recorded the lowest support at 84%, compared to 91% among those aged 25 to 34.




Figure 92: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to support inter-ethnic marriages, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Support for inter-ethnic marriage was high across religious groups: Christians at 90%, Muslims at 89% and Traditionalists at 78%. Traditionalists were the only group where a notable minority (22%) expressed opposition. On educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above recorded higher support at 91%, compared to 84% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Would you support marriage based on the following?
Marriage between two people from different ethnic groups
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 93: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to support inter-ethnic marriages, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.3.2 Support of Inter-Faith Marriages

Support for marriages between people of different faiths was considerably lower than for inter-ethnic marriages. A total of 62% expressed support in 2026, compared to 64% in 2025. The trend shows a consistent increase from 55% in 2019, with a slight decline in 2026.

**Would you support marriage based on the following?
Marriage between two people from different religions (e.g., Christian and Muslim)**




Figure 94: Willingness to support inter-religious marriages

The South West recorded the highest support at 81%, while the South East recorded the lowest at 48%. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were least likely to support inter-faith marriage at 52%, compared to 65% among those aged 35 to 44. The contrast between high inter-ethnic and relatively lower inter-faith support points to religion as a more sensitive boundary than ethnicity in Nigerian social life.

**Would you support marriage based on the following?
Marriage between two people from different religions (e.g., Christian and Muslim)
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 95: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to support inter-religious marriages, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Support was broadly similar across religious groups: Muslims at 64%, Christians at 61% and Traditionalists at 60%, suggesting that members of all three faith traditions are largely open to inter-faith unions. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were slightly more likely to support inter-faith marriage at 63%, compared to 60% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Would you support marriage based on the following?
Marriage between two people from different religions (e.g., Christian and Muslim)
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 96: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to support inter-religious marriages, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.3.3 Support of Inter-Regional Marriages

Support for marriages across geopolitical zones stood at 84% in 2026, compared to 86% in 2025 and 82% in 2022.




Figure 97: Willingness to support marriages from different geopolitical regions

The North East recorded the highest support at 94%, followed by the South-South at 88% and the North Central at 87%. The South East again recorded the lowest at 67%. There was no significant difference across gender and age categories.




Figure 98: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to support marriages from different geopolitical regions by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Respondents with secondary education and above were more likely to support inter-regional marriage at 86%, compared to 78% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Would you support marriage based on the following?
Marriage across geopolitical zones (e.g., South-East and North-East)
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 99: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to support marriages from different geopolitical regions by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.4 Willingness to Co-exist Peacefully as Equals with Citizens of Other Identities

Respondents were asked how willing they are to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities. A total of 81% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, while 10% were unwilling and 9% were indifferent. This represents a marginal decline from 84% in 2025. A barrister from Borno State captured the spirit of peaceful coexistence even amidst division:

'Now everybody has understood that it's not a religion or something that wanted to divide us. I'm a Muslim and a non-Muslim has also understood that it's not just Muslims they are attacking and killing, it affects both Christians and Muslims. So now I believe we've understood each other and are uniting with each other.' (KII with Barrister, Borno State, 2026)

How willing are you to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities?




Figure 100: Willingness to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities

The North Central recorded the highest willingness at 90%, followed by the South-South at 85%. The South East and South West both recorded the lowest willingness at 76%. However, their unwillingness profiles differ: the South West recorded 16% unwilling while the South East recorded 9% unwilling, with the South East having a higher proportion of indifferent respondents at 15%. Older respondents aged 55 and above were most willing at 89%, while those aged 35 to 44 recorded the lowest at 77%. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

How willing are you to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 101: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Willingness to coexist was broadly similar across religious groups: Christians at 82%, Muslims at 80%, and Traditionalists at 81%. However, less-educated respondents were less willing, at 75%, compared to 83% among those with secondary education and above.

How willing are you to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 102: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to coexist peacefully as equals with citizens of other identities, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.5 Willingness to Vote for Someone from Another Identity group or Grounds of Merit

Respondents were asked whether they would be willing to vote for someone from another identity group, including religion, ethnicity, socio-political affiliation and gender, on grounds of merit. A total of 72% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, compared to 78% in 2025. The 6-percentage point decline from 2025 is notable, suggesting a modest retreat from cross-identity electoral openness.

Would you be willing, on grounds of merit, to vote for someone from another identity group such as; (Religion, Ethnic, Social-political and Gender) against someone from your own identity group?




Figure 103: Willingness to vote for someone from another identity group on the grounds of merit

The North Central recorded the highest willingness at 83%, followed by the South-South at 77% and the North East at 74%. The North West and South West both recorded the lowest at 68%. Older respondents aged 55 and above were most willing at 77%, while those aged 35 to 44 were least willing at 70%. There was no significant difference across gender categories.

Would you be willing, on grounds of merit, to vote for someone from another identity group such as; (Religion, Ethnic, Social-political and Gender) against someone from your own identity group?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 104: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for someone from another identity group on the grounds of merit, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more willing at 75%, compared to 70% of Muslims. Traditionalists recorded the lowest willingness at 59%, though notably 33% of Traditionalists were indifferent rather than actively unwilling, which is the highest indifference rate across all groups. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were more willing at 75%, compared to 66% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Would you be willing, on grounds of merit, to vote for someone from another identity group such as; (Religion, Ethnic, Social-political and Gender) against someone from your own identity group?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 105: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for someone from another identity group on the grounds of merit, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.5.6 Willingness to Accept People who are not from your State as Equals in your State of Origin

Respondents were asked how willing they are to accept people who are not originally from their state as equals in their state of origin. A total of 77% said they are extremely or somewhat willing, while 11% were unwilling and 12% were indifferent. This represents a marginal decline from 79% in 2025. A journalist from Osun State spoke directly to the challenge of being accepted as an equal in another state:

'If you go to Lagos, you will see a lot of Igbos being victimized. And these are people that have spent most of their lifetime in Lagos being treated as outcasts and this was not the case in the past.' (KII with Journalist, Osun State, 2026)

How willing are you to accept people who are not from your state as equals in your state of origin?




Figure 106: Willingness to accept people who are not from your state as equals

The North Central recorded the highest willingness at 84%, followed by the South-South and South East at 80% and 79% respectively. The North East, North West and South West recorded comparatively lower levels at 74%, 75% and 74% respectively. Female respondents were slightly more willing at 78%, compared to 75% among male respondents. Older respondents aged 55 and above were most willing at 80%, while those aged 35 to 44 were least willing at 74%.

**How willing are you to accept people who are not from your state as equals in your state of origin?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 107: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to accept people who are not from your state as equals by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Willingness to accept non-state residents was broadly similar across religious groups: Traditionalists at 79%, Christians at 78% and Muslims at 74%. Those with secondary education and above were more willing at 79%, compared to 71% among those with lower educational qualifications. A youth leader from Katsina State captured the spirit of acceptance that many respondents aspire to:

'If it will help, why not. All we want is the betterment of the country.' (KII with Youth Leader, Katsina State, 2026)

**How willing are you to accept people who are not from your state as equals in your state of origin?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 106: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to accept people who are not from your state as equals, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6 Assessment of “Gender Equity, Disability & Inclusion” as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines citizens’ perceptions of gender equity and disability inclusion in Nigeria. It covers views on equal access to education, women’s leadership, merit-based hiring, family inheritance rights, cross-state marriage rights, government efforts on gender equity and disability, sexual and gender-based violence, willingness to vote for women in political office, women’s political participation, and income equality.

6.6.1 Gender Equity and Equal Access to Education

Respondents were asked the extent to which they agree that boys and girls should have equal access to education. A total of 84% agreed in 2026, comprising 31% who agreed and 53% who strongly agreed, while only 12% disagreed. The level of agreement has remained broadly consistent across survey waves, indicating a strong and stable social consensus on equal educational access. A senior lecturer from Ekiti State, however, noted the gap between this expressed support and the reality on the ground:

'Nigeria is far from gender equity. There is still sharp disparity between male and female in terms of access to education considering enrolment and employment status.' (KII with Senior Lecturer, Ekiti State, 2026)

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Boys and girls should have equal access to education**




Figure 107: Gender equity and equal access to education

The South West recorded the highest agreement at 91%, followed by the North Central at 90% and the South-South at 88%. The North West recorded the lowest at 78%, with 16% disagreeing. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were most likely to agree at 89%, while those aged 35 to 44 recorded the lowest at 82%. There was no significant difference across gender categories, with both male and female respondents recording 84%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Boys and girls should have equal access to education
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 108: Socio-demographic analysis of gender equity and equal access to education, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to agree at 88%, compared to 80% of Muslims and 67% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists also recorded the highest disagreement at 30%, indicating that traditional belief systems remain a significant barrier to acceptance of equal educational access. On educational attainment, respondents with secondary education and above were more likely to agree at 87%, compared to 75% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Boys and girls should have equal access to education
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 109: Socio-demographic analysis of gender equity and equal access to education, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.2 Gender Equity and Women Leadership

Respondents were asked whether they agree that women should be allowed to lead in all spheres, including society, corporate entities and politics. A total of 69% agreed in 2026, comprising 34% who agreed and 35% who strongly agreed, while 19% disagreed and 12% were indifferent. The 2026 figure is broadly consistent with 2025 (71%), suggesting relatively stable support for women’s leadership. A barrister from Niger State put the underlying resistance plainly:

‘The gap between the gender is very obvious that even the blind can see. There’s no gender equity in Nigeria, even in government they are not giving equal opportunity.’ (KII with Barrister, Niger State, 2026)

A youth leader from Niger State framed the challenge in terms of deeply entrenched social norms:

‘We live in a partaker society where the male role is dominant. We are yet to adopt the global civilisation of saying women can be given a chance. We are only attempting to give women roles of leadership, but absolutely we are not allowing them to operate.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Niger State, 2026)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Women should be allowed to lead in all, especially in the society, including in corporate entities, and politics




Figure 110: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women’s leadership

The North Central recorded the highest agreement at 79%, followed by the South East at 74% and the South-South at 73%. The North West recorded the lowest at 59%. Notably, female respondents were considerably more likely to agree at 74%, compared to 64% among male respondents, reflecting the personal stake women have in leadership inclusion. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 recorded the highest agreement at 75%.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Women should be allowed to lead in all, especially in the society, including in corporate entities, and politics. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 111: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women’s leadership, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to agree at 74%, compared to 62% of Muslims and 51% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists recorded the highest disagreement at 32%. Respondents with secondary education or above were more likely to agree, at 72%, compared with 58% among those with lower educational qualifications.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Women should be allowed to lead in all, especially in the society, including in corporate entities, and politics. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 112: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women’s leadership by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.3 Gender Equity and Merit

Respondents were asked whether they agree that Nigerians should stop thinking about whether people are male or female and instead focus on other characteristics such as qualifications, competence and track records. A total of 77% agreed in 2026, comprising 36% who agreed and 41% who strongly agreed. This represents a marginal decline from 79% in 2025. A youth leader and lecturer from Kwara State offered a balanced assessment of where Nigeria stands:

‘Gender equity has improved compared to the past, but it is still not where the government wants it to be. In education, especially in the South West (including Kwara), there is almost total equality.’ (KII with Youth Leader/Lecturer, Kwara State, 2026)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female, and focus on other characteristics such as: qualification, competence, and track records etc.




Figure 113: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and merit

The North Central recorded the highest agreement at 85%, followed by the South West at 84% and the South-South at 82%. The North East and North West recorded the lowest at 70% and 69% respectively. Respondents aged 15 to 24 were most likely to agree at 81%, compared to 76% among those aged 35 to 44. Female respondents were more likely to agree at 81%, compared to 74% among male respondents.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female, and focus on other characteristics such as: qualification, competence, and track records etc.

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 114: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on gender equity and merit by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were considerably more likely to agree at 83%, compared to 70% of Muslims and 60% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists reported the highest level of indifference at 27%, suggesting ambivalence rather than outright opposition. Those with secondary education or above were more likely to agree, at 82%, compared with 64% among those with lower educational qualifications.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female, and focus on other characteristics such as: qualification, competence, and track records etc.

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 115: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on gender equity and merit by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.4 Gender Equity and Women’s Entitlement to Family Inheritance

On women’s entitlement to family inheritances, 62% agreed in 2026, comprising 32% who agreed and 30% who strongly agreed, while 27% disagreed and 11% were indifferent. This represents a notable decline from 73% in 2025. A legal practitioner from Katsina State reflected on where gender equity gaps persist:

‘I don’t think Nigeria has any issues to gender equity when it comes to social life generally. The only area I feel like there’s no gender equity is politics, in the sense that there are no set-aside roles for women in politics.’ (KII with Legal Practitioner, Katsina State, 2026)

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Women should be allowed equal entitlement to family inheritances




Figure 116: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women’s entitlement to family inheritance

The South West recorded the highest agreement at 77%, followed by the South-South at 72% and the North Central at 69%. The North West recorded the lowest at 37%, with 50% disagreeing. Female respondents were considerably more likely to agree at 67%, compared to 57% among male respondents. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 recorded the highest agreement at 67%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women should be allowed equal entitlement to family inheritances**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 117: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women’s entitlement to family inheritance, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

The most striking religious finding is that Christians recorded agreement at 73%, considerably above Muslims at 46% and the national average. Muslims recorded the highest disagreement at 42%. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above recorded 67% agreement, compared to 46% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women should be allowed equal entitlement to family inheritances**

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 118: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women’s entitlement to family inheritance, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.5 Gender Equity and Women’s Equal Opportunity in Cross-State Marriages

When asked whether women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state of origin, 71% agreed in 2026, comprising 37% who agreed and 34% who strongly agreed, while 16% disagreed and 13% were indifferent. The 2025 figure was 73%, indicating a marginal decline.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state**




Figure 119: Perception of Nigerians on whether women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state

The North Central, South-South, and South West all recorded the highest agreement at 76%, tied at the top. The North East recorded the lowest at 63%, with 28% disagreeing. There was no significant difference across age categories. Female respondents were more likely to agree at 76%, compared to 67% among male respondents.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 120: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on whether women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to agree at 76%, compared to 66% of Muslims and 59% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists recorded the highest disagreement at 24%. The 20-percentage point gap between secondary-educated (76%) and lower-educated (56%) respondents is among the widest recorded across all gender equity statements, reinforcing that education is one of the most important variables in determining support for women’s cross-state rights.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 121: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on whether women who marry into other states should have equal opportunity in their husband’s state, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.6 Gender Equity and Women’s Right to Claim Benefits in Both States (Women’s and their Husband’s State of Origin)

Closely related to equal opportunity, respondents were also asked whether women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their state of origin and their husband’s state. A total of 66% agreed in 2026, compared to 68% in 2025, indicating a marginal decline. While support is slightly lower than for equal opportunity (71%), a clear majority of Nigerians back dual-state benefit entitlements for married women.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their own state of origin as well their husband’s state of origin




Figure 122: Perception of Nigerians on whether women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their state of origin as well their husband’s state of origin

The South West recorded the highest support at 71%, followed by the North Central at 70%. The South East recorded the lowest at 54%, with 32% disagreeing. Female respondents were more likely to agree at 70%, compared to 61% among male respondents. Among age groups, respondents aged 25 to 34 were most supportive at 68%, while those aged 55 and above recorded the lowest at 57%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their own state of origin as well their husband’s state of origin**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 123: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on whether women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their state of origin as well as their husband’s state of origin by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to agree at 68%, compared to 62% of Muslims and 59% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists recorded the highest disagreement at 30%. Those with secondary education and above were more likely to agree at 70%, compared to 52% among those with lower educational qualifications, an 18-percentage point gap consistent with the pattern seen across other cross-state marriage statements.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their own state of origin as well their husband’s state of origin**

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 124: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of Nigerians on whether women who marry into other states should be allowed to claim benefits in both their state of origin as well as their husband’s state of origin by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.7 Citizens' Perception of Federal Government Efforts at Promoting Gender Equity

Citizens were asked to rate the federal government's efforts at promoting gender equity. A total of 38% rated the efforts as poor or very poor, 31% as good or very good, and 31% as fair. This represents a marginal improvement from 2025, when 39% rated the efforts as poor or very poor and 28% as good or very good. The overall picture indicates that citizens remain broadly dissatisfied with the government's gender equity performance. An Ekiti State youth leader captured the gap between policy and practice:

'Gender equity remains limited, especially in leadership, politics, and income equality. Although there has been some progress, cultural norms still restrict access in some regions.' (KII with Youth Leader, Ekiti State, 2026)

How would you rate the efforts of the Federal government at promoting gender equity in the country?




Figure 125: Efforts of the current administration at promoting gender equity

The South East recorded the highest dissatisfaction, with 55% rating government efforts as poor or very poor, followed by the North Central at 44% and the South South at 42%. The North West recorded the highest positive rating at 38% good or very good. There was no significant difference across gender and age categories.

How would you rate the efforts of the Federal government at promoting gender equity in the country?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 126: Socio-demographic analysis of the efforts of the current administration at promoting gender equity by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more dissatisfied at 43% rating poor or very poor, compared to 34% of Muslims. Traditionalists were the most positive, with 49% rating the government’s efforts as good or very good. Regarding educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were slightly more dissatisfied, at 40%, compared with 37% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**How would you rate the efforts of the Federal government at promoting gender equity in the country?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 127: Socio-demographic analysis of the efforts of the current administration at promoting gender equity by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.8 Government Efforts at Promoting Disability Inclusion

On disability inclusion, 41% rated the efforts as poor or very poor in 2026, compared to 38% in 2025, indicating growing dissatisfaction. Only 30% rated government efforts as good or very good, while 25% were fair. A youth leader from Bauchi State captured the gap between stated commitment and practical delivery:

‘It’s more in words than in action. They say it. But even in structures that government constructs, they don’t comply with these things. I will say it’s more in words than in action.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Bauchi State, 2026)

How would you rate the effort of the current administration at promoting Disability inclusion in the country?




Figure 128: Rating the effort of the current administration at promoting disability in the country

The South East recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 53%, followed by the North Central at 48% and the South-South at 46%. The North West recorded the highest positive rating at 35% good or very good. There was no significant difference across gender categories. Among age groups, respondents aged 25 to 34 were the most dissatisfied, at 43% poor or very poor, while those aged 55 and above were the most positive, at 33% good or very good.

How would you rate the effort of the current administration at promoting Disability inclusion in the country? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 129: Socio-demographic analysis of the effort of the current administration at promoting disability in the country, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were most dissatisfied at 45% rating poor or very poor, followed by Traditionalists at 41% and Muslims at 35%. Notably, Traditionalists were the most likely to rate government efforts positively at 43% good or very good. A clergy member from Kwara State reframed the disability conversation in terms of potential rather than deficit:

'They are not disabled; they are only with disability because there is ability in disability. A person with disability can mobilise people. They can do things that people imagine they cannot do.' (KII with Clergy, Kwara State, 2026)

How would you rate the effort of the current administration at promoting Disability inclusion in the country? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 130: Socio-demographic analysis of the effort of the current administration at promoting disability in the country, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.9 Citizen’s Assessment of Government Efforts at Passing Laws to Protect Women and Girls

Citizens were asked to assess the current administration in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence. A total of 39% rated the government’s efforts as poor or very poor in 2026, up from 34% in 2025, indicating growing dissatisfaction, while 33% rated them as good or very good and 25% as fair. A journalist from Osun State captured the implementation gap that frustrates many citizens:

‘The problem with Nigeria is not ideas but implementation. The current government needs to do more. Nigerian politicians preach it but practice something else.’ (KII with Journalist, Osun State, 2026)

How would you assess the current administration in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence?




Figure 131: Efforts of the current administration in implementing policies on discrimination and violence

The North East was the most satisfied zone at 46% good or very good, in sharp contrast to the South East at 54% poor and the North Central at 44% poor. Female respondents were marginally more positive than males, with 35% rating efforts good or very good compared to 30% of males, a modest but notable finding given that women are the primary beneficiaries of these laws.

How would you assess the current administration in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 132: Socio-demographic analysis of the efforts of the current administration in implementing policies on discrimination and violence, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were the most positive religious group, at 45% good or very good, while Christians recorded the highest dissatisfaction, at 43% poor or very poor, compared with 33% among Muslims. On educational attainment, those with lower educational qualifications were marginally more likely to rate their educational attainment as good or very good, at 35%, compared to 32% among those with secondary education and above.

How would you assess the current administration in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence?

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 133: Socio-demographic analysis of the efforts of the current administration in implementing policies on discrimination and violence, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.10 Accessibility of Government Programmes to Persons with Disability

Regarding the accessibility of government programmes and projects for persons with disabilities, 40% rated accessibility as poor or very poor, 24% as fair, and 30% as good or very good, which is broadly consistent with the disability inclusion rating. An Enugu youth leader articulated the contradiction at the heart of the state’s relationship with persons with disability:

‘Nigerians are not being fair to them. No plans for them. In voting they will ask them to come and vote. After voting them in they will not have any provision for them.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Enugu State, 2026)

How accessible are Government programmes and projects to Persons with Disability?




Figure 134: Accessibility of government programmes to persons with disability

The North Central recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 51% poor or very poor, followed by the South East at 47%, and the South-South at 44%. The North West recorded the highest positive rating at 37% good or very good. Respondents aged 55 and above were most likely to rate accessibility positively at 36% good or very good, compared to 28% among those aged 15 to 24.

**How accessible are Government programmes and projects to Persons with Disability?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 135: Socio-demographic analysis of the accessibility of government programmes to persons with disability by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

By religion, Traditionalists were the most positive at 44% good or very good, followed by Muslims at 32%, while Christians recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 43% poor or very poor. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference, with both lower educated and secondary educated respondents recording 31% good or very good.

**How accessible are Government programmes and projects to Persons with Disability?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 136: Socio-demographic analysis of the accessibility of government programmes to persons with disability by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.11 Assessing the Effort of the Government at Creating Political Opportunities for Women

On providing opportunities for women in political and public appointments, 37% of citizens rated the government’s efforts as poor or very poor in 2026, up from 34% in 2025. Only 28% rated them as good or very good, while 35% rated them as fair. The pattern points to a specific gap in translating gender equity rhetoric into representational practice.

How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at providing more opportunities for women to be appointed into political offices?




Figure 137: Efforts of the current administration for women in political appointments

The South East recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 58% and the lowest fair rating at 18%, suggesting opinions there are polarized rather than uncertain, while the North Central also recorded high dissatisfaction at 45%. The North West and North East were the most positive at 31% and 30% good or very good respectively. Female respondents were marginally more positive than males (30% vs 26% good), and those aged 55 and above were the most positive age group at 32%, compared to 39% poor among those aged 25 to 34 and 45 to 54.

How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at providing more opportunities for women to be appointed into political offices?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 138: Socio-demographic analysis of efforts of the current administration for women in political appointments, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were the most dissatisfied at 42% poor or very poor, compared to 32% of Muslims and 38% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists were comparatively more positive at 38% good or very good. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference between those with secondary education and above (38% poor) and those with lower educational qualifications (38% poor).

How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at providing more opportunities for women to be appointed into political offices?

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 139: Socio-demographic analysis of efforts of the current administration for women in political appointments, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.12 Citizen’s Assessment of Government Efforts at Punishing SGBV Offenders

When asked to assess the current administration’s efforts at punishing sexual and gender-based violence offenders, 39% rated the government’s performance as poor or very poor in 2026, while 31% rated it as good or very good and 30% as fair. Compared with 2025, when 37% rated efforts as poor, dissatisfaction has edged up marginally. An Edo market leader captured the structural barriers that prevent survivors from seeking justice:

‘They will not push the case. If I decide to go for a lawyer, I don’t have the money. You will bribe. If I reason, I will tell myself the truth that it’s not necessary, let me rest.’ (KII with Market Leader, Edo State, 2026)

How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at punishing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) offenders?




Figure 140: Government efforts at punishing SGBV offenders

The North East was the most satisfied zone at 45% good or very good, while the South East recorded 57% dissatisfaction, the highest across this dimension. There was no significant difference across gender.

The sharpest age divide was between those aged 55 and above (37% good) and those aged 25 to 34 (28% good), with younger adults most likely to feel that perpetrators escape accountability.

How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at punishing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) offenders? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 141: Socio-demographic analysis of Government efforts at punishing SGBV offenders, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were the most dissatisfied at 44% poor or very poor, while Muslims recorded 33% and Traditionalists 32%. Traditionalists were the most positive at 41% good or very good. Regarding educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were slightly more dissatisfied, at 40%, compared with 36% among those with lower educational qualifications.

How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at punishing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) offenders? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 142: Socio-demographic analysis of Government efforts at punishing SGBV offenders, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.13 Citizen’s Assessment of Government Efforts at Preventing SGBV

On preventing sexual and gender-based violence, 36% of citizens rated the government’s efforts as good or very good in 2026, while 37% rated them as poor or very poor and 27% as fair. Compared with 2025, when 28% rated efforts as good, the 7-percentage-point improvement signals a modest but notable positive shift in public perception.

How would you rate the efforts of the Federal Government at preventing incidence of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)?




Figure 143: Government efforts at preventing SGBV

The North East led at 51% good or very good, while the South East recorded 54% dissatisfaction. Female respondents were marginally more positive than males (37% vs 34% good), and younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most positive age group at 37%.

How would you rate the efforts of the Federal Government at preventing incidences of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 144: Socio-demographic analysis of Government efforts at preventing SGBV, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were the most positive religious group at 48% good or very good, followed by Muslims at 39% and Christians at 33%. Christians recorded the highest dissatisfaction, at 41%, rated as poor or very poor. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference, with lower-educated respondents recording 36% good or very good, marginally above 35% among those with secondary education and above.

How would you rate the efforts of the Federal Government at preventing incidence of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 145: Socio-demographic analysis of Government efforts at preventing SGBV, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.14 Willingness to Vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria

A total of 60% of respondents said they would be willing to vote for a woman as President in 2026, down from 63% in 2025. While a majority expressed willingness, 32% were unwilling, and 8% were undecided. The decline signals a marginal pullback in support for women at the highest level of political office. A community leader from Osun State captured the structural deficit that makes this aspiration still distant from reality:

‘We do not have a single female governor in the 36 states of the country. And even if you have some ministers, some commissioners in the states, they are very few.’ (KII with Community Leader, Osun State, 2026)

Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria?




Figure 146: Willingness to vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria

The North East recorded the highest willingness at 76%, followed by the South West at 71% and the South-South at 67%. The North West (47%) and South East (43%) were the least willing, with the South East the only zone where those unwilling (45%) outnumbered those willing (43%). The gender gap was the most striking finding: female respondents were 19 percentage points more willing than male respondents (70% vs 51%), while older respondents aged 55 and above were the least willing, at 56%.

**Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 147: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more willing at 63%, compared to 58% of Muslims. Traditionalists recorded the lowest willingness at 24%, with a notably high indifference rate, suggesting neither active support nor strong opposition. Those with secondary education and above were marginally more willing at 61%, compared to 56% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 148: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for a Woman as the President of Nigeria by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.15 Willingness to Vote for a Woman as the Governor of the State

Willingness to vote for a woman as State Governor stood at 66% in 2026, down from 69% in 2025, with 28% unwilling. Support is consistently higher for the Governor than for the President, reflecting a pattern of greater comfort with women in sub-national rather than national leadership roles.




Figure 149: Willingness to vote for a Woman as the Governor of the State

The North East led at 82%, followed by the South West at 77% and the South-South at 71%. The North West (51%) remained among the least willing zones, alongside the South East at 54%. Younger respondents aged 25 to 34 were the most willing at 70%, while those aged 45 to 54 and 55 and above were jointly the least willing at 62%. The gender gap remained wide at 20 percentage points, with females at 76% and males at 56%.

Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the Governor of your state? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 150: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for a Woman as the Governor of the State, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more willing at 69%, compared to 63% of Muslims. Traditionalists recorded 35% willingness, considerably higher than at the presidential level (24%), but still the lowest among all religious groups. Those with secondary education and above were more willing at 68%, compared to 60% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the Governor of your state?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 151: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for a Woman as the Governor of the State, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.16 Willingness to Vote for a Woman as LGA Chairperson

Willingness to vote for a woman as LGA Chairperson was the highest across all three offices at 73%, down from 76% in 2025, with 21% unwilling. The consistent pattern across all three questions is that Nigerians are more willing to accept women in leadership as the office moves closer to the community level. Willingness rises 13 percentage points from the President (60%) to the LGA Chairperson (73%).

Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the Chairperson of your Local Government Area (LGA)?




Figure 152: Willingness to vote for a Woman as LGA Chairperson

The North East again recorded the highest willingness at 86%, followed by the South West at 83% and the South-South at 78%. The North West was the least willing at 60%. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 and 25 to 34 were the most willing at 76% and 77% respectively. The gender gap narrowed compared to higher offices, with females at 80% and males at 66%, a 14-percentage-point gap.

Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the Chairperson of your Local Government Area (LGA)?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 153: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for a Woman as LGA Chairperson, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded notably higher willingness at the LGA level (45%) than at the presidential (24%) or gubernatorial (35%) levels, reinforcing the pattern that community proximity increases acceptance of women in leadership. Christians reported a 77% willingness, compared to 69% among Muslims. Those with secondary education and above were more willing at 75%, compared to 65% among those with lower educational qualifications.

Would you be willing to vote for a Woman as the Chairperson of your Local Government Area (LGA)?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 154: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to vote for a Woman as LGA Chairperson, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.17 Citizens' Perception of Women's Participation in Politics

6.6.17.1 Women's Participation in Political Rallies

A total of 66% of respondents said women should often or always participate in political rallies in 2026, consistent with 66% in 2025; 41% said women should always participate, and 25% said often. Despite broad support for women's electoral presence, the finding that one-third of respondents either oppose or are indifferent to women's participation in rallies points to an enduring social ambivalence about women in active public political spaces. An Ekiti State youth leader summed up the structural reality behind this ambivalence:

'Institutionally, Nigeria is ready. However, social and cultural resistance, gender stereotypes, political party structures, and financial barriers still limit women's participation. We are not yet there socially and culturally.' (KII with Youth Leader, Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti State, 2026)

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Participation in a political rally**




Figure 155: Perception of women's participation in political rally

The South-South recorded the highest support at 80%, followed by the South East at 79%, and the South West and North Central both at 70%. The North West was the least supportive at 51%. Female respondents were more supportive than male respondents (72% vs 60%), and respondents aged 55 and above recorded the highest level of support at 71%.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Participation in a political rally. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 156: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women's participation in political rally, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more supportive at 72%, compared to 58% of Muslims and 63% of Traditionalists. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were considerably more supportive at 70%, compared to 55% among those with lower educational qualifications, a 15-percentage point gap.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Participation in a political rally. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 157: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women’s participation in political rallies, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.17.2 Women’s Participation in Voting Exercise during Elections

A total of 81% of respondents said women should often or always vote in 2026, consistent with 81% in 2025, with 56% saying 'always'. The near-universal consensus on women’s right to vote reflects a settled public norm, even where support for women in active political roles remains more contested.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Vote during elections**




Figure 158: Perception of women’s participation in voting during elections

The South-South led at 86%, followed by the South East and South West, both at 85%. The North West recorded the lowest at 78%, though even this represents a broad consensus. There was no significant difference across gender, with females at 83% and males at 81%. Respondents aged 55 and above were most supportive at 84%, while those aged 35 to 44 recorded the lowest at 78%.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Vote during elections. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 159: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women’s participation in voting during elections by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more supportive at 83%, compared to 80% of Muslims. Traditionalists recorded 65%, considerably below both groups and the national average, suggesting that for this community, even the most basic act of political participation by women remains contested. Those with secondary education and above were considerably more supportive at 85%, compared to 71% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Vote during elections. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 160: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women’s participation in voting during elections by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.17.3 Perception of Women’s Participation in Contesting Elections

Support for women contesting elections stood at 64% often or always in 2026, a marginal decline from 66% in 2025. The 17-percentage point drop from voting (81%) to contesting (64%) captures the distinction Nigerians draw between women as participants in elections and women as candidates, pointing to a hierarchy of acceptance in which presence is more tolerated than competition for power.

On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?

Contest during elections




Figure 161: Perception of women’s participation in contesting during elections

The South-South and South West recorded the highest support, both at 72%, while the North West was the least supportive at 52%, and the North Central at 62%. Female respondents were more supportive than males (71% vs 57%), a 14-percentage point gap, with respondents aged 55 and above the most supportive age group at 68%.

On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Contest during elections. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 162: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women’s participation in contesting during elections by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more supportive at 69%, compared to 58% of Muslims and 56% of Traditionalists. Those with secondary education and above were considerably more supportive at 68%, compared to 51% among those with lower educational qualifications, a 17-percentage point gap.

Contest during elections. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 163: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women’s participation in contesting during elections by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.17.4 Women and Political Party Leadership Positions

Support for women holding political party leadership positions stood at 64% “often” or “always” in 2026, marginally down from 65% in 2025. The finding mirrors the 64% of Nigerians who contest elections, suggesting that Nigerians view these two modes of assertive political engagement similarly. An Enugu youth leader captured the reality that women face when seeking substantive roles within party structures:

‘They have been cheating women in politics, women are not being allowed in certain positions. If you come to the House of Assembly or House of Senate you cannot count up to 10 women occupying a seat there.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Asata, Enugu State, 2026)

On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Hold political party leadership positions




Figure 164: Perception of women holding political positions in political parties

The South-South recorded the highest support at 73%, followed by the South West at 71% and the South East at 69%. The North West was the least supportive at 51%. Female respondents were considerably more supportive than male respondents (72% vs 57%), a 15-percentage-point gap. Respondents aged 55 and above were most supportive at 68%.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Hold political party leadership positions.
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 163: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women holding political positions in political parties by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more supportive at 69%, compared to 58% of Muslims and 59% of Traditionalists. Those with secondary education and above were more supportive at 69%, compared to 52% among those with lower educational qualifications, a 17-percentage-point gap consistent with the pattern seen in contesting elections.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?
Hold political party leadership positions. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 164: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women holding political positions in political parties by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.17.5 Women and Political Appointments in Government

Support for women holding political appointments in government stood at 67% ‘often’ or ‘always’ in 2026, a marginal decline from 69% in 2025. This is marginally higher than contesting and party leadership, suggesting that citizens are slightly more comfortable with women being appointed into government than with women competing for elected or party positions. A youth leader from Kebbi State reflected on the distance between aspiration and achievement:

'Nigeria is just trying its best to see that we have gender equity instead of gender equality. We have a long way to go. I was opportune to be one of the advocates of giving women a percentage of seats in parliament.' (KII with Youth Leader, Kebbi State, 2026)

On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Hold political appointments in the government




Figure 165: Perception of women having political appointments in government

The South-South recorded the highest support at 75%, followed by the South West at 74%, and the North East and South East at 71% each. The North West was the least supportive at 56%. Female respondents were more supportive than male respondents (74% vs 61%), a 13-percentage-point gap. Respondents aged 25 to 34 and 55 and above were jointly the most supportive at 69%.

On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Hold political appointments in the government. By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 166: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women having political appointments in government by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more supportive at 71%, compared to 62% of Muslims and 59% of Traditionalists. Those with secondary education and above were more supportive at 72%, compared to 55% among those with lower educational qualifications, a 17-percentage point gap.

On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Hold political appointments in the government. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 167: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of women having political appointments in government by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.18 Perception of Gender as a Factor in Income Determination

An overwhelming 76% of respondents said gender should not be a factor in determining income in 2026, compared to 71% in 2025 and 82% in 2022. Only 18% said yes. The consensus against gender-based income determination is one of the strongest single findings across the entire Gender Equity Sub-Index and has remained consistently high across survey waves.

Do you think gender should be a factor in determining income?




Figure 168: Citizens' perception of gender as a factor in income determination

The North Central recorded the highest rejection at 87%, followed by the South-South at 83% and the South East at 77%. The North East recorded the highest support for gender as an income factor at 27%, and the South West at 23%. There was no significant difference across gender, with females recording 78% No and males 75%. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most likely to reject gender as an income factor at 82%.

**Do you think gender should be a factor in determining income?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 169: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of citizens’ perception of gender as a factor in income determination, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians and Muslims recorded broadly similar rejection rates at 78% and 75%, respectively. Traditionalists recorded a considerably lower rejection rate of 50%, with a higher proportion of undecided responses than active support, suggesting ambivalence rather than a clear endorsement of gender-based income discrimination. There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with both lower-educated (75%) and secondary-educated (78%) respondents reporting high rejection.

**Do you think gender should be a factor in determining income?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 170: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of citizens’ perception of gender as a factor in income determination by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.19 Citizens’ Perception of Gender Equity and Income

6.6.19.1 Male Gender and Higher Income

Despite the broad consensus that gender should not determine income, 46% of respondents agreed that men should earn more than women in 2026, while 42% disagreed. This figure is unchanged from 2025, but the internal trend is notable: strongly disagree rose from 20% in 2025 to 27% in 2026, suggesting that active opposition to male income advantage is hardening even as overall agreement holds steady.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Men should earn a higher income than women**




Figure 171: Citizens’ perception of the male gender earning a higher income

The gender divide is the most telling finding: 55% of male respondents agreed that men should earn more, compared to only 37% of females, with a majority of women actively rejecting the statement (50%). The North West was most supportive at 57%, while the North East recorded the lowest support at 33%, with half its respondents disagreeing. Respondents aged 45 to 54 were the most likely to agree at 52%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Men should earn a higher income than women**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 172: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of the male gender earning a higher income by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Muslims were more likely to agree at 49%, compared to 43% of Christians and 42% of Traditionalists. Traditionalists recorded the highest disagreement at 52%. There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with lower-educated (45%) and secondary-educated (47%) respondents recording similarly divided responses.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Men should earn a higher income than women. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 173: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of the male gender earning a higher income by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.19.2 Female Gender and Higher Income

Only 17% of respondents agreed that women should earn more than men in 2026, while 65% disagreed. This is the lowest agreement recorded across all income equity statements. A Catholic youth leader from Anambra State captured the cultural norm that sustains this asymmetry:

‘In African culture, it is a taboo for a woman to earn more than a man. He will be feeling left out. Most times it brings disrespect from the part of the woman.’ (KII with Catholic Youth Leader, Anambra State, 2026)

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women should earn a higher income than men**




Figure 174: Citizens’ perception of the female gender earning a higher income

Agreement was broadly similar across zones, ranging from 17% in the North East and 15% in the South-South to 26% in the North West. Female respondents were more likely to agree than male respondents (23% vs 13%), reflecting greater openness among women to the idea of a female income advantage. Respondents aged 15 to 24 and 35 to 44 were jointly the most likely to agree at 19% each.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women should earn a higher income than men.

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 175: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of the female gender earning a higher income, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest agreement at 23%, compared to 19% of Christians and 15% of Muslims, suggesting that traditional belief systems are marginally more open to female income advantage than mainstream religious groups. Those with secondary education or above were more likely to agree, at 19%, compared with 14% among those with lower educational qualifications.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Women should earn a higher income than men. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 176: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of the female gender earning a higher income by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.19.3 Perception of Equal Incomes for Men and Women

In 2026, 64% of respondents agreed that men and women should earn equal incomes for the same positions, with 37% strongly agreeing and 21% disagreeing. Support has remained broadly stable, rising marginally from 63% in 2025, with disagreement level unchanged at 21%, suggesting that attitudes to equal pay are entrenched on both sides.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Men and Women should earn equal incomes for the same positions**




Figure 177: Citizens’ perception of equal income for Men and Women

The South West recorded the highest agreement at 74%, while the North Central, South East, South-South, and North West all recorded between 62% and 63%. Female respondents were considerably more likely to agree than males (69% vs 58%), an 11-percentage-point gap that reinforces the view that women are more consistent advocates for income equity than men. Respondents aged 55 and above recorded the highest agreement at 66%, while those aged 15 to 24 recorded the lowest at 60%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Men and Women should earn equal incomes for the same positions**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 178: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of equal income for Men and Women by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were marginally more supportive at 66%, compared to 61% of Muslims and 58% of Traditionalists. On educational attainment, those with secondary education and above were more likely to agree at 69%, compared to 50% among those with lower educational qualifications, a 19-percentage point gap.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
Men and Women should earn equal incomes for the same positions**

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 179: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of equal income for Men and Women by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.6.19.4 Perception that People Should be Paid According to their Competence Regardless of Gender

The strongest agreement across all four income equity statements was for skills- and competence-based pay: 74% agreed that people should be paid according to their competence, regardless of gender, in 2026, with 40% strongly agreeing and only 15% disagreeing. This reinforces the principle that Nigerians broadly prefer competence-based systems, even where gender-based attitudes persist in practice.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
People should be paid according to competence**




Figure 180: Perception that people should be paid according to competence

The North Central recorded the highest agreement at 88%, followed by the South East at 81% and the South-South at 78%. The South West recorded the lowest at 67%. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most supportive at 83%, while those aged 35 to 44 were the least supportive at 71%. There was no significant difference across gender, with males at 75% and females at 76%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
People should be paid according to competence**

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 181: Socio-demographic analysis of the Perception that people should be paid according to competence by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Agreement was broadly consistent across religious groups, with Christians at 77%, Muslims at 72%, and Traditionalists at 71%, indicating that skills-based pay commands wide cross-faith consensus. Those with secondary education or above were more likely to agree, at 77%, compared with 69% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?
People should be paid according to competence. By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 182: Socio-demographic analysis of the Perception that people should be paid according to competence by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.7 Assessment of “Trust” as Component of Social Cohesion

Trust is a foundational element of social cohesion: where citizens lack confidence in their institutions, the social contract weakens, and the bonds that hold communities together erode. The 2026 survey assessed the extent of trust Nigerians have in 14 institutions and groups, ranging from governmental and law enforcement bodies to religious and traditional leaders, as well as people of other ethnic and religious identities. The findings reveal a society in which formal institutions are broadly distrusted while community and social leaders command considerably higher public confidence.

6.7.1 Trust in Government and Institutions in Nigeria

The 2026 survey assessed the extent of trust citizens have in fourteen institutions and groups in Nigeria. The findings reveal a consistent divide between community and social institutions, which attract higher trust, and governmental and law enforcement bodies, which remain deeply distrusted. Religious leaders were the most trusted at 51%, with 18% expressing a lot of trust, the highest across all institutions.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following...?




Figure 183: Extent of trust in the Government and Institutions in the Nation

People of other ethnic groups and people of other religious faiths both recorded 47%, while traditional leaders stood at 45%. At the mid-tier, the media and State Government were both at 40%, followed by the Army at 39% and the Local Government Chairman at 34%. The Tinubu Government recorded 28%, followed by the EFCC, State Assembly, and Judiciary, all tied at 27%. The Police stood at 24%, and the National Assembly was the least trusted institution at 23%, with 77% of Nigerians expressing little or no trust in it.

6.7.2 Trust in the Government of President Tinubu

Trust in the Tinubu Government stood at 28% in 2026, up significantly from 17% in 2025 and representing the largest year-on-year gain across all fourteen institutions. However, 72% of citizens still expressed little or no trust, with 45% recording no trust at all. Trust under the Buhari administration stood at 42% in 2019 before falling to 17% by 2022, a level that persisted through 2025, making the 2026 recovery partial but meaningful. A youth leader from Bauchi State explained why low delivery on government promises erodes public trust:

‘Whatever programmes the government rolls out to address poverty, I think it has been hijacked by those in government, and it hardly reaches the people it was intended for.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Bauchi State, 2026)

A broadcaster from Bauchi State offered a more measured view, acknowledging visible improvements while questioning their depth:

‘I wouldn’t say everything is entirely bad. Even when we see that there is inclusion, the government before now you will see that appointments are mostly directed towards one ethnic group, but now at least it has been able to go round.’ (KII with Broadcaster, Bauchi State, 2026)

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... The Government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu




Figure 184: Trend in the extent of trust in the Government of President Bola Tinubu (2019-2025)

6.7.3 Trust in the National Assembly

The National Assembly remained the least trusted institution in 2026 at 23%, with 77% expressing little or no trust. This is an improvement over 18% in 2025, though the institution has consistently been one of the two least trusted since 2021. With 45% recording no trust at all and only 4% expressing a lot of trust, the crisis of legislative legitimacy is deep and enduring. A journalist from Borno State pointed to federal character failures as a driver of this distrust:

'The reality is that is not an inclusion government. There are some tribes that are being marginalized. There are sensitive posts in this country that were supposed to be shared based on federal character but have been given out.' (KII with Journalist, Borno State, 2026)

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... National Assembly




Figure 185: Trend in the extent of trust in the National Assembly (2019-2025)

6.7.4 Trust in the State Assembly

Trust in the State Assembly stood at 27% in 2026, up from 21% in 2025. Despite the improvement, 73% of Nigerians expressed little or no trust in their state legislatures, and only 5% expressed a lot of trust. The State Assembly consistently records lower trust than State Government, suggesting that citizens distinguish between executive and legislative arms, with the legislature viewed as less responsive to their concerns.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... State Assembly




Figure 186: Trend in the extent of trust in the State Assembly (2025-2026)

6.7.5 Trust in the Judiciary

Trust in the Judiciary stood at 27% in 2026, up from 21% in 2025, partially reversing a steady decline from 32% in 2019. Despite the recovery, 73% of citizens still distrust the judiciary, and only 6% expressed a lot of trust. The persistent gap between the judiciary’s constitutional mandate as guardian of the rule of law and citizens’ lived experience of it remains wide. An Anambra market leader captured the popular perception of judicial dependence on the executive:

‘Our judiciary and the lawyers are under the government; they are not doing their jobs well. If they start to stay on their own, and be independent, they will have right on their own.’ (KII with Market Leader, Anambra State, 2026)

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Judiciary




Figure 187: Trend in the extent of trust in the Judiciary (2019-2026)

6.7.6 Trust in Religious Leaders

Religious leaders were the most trusted of all fourteen institutions at 51% in 2026, the only group where a majority expressed trust. The figure is marginally up from 50% in 2025, maintaining the position religious leaders have held as the highest-trusted institution across survey waves. With 18% expressing a

lot of trust, the highest of ‘a lot’ of trust reading across all institutions, religious leaders command both breadth and depth of public confidence that no formal institution approaches.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Religious Leaders




Figure 188: Trend in the extent of trust in religious leaders (2021-2026)

6.7.7 Trust in State Government

The State Government was the most trusted governmental institution in 2026, at 40%, up from 33% in 2025. The 7-percentage-point gain is the second-largest improvement after the Tinubu Government and places the State Government on a par with the Media. That State Government is viewed more favourably than any federal institution or legislative body reflects the proximity effect: citizens engage more directly with state-level services and hold state executives more accountable for visible delivery.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... State Government




Figure 189: Trend in the extent of trust in State Government (2022-2026)

6.7.8 Trust in the Local Government Chairman

Trust in Local Government Chairmen stood at 34% in 2026, up from 30% in 2025. Despite the improvement, 66% expressed little or no trust. Local government is constitutionally the tier closest to the people, yet it consistently underperforms its potential as a trust anchor. This paradox, of proximity without trust, reflects the widespread perception that local government councils lack autonomy and are largely controlled by state governors rather than serving their communities independently.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Local Government



Figure 190: Trend in the extent of trust in the Local Government Chairman (2022-2026)

6.7.9 Trust in Traditional Leaders

Trust in traditional leaders stood at 45% in 2026, up from 42% in 2025, making them the second-most-trusted institution after religious leaders. The 3-percentage point improvement continues a steady trend of community-level leadership outperforming formal governmental structures. A Catholic youth leader from Anambra State articulated why traditional leaders command trust that formal institutions cannot:

‘Before any conflict starts, community leaders especially the igwes, imams or emirs are aware of what causes it. The governor is not close to the grassroots like the LGA chairmen. These are people that are closer and know how to address them.’ (KII with Catholic Youth Leader, Anambra State, 2026)

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Traditional Leaders




Figure 191: Trend in the extent of trust in Religious Leaders (2021-2026)

6.7.10 Trust in Media (Newspaper / Radio / TV)

Trust in the media stood at 40% in 2026, up from 36% in 2025 and recovering from a decline from 42% in 2022. At 40%, media trust is equal to State Government, placing it mid-table across the fourteen institutions. With 60% still expressing little or no trust, the media remains contested. Perceptions of partisan alignment, ownership concentration and the spread of misinformation continue to erode public confidence even as the media remains an important source of information for most Nigerians.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Media (Newspapers / Radio / TV)




Figure 192: Trend in the extent of trust in the Media (2021-2026)

6.7.11 Trust in the Police

The Police remained the second-least-trusted institution at 24% in 2026, up from 20% in 2025. With 76% expressing little or no trust and 48% recording no trust at all, citizen confidence in the Police is near the floor. Even the overall improvement is largely in shallow trust, with much of the increase coming from only 1 percentage point, from 5% in 2025 to 6% in 2026, indicating that citizens are moving from no trust to little trust rather than to genuine confidence.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Police




Figure 193: Trend in the extent of trust in the Police (2021-2026)

6.7.12 Trust in the Army

Trust in the Army stood at 39% in 2026, up from 37% in 2025, and considerably higher than the Police at 24%. The 15-percentage point gap between the two security institutions reflects citizens' differentiation of their roles: the Army is associated with counterinsurgency operations in the North East and Middle Belt, and in most parts of the country today, where its visibility has shaped a more favourable public view, while the Police is seen as the face of everyday enforcement and its failures more directly felt.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... Army




Figure 194: Trend in the extent of trust in the Army (2021-2026)

6.7.13 Trust in the EFCC

Trust in the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission stood at 27% in 2026, up from 23% in 2025, but 73% of Nigerians still distrust the agency. The EFCC is perceived as selective in its prosecution of corruption, with high-profile cases often seen as politically motivated. A taskforce leader from Rivers State put this bluntly:

'The politics in Nigeria is so corrupt, so dirty and it's not helping people. The level of corruption keeps increasing daily because we don't have credible leaders.' (KII with Taskforce Leader, Rivers State, 2026)

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC)




Figure 195: Trend in the extent of trust in the EFCC (2022-2026)

6.7.14 Trust in People of other Ethnic Groups

Trust in people of other ethnic groups stood at 47% in 2026, up from 46% in 2025. This places inter-ethnic interpersonal trust among the three highest-trust groups alongside religious leaders and people of other faiths. Notably, trust in people of other ethnic groups has recovered from a significant low of 39% in 2021 and 2022, suggesting that the social fabric of inter-group daily relations has proved more resilient than institutional trust.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... People of other ethnic groups apart from yours




Figure 196: Trend in the extent of trust in people of other ethnic groups (2019-2026)

6.7.15 Trust in People of Other Religious Faith

Trust in people of other religious faiths also stood at 47% in 2026, up from 46% in 2025, matching inter-ethnic trust and the third-highest reading across all fourteen institutions. The parity between inter-ethnic and inter-faith trust is notable: despite religion being a more sensitive identity marker than ethnicity in Nigerian social life, interpersonal trust levels are the same. Both figures point to a distinction between formal institutional distrust and the everyday social trust that sustains Nigerian community life.

On a scale of 1-4 where 4 = A lot of Trust and 1 = No trust at all, how much trust do you have for the following... People of other religious faiths




Figure 197: Trend in the extent of trust in people of other religious faiths (2019-2026)

6.8 Assessment of “Social Justice and Equity” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines citizens’ perceptions of social justice and equity in Nigeria, covering their views on how the country’s laws operate in practice, access to justice, the fairness of government treatment of different ethnic and religious groups, and government efforts to promote inclusion for all ethnic groups.

6.8.1 Feelings of Nigerians Regarding the Country’s Law

In 2026, 71% of Nigerians believed the law does not protect everyone equally, 24% believed it protects everyone equally, and 5% were unsure. The figure has remained persistently high since 2019 (70%), with only marginal fluctuations, indicating that legal inequality is an entrenched public perception that has not responded to changes in administration. A legal practitioner from Katsina State pointed to the awareness gap that leaves citizens without recourse:

'The major issue with human rights violations are the victims. Most of them are not aware of the channels to follow if their right is being trampled. Some are afraid, some are afraid of finances, some are afraid of being attacked. As a country, the institutions are on ground by the government, but it is only left for Nigerians to know these institutions exist.' (KII with Legal Practitioner, Katsina State, 2026)

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings concerning how Nigerian laws work in reality?




Figure 198: Feelings of Nigerian concerning the Laws of Nigeria

The South East recorded the highest perception of legal inequality at 86%, while the North Central recorded the lowest at 61%. The North East (79%) and South-South (76%) also recorded high no-equal-protection readings. There was no significant difference across gender. Among age groups, respondents aged 35 to 44 were the most likely to believe the law protects everyone equally at 27%, while those aged 15 to 24 were the least likely at 16%.

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings concerning how Nigerian laws work in reality? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 199: Socio-demographic analysis of the Feelings of Nigerian concerning the Laws of Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest perception of legal inequality at 78%, followed by Christians at 73% and Muslims at 68%. The education gap is notable: those with lower educational qualifications were more likely to believe the law protects everyone equally at 28%, compared to 23% among those with secondary education and above, suggesting that higher education sharpens awareness of legal inequality rather than increasing confidence in the system.

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings concerning how Nigerian laws work in reality? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 200: Socio-demographic analysis of the Feelings of Nigerian concerning the Laws of Nigeria, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.8.2 Perception of Nigerian on Access to Justice

On access to justice, 70% of Nigerians said only the rich and powerful can access civil justice in 2026, while only 24% believed all citizens can access civil justice when they need to. The 2026 figure represents a worsening from 65% in 2025 and 2022 levels, deepening a long-standing justice deficit. A taskforce leader from Rivers State articulated the constitutional rights that citizens feel are not being delivered:

'As a Nigerian, I have right to good judgement. I have the right to fair hearing. To be treated right. The civic right of someone as a Nigerian is not upheld in our constitution. Freedom of expression, freedom to travel, freedom as a person.' (KII with Taskforce Leader, Rivers State, 2026)

Which of the following is the most accurate description of access to justice in Nigeria?




Figure 201: How Nigerians feel about access to justice

The South East recorded the highest perception of restricted access at 85%, while the North East was at 78% and the South-South at 74%. The North West was comparatively more moderate at 64%, alongside the North Central at 65%. There was no significant difference across gender, with males at 71% and females at 69%. The youngest respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most likely to believe only the rich

can access justice at 76%, while those aged 45 to 54 and 55 and above were the most likely to believe all citizens can access justice at 27% each.

**Which of the following is the most accurate description of access to justice in Nigeria?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 201: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about access to justice, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians recorded the highest perception of restricted access at 73%, compared to 67% of Muslims. Traditionalists reported the highest uncertainty: 22% were unsure, and only 57% believed justice is reserved for the rich, suggesting greater ambivalence in that community. Those with secondary education and above were more likely to perceive restricted access at 72%, compared to 66% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**Which of the following is the most accurate description of access to justice in Nigeria?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 202: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians feel about access to justice, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.8.3 Perception of Government Fairness towards Ethnic Groups

Citizens were asked how often they believe their ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal Government. A total of 29% said often or always in 2026, while 53% said sometimes and 18% said never. The often or always figure is largely consistent with 2025 (29%) and 2022 (30%), suggesting that the sense of ethnic marginalisation has been stable at roughly three in ten Nigerians over the past several years. An Oba market leader from Edo State captured the experience of minority ethnic communities:

'Some tribes are being marginalised. I am from Edo State and I am not part of the three major ethnic groups. We are being marginalised especially during elections. When we want to contest, because we are a minority group, they would not give us such positions. Those three ethnic groups are the ones they consider most times. They do not carry us along.' (KII with Market Leader, Benin City, Edo State, 2026)

How often do you believe your ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal government?




Figure 203: Perception of fairness towards ethnic groups by the government

The South East recorded the highest perception of ethnic unfairness at 64% often or always, dramatically higher than any other zone, while the South West recorded the lowest at 16% often or always. The North East (19%) and North Central (24%) also recorded comparatively low levels of perceived ethnic unfairness, while the South-South recorded 32%. There was no significant difference across gender, with males at 30% and females at 29% often or always. Among age groups, those aged 15 to 24 recorded the lowest perception of often or always unfairness at 26%, while respondents aged 35 to 44 and 55 and above were slightly higher at 30%.

**How often do you believe your ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal government?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 204: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of fairness towards ethnic groups by the government, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded by far the highest perception of ethnic unfairness at 60% often or always, compared to 33% of Christians and 22% of Muslims. The gap between Traditionalists and both Muslim and Christian groups is striking, suggesting that those outside the mainstream religious communities

experience a sharper sense of ethnic exclusion. There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with lower-educated respondents at 27% and secondary-educated respondents at 30% often or always.

**How often do you believe your ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal government?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 205: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of fairness towards ethnic groups by the government by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.8.4 Perception of Government Fairness towards Religious Groups

On religious unfairness, 30% of respondents said their religion is treated unfairly by the Federal Government often or always in 2026, while 52% said sometimes, and 18% said never. The 2026 figure is higher than 2025, when it often and always combined stood at 25%, suggesting a modest increase in the perception of religious marginalisation

How often do you believe your religion is treated unfairly by the Federal government?




Figure 206: Perception of fairness towards religion by the government

The South East recorded the highest perception of religious unfairness at 61% often or always, while the South West was the lowest at 15%. The North Central was at 35% and the South-South at 36%, both above the national average. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 35 to 44 and 55 and above were the most likely to report often or always unfairness at 33% and 32% respectively, while those aged 25 to 34 were the lowest at 28%.

**How often do you believe your religion is treated unfairly by the Federal government?
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 207: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of fairness towards religion by the government, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists again recorded the highest perception of religious unfairness at 57% often or always, considerably above Christians (36%) and Muslims (21%). The 15-percentage point gap between Christians and Muslims on this question reflects different experiences of state engagement with religion. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference between lower-educated (29%) and secondary-educated (31%) respondents.

**How often do you believe your religion is treated unfairly by the Federal government?
by National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 208: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of fairness towards religion by the government, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.8.5 Perception of Government Efforts at Promoting Inclusion for all Ethnic Groups

Citizens were asked to rate the Federal Government’s efforts at promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups. A total of 46% rated the government’s efforts as poor or very poor in 2026, while 35% rated them as fair and only 19% as good or very good. The 2026 figure is marginally up from 2025 (45% poor), having improved substantially from 2019 when dissatisfaction peaked at 65% poor. Despite this long-run improvement, fewer than one in five Nigerians rate the government’s inclusion efforts positively. A media consultant from Bauchi State, responding directly to the inclusion question, offered a balanced but pointed assessment:

'The change in the national anthem and the student loan, I wouldn't say everything is entirely bad. When I say inclusion, the government before now you will see that appointments are mostly directed towards one ethnic group but now at least it has been able to go round. So that's an effort.' (KII with Media Consultant, Bauchi State, 2026)

How would you rate the efforts of the federal government in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in the country?



Figure 209: Efforts of the Federal Government in promoting a sense of inclusion

The South East recorded the highest dissatisfaction, with 75% rating the government's efforts as poor or very poor, only 11% rating them as good or very good, and the lowest fair rating at 14%, indicating polarized rather than ambivalent views. The North East was the most positive zone at 23% good or very good, followed by the South West at 23% and the North Central at 13%. There was no significant difference by gender, with 47% of males and 46% of females poor. Respondents aged 55 and above were the most positive at 22% good or very good, while those aged 15 to 24 recorded the lowest at 17%.

How would you rate the efforts of the federal government in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in the country? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 210: Socio-demographic analysis of the efforts of the Federal Government in promoting a sense of inclusion by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded both the highest dissatisfaction at 58% poor and the highest good rating at 26%, reflecting the polarized distribution seen in the zone data. Christians were the most consistently dissatisfied at 50% poor, compared to 41% of Muslims. On educational attainment, there was no significant difference between lower educated (44% poor) and secondary educated (47% poor) respondents.

How would you rate the efforts of the federal government in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in the country? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Table 211: Socio-demographic analysis of the efforts of the Federal Government in promoting a sense of inclusion by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9 Assessment of “Impunity” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines citizens’ perceptions of impunity in Nigeria, covering how seriously they view human rights abuses, their likelihood of reporting violations, perceptions of unreported cases, the likelihood of perpetrators escaping justice, the role of state agents in violations, and the perceived level of impunity among government officials in the current administration.

6.9.1 Feelings of Nigerians about Human Abuses and Violations

A total of 47% of respondents considered human rights abuses and violations a very serious problem in 2026, 27% a fairly serious problem, and 17% a minor problem. Combined, 74% viewed human rights abuse as a serious problem, marginally down from 75% in 2025 but consistent with the high readings recorded since 2021 (81%).

How serious is the issue of human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria?




Figure 212: Extent of human rights abuses and violations

The South East recorded the highest severity perception at 61% very serious, followed by the South-South at 58% and the North Central at 57%. The North West recorded the lowest at 30% very serious, with 28% viewing it as a minor problem. There was no significant difference across gender, with males at 48% and females at 46% ‘very serious’. Respondents aged 15 to 24 and 55 and above were the most likely to rate it very serious at 49% each.

How serious is the issue of human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
A very serious problem	47%	48%	46%	49%	47%	47%	46%	49%	57%	48%	30%	61%	58%	46%
A fairly serious problem	27%	26%	28%	24%	27%	27%	28%	28%	25%	30%	26%	27%	24%	30%
A minor problem	17%	17%	17%	16%	17%	17%	18%	14%	12%	18%	28%	8%	11%	14%
Not a problem	5%	6%	5%	4%	5%	6%	6%	6%	2%	4%	9%	2%	5%	6%
Not sure	4%	3%	4%	7%	4%	3%	2%	3%	4%	0%	7%	2%	2%	4%

Table 23: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent of human rights abuses and violations, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to rate human rights abuses as very serious at 51%, compared to 43% of Muslims and 45% of Traditionalists. Notably, Traditionalists recorded the highest 'not a problem' response at 22%, more than the national average of 5%, indicating a considerably lower baseline concern. There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with both groups recording 47% 'very serious.'

How serious is the issue of human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ Others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
A very serious problem	47%	51%	43%	45%	47%	47%
A fairly serious problem	27%	29%	24%	16%	21%	29%
A minor problem	17%	14%	20%	14%	19%	16%
Not a problem	5%	3%	8%	22%	7%	5%
Not sure	4%	3%	5%	3%	6%	3%

Table 24: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent of human rights abuses and violations, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.2 Likelihood to Report Human Rights Abuses to the Police

On the likelihood of reporting human rights abuses to the Police, 52% of respondents said they would be somewhat or very likely to report in 2026, while 48% said they were unlikely or would never report. The figure has declined from 56% in both 2022 and 2025, returning to 2021 levels (52%). The unwillingness of nearly half of the victims to report to the Police reflects the deep distrust in law enforcement documented in the Trust Sub-Index, where the Police recorded the second lowest trust at 24%. A respondent from Borno State captured the fear that silences victims:

'Citizens have no right to protest. Under the Human Rights Act, as citizens of the country, you have the freedom and liberty to demonstrate and protest peacefully, but there is this fear of doing so, to even express your opinion.' (KII with Respondent, Borno State, 2026)

What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuse would report such cases of abuse to the police?




Figure 213: Likelihood to report human rights abuses to the Police

The South East was most willing to report to the Police at 58% somewhat or very likely, while the North Central was least willing at 42%. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 45 to 54 were most willing at 54%, while those aged 55 and above were least willing at 49%.

What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuse would report such cases of abuse to the police? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 214: Socio-demographic analysis of the likelihood to report human rights abuses to the Police, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were the most willing religious group at 73%, compared to 50% of Christians and 54% of Muslims. There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with lower-educated (52%) and secondary-educated (51%) respondents recording virtually identical willingness to report to the Police.

What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuse would report such cases of abuse to the police? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 215: Socio-demographic analysis of the likelihood to report human rights abuses to the Police, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.3 Likelihood to Report Human Rights Abuses to Community or Religious Leader

Willingness to report human rights abuses to a community or religious leader was higher than willingness to report to the Police. A total of 67% said they would be somewhat or very likely to report to a community or religious leader in 2026, consistent with the 68% recorded in 2025. The higher willingness to report to community leaders than to the Police reflects the broader trust pattern seen in the Trust Sub-Index, where religious leaders (51%) and traditional leaders (45%) significantly outperformed the Police (24%).

What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuses would report such cases of abuse to a community or religious leader?




Figure 216: Likelihood to report human rights abuses to a community or religious leader

The North East recorded the highest willingness at 74% somewhat or very likely, followed by the South East at 67%. The North Central was the least willing at 53%. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 45 to 54 were most willing at 68%, while those aged 55 and above were least willing at 61%.

What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuses would report such cases of abuse to a community or religious leader? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 217: Socio-demographic analysis of the likelihood to report human rights abuses to a community or religious leader, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Lower-educated respondents were marginally more willing, at 65%, compared to 64% among secondary-educated respondents. Christians and Muslims recorded similar willingness at 64% and 66% respectively. The pattern confirms that community and religious leaders are the preferred first point of redress for human rights violations, consistent with their high trust ratings and their proximity to citizens’ daily lives.

What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuses would report such cases of abuse to a community or religious leader? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 218: Socio-demographic analysis of the likelihood to report human rights abuses to to a community or religious leader, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.4 Citizen’s Perception of Unreported Cases of Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria

A total of 46% believed the level of unreported human rights abuses was high or extremely high in 2026, while 48% said low or moderate, and 6% were unsure. The 2026 figure represents a significant 9-percentage-point improvement over 2025 (55%) and continues a sustained improvement over 2022 (66%), suggesting that citizens increasingly feel human rights violations are being brought to light rather than buried. Even so, nearly half still believe significant underreporting persists.

In your opinion, what is the level of unreported cases of human rights abuses in the country?




Figure 219: Extent of unreported cases of human rights abuses in Nigeria

The South East recorded the highest perception of unreported abuses, at 64% (high or extremely high), followed by the South-South at 54%. The North East was the most moderate, with 39% rating it as high or extremely high. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 35 to 44 were most likely to rate the level as extremely high at 17%, while those aged 15 to 24 were most uncertain at 11% don't know.

**In your opinion, what is the level of unreported cases of human rights abuses in the country?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 220: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent of unreported cases of human rights abuses in Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest perception of extremely high underreporting at 51%, more than double the national average of 15%, and only 2% rated the level as low. Christians were more likely to rate the level high or extremely high at 53%, compared to 37% of Muslims. Those with secondary education and above were more likely to rate it high or extremely high at 48%, compared to 41% among those with lower educational qualifications.

**In your opinion, what is the level of unreported cases of human rights abuses in the country?
by National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 221: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent of unreported cases of human rights abuses in Nigeria, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.5 Likelihood of Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuse Going Unpunished

A total of 68% of respondents believed perpetrators of human rights abuses were somewhat or very likely to go unpunished in 2026, while only 28% believed they were unlikely or would never go unpunished. The figure is consistent with 2025 (70%) and 2022 (69%), indicating that the perception of impunity for human rights abusers has been entrenched among over two-thirds of the population for several years. A barrister from Benue State captured the everyday mechanics of impunity at police stations:

‘There is a high rate of rights violations, especially from the law enforcement agents. They are there to protect the rights of individuals, but they are the ones violating them. If you go to the station, they will detain somebody without taking them to court, even after 24 hours. They will not charge somebody to court. Even a lawyer, they violate their rights.’ (Kil with Barrister, Benue State, 2026)

What is the likelihood that perpetrators of human rights abuses, even when reported, may still go unpunished?




Figure 222: Likelihood of perpetrators of human rights abuses going unpunished

The South East and South-South recorded the highest likelihood of impunity at 71% and 70%, somewhat or very likely, respectively, while the North East was the most moderate at 65%. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most likely to believe perpetrators would escape, at 71% somewhat or very likely, while those aged 55 and above were the least likely, at 62%.

What is the likelihood that perpetrators of human rights abuses, even when reported, may still go unpunished? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 223: Socio-demographic analysis of the likelihood of perpetrators of human rights abuses going unpunished, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest perception at 80% somewhat or very likely, more than 10 percentage points above Christians (70%) and Muslims (63%), who were of the opinion that it is likely for perpetrators of human rights abuses to go unpunished. Also, secondary school-educated respondents were marginally more likely to believe perpetrators would escape at 71%, compared to 61% among lower-educated respondents.

What is the likelihood that perpetrators of human rights abuses, even when reported, may still go unpunished? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 224: Socio-demographic analysis of the likelihood of perpetrators of human rights abuses going unpunished, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.6 Perception of State Agents' Involvement in Human Rights Abuses

On whether state agents such as the police and military are themselves perpetrators of human rights abuses, 39% of respondents said they were somewhat or very likely perpetrators in 2026, while 53% said they were unlikely or would never be perpetrators, and 8% were unsure. The 2026 figure represents an improvement from 2025 (45% somewhat or very likely) and 2022 (47%), suggesting a modest shift in public perception of state agents. However, nearly four in ten Nigerians still believe security forces actively violate the rights of citizens, a finding with serious implications for social cohesion.

How often would you say state agents (such as the police and military) are themselves perpetrators of human rights abuse?




Figure 225: Perception of state agents' involvement in human rights abuse

The South East recorded the highest perception of state agents as perpetrators at 56% 'somewhat or very likely', while the North East was the lowest at 32%. There was no significant difference across gender. Younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were the least likely to perceive state agents as perpetrators, at 33%, while those aged 35 to 44 were the most likely, at 43%.

How often would you say state agents (such as the police and military) are themselves perpetrators of human rights abuse? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 226: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of state agents' involvement in human rights abuse, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely than Muslims to perceive state agents as perpetrators at 47% versus 30%, while Traditionalists were at 57%. Those with secondary education and above were more likely at 41%, compared to 35% among those with lower educational qualifications.




Figure 227: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of state agents' involvement in human rights abuse, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.7 Perception of Impunity Among Government Officials

Citizens were asked whether they believe there is impunity among government officials in President Tinubu's administration. In 2026, 48% said yes, 20% said no, and 22% were not sure. The 2026 yes figure represents a decline from 59% in 2022 and 54% in 2025, suggesting a modest improvement in perception of official impunity under the current administration. However, with nearly half of Nigerians reporting impunity among officials, the finding remains a significant concern for social cohesion. A youth leader from Niger State was blunt about citizens' powerlessness:

'Human rights violations in Nigeria, irrespective of how we cry, nobody listens. They continue to oppress us. There is no human right freedom in Nigeria as it is. The citizens have always been oppressed.' (KII with Youth Leader, Niger State, 2026)

In your opinion, do you think there is impunity among government officials in President Bola Ahmed Tinubu's administration?




Figure 228: Perception of impunity among government officials

The North East recorded the highest affirmation at 63% 'yes', followed by the South East at 58% and the North Central at 51%. The North West recorded the lowest at 39% 'yes', with 27% uncertain. Males were more likely to affirm impunity at 51% compared to 46% of females. Respondents aged 55 and above were the most likely to say yes at 56%, while younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most uncertain at 27% 'not sure'.

In your opinion, do you think there is impunity among government officials in President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 229: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of impunity among government officials, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

There was no significant difference across religious groups, with Christians at 50%, Muslims at 47% and Traditionalists at 47%, nor across educational attainment. The broadly consistent response across religious groups and education levels on this question suggests that the perception of official impunity is not concentrated in any particular demographic profile but is a widely shared view across Nigerian society.

In your opinion, do you think there is impunity among government officials in President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 230: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of impunity among government officials, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.9.8 How Nigerians Feel about Impunity in the Current Administration

Among those who believe impunity exists among government officials, 48% rated impunity as high in 2026, 35% as moderate, and 17% as low. The 2026 high rating represents a significant improvement over 60% in 2025 and 78% in 2022, indicating that while impunity is still widely perceived, citizens rate its intensity as less extreme than in previous years.

If yes, please rate the level of impunity among government officials in President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration?



Figure 231: Extent of impunity among government officials in the current administration

South East recorded the highest rating of high impunity at 68%, followed by the South-South at 62%. The North Central recorded 38% high, while the North East and North West recorded 37% and 41%, respectively. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 55 and above were most likely to rate the level as high at 60%, while those aged 35 to 44 were least likely at 42%.

If yes, please rate the level of impunity among government officials in President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 232: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent of impunity among government officials in the current administration, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest high rating at 76%, considerably above Christians (54%) and Muslims (39%). Regarding educational attainment, there was no significant difference, with both lower-educated (48%) and secondary-educated (48%) respondents recording identical high ratings.

If yes, please rate the level of impunity among government officials in Tinubu’s administration.
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 233: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent of impunity among government officials in the current administration, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.10 Assessment of “Corruption” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Nigeria, covering the perceived level of corruption, the government’s efforts at fighting it, the most prevalent and most damaging forms of corruption, and whether access to justice is free from corruption.

6.10.1 Perception of the Level of Corruption in Nigeria

In 2026, 58% of respondents believed corruption had increased in Nigeria over the past year, 27% felt it had remained the same, and 12% believed it had decreased. The figure has declined steadily from 75% in 2022 to 69% in 2021 to 61% in 2025, representing continued improvement. Nevertheless, six in ten Nigerians still believe corruption is worsening. A community leader from Osun State offered a measured reflection on how corruption is perceived across administrations:

‘Corruption is dependent on the angle at which each government wants to fight it. During the past administration, we had the likes of Emeziele and co, who were not tagged corrupt at the time. But immediately the current government assumed power, they exposed them and every Nigerian got to know. That is an indication that this current government is willing to fight corruption.’ (KII with Community Leader, Osun State, 2026)




Figure 234: Perception of extent of corruption in Nigeria

The South East recorded the highest belief that corruption had increased at 80%, followed by the South-South at 71%. The North East was the most moderate at 45%, with 48% saying corruption had remained the same. Males (59%) and females (55%) recorded broadly similar perceptions, while those aged 55 and above (62%) and 15 to 24 (61%) were the most likely age groups to believe corruption had increased.

Over the past year, how would you assess the level of corruption in the country
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 235: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of extent of corruption in Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to believe corruption had increased at 65%, compared to 47% of Muslims. Traditionalists recorded the highest uncertainty at 24% “don’t know”, and only 41% believed it had increased. Those with secondary education and above were more likely to believe that corruption had increased, at 59%, compared with 51% among those with lower educational qualifications.

Over the past year, how would you assess the level of corruption in the country
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 236: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of the extent of corruption in Nigeria, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.10.2 Citizens’ Perception of Government Efforts at Fighting Corruption

Government efforts at fighting corruption were rated poorly by the majority of Nigerians. A total of 62% rated the Federal Government’s efforts as very poor or poor in 2026, while only 14% rated them as good or very good and 24% as fair. The 2026 figure is broadly consistent with 2025 (64% very poor or poor)

and 2021 (63%). The 2022 spike to 76% very poor or poor was the worst recorded, and the current reading reflects a partial but still fragile recovery.




Figure 237: Effort of the Government in fighting corruption

The South East recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 85% very poor or poor, with the very poor rating alone at 59%, the highest very poor rating across all zones. The North East was the most moderate at 60% ‘very poor or poor’, and the North West at 55%. Male respondents were more critical at 64% ‘very poor or poor’, compared to 59% of females. Among age groups, those aged 15 to 24 recorded the highest dissatisfaction at 67%.

**How would you rate the effort of the Federal Government in fighting corruption?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Very Poor	34%	37%	29%	37%	31%	31%	37%	37%	35%	20%	27%	59%	45%	25%
Poor	28%	27%	30%	30%	31%	28%	26%	24%	24%	40%	28%	26%	24%	29%
Fair	24%	24%	25%	19%	24%	27%	23%	23%	29%	26%	28%	10%	16%	30%
Good	12%	11%	14%	12%	12%	12%	13%	13%	11%	13%	15%	5%	12%	14%
Very Good	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%	2%	0%	3%	2%

Table 25: Socio-demographic analysis of the effort of the Government in fighting corruption, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were the most dissatisfied at 66% ‘very poor or poor’, compared to 57% of Muslims. Traditionalists were the most positive at 25% good or very good, considerably above Christians (12%) and Muslims (16%). There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with lower-educated (57%) and secondary-educated (63%) groups recording broadly similar poor ratings.

**How would you rate the effort of the Federal Government in fighting corruption?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Very Poor	34%	40%	24%	38%	29%	35%
Poor	28%	26%	33%	16%	28%	28%
Fair	24%	22%	27%	21%	29%	23%
Good	12%	11%	14%	19%	12%	12%
Very Good	2%	1%	2%	6%	2%	2%

Table 26: Socio-demographic analysis of the effort of the Government in fighting corruption, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.10.3 Forms of Corruption Prevalent in Nigeria

On the most prevalent forms of corruption, 41% identified political corruption as most prevalent in 2026, followed by financial corruption at 35%, everyday or petty corruption at 15%, and judicial corruption at 7%. These figures are broadly consistent with 2025 (political=38%, financial=33%).

In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is prevalent in Nigeria?




Figure 238: Forms of corruption prevalent in Nigeria

The North Central was the key outlier: financial corruption was cited as most prevalent at 56%, considerably above political corruption at 29%, the only zone where financial corruption ranked first. The South East led in identifying political corruption at 48%, followed by the South West at 45%. The North West was notable for the highest perception of everyday or petty corruption, at 27%, compared to the national average of 15%, suggesting that citizens in the North West experience corruption most acutely at the street level rather than at the elite political level. Males (43%) were more likely than females (38%) to identify political corruption as the most prevalent issue. There was no significant difference across age groups.

**In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is prevalent in Nigeria?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 239: Socio-demographic analysis of the forms of corruption prevalent in Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Across religious groups, Christians (41%) and Muslims (39%) had similar rankings of political corruption. Traditionalists were distinctive: judicial corruption was cited at 22%, compared to 9% among Christians and 5% among Muslims, and financial corruption was cited at only 11%, reflecting a different daily experience of corrupt practices. There was no significant difference across educational attainment levels.

**In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is prevalent in Nigeria?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 240: Socio-demographic analysis of the forms of corruption prevalent in Nigeria, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.10.4 Most Damaging Form of Corruption in Nigeria

On the most damaging form of corruption, 41% identified political corruption in 2026, 33% financial corruption, 14% everyday or petty corruption and 10% judiciary corruption. The rankings are consistent with 2025 (political=40%, financial=32%), confirming that political corruption is consistently seen as both the most prevalent and most damaging form. Financial corruption rose marginally from 32% in 2025 to 33% in 2026, while judiciary corruption fell from 13% to 10%.

In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is most damaging?




Figure 241: Citizens' perception of the most damaging form of corruption

The South West recorded the highest level of political corruption as most damaging at 48%, while the North Central again stood out, with financial corruption as most damaging at 52%, compared to political corruption at only 29%. The North West cited everyday or petty corruption as most damaging at 25%, the highest across all zones. Males were more likely than females to cite political corruption as most damaging (44% vs 37%). Among age groups, those aged 55 and above were most likely to cite political corruption at 45%, while those aged 45 to 54 were least likely at 37%.

In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is most damaging?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 241: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens' perception of the most damaging form of corruption, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to cite judiciary corruption as most damaging at 12%, compared to 7% of Muslims, while Traditionalists recorded the highest everyday or petty corruption at 25% and judiciary at 21%. The Traditionalist pattern, with relatively low political and financial corruption rankings, reflects a community whose daily experience of corruption is more dispersed across institutional forms. There was no significant difference by educational attainment.

**In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is most damaging?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 242: Socio-demographic analysis of the citizens’ perception of the most damaging form of corruption, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.10.5 Perception of Access to Justice being Free from Corruption

On whether access to justice is free from corruption in Nigeria, 38% said it is never free from corruption, 46% said sometimes, and only 16% said often or always in 2026. The 2026 figure represents a marginal improvement from 2025, when 42% said never, though both readings remain considerably worse than 2021 (26% never). Combined, 84% of Nigerians say justice is either never or only sometimes free from corruption. A youth leader and lecturer from Kwara State gave a personal account of how corruption distorts justice outcomes:

‘There is too much delay and corruption in the justice system. I have a brother who was involved in a car accident that killed a motorcyclist. The other driver bribed the police, and the blame was shifted to my brother. It took two full years in court before the matter was resolved.’ (KII with Youth Leader and Lecturer, Kwara State, 2026)

Do you believe access to justice in Nigeria is free from corruption?




Figure 243: Perception of justice being free from corruption

The South East recorded the highest perception of justice never being free from corruption at 58%, while the North West and South West were more moderate at 28% and 29% ‘never’ respectively. The North West recorded the highest ‘often or always’ free ratings at 25%. There was no significant gender difference. Those aged 55 and above were most likely to say “never” (42%), while younger respondents aged 15 to 24 were most likely to say “often” or “always” (17%).

Do you believe access to justice in Nigeria is free from corruption?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 234: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of justice being free from corruption, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (40%) were more likely than Muslims (36%) to say justice is never free from corruption. Traditionalists recorded a highly distinctive pattern: 30% said always free, considerably above Christians (3%) and Muslims (4%), suggesting either a different institutional experience of justice or a different interpretation of the question in traditional community settings. There was no difference by educational attainment, with both lower and secondary educated respondents recording 38% never.

Do you believe access to justice in Nigeria is free from corruption?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 235: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of justice being free from corruption, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11 Assessment of “Natural Resource Governance” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines citizens’ perceptions of how Nigeria manages its natural resource revenues, and whether natural resources are associated with increases in corruption, conflict and commodity prices. It also assesses public trust in the government’s restructuring efforts, feelings about resource sustainability and the role of local communities in resource management.

6.11.1 Citizens' Perception of Government Efforts at Managing Revenues from Natural Resources

A total of 56% of respondents rated the government's management of natural resource revenues as 'poor' in 2026, while 23% said 'just okay' and 12% said 'very well'. The 2026 figure represents an improvement from 2025 (63% poor) and 2022 (65% poor). The 7-percentage point improvement from 2025 is the largest single-year gain recorded, though a clear majority still rate management poorly.

In your opinion, how well does the government manage the funds that come from the country's natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc)?




Figure 236: Effort of the Government at managing revenues from natural resources

The South West (67%), South East (66%), and South-South (65%) were the most dissatisfied zones, while the North West was the most moderate at 44% poor. Respondents aged 15 to 24 and 45 to 54 were most likely to rate management poorly at 63% each, while those aged 35 to 44 were the most positive at 51% poor.

**In your opinion, how well does the government manage the funds that come from the country's natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.)?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 237: Socio-demographic analysis of the effort of the Government at managing revenues from natural resources, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (64%) and Traditionalists (63%) were considerably more dissatisfied than Muslims (47%). Muslims were more likely to rate management just okay at 28%, compared to 19% of Christians. Secondary educated respondents were more critical at 59% 'poor' than lower educated respondents at 49%.

**In your opinion, how well does the government manage the funds that come from the country's natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.)?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 238: Socio-demographic analysis of the effort of the Government at managing revenues from natural resources, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.2 Citizens' Perception of Natural Resources and the Increase in Corruption

A total of 50% agreed or strongly agreed that natural resource availability can increase corruption in 2026, while 31% disagreed and 19% were neutral. Agreement rose from 38% in 2022 (30%+8%) to 50% in 2025, and held in 2026, confirming a sustained public belief in the resource-corruption nexus.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can increase corruption?




Figure 239: Perception of the availability of natural resources and the increase in corruption

The North East led at 59% agreement, while the South West was most sceptical at 44% disagreeing. The South-South recorded the highest strong agreement at 24%, reflecting the lived experience of communities in the Niger Delta, where oil wealth has coexisted with corruption and underdevelopment. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 45 to 54 were the most likely to agree at 54%.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can increase corruption?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 240: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of the availability of natural resources and increase in corruption, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest agreement at 67%, more than 15-percentage points above Christians (52%) and Muslims (47%). Those with secondary education and above (50%) and lower educated (49%) recorded virtually identical agreement levels, indicating that the resource-corruption link is broadly recognised across all education levels.

To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) can increase corruption?

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 241: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of the availability of natural resources and increase in corruption, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.3 Citizens' Perception of Natural Resources and Conflicts

A total of 56% agreed or strongly agreed that natural resource availability can trigger conflicts in 2026, while 25% disagreed and 19% were neutral. Agreement has risen steadily from 43% in 2022 to 54% in 2025 and 56% in 2026.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) can trigger conflicts?




Figure 242: Perception of the availability of natural resources and conflicts

Respondents aged 45 to 54 were the most likely to agree at 64%. There was no significant difference across gender. The North Central recorded the highest combined agreement at 64%, while the South West recorded the lowest overall agreement at 47%.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can trigger conflicts?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 243: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of the availability of natural resources and conflict, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest agreement at 65%, with 35% strongly agreeing, well above Christians (58%) and Muslims (54%). The broadly high agreement across all groups confirms the resource-conflict link is widely recognised regardless of religion or education.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can trigger conflicts?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 244: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of the availability of natural resources and conflict, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.4 Citizens’ Perception of Natural Resources and Commodity Prices

A total of 45% agreed or strongly agreed that natural resource availability leads to higher commodity prices in 2026, while 34% disagreed and 21% were neutral. The most analytically significant trend is the reversal since 2021, when more Nigerians disagreed (45%) than agreed (35%) on this question. By 2026, the balance has shifted, likely reflecting the lived experience of subsidy removal and fuel price increases.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) can lead to increase in prices of commodities in the country?




Figure 245: Perception of natural resources towards an increase in the price of commodities

The most striking age finding is that respondents aged 55 and above recorded the lowest agreement at 36%, compared with 47% for those aged 35 to 44, an 11-percentage-point gap. Older Nigerians, who experienced Nigeria before the oil boom economy, are considerably less convinced that resource availability drives up prices. The North West was the least convinced at 39% agreement, while the North East (51%) and South-South (51%) were the most convinced, reflecting zones where resource extraction and its economic consequences are most directly felt.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) can lead to increase in prices of commodities in the country?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 246: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of natural resources towards an increase in the price of commodities, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (50%) were 10 percentage points more likely to agree than Muslims (40%), a notable gap on an economic question that may reflect different geographic proximity to resource extraction zones. Traditionalists recorded 45% agreement but the highest neutrality at 30%, suggesting ambivalence rather than rejection of the resource-price link. Lower-educated respondents (44%) and secondary-educated respondents (46%) recorded virtually identical levels of agreement, indicating that this economic perception is not shaped by formal education.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) can lead to increase in prices of commodities in the country?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 247: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of natural resources towards an increase in the price of commodities, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.5 Citizens' Perception of Competition over Local Resources as a Cause of Conflict

On whether competition over local natural resources is causing conflict in their community, 43% said yes in 2026, 42% said no and 15% were unsure, consistent with 2025 (43% yes, 46% no). The near-even split reflects the locally varied nature of resource conflict.

Do you think competition over local National Resources is causing conflict in your community?




Figure 248: Citizens' perception of competition over local natural resources causing conflict in the community

Males (44%) were marginally more likely than females (41%) to say 'yes'. Respondents aged 25 to 34 were the most likely to say yes at 47%, while those aged 55 and above were the least likely at 34%, with the highest 'no' response at 53%. The North East recorded the highest 'yes' at 60%, while the North West recorded the lowest at 33%.

Do you think competition over local National Resources is causing conflict in your community?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 249: Socio-demographic analysis of citizens' perception of competition over local natural resources causing conflict in the community, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (44%) and Muslims (42%) recorded broadly similar yes responses. Traditionalists were distinctive, with only 21% saying 'yes' and 38% 'don't know', suggesting significant uncertainty or reluctance to attribute community conflict to resource competition in traditional settings. Secondary educated respondents (44%) were more likely to say 'yes' than lower educated (40%).

**Do you think competition over local National Resources is causing conflict in your community?
by National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 250: Socio-demographic analysis of citizens’ perception of competition over local natural resources causing conflict in the community, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.6 Citizens’ Perception of Trust in the Current Federal Government’s Effort to Restructure Nigeria

On trust in the Federal Government to restructure Nigeria by giving natural resource ownership to host states, 45% do not trust the government at all, 41% trust it a little, and only 8% trust it a lot in 2026. The combined no-trust and little-trust stands at 86%, the same as 2025, reflecting consolidation rather than further improvement. The sharpest shift in this series occurred between 2022 and 2025, when combined distrust fell dramatically from 96% to 86%.

How much trust do you have in the current Federal Government to restructure Nigeria in a way that would give ownership and control of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) to the states where they are domiciled?




Figure 251: Citizens’ trust in government to restructure Nigeria on natural resource ownership

Respondents aged 15 to 24 recorded the highest rejection at 51% ‘no trust at all’, while those aged 55 and above were the most likely to trust a lot at 13%. The South East was the most sceptical at 67% ‘no trust at all’, while the North East was the most willing to ‘trust a little’ at 61%.

How much trust do you have in the current Federal Government to restructure Nigeria in a way that would give ownership and control of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) to the states where they are domiciled? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 252: Socio-demographic analysis of citizens’ trust in government to restructure Nigeria on natural resource ownership, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians recorded the highest no trust at all at 49%, compared to 39% of Muslims. Traditionalists stood apart: 21% trusted a lot, the highest across all religious groups, alongside 11% not sure, suggesting a more open or ambivalent posture toward government restructuring than either Christians or Muslims. There was no significant difference across educational attainment levels.

How much trust do you have in the current Federal Government to restructure Nigeria in a way that would give ownership and control of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc.) to the states where they are domiciled? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 253: Socio-demographic analysis of citizens’ trust in government to restructure Nigeria on natural resource ownership, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.7 Feelings about the Sustainability of Resources in Nigeria

In 2026, 57% believed the government is doing too little to sustain natural resources, 32% believed it is trying its best, and 11% could not say. The figure has improved marginally from 59% in 2025 and 60% in 2022.

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings about the sustainability of resources in Nigeria?




Figure 254: How citizens feel about the sustainability of resources

Dissatisfaction was highest in the South East (67%), South-South (61%), and North East (60%). The North Central was the most positive at 51% 'too little', with 38% believing the government is trying its best. Males (60%) were more critical than females (54%), with females more likely to credit government effort at 35% versus 29% of males. Older Nigerians were the most demanding: those aged 55 and above were at 63%, which was too low, compared to 55% among those aged 25 to 44.

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings about the sustainability of resources in Nigeria? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 255: Socio-demographic analysis of how citizens feel about the sustainability of resources, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (58%) and Muslims (55%) recorded similar too little ratings, while Traditionalists were the most moderate at 48% too little and 19% uncertain, the highest can't say response across all religious groups. Lower-educated respondents (56%) and secondary-educated respondents (57%) recorded virtually identical "too little" ratings, confirming that views on resource sustainability are not shaped by educational level.

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings about the sustainability of resources in Nigeria? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 256: Socio-demographic analysis of how citizens feel about the sustainability of resources, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.8 The Role of Local Communities in Resource Sustainability

In 2026, 58% agreed or strongly agreed that local communities have a role to play in resource sustainability, while 19% disagreed and 23% were neutral. The figure is consistent with 2025 (62%) and 2022 (60%).

Do you agree or disagree that local communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria?




Figure 257: Citizens' perception of the role of local communities in resource sustainability

There was no significant difference across gender, with females (60%) marginally more likely to agree than males (57%). The North East led at 66%, while the South East was most divided at 52% agreement and 27% disagreement.

**Do you agree or disagree that local communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria?
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 258: Socio-demographic analysis of citizens’ perception of the role of local communities in resource sustainability, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Muslims were the most supportive at 59%, compared to 58% of Christians and 47% of Traditionalists. Secondary-educated respondents were marginally more likely to agree, at 60%, compared to 56% among lower-educated respondents.

**Do you agree or disagree that local communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria?
by National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 259: Socio-demographic analysis of citizens’ perception of the role of local communities in resource sustainability, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.9 Citizens' Perception of Climate Change in Nigeria

A total of 27% considered climate change a very serious problem in 2026, 32% fairly serious, 24% not serious and 17% not sure. Combined, 59% viewed it as serious, up from 57% in 2025.

How serious is the issue of climate change in Nigeria?




Figure 260: Perception of climate change

Males (29%) were marginally more likely than females (25%) to rate it very serious. Respondents aged 55 and above were the most concerned at 31%, while those aged 45 to 54 were the least at 24%. The South-South was most concerned at 41% very serious, while the North West recorded only 17% very serious.

How serious is the issue of climate change in Nigeria?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 261: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of climate change, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were more likely to consider climate change serious or very serious at 63%, compared to 52% of Muslims. Traditionalists recorded the highest not sure response at 35%, indicating the lowest climate

change awareness among religious groups. There was no significant difference by educational attainment.

**How serious is the issue of climate change in Nigeria?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 262: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of climate change, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.10 Perception of Climate Change as a Cause of Resource Conflicts in Nigeria

On whether Nigeria's conflicts are mainly caused by climate change, 27% agreed or strongly agreed in 2026, while 44% disagreed, and 29% were neutral. The agreement figure has risen from 19% in 2022 to 22% in 2025 and 27% in 2026, though climate change remains a minority explanation for conflict. Most Nigerians attribute conflict to political, ethnic, and economic factors rather than climate.

Do you agree or disagree that resource conflicts in Nigeria are mainly caused by climate change?




Figure 263: Perception of climate change as the cause of resource conflicts

The North Central was most likely to agree at 36%, while the South West was the least likely to agree at 14%, with the highest neutral response at 36%. There was no significant difference across gender. Respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most likely to agree at 30%, while those aged 55 and above were the least likely at 24%.

**Do you agree or disagree that resource conflicts in Nigeria are mainly caused by climate change?
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 264: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of climate change as the cause of resource conflicts, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest neutral response at 44% and the lowest agreement at 22%, suggesting significant uncertainty. Christians (28%) and Muslims (24%) recorded slightly higher agreement. There was no significant difference by educational attainment.

**Do you agree or disagree that resource conflicts in Nigeria are mainly caused by climate change?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 265: Socio-demographic analysis of perception of climate change as the cause of resource conflicts, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.11.11 Federal Government Efforts in Reducing the Consequences of Climate Change

In 2026, 41% of respondents rated the Federal Government's efforts to reduce the consequences of climate change as very poor or poor, 41% as fair, and 18% as good or very good. The 2026 poor rating represents a marginal worsening from 2025 (40% poor) and remains considerably better than 2022 (51% poor). The finding suggests that the notable improvement in perception between 2022 and 2025 has now plateaued, with neither further progress nor significant deterioration.

How would you rate the efforts of the federal government to reduce the consequences of climate change?




Figure 266: Efforts of the Federal Government to reduce the consequence of climate change

The South East (55% poor) and South-South (53% poor) were the most critical zones, while the North East recorded the most positive outlook, with only 27% poor and 57% rating the efforts as fair, the highest fair response across all zones. Males were more critical, at 45% poor, compared to 39% for females.

How would you rate the efforts of the federal government to reduce the consequences of climate change?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 267: Socio-demographic analysis of efforts of the Federal Government to reduce the consequence of climate change, By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were the most polarized: 34% rated government efforts as good or very good, the highest across all religious or educational groups, yet 40% rated them poor or very poor. Christians (44% poor) were more critical than Muslims (38% poor). Lower-educated respondents (39% poor) were marginally more satisfied than secondary-educated respondents (42% poor), suggesting that higher education sharpens expectations on climate action.

**How would you rate the efforts of the federal government to reduce the consequences of climate change?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 268: Socio-demographic analysis of efforts of the Federal Government to reduce the consequence of climate change, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12 Assessment of “Security and Peacebuilding” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section assesses citizens’ perceptions of safety in their locality, the government’s performance in providing security and promoting peacebuilding, and public willingness to participate in peacebuilding efforts. It also examines support for US strikes on terrorist hotspots and whether security has improved under the current administration.

6.12.1 Assessment of Safety in your Locality

A total of 53% of respondents felt safe or very safe in their locality in 2026, while 32% felt unsafe or very unsafe, and 15% were neutral. Safety has worsened since 2025 (58% safe or very safe), a significant 5-percentage-point decline in one year. A barrister from Borno State captured the shifting nature of insecurity:

‘There is no security. Places that used to be safe are no longer safe. If you are traveling today you will not be scared of thieves or robbers, you will be scared of bandits. Not just on the road, in your place they will come and kidnap people.’ (Kil with Barrister, Borno State, 2026)

How safe do you feel in your locality?




Figure 269: Safety in locality

Respondents aged 55 and above were the most likely to feel safe at 64%. There was no significant gender difference. The South West was the safest zone at 61% safe or very safe, while the North East was the least safe at 43% unsafe or very unsafe.

How safe do you feel in your locality?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 270: Socio-demographic analysis of safety in locality, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Muslims (54%) were marginally more likely than Christians (51%) to feel safe or very safe, while Traditionalists recorded the highest uncertainty at 24% neutral. Those with secondary education and above were more likely to feel safe at 54%, compared to 50% among those with lower educational qualifications.

How safe do you feel in your locality?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 271: Socio-demographic analysis of safety in locality, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.2 Assessment of Government's Effort in Providing Security for Life and Property

A total of 51% rated the government's effort in providing security for life and property as very poor or poor in 2026, up from 45% in 2025. A youth leader from Katsina State was direct about the national picture:

'It's not enough. They need to do more because every day they are kidnapping people.' (KII with Youth Leader, Katsina State, 2026)

How would you rate the Government's effort in providing security for life and property in Nigeria?



Figure 272: The Government’s effort in providing security for life and property

There was no significant gender difference. The South East was the most critical at 68% poor or very poor, while the South West was the most positive at 30% good or very good.

'The current government has strengthened security measures, including better enforcement and support for farmers. This has helped reduce farmers-herders clashes and improved safety in many communities.' (KII with Youth Leader, Ekiti State, 2026)

**How would you rate the Government's effort in providing security for life and property in Nigeria?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure 273: Socio-demographic analysis of the Government’s effort in providing security for life and property, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest very poor rating at 35%, considerably above Christians (26%) and Muslims (20%), though they also recorded a balanced 29% fair response. Lower-educated respondents were marginally more satisfied, at 21% good or very good, compared to 23% among secondary-educated respondents.

**How would you rate the Government's effort in providing security for life and property in Nigeria?
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 274: Socio-demographic analysis of the Government’s effort in providing security for life and property, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.3 Support for US Strikes on Terrorist Hotspots in Nigeria

A new question in 2026 asked whether respondents support US strikes on terrorist hotspots in Nigeria. A total of 56% said Yes, 24% said No, and 13% were simply unsure. The 56% majority support for foreign military intervention signals deep frustration with the pace of domestic security improvement.

Are you in support of the recent missile attack by the United States of America on some terrorist hotspots in Nigeria?




Figure 275: Support for US strikes on terrorist hotspots in Nigeria

The North West recorded the lowest support at 32%, the only zone where opposition (38%) exceeded support. The South East was the most supportive at 72%. There was no significant gender difference (females 57%, males 56%).

Are you in support of the recent missile attack by the United States of America on some terrorist hotspots in Nigeria? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 276: Socio-demographic analysis of the support for US strikes on terrorist hotspots in Nigeria, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

The sharpest finding is the religious divide: Christians supported at 66%, compared to 42% of Muslims, a 24-percentage point gap. Traditionalists recorded the highest uncertainty, at 30% unsure, and only 49% support. Secondary-educated respondents were more supportive, at 59%, compared to 48% among lower-educated respondents.

Are you in support of the recent missile attack by the United States of America on some terrorist hotspots in Nigeria? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 277: Socio-demographic analysis of the support for US strikes on terrorist hotspots in Nigeria by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.4 Perception of Improvement in Nigeria's Overall Security

A second new question asked whether US strikes have brought about considerable improvement in Nigeria's overall security. A total of 51% agreed, 25% disagreed, and 17% were unsure.

Do you agree or disagree that the recent missile attack by the US in Nigeria has brought about considerable improvement in the country's overall security?




Figure 278: Perception in improvement in Nigeria's overall security

The North Central (65%), South East (64%), and South-South (64%) were most likely to agree, while the North West again recorded the lowest at 26% agreeing and 39% disagreeing. Respondents aged 55 and above were the most likely to agree at 55%, while younger respondents aged 25 to 34 were the least likely at 48%. There was no significant gender difference, with males at 49% and females at 50% agreement.

Do you agree or disagree that the recent missile attack by the US in Nigeria has brought about considerable improvement in the country's overall security? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 279: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception in improvement in Nigeria's overall security, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians were significantly more likely to agree at 61%, compared to 35% of Muslims. Lower-educated respondents were less likely to agree, at 38%, while secondary-educated respondents recorded 54% agreement, a 16-percentage-point education gap.

Do you agree or disagree that the recent missile attack by the US in Nigeria has brought about considerable improvement in the country's overall security?

By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 280: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception in improvement in Nigeria's overall security by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.5 Nigerians' Understanding of Peacebuilding Practices

Citizens were asked what they understood peacebuilding to be. Nearly half (43%) described it simply as initiatives that foster peace and social harmony, a broad, aspirational framing. A further 10% cited programmes and actions dedicated to building a peaceful society, and 9% cited constructive dialogue to address the root causes of violence. Only 1% mentioned conflict resolution through nonviolent means and 3% promoting tolerance and empathy, suggesting that most Nigerians understand peacebuilding at the level of outcomes rather than processes or mechanisms. Encouragingly, only 8% had no opinion.

What do you understand by peacebuilding practices?




Figure 281: Understanding of Peacebuilding practices

6.12.6 Perception of How Local Peacebuilding Efforts Can Resolve Recurring Conflicts

A total of 63% agreed or strongly agreed that local peacebuilding efforts can resolve recurring conflicts in 2026, while 18% disagreed and 19% were neutral. The figure is consistent with 2025 (64%) and has improved from 2022 (58%).

In your opinion, can Nigeria’s recurring conflicts be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts?




Figure 282: Perception of local peacebuilding efforts to help resolve conflicts

The North East led at 74%, while the South-South respondents seemed to be the most sceptical at 53% agreement.

In your opinion, can Nigeria’s recurring conflicts be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 283: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of local peacebuilding efforts to help resolve conflicts, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Muslims (66%) were marginally more supportive than Christians (61%). Both lower- and secondary-educated respondents recorded identical agreement at 63%.

**In your opinion, can Nigeria’s recurring conflicts be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts?
by National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 284: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of local peacebuilding efforts to help resolve conflicts, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.7 Willingness to Participate in Peacebuilding Efforts

A total of 77% were extremely or somewhat willing to participate in peacebuilding efforts in their locality in 2026, while 10% were unwilling and 13% indifferent. The 2026 figure represents a decline from 81% in 2025 but remains very high.

How willing are you to participate in peacebuilding efforts in your locality?




Figure 285: Extent Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding practices

The North Central led at 87%, while the South West was lowest at 69% with the highest unwillingness at 19%. Respondents aged 55 and above were the most willing at 83%, while those aged 35 to 44 were the least at 75%. There was no significant gender difference.

How willing are you to participate in peacebuilding efforts in your locality? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 286: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding practices, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (76%) and Muslims (78%) recorded broadly similar willingness to participate. Traditionalists were the least willing, at 73%, with the highest level of indifference at 19%. There was no meaningful difference by educational attainment, with lower-educated (75%) and secondary-educated (78%) respondents recording virtually identical willingness.

How willing are you to participate in peacebuilding efforts in your locality? by National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 287: Socio-demographic analysis of the extent Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding practices, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.8 Gauging Federal Government Peacebuilding Approaches in Tackling Conflicts

Only 25% said the Federal Government often or always deploys peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts in 2026, while 36% said rarely or never, and 39% said ‘sometimes’. The often or always figure improved from 20% in 2025, a 5-percentage point gain, though the majority still experience government peacebuilding as inconsistent.

How often does the Federal Government deploy peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts?




Figure 286: Gauging federal government peacebuilding approaches

The North West (29% often or always) was the most positive zone, a counterintuitive finding given that it is among the most affected by banditry. The South East was the most skeptical at 22% never and 48% rarely or never combined. There were no significant gender and age-group differences.

How often does the Federal Government deploy peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts?

By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 287: Socio-demographic analysis of Gauging federal government peacebuilding approaches, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (25%) and Muslims (26%) recorded virtually identical "often" or "always" ratings. Traditionalists recorded the highest never rating at 24%, suggesting government peacebuilding initiatives are least visible in traditional community settings. There was no significant difference by educational attainment.

How often does the Federal Government deploy peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 288: Socio-demographic analysis of Gauging federal government peacebuilding approaches, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.12.9 Efforts of the Federal Government in the Area of Peacebuilding

In 2026, a total of 41% rated the Federal Government's peacebuilding initiatives as poor or very poor, while 33% rated them fair and 26% rated them good or very good. The good or very good rating has improved from 13% in 2022 to 24% in 2025, a steady 13-percentage-point gain over four years.

How would you rate the efforts of the current Federal Government administration at promoting peacebuilding initiatives?




Figure 289: How Nigerians rate the Federal Government in peacebuilding

The South East respondents were the most critical of assessing the efforts of the current administration in promoting peacebuilding initiatives, with 58% rating the government poor or very poor, while the North East (28%) and South West (28%) were the most positive. Females (27% good or Very Good) were more positive than males (23%).

How would you rate the efforts of the current Federal Government administration at promoting peacebuilding initiatives? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 290: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians rate the Federal Government in peacebuilding, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were highly polarized: 30% rated government efforts very poor at promoting peacebuilding initiatives, yet 37% rated them good or very good, the highest positive rating across all religious groups, and considerably above Christians (25%) and Muslims (26%). Christians (43%) were the largest proportion of respondents to rate the government's efforts poorly. There was no significant difference by educational attainment.

How would you rate the efforts of the current Federal Government administration at promoting peacebuilding initiatives? by National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 291: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians rate the Federal Government in peacebuilding, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.13 Assessment of “Coping Strategy” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines the coping strategies Nigerians employ in the face of poverty and insecurity, including social group membership, reliance on government support, perceptions of whether the government is doing enough, and the primary mechanisms by which Nigerians manage daily hardship.

6.13.1 Membership in a Social Group, Clubs, Association, or Union

Only 20% of respondents reported belonging to a formal social group, club, association, or union in 2026, while 80% did not. Membership has risen marginally from 17% in 2025, signaling a weak or slow-growing organised social participation by citizens, since most people now engage with others and get informed and entertained these days via social media.

Do you belong to a social group, clubs, association or union?




Figure 291: Belonging to a social group, club, association or union

The North West recorded the lowest membership in formal social groups, clubs, and associations at 9%, a striking outlier likely reflecting the disruption of associational life caused by security challenges in a region severely affected by banditry. The North East (28%) and South West (27%) led all zones. The age gradient is sharp: those aged 55 and above accounted for 27% of members of these formal social groups, compared to only 17% among those aged 15 to 24 and 25 to 34, a 10-percentage-point gap that reflects the role of life experience and economic need in driving group participation. There was no significant gender difference.

Do you belong to a social group, clubs, association or union?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 292: Socio-demographic analysis of belonging to a social group, club, association or union, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists (25%) were the most likely to belong to a group, above Christians (21%) and Muslims (17%). There was no significant difference by educational attainment, with lower-educated (17%) and secondary-educated (20%) groups recording similar membership levels.




Figure 293: Socio-demographic analysis of belonging to a social group, club, association or union, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.13.2 Type of Social Group, Clubs, Association, or Union

Among 20% of respondents who belong to a formal social group, club, association, or union, Cooperatives and Trade Associations were the most common at 38%, followed by Sports and Recreation at 35%, and Community and Development associations at 16%. The dominance of economic survival groups over faith-based (5%) and professional (4%) groups reflects the economic pressures that drive social membership.




Figure 294: Type of social group, club, association or union

6.13.3 How Social Group Helps to Cope with Economic Challenges

Among group members, motivation and emotional support were the most cited benefits at 30%, followed by financial assistance at 20% and empowerment programs at 17%. Notably, 13% said their group provided no support, meaning one in eight members received nothing tangible from membership.

How does the social group, association or union help you to cope with the current economic challenges? (2026)




Figure 295: How social group helps to cope with economic challenges

6.13.4 Reliance on Government for Support to Cope with Poverty and Insecurity

In 2026, a total of 57% never or rarely rely on the government for support to cope with poverty and insecurity, and 31% sometimes do. The figure is broadly unchanged from 2025 (60%), confirming that low government reliance is an entrenched feature of Nigerian coping behaviour, not a temporary response to any particular administration.

How often do you rely on the government for support to cope with the challenges of poverty & insecurity in Nigeria?




Figure 296: Reliance on Government for support to cope with poverty and insecurity

The North East was the least self-reliant zone, with 43% sometimes and 14% often or always relying on government, likely reflecting the region's history of state security and humanitarian interventions. The South East was the most self-reliant, at 54% never, a striking finding given that the zone also rates government security and resource management the worst.

How often do you rely on the government for support to cope with the challenges of poverty & insecurity in Nigeria? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 297: Socio-demographic analysis of reliance on Government for support to cope with poverty and insecurity, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists recorded the highest ‘often’ reliance at 21%, more than double the national average of 9%, suggesting that traditional communities have fewer informal safety nets and rely more heavily on state provision. Christians (34% ‘never’) were more self-reliant than Muslims (22% ‘never’). Secondary-educated (29% never) and lower-educated (25% never) individuals recorded similar levels of self-reliance.

How often do you rely on the government for support to cope with the challenges of poverty & insecurity in Nigeria? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 298: Socio-demographic analysis of reliance on Government for support to cope with poverty and insecurity by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.13.5 Perception of Whether the Government is Doing Enough to Assist Nigerians

A total of 52% disagreed or strongly disagreed that the government is doing enough to assist Nigerians with economic challenges in 2026, while 26% agreed and 22% were neutral. The improvement from 68% disagree in 2022 to 62% in 2025 is the most significant positive trend in this section, suggesting that economic relief measures are beginning to shift public perception, even if a majority still considers them insufficient.

In your opinion, would you say the Government is doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges?




Figure 299: Perception of whether Government is doing enough to assist Nigerians

The South East was the most negative at 65% disagree, while the North West (30% agree) and North East (30% agree) were the most positive. Females (27% agree) were marginally more positive than males (25%). Respondents aged 55 and above were the most positive, with 30% agreeing, while those aged 15 to 24 were the most negative, with 59% disagreeing.

In your opinion, would you say the Government is doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 300: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of whether Government is doing enough to assist Nigerians, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were the most negative at 66% disagree and only 13% agree. Muslims (29% agree) were more positive than Christians (25% agree). Secondary educated respondents (28% agree) were marginally more positive than lower educated (22% agree).

In your opinion, would you say the Government is doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 301: Socio-demographic analysis of the perception of whether Government is doing enough to assist Nigerians, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.13.6 Primary Coping Mechanism for Poverty and Insecurity

Community and relatives remained the primary coping mechanism at 48%, followed by prayers at 34% and reliance on government provisions at only 17%. The 31-percentage-point gap between community reliance and government reliance is the starkest finding in this section: Nigerians cope primarily through one another, not through the state. The pattern has been consistent since 2022 and 2025.

In your opinion which of these approaches best captures the ways Nigerians cope with poverty & insecurity?




Figure 302: How Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity

Respondents aged 15 to 24 were the most likely to rely on relatives at 53%, while those aged 55 and above relied most on prayer at 39%, suggesting that faith becomes a more important coping mechanism as people age. Males (49%) relied on community marginally more than females (46%), with females more likely to turn to government provision at 19% versus 15% for males. The South East (55%) and North East (58%) recorded the highest community reliance, while the South West was the most likely to rely on government at 25%.

In your opinion, which of these approaches best captures the ways Nigerians cope with poverty & insecurity? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 303: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists stood out sharply: 32% relied on the government for provision, the highest across all groups and far above Christians (16%) and Muslims (18%). This suggests traditional communities lack the strong religious and communal networks that sustain others, making them more state-dependent. Lower-educated respondents (51%) relied more on the community than secondary-educated respondents (46%).

In your opinion which of these approaches best captures the ways Nigerians cope with poverty & insecurity? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 304: Socio-demographic analysis of how Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.14 Assessment of “Migration” as Component of Social Cohesion

This section examines migration patterns in Nigeria, covering state-of-origin rootedness, years spent outside the state of origin, internal relocation preferences, willingness to relocate abroad, and preferred countries. Migration is treated as both an indicator of social cohesion and a signal of citizens' confidence in Nigeria’s economic and security prospects.

6.14.1 Originally from the Study State

A total of 83% of respondents are indigenes of the states they were surveyed in for the 2026 survey, up marginally (2%) from 81% in 2025.




Figure 305: Originally from the State

The North East (95%) and South East (93%) were the most rooted zones, while the South West was the least rooted at 72%, reflecting its role as Nigeria’s primary destination for internal migrants. Respondents aged 55 and above were the most rooted at 90%, compared to 82% for those aged 25 to 34. Males (85%) were marginally more rooted than females (82%).




Figure 305: State Origin by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists (90%) and Muslims (87%) were the most rooted, compared to Christians (81%). Lower-educated respondents were considerably more rooted at 89% versus 82% among secondary-educated respondents, reflecting how education facilitates mobility

**Are you originally from this State? Study State
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 306: State Origin by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.14.2 State of Origin among Non-Native Residents

Among the 17% not from their study state, Kogi (7%), Imo (6%), Anambra (5%) and Ogun (5%) were the most common states of origin. The prevalence of South East states reflects the historically high mobility of Igbo communities for trade. Kogi’s prominence reflects its central geographic position bordering six states.

If No, which state are you originally from? State of Origin (2026)

State of Origin for Respondent Residence Outside Their State (2026)			
Kogi	7%	Rivers	2%
Imo	6%	Lagos	2%
Anambra	5%	Gombe	2%
Ogun	5%	Kano	2%
Enugu	4%	Katsina	2%
Ebonyi	4%	Kebbi	2%
Akwa-Ibom	4%	Cross Rivers	1%
Delta	4%	Bayelsa	1%
Edo	4%	Borno	1%
Oyo	4%	Bauchi	1%
Osun	4%	Taraba	1%
Ekiti	4%	Jigawa	1%
Adamawa	4%	Sokoto	1%
Benue	4%	Zamfara	1%
Ondo	3%	Niger	1%
Kaduna	3%	Plateau	1%
Kwara	3%	Nasarawa	1%
Refused	3%		
Abia	2%		

Table 27: State Origin among non-native residents

6.14.3 Average Number of Years Living Outside State of Origin

Respondents had lived outside their state of origin for an average of 15 years in 2026, down from 17 years in 2025.

Average Number of Years Living Outside State of Origin




Figure 307: Average number of years living outside state of origin

The South East and South-South recorded the shortest displacement at 12 years each, while the North East recorded the longest at 19 years, likely reflecting prolonged conflict-related displacement in that zone. Males (16 years) had been away marginally longer than females (14 years). The age gradient was steep: those aged 55 and above averaged 29 years, compared to 12 years for those aged 15 to 34, a 17-year gap that captures how length of displacement accumulates across a lifetime.

Average Number of Years Living Outside State of Origin
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 308: Socio-demographic analysis of average number of years living outside state of origin, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists were a sharp outlier at 33 years, more than double the national average and considerably above Christians and Muslims (both 15 years), suggesting that members of traditional communities who migrate tend to stay away for much longer periods. Lower-educated respondents averaged 18 years, compared to 14 years for secondary-educated respondents.

**Average Number of Years Living Outside State of Origin
By National Average, Religion & Educational Level**




Figure 309: Socio-demographic analysis of average number of years living outside state of origin, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.14.4 Preference for Internal Relocation within Nigeria

A total of 51% were not interested in relocating to another state, while 49% expressed some interest. Among those willing to relocate, Lagos was the most preferred destination at 12%, followed by Abuja at 8% and Kano at 4%. All other states attracted only 1-3% each, confirming that migration intent is highly concentrated in a few urban economic centres.

If you would consider relocating to another state in Nigeria, which state would that be? (2026)




Figure 310: State Nigerians Consider relocating to

By region, the South West led at 31% of those willing, the North Central at 26% and the North West at 16%, underscoring the economic pull of Lagos and Abuja as Nigeria's primary relocation magnets.

Which region in Nigeria would you consider relocating to if you have the opportunity?




Figure 311: Preferred destination (region) for internal relocation

6.14.5 Reasons for Considering Internal Relocation

Better business opportunities led at 28%, followed by greater employment prospects at 22%, a safer environment at 13%, hometown connection at 11%, economic conditions at 9% and agricultural practices at 7%. Economic motivations, business and employment combined, account for 50% of all reasons, confirming that internal migration is overwhelmingly a livelihood decision rather than a lifestyle one.

Reasons for considering relocating to another state in Nigeria (2026)




Figure 312: Reasons for considering internal relocation

6.14.6 Willingness to Relocate Abroad

A total of 55% said they would relocate abroad in 2026, unchanged from 2025. Critically, the “No, I wouldn’t relocate” response has risen from 21% to 28%, a 7-percentage point increase signaling more Nigerians actively deciding to stay back and make the country a better place. The 2021 spike to 73% was the historic peak; the current 55% reflects a gradual retreat. A youth leader from Edo State captured the economic pull behind Japa:

‘Things are not working here. The exchange rate. Everything you see in Edo is based on money coming from abroad. If you look at Edo State economy, 60% is remittance driven. Once your senior brother is abroad, he carries the load of seven in your family. How much can you make here to survive?’ (KII with Youth Leader, Edo State, 2026)

If you had the opportunity to relocate with your family from Nigeria today, would you seize the opportunity?




Figure 313: Willingness to relocate abroad

The South West led at 73%, the North West was the lowest at 34%. Youth were the most willing: those aged 15 to 24 at 64% and 25 to 34 at 63%, against only 29% among those aged 55 and above. There was no gender difference. The South-South (62%), North Central (61%) and South East (56%) all recorded majority willingness, while the North East (49%) was below the national average.

If you had the opportunity to relocate with your family from Nigeria today, would you seize the opportunity? By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Figure 314: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to relocate abroad, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Christians (62%) were considerably more willing than Muslims (44%), an 18-percentage point gap. Traditionalists recorded the highest uncertainty at 30% not sure and only 51% ‘yes’. The education gap was stark: secondary educated respondents at 60% versus only 38% among lower educated respondents, a 22-percentage point difference that reflects both greater awareness of opportunities and stronger economic frustration among the educated.

If you had the opportunity to relocate with your family from Nigeria today, would you seize the opportunity? By National Average, Religion & Educational Level




Figure 315: Socio-demographic analysis of the willingness to relocate abroad, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.14.7 Reasons for Considering Migration Abroad

Better job opportunity was the primary reason at 34%, followed by better economic prospects at 22%, giving children a better life at 14%, suitable business environment at 9% and better governance at 8%. Economic motivations (job and economic prospects) combined account for 56% of all reasons. An Anambra youth leader, asked directly why Nigerians travel abroad, offered a candid perspective:

‘Because they feel nothing good can come out of Nigeria. Some japa due to crime while others believe in greener pasture. But still I believe in Nigeria.’ (KII with Youth Leader, Anambra State, 2026)

If yes, what would be the SINGLE most important reason for your




Figure 316: Reasons for considering migration abroad

Those aged 25 to 34 were the most job-focused at 41%, while those aged 55 and above cited economic prospects most at 34%. Males were more job-driven at 36% versus 32% for females. The North Central led on job motivation at 38%, the North East cited economic prospects most at 27%, and the South East led on children’s future at 19%.

**If yes, what would be the SINGLE most important reason for your relocation?
By National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	National	Gender		Age Category					Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	15-24 years	25-34 years	35-44 years	45-54 years	55 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Better Economic Prospect	22%	22%	22%	22%	22%	21%	21%	34%	23%	27%	20%	15%	20%	26%
Better Job Opportunity	34%	36%	32%	32%	41%	34%	24%	20%	38%	25%	34%	27%	33%	39%
Better Security	6%	6%	6%	8%	5%	6%	8%	7%	6%	9%	6%	8%	6%	6%
Better Governance	8%	8%	7%	4%	7%	9%	10%	8%	7%	7%	10%	10%	8%	6%
Suitable Business Environment	9%	10%	8%	8%	8%	8%	14%	14%	6%	12%	10%	15%	9%	6%
Give My Children Better Life	14%	12%	16%	8%	10%	18%	18%	11%	14%	6%	12%	19%	16%	14%
Better Education	4%	3%	5%	15%	4%	2%	1%	0%	3%	7%	5%	4%	5%	2%
Better Health Service	2%	2%	2%	2%	1%	1%	3%	6%	1%	2%	2%	2%	3%	0%
Persecution (E.g., due to religious affiliation, sexual orientation, ethnicity, career path)	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%	1%	0%	2%	5%	1%	0%	0%	1%

Table 28: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons for considering migration abroad, by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Traditionalists stood apart: 31% cited giving children a better life, the highest of any group and more than double the national average of 14%. Muslims placed higher weight on economic prospects at 26% versus 20% for Christians. Lower educated respondents were more likely to cite economic prospects at 26%, while secondary educated respondents were more job-focused at 35%. An Enugu barrister framed the underlying loss of confidence:

‘When the country is not in order, everybody will want their family to get a good stay elsewhere. That is what drives those that travel, so that they can get peace of mind and contribute back to the country.’ (KII with Barrister, Enugu State, 2026)

**If yes, what would be the SINGLE most important reason for your relocation?
By National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**

	National	Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Better Economic Prospect	22%	20%	26%	12%	26%	21%
Better Job Opportunity	34%	35%	31%	41%	36%	35%
Better Security	6%	6%	8%	13%	6%	6%
Better Governance	8%	8%	7%	0%	6%	8%
Suitable Business Environment	9%	10%	8%	0%	7%	9%
Give My Children Better Life	14%	13%	14%	31%	13%	14%
Better Education	4%	4%	4%	3%	2%	5%
Better Health Service	2%	2%	1%	0%	3%	1%
Persecution (E.g., due to religious affiliation, sexual orientation, ethnicity, career path)	1%	2%	1%	0%	1%	1%

Table 29: Socio-demographic analysis of the reasons for considering migration abroad, by National Average, Religion & Educational Level

6.14.8 Preferred Countries and Regions for Relocation

The USA was the most preferred country at 27%, followed by the UK at 19% and Canada at 17%. Saudi Arabia (6%), Dubai (6%), and China (4%) followed. North America (USA and Canada) accounted for 44% of choices, stable from 42% in 2021. The UK has risen steadily from 15% in 2021, while Canada rose sharply to 20% in 2025, then declined to 16.5% in 2026.

If yes, which country would you consider relocating to?

Country	2021 (%)	2022 (%)	2025 (%)	2026 (%)
USA	28.0	29.0	24.8	27.2
United Kingdom	14.7	14.9	19.8	19.3
Canada	13.1	14.0	20.2	16.5
Dubai (UAE)	7.7	8.4	7.2	5.9
Saudi Arabia	7.5	8.8	6.6	6.1
China	3.0	1.5	3.7	4.2
Germany	3.5	2.3	3.0	2.7
Others*	22.5	21.1	14.7	18.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 30: Respondents’ preferred countries for relocation

Others (54 countries)

- **Europe:** France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Russia, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Norway, Ukraine
- **Asia:** India, Malaysia, Japan, Turkey, Egypt, Singapore, Israel, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran, South Korea
- **Africa:** Ghana, South Africa, Libya, Niger Republic, Algeria, Sudan, Kenya, Cameroon, Togo, Ethiopia, Uganda, Morocco, Benin Republic, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Liberia, Mali
- **Americas:** Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
- **Oceania:** Australia, New Zealand

Across regions, North America led at 44%, followed by Europe at 30% and Asia at 19%. The Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Dubai combined) declined from 15% in 2021 to 12% in 2026, suggesting reduced appeal of the Gulf relative to Western destinations. North America and Europe together accounted for 74% of all preferred destinations, confirming a clear preference for developed Western economies.

Continents / Regions people are willing to relocate to



Figure XXX: Preferred regions for relocation across waves



7.0 SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS



7.1 Summary Findings

The Nigeria Social Cohesion Index for 2026 stands at 48.8%, the highest recorded since measurement began in 2021, improving from 46.8% in 2025 and from a low of 39.6% in 2022. The index measures citizens' own perceptions of social cohesion across 14 indicators: Identity, Trust, Tolerance, Social Justice, Civic Participation, Gender Equity, Natural Resource Governance, Impunity, Corruption, Polarization, Security and Peacebuilding, Coping Strategy, Self-Worth and Future Expectation, and Migration. The 2-percentage-point improvement is driven most significantly by a breakthrough in national identity, supported by modest gains in future optimism and tolerance. Nigeria remains just below the 50% average threshold that would indicate a majority perception of social cohesion.

The most significant positive shift in 2026 is in national identity. For the first time since measurement began, a majority of Nigerians (52%) identify primarily as Nigerian rather than by ethnicity, religion, or region, reversing a 2025 figure of 39%. On feelings about the country, 46% feel truly proud of Nigeria in 2026, recovering from 33% in 2025, while those who feel disappointed have declined from 53% to 41%. Future optimism has risen from 56% to 61%. On Polarization, 49% agree or strongly agree that Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago, and 55% agree that political division has increased, making it the most acute of the three Polarization dimensions tracked.

Several sub-indices have remained persistently weak. On trust, only 3% of citizens express a high level of trust in institutions, while 24% express no trust at all. Social justice is perceived as low by 75% of respondents in 2026, having worsened to 79% in 2025 before recovering slightly. On impunity, only 2% of citizens rate it as absent, while 13% rate it as high and 51% as average, meaning 64% perceive impunity as a present feature of their social environment, though this has improved notably from 43% in 2025, who rated it as high. On corruption, 59% rate the level of corruption as high, 62% rate efforts to address it as poor, and only 16% believe that access to justice is free from corruption. These indicators form the most structurally resistant dimension of Nigeria's social cohesion challenge.

Gender equity shows meaningful improvement in 2026. The rating has risen sharply from 9% in 2021 and 28% in 2025 to 33% in 2026, while the poor rating has fallen from 30% in 2021 to 13% in 2026. However, 52% still rate gender equity as only fair, and most respondents continue to believe that men should earn more and hold more political positions, indicating that attitudinal change is lagging the positive directional shift. Tolerance has improved from a high of 10% in 2025 to 15% in 2026, though 85% remain in the low category. Civic participation has risen from a high of 14% in 2025 to 16% in 2026.

The sense of personal safety has declined, with 53% feeling safe or very safe in 2026, down from 58% in 2025. On international migration, 55% of Nigerians say they would relocate abroad if given the opportunity, driven primarily by better job opportunities (34%) and economic prospects (22%). A significant countervailing signal has emerged: the proportion of those who say they would not relocate has risen from 21% to 28%, a 7-percentage point shift in a single year. For internal relocation, the majority (51%) are not interested in moving to another state, with Lagos (12%) and Abuja (8%) the most preferred destinations among those willing.

On natural resource governance, 56% rate the management of resource revenues as poor, and 86% express little or no trust in restructuring efforts, though this has improved from 96% in 2022. The coping strategy index shows the most notable improvement of any sub-index in 2026: the proportion rating coping strategy as low has dropped from 69% in 2022 and 62% in 2025 to 52% in 2026, while those rating it as high have risen from 14% to 26% over the same period. Community networks remain the primary safety net, with 48% relying on relatives and communal groups, compared with 17% relying on institutional support.

On security and peacebuilding, 26% rate the overall situation as high in 2026, up from 19% in 2022 and 21% in 2025, while 18% rate it as low. Willingness to participate in peacebuilding efforts stands at 77%, and 63% believe that local community-level efforts can resolve recurring conflicts. These figures point to a civic capacity for social cohesion that is growing independently of broader structural conditions. The 2026 findings, taken together, describe a Nigeria where the citizen-to-citizen dimension of social cohesion is gradually strengthening, anchored by a newly emergent majority national identity, while the deeper structural dimensions of justice, accountability, and equity remain the most pressing unresolved challenge.

7.2 Conclusions

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey presents a picture of genuine but uneven progress. The NSC Index has risen to 48.8%, its highest level since measurement began, yet remains below the majority threshold of 50%. The improvement is real and should be acknowledged: for the first time, more Nigerians identify as Nigerian first than by ethnicity, religion, or region. Pride in the country, though declining, is matched by rising optimism about the future. Community bonds remain strong. These are not trivial findings. They point to an enduring social resilience that has persisted through years of economic hardship, insecurity, and political volatility.

The shift in national identity is the single most significant finding of the 2026 survey. When 52% of citizens identify primarily as Nigerian, a 13-percentage-point increase from 2025, it signals that a shared sense of fate and belonging is beginning to outweigh sub-national loyalties. This does not mean that ethnic, religious, and regional identities are weakening. Polarization has, in fact, edged upward, with 49% agreeing that Nigeria is more divided today than four years ago. What it means is that Nigerians are holding two truths simultaneously: they are proud of a shared national identity while also navigating deepening inter-group tensions. Social cohesion in Nigeria is not built on the absence of difference but on the capacity to maintain a collective identity despite it.

Across all waves of this survey, the indicators of governance experience have remained the weakest. Trust in institutions stands at a high 3%. Social justice is perceived as low by 75%. On impunity, only 2% of citizens rate it as absent, while 64% rate it as average or high. Notably, the high impunity rating has improved from 43% in 2025 to 13% in 2026, the most measurable governance shift in this wave, though the majority still experience impunity as a present feature of daily life. On corruption, 59% rate the level as high, and 62% rate efforts to address it as poor. These indicators constitute the most structurally resistant dimension of Nigeria's social cohesion challenge.

Gender equity presents an instructive case of the gap between measurable improvement and lived experience. The proportion rating gender equity as good has risen sharply from 9% in 2021 to 33% in 2026, while the proportion rating it as poor has fallen from 30% to 13% over the same period. Yet the majority of Nigerians continue to believe that men should earn more than women and hold more political positions. The numbers are moving in the right direction while the attitudes that generate inequality remain broadly unchanged. This gap between the perception of improvement and the persistence of discriminatory beliefs is one of the more sobering findings of the 2026 survey, suggesting that gender equity gains remain fragile and reversible.

The deterioration in personal safety, from 58% feeling safe in 2025 to 53% in 2026, is occurring alongside a migration picture that is more nuanced than the headline “japa” narrative suggests. While 55% of Nigerians say they would relocate abroad if given the opportunity, the proportion actively deciding not to relocate has grown from 21% to 28% in a single year. This growing counter-current is significant. It indicates that a

segment of the Nigerian population is making a deliberate, informed choice to remain and invest in the country, even as safety conditions worsen. The two positions are not contradictory: they reflect different readings of the same social reality, and both deserve analytical attention. The 2026 survey is the first to clearly reveal this bifurcation.

The natural resource governance findings reinforce a long-standing pattern of low citizen confidence in the management of the country's wealth. Sixty-two percent (62%) rate resource revenue management as poor, and 86% express little or no trust in restructuring efforts. Against this backdrop, the findings on coping strategies are revealing: Nigerians have responded not by increasing their reliance on institutions but by deepening their dependence on the community. Forty-eight percent (48%) rely primarily on relatives and communal networks, against 17% who rely on institutional support, a 31-percentage point gap. This is not simply a coping mechanism: it is an architecture of informal social insurance built precisely because formal systems are perceived as unreliable. The strength of this informal architecture is both a resource for social cohesion and a signal of where formal systems fall short.

The 2026 survey's most important underreported finding is the extent of citizens' willingness to engage in peacebuilding. Twenty-six percent (26%) rate the overall security and peacebuilding situation as high in 2026, up from 19% in 2022 and 21% in 2025, a steady improvement across waves. Seventy-seven percent (77%) say they are willing to participate in peacebuilding efforts in their locality, and 63% believe that local community-level efforts can resolve recurring conflicts. These figures represent a vast, largely untapped reservoir of civic energy. The challenge is that this energy exists primarily at the community level, while the structural conditions that generate conflict operate at the institutional level. Bridging this gap is the central challenge the 2026 findings place before all stakeholders.

7.3 Recommendations

Drawing from the findings of the 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey, and grounded in the specific shifts and persistent challenges identified across all 14 sub-indices, the following recommendations are addressed to key stakeholders.

The Nigerian Government

The 2026 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey measures the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) calculated at 48.8%, just below the average threshold of 50 points. The national identity breakthrough and improving peacebuilding outlook provide a foundation for accelerated progress. Government must now match citizen momentum with structural reforms:

- i. Leverage the national identity breakthrough by adopting inclusive citizenship frameworks that reinforce shared vision and belonging across ethnic, religious, and regional lines. The 52% majority Nigerian-first identification is the country's most important social capital right now, and it must be protected and nurtured.
- ii. Address impunity urgently and consistently. The improvement from 43% high impunity in 2025 to 13% in 2026 is the most encouraging governance shift in this wave. Sustaining and deepening it requires visible, consistent, and non-partisan prosecution of human rights abuses and financial crimes.
- iii. Invest in gender equity beyond legislative compliance. With 52% still rating gender equity as only fair and attitudinal change lagging measurable gains, behaviour change programmes, economic empowerment, and enforcement of existing laws are necessary.
- iv. Strengthen the social safety net to close the 31-percentage-point gap between community reliance (48%) and institutional reliance (17%) on coping with poverty and insecurity. Targeted social protection programmes, expanded coverage of existing poverty alleviation schemes, and

- community-based delivery mechanisms can begin to shift this imbalance and reduce citizens' dependence on informal safety nets in the face of structural economic hardship.
- v. Prioritise community-level security. The 5-percentage-point decline in personal safety in a single year is a significant deterioration that requires immediate attention, particularly in the North East and North West, where insecurity is most acute. Community policing frameworks, rapid-response mechanisms, and support for local conflict early-warning systems should be urgently strengthened.
 - vi. Reform natural resource governance structures and institutions. With 62% rating revenue management as poor and 86% with little or no trust in restructuring, the full implementation of the Petroleum Industry Act and transparent revenue reporting are minimum requirements for restoring citizen confidence. Besides, the government needs to ensure that revenues from all of Nigeria's natural resources (gold, copper, gemstones, lithium, etc.) are included in the country's revenue base and reduce heavy dependence on crude oil revenue.
 - vii. Finally, API recommends that Nigeria requires a National Social Cohesion Commission, similar to Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission, focused on fostering national identity, unity, peaceful coexistence, citizens trust, civic participation, social justice, patriotism and positive future expectations, among other components of social cohesion; or at least institute a Social Cohesion desk in every Ministry, Department and Agency (MDA) of government, to ensure that development plans and public policies are inclusive and socially-cohesive.

Traditional and Religious Leaders

The survey consistently shows that citizens place greater trust in traditional and religious leaders than in government at all levels and public institutions, making them indispensable partners in social cohesion building:

- i. Champion tolerance and inter-group dialogue within and across communities. With 85% of Nigerians in the low tolerance category, traditional and religious leaders are best placed to counter divisive narratives and model inclusive values.
- ii. Activate the 77% peacebuilding willingness. The survey finds that 77% of Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding in their locality. Traditional and religious leaders should provide the local structures and legitimacy for this civic capacity to be deployed.
- iii. Model and reinforce the emerging national identity. The shift to 52% Nigerian-first identity is fragile and must be nurtured at the community level through narratives of shared nationhood and common destiny.
- iv. Serve as advocates for good governance, bridging the gap between the government and the governed, while encouraging the citizenry to fully embrace civic participation and trust, as well as expressing hope for citizens to embrace self-worth and positive future expectations.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)

CSOs are uniquely positioned to bridge the gap between citizen capacity and institutional delivery:

- i. Scale up community peacebuilding infrastructure. The 77% of citizens' willingness to engage in peacebuilding and the 63% belief in local solutions represent an enormous untapped resource. CSOs should work with communities to establish structured local peacebuilding platforms.
- ii. Lead on gender equity and tolerance advocacy. With attitudinal change on gender equity lagging measurable improvements, CSOs should invest in community-based behaviour change programmes that address the root causes of discrimination.
- iii. Monitor and document the 'Japa' counter-movement. The growing cohort of Nigerians actively choosing to stay (28% in 2026, up from 21% in 2025) is an underexplored social development that CSOs should study and amplify as a positive signal of social cohesion.

Citizens

Citizens are the primary architects of social cohesion. The 2026 survey shows that community resilience, communal solidarity, and civic willingness are the strongest assets Nigeria possesses:

- i. Embrace and sustain the emerging national identity. The shift to a majority Nigerian-first identification is a collective achievement by citizens. Sustaining it requires conscious choices to engage across ethnic, religious, and regional lines in everyday life.
- ii. Participate actively in peacebuilding and civic life. With 77% willing and only 16% currently highly engaged in civic participation, there is a significant gap between intent and action. Active citizens should stir up passion for responsible citizenship and translate their willingness to engage in civic participation into community dialogue, conflict resolution, and other civic processes, such as voting and peaceful protests.
- iii. Active citizens should hold all leaders accountable and demand transparency. With only 3% trusting public institutions highly and 59% rating corruption as high, citizen accountability mechanisms, scorecards, and informed participation in democratic processes are the most effective tools for driving institutional reform.




Collect Credible & Reliable Data in Nigeria using Telephone or In-Person / Face-to-face Interviews

PUBLICATIONS



Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NCSC2025)




Socio-Economic Implications of COVID-19 on Rural Women (2020)




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
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
Does Nigeria Love Nigerians Survey (2020)



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