



# THE NIGERIA SOCIAL COHESION SURVEY

## REPORT #NSCS2022

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### The Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey Report #NSCS2022 [October 2022]

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# Preface

It is of utmost delight that I present the 2022 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2022) Report to the public. This report represents the third in a series of reports produced since the launch of the maiden edition in 2019. Similar to previous editions, the #NSCS2022 reports citizens' attitudes and perceptions on the state of social cohesion in Nigeria. API had benefitted from the award of a 2-year Ford Foundation grant to conduct 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> rounds of the survey in 2021 and 2022. Like in 2021, this current survey develops a National Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) for Nigeria and presents the computation of the index and findings from the 3<sup>rd</sup> round of the survey. The scope of the 2022 survey was expanded to cover 13 key indicators (Sub-Indices for computing the Index): **Identity, Trust, Social Justice, Participation & Patriotism, Natural Resource Governance, Gender Equity, Impunity, Corruption, Polarization, Peacebuilding, Coping strategies, Self-Worth and Future Expectation.**

A united society fosters peace and prosperity, and gives a sense of belonging and identity to all its citizens irrespective of ethnicity, religion or other socio-cultural affiliation. The concept of Social Cohesion focuses on the willingness of citizens cooperate and prosper as one united entity. However, the current state of the nation amidst the harsh economic realities, high unemployment rates, increasing poverty and heightened insecurity, only begs the question: Can Nigeria be said to be united and prosperous?

The 2022 Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) has been computed as 39.6%, which is below the 50% average, signifying that Nigeria is not as socially cohesive as it ought to be. The index displays a 4.6% reduction when compared with the 2021 index of 44.2%. In addition, under the 'Identity' index, more Nigerians express higher proclivity towards ethnicity (50%) than nationalism (14%). Similarly, a large majority of respondents (66%), believe that the country is much more divided today [in 2022] than it was four years ago.

In summary, the results and findings of the survey highlight dissatisfaction among the citizenry on the state of the security and economy, pace of development and existential threats in our quest for nation-building. Increasingly Nigerians are polarized along ethnic and religious lines; in fact, the fault lines are widening and this portends very serious implications for the country.



The onerous task of leadership and governance requires -citizens trust in government. Unfortunately, the evidence from our survey highlights clear trust-deficit; thus, requiring significant attention.

Building social cohesion in a heterogeneous country like Nigeria is a huge and complex undertaking. It involves a myriad of actors and stakeholders who need to find common ground. How then do we foster social cohesion? This report provides some answers to help us understand the issues. It does not claim to have all the solutions, but has attempted to shed some light on the attitudes of citizens and provide some recommendations for consideration.

It is not by happenstance that the 2023 General Elections are around the corner and will further deepen the fault-lines. Therefore, API considers this report quite apt and timely to the ongoing conversations on the need for a national coalesce or rallying-point that embraces the needs and aspirations of all segments of the citizenry.

The #NSCS2022 is one of the flagship research offerings of Africa Polling Institute and I hope you enjoy reading the report and gaining some insights from its result and findings.

**Professor Bell Ihua (PhD Kent)**  
Executive Director, Africa Polling Institute (API)

# Acknowledgment

The Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey [#NSCS2022] is the intellectual property of Africa Polling Institute (API), which captures the attitudes and perceptions of Nigerians on the subject of Social Cohesion. We sincerely appreciate and thank all individuals, institutions and organizations who contributed immensely to ensure the success of this research project.

First, the institute acknowledges and appreciates the contribution made by the team of researcher scholars who worked tirelessly to interview respondents, engage stakeholders across the country, undertake data analysis and the writing of the report. Our Social Cohesion Fellows – Professor Fidelis Allen, of the University of Port Harcourt, Nigeria; Professor Hauwau Yusuf, of the Kaduna State University, Nigeria; and Dr Ifeanyi Onwuzuruigbo, of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Their insights helped to enrich this report.

Second, we also appreciate Professor James Olaniyi Okunlola, Chair of the API Board, who actively participated and contributed in all phases of the study; and the entire API team who worked on the report. Others include: Dr Feyishola Kadiri, Senior Research Fellow; Segun Olajonrin, Senior Manager Research; Ekene Okonkwo, Senior Research Associate; Amarachi Charles, Head Corporate Services; and Voke Roland; for their immense contributions to the success of this research.



Specifically, we wish to acknowledge the support of our donor, the Ford Foundation, Office for West Africa, who provided the funding for us to conduct this study, and other advocacy components, under the Nigeria Social Cohesion Project.

Signed

**Dr. Olugbenga Ogunmefun**  
Director of Research and  
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# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>API</b>	Africa Polling Institute
<b>AYCF</b>	Arewa Youths Consultative Forum
<b>CPS</b>	Citizens Perception Survey
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society of Nigeria
<b>Covid-19</b>	The Coronavirus Disease 2019
<b>EFCC</b>	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
<b>FRCN</b>	Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
<b>ICPC</b>	Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>IPOB</b>	Indigenous People of Biafra
<b>LGAs</b>	Local Government Areas
<b>MASSOB</b>	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
<b>MEND</b>	Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
<b>NBC</b>	Nigerian Bitumen Company
<b>NDDC</b>	Niger Delta Development Commission
<b>NDPVF</b>	Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force
<b>NEITI</b>	Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
<b>NOA</b>	National Orientation Agency
<b>NSCI</b>	Nigeria Social Cohesion Index
<b>NSIP</b>	National Social Investment Programme
<b>OECD</b>	Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OMPADEC</b>	Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission
<b>OPC</b>	Oodua People's Congress
<b>SARS</b>	Special Anti-Robbery Squad
<b>SPSS</b>	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNCTAD</b>	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development





Photo Credit: @Manly.ng

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2022 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2022) was designed to build upon the last two editions (2019 and 2021). It is a National Citizens Perception Survey, undertaken by Africa Polling Institute (API), with support from Ford Foundation. This current edition captures attitudes and perceptions of citizens using 13 key indicators (which also served as Sub-Indices for computing the Index). The broad aim of the survey is to generate credible and scientific data to stimulate constructive policy dialogue on how to address existing conflicts, design peacebuilding initiatives and enhance mutual trust between the government and the governed. We consider this report very timely and important, especially as Nigeria faces another round of General Elections in the next few months.

### KEY OBJECTIVES

In recent years, the topic of social cohesion has become somewhat ubiquitous in the socio-political lexicon of Nigeria. Evidently, the challenges of nation building and increasing polarization have continued to deepen the nation's fault lines, thus threatening the unity and stability of the country. It is therefore important to scientifically measure the Social Cohesion in Nigeria and compute the Social Cohesion Index in order to capture citizens attitudes and perspectives on the state of social cohesion in country, vis-a-vis the recent challenges of insecurity, economic downturn and spiraling unemployment amongst others. The Objectives of the Survey are: (1) To develop a nationally representative measurement for Social Cohesion in Nigeria; (2) To examine the state of Social Cohesion in Nigeria, in the light of recent happenings within the polity; (3) To conduct a Citizens Perception Survey in order to measure the concept of Social Cohesion through the lens of 13 Key Indicators, namely: Identity, Trust, Social Justice, Participation and Patriotism, Worth, Future, Gender Equity, Natural Resources Governance, Impunity, Corruption, Peacebuilding, Polarization and Coping Strategy; and (4) To proffer recommendations to various stakeholders on how to strengthen the state of social cohesion in the country.

### METHODOLOGY

For the 2022 Edition, the study applied a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, with Citizens Perception Survey (CPS) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) adopted for primary data collection, respectively. The Survey Questionnaire and Interview Guide were designed by the research team and a methodology workshop was organized on 16<sup>th</sup> March

2022 in Abuja, after which a pilot survey was conducted to pre-test the survey tools. For the data collection all interviews were administered between 1<sup>st</sup> May and 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022, via face-to-face Household survey, using the Stratified Random Sampling Technique.

The interviews were conducted in five major Nigerian languages: English, Pidgin English, Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. All 36 states and 109 Senatorial Districts in Nigeria were proportionately represented in the survey. The average time per interview was 25 minutes. All respondents were 18 years and above. Geographic quotas were assigned during the survey, which ensured that all senatorial district and state were proportionately represented in the sample. A total of 6 Local Government Areas (LGAs) were visited in each of the 36 states (2 LGAs per Senatorial District), except in the FCT where enumerators visited all Six Area Councils. A total of 7,245 respondents were contacted to participate in the survey across the country, with 5,178 interviews completed, representing a response rate of 71.5%.

Post-stratification gender and senatorial weights were applied to the data to enable representativeness to the national population, more accurate population estimates and reduce non-response bias. The weights assigned were in proportion to the 2006 population figures. The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 3 percent at the mid-range with a confidence level of 95 percent. To further ensure that the sets of variables used for the index are reliable, a Reliability Test was conducted. The Cronbach's Alpha value was used to assess the reliability or interval consistency of the scale or test items that compose the index. In the analysis of the NSC Index and the key questions, results were compared between 2021 and 2022 to access possible changes that have occurred over time in the perceptions of Nigerians towards the focus assessment questions.

### KEY FINDINGS

Overall, the results and findings of the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 2022 and the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index with a computed score of 39.6%, suggests that Nigeria still remains below the average threshold for a socially cohesive country. Furthermore, compared to the 2021 Index, which was computed as 44.2%, there's clear evidence to suggest that the state of social cohesion in Nigeria has weakened over the last one year. Presented below are some of the key findings and recommendations from the survey.

### Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) 2022

The 2022 Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) has been computed as 39.6%. This score represents a 4.6% decline from the 2021 Index of 44.2%, falls short of the 50% average and signifies a weakening of the state of social cohesion in Nigeria. The Index score was derived from the computation of 13 key indicators / sub-indices of Identity, Trust, Social Justice, Participation and Patriotism, Worth, Future, Gender Equity, Natural Resources Governance, Impunity, Corruption, Peacebuilding, Polarization and Coping Strategy. It's worth noting that the 2022 Index reflects the perception of citizens on the current state of the nation, given the increasing level of insecurity, agitations against the state, increasing calls for restructuring, and a general sense of disaffection amongst majority of citizens. Therefore, the 2022 NSCI of 39.6%, declining from 44.2% in 2021, is not surprising; considering the data provides evidence of deepening fault lines and polarization along ethnic, religious, economic and political lines.

NSCI is derived from the proportion of Respondents that perceived 'average' and 'high' social cohesion in Nigeria, averaged over the 13-Indicators mentioned above. Cronbach's Alpha Value = 0.510. This is a measure used to assess the reliability or internal consistency, of a set of scale or test items. Values less than 0.5 are usually not acceptable. The average per cent (*presented in 1 decimal point*) represents the social cohesion computation from the survey of Nigerian citizens in 2021. If the value is less than 50.0%, it signifies 'below-average social cohesion'. If greater than 50%, it signifies 'above average social cohesion'. At 50%, it signifies an 'average social cohesion'. *The NSCI has been computed as 39.6 per cent, and this implies that Nigerian Citizens have assessed the level of Social Cohesion in Nigeria as below average (<50.0 per cent).*



### Key Results & Findings from the 2022 Survey Round



#### On Identity

Overall, 81% of Nigerians feel comfortable with the dual identity of being identified as both Nigerian and from their ethnic group, but to different proportions. Remarkably, 36% of Nigerians feel proud of being equally Nigerian and from their ethnic group; while 35% identify more with their ethnic group than being Nigerian; compared to only 10% that feel more Nigerian than ethnic.

Half of the citizens (50%) said they “feel disappointed in Nigeria”, compared to 38% who “feel truly proud of the country”.

Remarkably, 66% of citizens opined that the country is much more divided today (in 2022) than it was four years ago; compared to only a few (10%) who said the country is much more united today and 20% who believe that the country has stayed the same.

The 2022 survey showed that the five major causes of conflicts in Nigeria are: Political Party affiliations (51%), Ethnic / Tribal Differences (48%), Religious Differences (45%), Access to land (30%), and Differences in Social Status (25%) amongst others. It is unsurprising that political party affiliation comes top, given the heightened political activities resulting from the buildup to the 2023 General Elections



#### On Trust

Religious leaders were rated more favourably by citizens (50%), followed by traditional leaders (43%). Citizens' trust for President Buhari's Government, the National Assembly and the Judiciary have all declined to 17%, 16% and 22% respectively. The data reveals that the National Assembly is the least trusted public institution in Nigeria, compared to the Nigeria Police Force (20%), which was the least trusted in the 2021 survey.



#### On Social Justice

About 6 in 10 Nigerians (61%) expressed the view that the Federal Government isn't making enough effort to promote a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups; as opposed to only 12% who assess the government's effort positively, and 27% who assess their efforts fairly. 67% of citizens believe that the Law does not apply equally to citizens in the country, as “there are persons above the law in Nigeria”; as against 26% who believe that the country's laws protect everyone equally. 66% of citizens hold the view that “Only the rich and powerful have access to justice”, compared to 27% who believe that “all citizens have equal access to civil justice”.



### On Participation & Patriotism

Majority of Nigerians (71%) are “Extremely or Somewhat Willing” to cooperate with fellow citizens to make Nigeria more united; while 65% say they are “Extremely and Somewhat Willing,” to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place. However, 42% expressed willingness to join the military to defend the Nigerian state.



### On Natural Resource Governance

Over 6 in 10 Nigerian (65%) believe that the government has been managing the revenues from natural resources “Poorly”; compared to 35% who assessed the government’s management favourably.

The survey reported mixed feelings regarding the connection between the availability of natural resources and the promotion of corruption; as 38% of Nigerians “Agree or Strongly Agree” that the availability of natural resources fuels corruption in the country; similar to 40% of citizens who “Disagreed or Strongly Disagreed”. Also, 59% of citizens consider the 13% derivation policy “Unfair and Insufficient”, while 38% feel it is okay. Unsurprisingly, a significant proportion of those who consider the policy “Unfair and Insufficient” is based in the South-South region (77%).



### On Gender Equity

More than half of Nigerians (53%) rate the current administration's efforts at promoting gender equity “Poorly”; as against 15% who rate government favourably. About 8 in 10 Nigerians (80%) agree that boys and girls should have equal access to education; 71% agree that both males and females should be judged based on their qualifications, competence and track records; 61% agree that women should be given the opportunity to lead in politics, corporate entities and religious organizations; and 60% agree that women should be given equal opportunity to family inheritances.

Again, more than half of Nigerians (54%) rate the efforts of the current administration “Poorly” in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and

violence, compared to a paltry 16% who rated their efforts favourably. 51% of citizens rate the efforts of government “Poorly” in the areas of providing more opportunities for women to be appointed into public offices; compared to a meagre 17% who assessed the government positively.



### On Impunity

A large majority of Nigerians (96%) consider human rights abuses and violations a problem in the country; while 44% believe that such many cases of human rights violations are never reported to the Police. Interestingly, 60% of citizens are “Very or Somewhat Likely” to report such cases to Community and Religious Leaders as opposed to the Police (56%).

Also, 53% of citizens believe that impunity thrives in the current administration; 83% believe impunity amongst government officials is “increasing”; 63% believe that state agents such as the Police and Military are often perpetrators of human rights abuses; while 58% believe that perpetrators of human rights abuses are likely to go unpunished and not convicted even when reported.



### On Corruption

Over 7 in 10 citizens (75%) believe that the level of corruption has increased significantly in the past year, while 76% assess the government's efforts at tackling corruption “Poorly”. 87% believe that access to justice is never or sometimes free from corruption; compared to only 13% who believe that access to justice is most often free from corruption.



### Peacebuilding

Most Nigerians (48%) define peacebuilding practices as “General actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people”; while 58% “agree and strongly agree” that recurring conflicts facing the country can be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts. 67% rated the government “Poorly” at deploying appropriate peacebuilding initiatives to tackle conflicts. Furthermore, 76% of Nigerians affirmed their willingness to participate in peacebuilding practices.



### Polarization

Over half of Nigerians (53%) “agree and strongly agree” that Nigeria is more polarized today (in 2022) than it was under the previous administration. On the key causes of polarization, more Nigerians consider Ethnicity (62%), Political affiliation (60%) and Religion (57%) as the top three factors that have divided the country today (in 2022) compared to the previous administration.



### Coping Strategy

In terms of social protection, 53% of Nigerians said they do not rely on the government for support with the challenges of poverty and insecurity in Nigeria; compared to 47% who affirmed that they rely on the government. Also, 68% “disagree and strongly disagree” that the government is doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic realities. However, 15% agree that government is doing enough. In other to cope with the challenges of poverty and insecurity, 44% of Nigerians resort to “Relatives, Ethnic and Communal groups for succour”; while 41% resort to “Prayers in their Churches and Mosques” and 12% resort to “Support from Government” to survive.



### On Self Worth

On Citizens Self-worth, 63% of Nigerians said they feel “Extremely or Somewhat Dissatisfied” about their lives as Nigerians right now, as against only a quarter of citizens (25%) who said they feel “Extremely or Somewhat Satisfied”.

If citizens would consider relocating to another state in the country, Lagos (18%), Abuja (16%) and Kano (10%) were identified as the most preferred. Also, 69% of Nigerians surveyed said they would seize the opportunity to emigrate with their families; in search of greener pasture (33%), better job opportunities (28%), and better governance (11%). On the contrary, only 25% expressed their unwillingness to relocate.

Top destinations for those with a propensity to emigrate are the United States of America (28%),

United Kingdom (15%), Canada (14%), Saudi Arabia (9%) and Dubai (8%) amongst others. Interestingly, Ghana makes it on the top ten countries of destination by 3%.



### On Future Expectation

Overall, almost 6 in 10 (60%) citizens believe that the future of the country would be much better than it is presently; compared to 27% who expressed pessimism that the future would be much worse; and 6% simply do not foresee any change in the future.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

In conclusion, the results and findings of the 2022 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2022) and Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) of 39.6% remains below the average social cohesion threshold of 50%. The study highlights the weakening state of social cohesion in the country, occasioned by the deepening fault lines and increasing polarization along ethnic, religious, economic and political lines. These have been irked by the current spate of insecurity, harsh economic realities, growing trust deficit, deep-rooted perceptions of inequality and exclusion, and spiraling unemployment amongst others. Consequently, the following recommendation could help shape public policy in a bid to address factors weakening the state of Social Cohesion in Nigeria.

**The Nigerian Government:** Social Cohesion is imperative for government to operate successfully, and the absence of social cohesion may threaten the peaceful co-existence of citizens.

- I. There is an urgent need for government to strengthen existing policies, legislation and institutions, that help to create a sense of belonging, promote trust, foster good governance and provide a conducive atmosphere for citizens to thrive and fulfil their life aspirations. In this connection, Nigeria's legislation and policies on citizenship should be rejigged to encourage social and inclusive citizenship that de-emphasize indigeneity and discourage the exclusion of citizens based on indigeneity. Such unemployment and poverty alleviation programmes like the Nigerian Social Investment Programme (NSIP) and NAPEP

should be revived and strengthened to tackle the problems of poverty, unemployment and underemployment.

- ii. There is need for government to adopt a hybrid of conventional and unconventional peacebuilding initiatives as the main thrust of its conflict management strategies. It is worth noting that state like Lagos and Oyo operate Alternative Dispute Resolution Centres, attached to the State Ministries of Justice. The Centres deploy a hybrid of conventional and local peacebuilding mechanisms of negotiations, remediation and arbitration to mediate on individual and group conflicts, and build peace among parties.
- iii. At the federal, state and local government levels, civil engagement and dialogues should be encouraged as part of the national life. This is to promote the culture of dialogue and negotiation, especially among individuals and groups who feel mistreated and nurse grievances against the state. In this connection, there is a need for a national dialogue involving the different ethnic nationalities and religious groups of the country to discuss their grievances and find lasting solutions to them. Because as the saying goes, 'It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war'.
- iv. Government should take more stringent punitive measures against sponsors and elite collaborators of bandits and illegal resource miners. Purging the military and paramilitary agencies of government of "bad eggs" would also improve their role in the fight against banditry and resolve the insecurity problem bedevilling the country. A Truth Commission would be necessary to ensure justice to families that have been affected by the activities of bandits, insurgents and the likes. Creating a Social Cohesion Commission at the national and state levels of governance would also come in handy.
- v. The government should strengthen the activities of the anti-corruption agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) by eliminating corruption and impunity loopholes to facilitate an enabling corrupt-free and independent environment to effectively fight against corruption.
- vi. Government should ensure that all political appointments follow the principle of Federal Character and all citizens must be given equal

access to opportunities in all aspects including employment, promotion wages/salaries, etc.

**Traditional and Religious Leaders:** These groups of institutions play a significant role in fostering social cohesion in Nigeria because the citizens cannot subsist without ethnic and religious tolerance.

- i. Religion and ethnicity play a huge role in fueling crises and civil unrest. The religious and traditional institutions are key instruments for resolving local conflicts in communities since many Nigerians have been found to trust these institutions, as they also identify strongly with their ethnicity and religious affiliations.
- ii. Government needs to fashion a constitutional provision that engenders clearly specified roles and responsibilities for the traditional institution in Nigeria. Government should collaborate with the traditional and religious leaders to design policy initiatives to resolve existing conflicts for a more peaceful interdependence and relationship at the community level.
- iii. It has been established that Nigerians trust traditional and religious leaders more than public officials and institutions. To absolve the problem of trust deficit, traditional and religious leaders should intensify efforts to mitigate against local conflicts, discrimination and hate speech, since they are closer to the people and earn more trust of the people than the government.
- iv. Furthermore, religious and traditional mechanisms of conflict management can be leveraged to foster peace at the grassroots. In view of this, the government should involve traditional and religious leaders in managing conflict and building peace.

**Civil Society of Nigeria (CSO):** The role of CSOs is to "help groups learn how to live together in peaceful co-existence", especially in conflict-afflicted societies. Conflict and rivalry amidst other social issues are destroying trust and peaceful co-existence between groups in Nigeria.

- i. Through their activities, CSOs are in good stead to contribute to building community or national social cohesion in the nation because they are technically equipped to respond to local issues and facilitate a more cohesive society.

- ii. In collaboration with traditional leaders and religious authorities, CSO can create platforms for dialogue, mediation and monitoring peacebuilding. They can also provide direction in formulating social cohesion policies and legislations emanating from the government.
- iii. CSOs are enjoined to focus attention on key societal challenges that are engendering a less socially cohesive state – widespread poverty and limited economic opportunities, pervasive insecurity and impunity, growing civil distrust and division across ethno-religious lines, and deepening citizens apathy towards civil authorities, amongst others.
- iv. CSOs can also play a huge role in helping to rekindle public trust for civil authorities. While there's evidence to suggest that effective implementation of programmes and policies that improve the livelihood and wellbeing of citizens can help to rebuild trust; CSOs can guide government towards focusing on policies, programmes and projects that would have more impact on the lives of citizens, especially at the grass-root levels.

- i. As previously highlighted, we encourage Nigerians to embrace a new National Identity that emphasizes the strengths of Nigeria and her people. One that is reflective of the country's past victories and successes focuses on the current achievements and expresses optimism for a brighter future.
- ii. Nigeria requires a concerned and responsible citizenry. That is citizens who take a keen interest in not only what happens to them but also what happens to their nations. Citizens who are driven by a common goal, and value system and eager to work out the kind of society they wish to live in and bequeath to future generations.
- iii. Citizens should engage their leaders and other critical stakeholders in dialogue and ensure they render an account of their stewardship. In doing so, emphasis should focus on contributions to social cohesion and building a strong and prosperous Nigeria.
- iv. Citizens should discourage statements and actions that can impede the peace and unity of the country, and avert conflicts, chaos and civil unrest; especially as the country gears up the next General Elections. Also, the trend of destroying and vandalizing public properties needs to stop.

**Citizens:** The participation of citizens, particularly women and youths in governance is often mitigated by socio-economic challenges that they experience in the communities. Howbeit, every citizen has an important responsibility to play in promoting peaceful coexistence with neighbours and other community members.



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Photo Credit: Tayo Adeoye

## 1.0 BACKGROUND



Social cohesion is a common issue in development studies, which when properly studied and projected improves the quality of the societies in which people live and help to avoid violent conflict with all its attendant ills<sup>1</sup>. A country/society that is united fosters peace and prosperity and gives a sense of belonging and identity to all its citizens irrespective of tribal, religious or other socio-cultural affiliation. The concept of Social Cohesion presupposes that citizens of a country have willingly decided to cooperate to survive and prosper as one united entity. A socially cohesive society encourages participation, and social inclusion of all groups minimises disparities and avoids marginalisation. On the other hand, a non-socially cohesive society is at risk of increased social vices and conflicts due to perceived exclusion, marginalisation and disconnection from the social contract.

The OECD Development Centre (2011) describes a socially cohesive society as one that works towards the well-being of all its members, minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation. The OECD's characterisation entails three major dimensions, namely: fostering cohesion by building networks of relationships, trust and identity between different groups; fighting discrimination, exclusion and excessive inequalities; and enabling upward social mobility<sup>2</sup>. This definition of social cohesion highlights the capacity of a society to pursue its members' welfare while at the same time reducing inequalities and promoting inclusion amongst diverse groups.

The social conflict ravaging Nigeria today cannot be underemphasised as threats to peace, unity and security have widened in recent times ranging from kidnapping, Boko Haram, banditry and farmer-herder clashes<sup>3</sup> thereby causing Nigeria to be in dire need of social cohesion today.

Heightened social conflict stems from Nigeria being a pluralistic and multicultural society with people of diverse groups identifying by ethnicity and religion. The country grapples with the twin evils of high levels of poverty and unemployment. It has also had to grapple with social upheavals that have threatened the existence of the Nigerian nation as we know it.<sup>4</sup> These social upheavals have been manifested in the creation of several regional interest groups each protesting perceived marginalisation and agitating for self-actualization and self-government. This includes the creation of such groups as IPOB, MASSOB, Niger Delta Avengers, OPC, Egbesu Boys, Arewa Youths etc, many of which emerged in the late 90s and most of which claim to be aimed at fighting the menace of the injustice of marginalization, disparity and the many ills which they perceive to be against their collective will. The religious divide in the country has also been seen to cause tensions between Christians and Muslims – the two major religions in the country. Religious crises have often rocked parts of the country and have over the years placed significant strain on social cohesion to the point of near collapse.

At the core of the social upheavals in Nigeria are lopsided power-sharing formula, discriminatory access to public service and political appointments, and ethnic minorities' phobia of marginalization by large ethnic blocks (Aghedo, 2007)<sup>5</sup>. Marginalisation and agitations for self-existence are rooted in ethnicity and the major cause of ethnic rivalry is a sentimental attachment to the differences in languages and cultures among members of different ethnic groups. This sentimental attachment and feeling of loyalty towards one's ethnic group is what makes citizens put their ethnic interests first and above national interests. Suffice it to say that social cohesion in the context of any nation cannot thrive where there is a lack of a unifying sense of national identity and a superseding pursuit of the National interest.

Hence, genuine attention toward building national identity and “oneness” is the panacea to achieving a socially cohesive Nigerian society. This requires a deliberate strategy to build a free society where people can pursue common goals irrespective of their ethnic, religious and cultural beliefs. The federal government needs to put more effort into promoting a more inclusive society. The failure of the government to promote policies that strengthen cohesion always may be exacerbated by biased reports, falsifications of stories, and unprofessionalism in printed and electronic media, including social media.

<sup>1</sup>Langer, A; Stewart, F; Smedts, K & Demarest, L. (2017). Conceptualising and Measuring Social Cohesion in Africa: Towards a Perceptions-Based Index. *Social Indicators Research*, (131), 321-343

<sup>2</sup>OECD (2011), *Perspectives on Global Development 2012: Social Cohesion in a Shifting World*, OECD Publishing, Paris, [https://doi.org/10.1787/persp\\_glob\\_dev-2012-en](https://doi.org/10.1787/persp_glob_dev-2012-en).

<sup>3</sup><https://press.un.org/en/2021/dsgsm1622.doc.htm>

<sup>4</sup>Agbedo, Chris. *Problems of Multilingual Nations: The Nigerian Perspective*. Enugu-Nigeria: Fidgina Global books. 2007.

<sup>5</sup>ibid.

To assess the state of social cohesion in Nigeria, the Africa Polling Institute (API) conducted the 1<sup>st</sup> nationally representative survey on social cohesion in Nigeria – the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2019) in 2019. The Survey measured social cohesion using 5 key indicators/components: **Identity, Trust, Equity & Social Justice, Participation & Patriotism and Self Worth & Future Expectations**. With the successful release and dissemination of the survey report into the social space, especially within the development and non-profit community, several conversations were stimulated; part of which led to further discussions on how to expand the indicators in line with the current realities in Nigeria.

In 2021, and with support from Ford Foundation, API conducted **the 2nd round of the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2021)** with an expanded scope to cover a few other indicators – **Corruption, Impunity, Gender, and Natural Resource Governance**. The goal is to deepen public understanding of social cohesion in Nigeria; with a renewed focus on how these extra components contribute to the conversation on building a strong and sustainable socially cohesive society.

Today, extreme marginalization grievances from perceived inequitable resource distribution, deteriorating welfare conditions, insecurity and political discrimination against Igbo ethnic from assuming top leadership positions have continued to stir the secessionist movement and rise in killings of Igbos and Nigeria Armed Forces in the Eastern part of Nigeria<sup>6</sup>. Unconfirmed reports blame the killings on Unknown Gunmen, Armed Forces and members of the Eastern Security Network (ESN)<sup>7</sup>. Despite the high level of insecurity challenges ravaging the Eastern region, the government has not successfully restored peace in the communities.

Security unrest in the Eastern region has thus dwindled commercial activities, worsened welfare and heightened insecurity tension. These burning issues amidst banditry, kidnapping, farmers/herders crisis, police brutality, non-economic restructuring and dwindling economic development have worsened social divisions at ethnic and religious levels and enhanced further polarization of the nationalistic tendencies of promoting peace and unity among the citizens.

Economic inequalities, social exclusion, marginalization of minorities, disconnection from the social contract, failures in protecting the well-being of the poor, and mutual mistrust among social groups in multi-ethnic societies, therefore, represent the greatest threat to social cohesion in Nigeria. That is achieving social cohesion is one of the most fundamental challenges facing Nigeria as a country.

Drawing from the worsening socio-economic challenges facing Nigeria and with the continued support from Ford Foundation, API embarked on the 3rd round of the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2022) with an expanded scope to cover 3 additional indicators – **Polarization, Peacebuilding and Coping Strategy** to further deepen public understanding of social cohesion and the way forward in Nigeria. These additional indicators are in line with the current realities bedeviling the nation as Nigeria is currently facing worsening and complex issues of insecurity.

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<sup>6</sup>See <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2021/9/14/why-support-for-secession-is-growing-in-southeast-Nigeria>

<sup>7</sup>ESN is the armed wing of pro-separatist Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)



Photo Credit: Afolabi Sotunde/Reuters

## 2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2.1 Measuring Social Cohesion

Based on survey data from 19 African countries from the Afro barometer, Langer *et al.* (2017) pointed out the three most critical areas in assessing the level of social cohesiveness in any society. The three social cohesion indices are based on individuals' shared perceptions. These include the levels of inequalities, trust and identity prevalence in society. In their own words:



*We argue that to begin to capture the complexity of the concept such a measure should include three components. These are inequality (the chief feature of European approaches to defining social cohesion concerning social exclusion), trust (the chief feature of the US approach to social cohesion concerning social capital), and identity (national versus group), which is an important feature of multi-ethnic societies. We argued that all three of these components should focus on perceptions of people in the society in question, rather than any attempt to get at more 'objective' measures since social cohesion is a matter of how people perceive the society in which they live".<sup>8</sup>*

They go on to construe social cohesion as being expressive of the sense of belongingness exhibited within a group and the individual perception of the whole group or 'society' as greater than its constituent parts. This individual sense of belongingness helps in bringing peaceful solutions to conflicts that may arise among members. Part of this is communicated through shared values and 'shared norms of behaviour' which binds people together for social cohesion (or solidarity). Moreover, they found these shared norms of behaviour to be prevalent in the North American approach to conceptualizing social cohesion - which focuses on the government ensuring the objectives of the people. Langer *et al.* (2017) however do not explain the issue of deviants from groups and how oligarchies emerge in groups, steering group interests to their whims and caprices.

Delhey and Dragolov (2016)<sup>9</sup> linked multifaceted dimensions of social cohesion to happiness. They explained social trust as 'trust in most people' and 'identification' as to how one is attached to his or her country. Trust for them should be viewed from individual perspectives as one's trust in institutions. They further espouse that absolute values in society have multiplier effects, bringing about like values just like the existence of constitutionalism in society. However, the import of these definitions and characterizations has not been well articulated in the African context - where there are still challenges to nationalism. Regardless, happiness can easily be thought of as a key product of positive social cohesion in different contexts.

Mann (1970)<sup>10</sup>, comes at social cohesion from the standpoint of justice. Here, justice is viewed in terms of social justice and is construed to have the same challenges in the conceptualization of 'shared values' in that like 'shared values', 'social justice' does not necessarily lead to cohesion. The same can be said for 'equality' which is synonymous with 'justice'. Mann argues that absolute values may not co-exist when members of the society stick to them as core values, given that abiding strictly to one means leaving out the other. This study is more on the abstract and argumentative part and does not bring about development. Even concepts as vague as they are, are definitive and are not strictly within their boundaries, yet they are building blocks for theory and practice. Thus, this view does not present a prospect for theoretical inquiry and thus still faces the problem of not being realistic.

Langer *et al.* (2017) also define social cohesion and posited that one of its determinants is the existence of common economic wellbeing. This is demonstrated by the reduction in disparities in income and wealth, and the perception of issues as a common enterprise by people. Arguably, this practice demonstrates social cohesion as a value that would be expectedly lacking in developing countries like Nigeria, where there is a wider gap between the rich and the poor.

<sup>8</sup>Arnim Langer & Frances Stewart & Kristien Smedts & Leila Demarest, 2017. "Conceptualising and Measuring Social Cohesion in Africa: Towards a Perceptions-Based Index," *Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement*, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 321-343, March.

<sup>9</sup>Delhey, J. & Dragolov, G. (2016). Happier together: Social Cohesion and Subjective Well-being in Europe. *International Journal of Psychology*, 51 (3), 163-176

<sup>10</sup>Mann, M., (1970). The social cohesion of liberal democracy, *American sociological review* 35 (3) 423-439.

Another aspect of social cohesion expressed in the literature is community engagement. For McCloskey et al. (2011)<sup>11</sup>, community engagement is grounded in the principles of community organization, fairness, justice, participation and self-determination. Hence, community participation is reinforced in a society that experiences engagement by other organisations, both public and private. In their characterisation, community participation extends beyond physical contribution to the execution of community projects to include 'generation of ideas, contributions to decision making and sharing of responsibility'.

## Definitions of Social Cohesion



### Canada

Social cohesion is an ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunities within Canada, based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all Canadians.



### France

Social cohesion is a set of social processes that help instil in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognised as members of that community.



### New Zealand

Social cohesion describes where different groups and institutions knit together effectively despite differences. It reflects a high degree of willingness to work together, taking into account diverse needs and priorities. Social cohesion is underpinned by the four following conditions:

1. Individual opportunities - including education, jobs and health
2. Family well-being - including parental responsibility
3. Strong Communities - including safe and reliant communities
4. National identity - including history, heritage, culture and rights and entitlements of citizenship



### Australia

Social cohesion is the bond between communities of people who co-exist, interact and support each other through material means and by sharing group beliefs, customs and expectations.



### Denmark

Social cohesion refers to a situation where everyone has access to establishing basic social relationships in society, such as work participation, family life, political participation and activities in civil society.



### European Union

Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union states that the tasks of the union included: "Maintaining economic and social cohesion and solidarity between all member states of the Union".

The objective of social cohesion implies a reconciliation of a system of organization based on market forces, freedom of opportunity and enterprise, with a commitment to the values of solidarity and mutual support which ensures open access to benefit and to protect all members of society.

<sup>11</sup>McCloskey, Silberberg, M., Cook, J Dreschers, C., D.J., Weaver, S. & Ziegahn, L., (Eds.) (June, 2011), Principle of Community Engagement, 2nded. U.S.A.: NIH Publication

## 2.2 Social Cohesion in Nigeria

According to Hofstede (1994; cited in Aluko and Ajani, 2009<sup>12</sup>), any nation united by ethnicity or language agitates for independent recognition of their own identity at a national or international level. This ideology aligns with the social circumstance of Nigeria, where a socio-conscious mindset of a united nation is gradually fading away amongst the people due to some peculiar issues. The threat to social cohesion has long existed before the emergence of Nigeria in 1914. The history of Nigeria is speckled with various ethno-nationalist conflicts characterised by a civil war between 1967 and 1970, ethno-religious crisis, secession agitations<sup>13</sup> and the amalgamation of over 250 ethnic groups to create Nigeria in 1914. Before colonial rule, the ethnic groups in the South-South region share a homogeneous cultural practice and were never united evidenced between the Efik and Ibibio; and the Urhobo and Itsekiris<sup>14</sup>. Similarly, Benin, the most powerful empire from the 15<sup>th</sup> century possessed extensive imperial control over some states in the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria including the Oyo empire (Ajayi & Akintoye, 1980; cited by Edewor, et al., 2014)<sup>15</sup>. This action stirred rivalry, tension, distrust and cold war before the British colonization (ibid).

Before independence, the unification of over 250 ethnic groups (some of which were rivals) characterised by diverse cultural and religious practices to form Nigeria has made and marred social cohesion in Nigeria. Many consider the unification of the multiple ethnic groups as a 'forceful' political and economic union<sup>16</sup> and reportedly unacceptable by some ethnic groups, hence birthing "mutual suspicion, hatred and disunity"<sup>17</sup> amongst groups in Nigeria to date. To the late Chief Obafemi Awolowo:

“

*Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are English, Welsh, or French. The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not" (West African Pilot 1946: 23<sup>18</sup>; cited in Olayode, 2011)<sup>19</sup>.*

Unfortunately, the unification of multiple ethnic groups in 1914 aided colonialist rule through an Indirect Rule System and ethnically divided the people<sup>20</sup> sparking fear of dominance and calls for secession, national restructuring and good governance. For instance, adopting a disparate administration within the Southern and Northern Protectorates contributed to the disparate level of development between the regions. While the Southern region enjoyed trade, educational opportunities and urbanization, the Northern region (the most populated) protected their religion instead<sup>21</sup>.

The bane of developmental disparity in the regions is fuelling developmental strife of fear of domination of one ethnic group over others, thus threatening the peaceful co-existence of the people. For example, the 1950's call for self-rule was approved by the Western and Southern regions and declined in the Northern region due to relative educational backwardness and fear that low employability in public services may influence the domination of the Southern region at

<sup>12</sup>Aluko, M. A. O. & Ajani O. A. (2009). Ethnic nationalism and the Nigerian democratic experience in the Fourth Republic. *An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal* 3(1), 483-499.

<sup>13</sup>Nwokedi, M. E and Ngwu, E. C. (2018). The challenges of Nationhood and State-building in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. *AfriHeritage Working Paper Series*.

<sup>14</sup>Edewor, P. A., Aluko, Y. A. & Folarin, S. F. (2014). *Managing Ethnic and Cultural Diversity for National Integration in Nigeria*. *Developing Countries Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 6.

<sup>15</sup>Ajayi, J.F.A. and Akintoye, S.A. (1980) "Yorubaland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century" in Ikime, O. (ed.) *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, Ibadan: Heinemann

<sup>16</sup>Mbanefo, O. (2018). *Agitations for Separation and Non-Negotiability of Nigeria's Unity: Bottling the Bomb?*

<sup>17</sup>Mbanefo, O. (2018). *Agitations for Separation and Non-Negotiability of Nigeria's Unity: Bottling the Bomb?*

<sup>18</sup>West Africa Pilot (1946). *The Nigeria Nation*. Lagos: 2 March 1946, 23-32

<sup>19</sup>Olayode, K. O. (2011). Ethno-nationalist movements and political mobilisation in Africa: The Nigeria experience (1990-2003). *Wiener Zeitschrift für kritische Afrikastudien*, No. 20, Pp. 69-93

<sup>20</sup>Olasupo, O., Oladeji, I. O. & Ijeoma, E. O. C. (2017). Nationalism and Nationalist Agitation in Africa: The Nigerian Trajectory. *The Review of Black Political Economy*, No. 44, Pp. 261–283

<sup>21</sup>Kawwam, S. (2011). *The Evolution of the Nigerian State from the Colonial Era through the present Democratic Dispensation*. GRIN Verlag: Munich.

independence<sup>22</sup>. Such strife and grievances in Nigeria remarkably in the Northern region depict the “outcomes of high-income inequality which increase the chance of violence by worsening social distrust and also increases the perception of relative deprivation” (World Bank, 2014<sup>23</sup>; cited by Jaiyeola & Choga, 2020:7).

Similarly, the post-independence adoption of the “colonial legacy of political culture, structure, culture and general policy” and the establishment of a central system of government is further infuriating fear of dominance, marginalization, social exclusion and injustice in Nigeria to date. The 1966 mass killings of Igbos and the 1967-1970 civil war could have been averted if the government had recognised the people, respected their fundamental rights, distributed resources equitably, protected the people, and did not fuel the perceived marginalization of occupying political positions in South-East<sup>24</sup>.

According to Nwuke (2021), “all ethnic groups are affected by the poor state of governance in Nigeria today and are protesting. The most intriguing thing is the discriminatory attitude of the federal government to particular protests and other threats to the integrity of the country”<sup>25</sup>. This discriminatory attitude is noticeable during the environmental degradation by non-indigenous oil-producing companies, particularly Shell and the herder-farmer crisis in recent times. For instance, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta Avengers share similar grievances concerning unethical environmental degradation, inequitable resource distribution, poor governance and social injustice causing high levels of poverty, unemployment and inequality in the Niger-Delta region. Similarly, the herder-farmer crisis may have been brought under control if the government had brought the unpatriotic herdsmen to book and created a viable and feasible strategic solution than open ranching.

Visible marginalization, social injustice, inequality and politicising of resource distribution are thus fuelling rising and incessant agitations for secession groups such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State for Biafra (MASSOB), and the present Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Yoruba Nation.

Agitators of IPOB (the current agitators for Biafra) and Yoruba nation previously differed in political ideologies for Nigeria but not anymore since the present administration has refused to restructure Nigeria. While the agitators for Biafra have always declared interest in secession, Afenifere agitated for restructuring based on true federalism<sup>26</sup>. According to Johnson et al (2021), Afenifere fronted the restructuring of Nigeria where powers move from the Federal Government to the State Government levels in Nigerians before the 2015 election. That is, more responsibilities will be allocated to the State governments to facilitate better development and social cohesion and control the distribution of resources, internally generate revenue and pay taxes to the Federal Government as evidenced during the First Republic<sup>27</sup>. The uneven distribution of natural resources informed incessant calls for restructuring by the Yorubas' and the tacit support given to the current administration in 2015 by the main Yoruba socio-group Afenifere was hinged on the promise to restructure the country.

Having reneged on this promise, and the failure to accommodate opinion on restructuring, the calls for secession reached a crescendo during the rampage of Fulani herdsmen who wantonly destroy farmlands and the people. Yoruba Nation agitators are reportedly fuming about the impunity of Fulani herdsmen poor open grazing on farmlands and incessant killings of farmers in Yoruba states, and the poor attitude of the current government to duly sanction the culprits. According to Sunday Igboho,

<sup>22</sup>Raheem, W. M., Oyeleye, O. I., & Aladekoyi, O. C. (2014). Regional imbalances and Inequalities in Nigeria: Causes, consequences and Remedies. *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 4, No. 18.

<sup>23</sup>World Bank. (2014). *World development report 2014*

<sup>24</sup>Lugard, S. B., Zechariah, M. & Ngufwang, T. (2015). Self-Determination a Right of the Marginalized in Nigeria: A Mirage or Reality? *Journal of International Human Rights Law*, Vol. 1, No.1.

<sup>25</sup>Nwuke, K. (2021). Nigeria: Resolving the so-called 'Igbo Problem'. (Online). *The Africa Report*. (8 June 2021). Accessed on 24 June 2021. Available here: <https://www.theafricareport.com/95288/nigeria-resolving-the-so-called-igbo-problem/>

<sup>26</sup>Odum, M. (n.d). Agitations for Separation and Non-Negotiability of Nigeria's Unity: Bottling the Bomb?

<sup>27</sup>Johnson, D., Ajayi, O., Ojo, S. A, Ojomoyela, R. & Ogunnaike, J. (2021). Restructuring without Zoning: Yoruba leaders cautious on ACF, NEF, others' move. (Online). *Vanguard Newspaper*. (11 April 2021). Accessed on 28 June 2021. Available here: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/04/restructuring-without-zoning-yoruba-leaders-cautious-on-acf-nef-others-move/>



“We don't want one Nigeria again, but Yoruba nation. There is no essence for one Nigeria. We are being marginalised. We say enough is enough. Enough is enough, no going back... we are not scared of anybody, these killer herders are taking over our land and they are killing us, raping our wives, and female children in our presence and would also take over our land. We are not safe in our own country, we can't sleep in peace, we can't travel in peace, we can't go to our farm in peace, what have we done? Is it a sin or are we slaves in our fatherland? Please what have done wrong? We have chosen the wrong leaders and we are now tired and saying that enough is enough”<sup>28</sup>

The agitators thus perceive the government's response as sheer nepotism and social injustice for the local farmers in Yoruba states and further degenerated farmers/herder's crisis in the states.

Furthermore, the MASSOB group (pro-Biafra) created in 1992 has long agitated for secession following the alienation of the Igbo group from enjoying the distribution of resources and occupying national leadership positions in government for over sixty years which they perceive as a strategic exclusion of Igbos from occupying certain positions of authority<sup>29</sup>. This marginalization informed the group's desire to break away from the Eastern region of Nigeria to form the Biafran state thus renewing the secessionist movement between 1967 and 1970<sup>30</sup>, yet the goal was unsuccessful.

Despite the futile call for self-government, Biafra agitators believe that the Nigerian government prefer to 'forcefully' preserve the peace and unity of the country the same way the country was formed<sup>31</sup> by not granting a referendum to listen to the concerns of the people. Continuous deteriorating economic conditions, political instability and insecurity further influenced the emergence of the present Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) (Pro-Biafra) and intensified agitation for secession in the Eastern region of Nigeria. Nevertheless, with the increasing call for secession, there are significant indications that the unity of Nigeria is seriously questioned by ethnic nationalities.

Considering the state of the nation, there is thus a generalized perception of marginalization and dissatisfaction amongst the ethnic groups, which have worsened mistrust and influenced secession agitations, therefore, threatening cohesion in Nigeria.

## 2.3 Conceptualisation

### 2.3.1 Social Cohesion

Analysis of any kind in the research world rightly demands an understanding of the concept of variables being studied. The literature on social cohesion consistently criticizes the notion of a lack of consensus in definitions and indicators (Schiefer & van der Noll, 2017)<sup>32</sup>. As old as the concept is, dating back to the time of sociologist Durkheim and its pre-modern perspectives, the research community has yet to see a coherent theory and a definition that easily facilitates empirical studies. Batterman (2015)<sup>33</sup> has argued from a background knowledge provided by sociologists, fathers of the concept of social cohesion, Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tonnies, argue five dimensions of the theory, namely, common values and civic culture, social order and social control, social solidarity and reduction in wealth disparities, and social networks and social capital, and attachment to identity.

<sup>28</sup>Adeyemo, S. (2021). No going back on Yoruba Nation – Sunday Igboho Insists. (Online). Vanguard Newspaper. 23 May 2021. (Accessed on 6 June 2021). Available here: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/05/no-going-back-on-yoruba-nation-sunday-igboho-insists/>

<sup>29</sup>Ikegbunam, P. C. & Agudoso, F. I. (2012). Cultivating Biafran agenda in Nigeria: Evaluation of the influence of radio Biafra's rhetoric of ethnic marginalization on rural dwellers in the South-East. *Journal of Media and Communication Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Pp.23-37

<sup>30</sup>Sandig, J. (2018). Framing Non-Violence : MASSOB and the Puzzling Non-Escalation of the Struggle for Biafra in Nigeria. Found in Frie. E., Kohl, T. & Meier, M. (Eds). *Dynamics of Social Change and perceptions of Threat*

<sup>31</sup>Odum, M. (n.d). *Agitations for Separation and Non-Negotiability of Nigeria's Unity: Bottling the Bomb?*

<sup>32</sup>Schiefer, D., & van der Noll, J. (2017). The Essentials of Social Cohesion: A Literature Review. *Social Indicators Research*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-016-1314-5>

<sup>33</sup>Batterman, Sarah (2015) *An Empirical Multilevel Study of the relation between community level social cohesion indicators and individual social capital in Flanders, Belgium*, doctoral dissertation



As Loris Vergolini (2011)<sup>34</sup> points out, “there are some problems with the theme of social cohesion”, such as the lack of clear definition and its heterogeneity. What Dick Stanley (2003, p.1)<sup>35</sup> means in defining the concept as “the willingness of members of society to cooperate to survive and prosper,” perhaps is, that relationship or cooperation among citizens or groups in society is a function of choice, a rational one for that matter. The perception that equity, fairness and individual goals in life or society can be realized through cooperation is rationality. This means that social cohesion cannot be forced. It must be done voluntarily. In this sense, getting people to cooperate in society for the greater good of all is a task that policy should achieve, of which many countries are said to have fallen far behind.

The literature contains numerous components and determinants of social cohesion. Three key elements, according to Schiefer and van der Noll, are social relations, identification with a territorial zone and provision for the common good. Other determinants of social cohesion are equity, quality of life, shared values and cooperation. There is a wide range of further issues that add up to the confusion about the concept in societies trying to hold together and understand the differences that can bind them together or tear them (Lenshie, 2014)<sup>36</sup>. Some researchers believe that ethnic differences or diversity undermine social cohesion and have explored questions in this direction with findings that do not necessarily follow. Rather, they are individuals in positions of influence and power who, for personal and selfish reasons, frequently arm ethnicity. The decisive role of ethnicity in ethnic relationships threatens cooperation (van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014)<sup>37</sup>. Lanzi also explained social cohesion by exploring its connection with well-being by applying socio-psychological models to understand the cohesion of communities and groups. The author then argues the need for a multi-dimensional understanding of the concept that emphasizes a wellness perspective (Lanzi, 2011)<sup>38</sup>.

The question of what we know of social cohesion begins with this debate about the meaning of the concept, which the literature continues to suggest gaps, which has not been sufficiently asked. These gaps need to be filled by more empirical, theoretical studies on a case-by-case basis. There are even specific activities and organizations that have been proposed to have the capacity to promote social cohesion in society, like the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. This implies the deliberate pursuit of social cohesion as a goal through relevant behaviours, activities, and institutions of governance (Koonce, 2011)<sup>39</sup>. Some have even implied in their analyses that social cohesion is a function of happiness and used a subjective approach to describing what happiness or what makes a person happy to incline to cooperation and peaceful social relations (Chan et al., 2006)<sup>40</sup>. The bottom line here is that the state of happiness of a people can contribute to the harmony in society and suggest whether they will cooperate with policies and laws. On the other hand, those happier than others are more likely to want to retain a policy or advocate for its sustenance if it gives them opportunities to be

<sup>34</sup>Vergolini, L. (2011). Does Economic Vulnerability Affect Social Cohesion? Evidence from a Comparative Analysis. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie*, 36(1), 1–23. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/canaisocahican.36.1.1>

<sup>35</sup>Stanley, D. (2003). What Do We Know about Social Cohesion: The Research Perspective of the Federal Government's Social Cohesion Research Network. *The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie*, 28(1), 5–17. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3341872>

<sup>36</sup>Lenshie, N. E. (2014). 'Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide': Exploring the Resurgence of Ethno-Cultural Identity in Nigeria. *Africa Development / Afrique et Développement*, 39(2), 153–212. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/afrdevafrdev.39.2.153>

<sup>37</sup>Van der Meer, T., & Tolsma, J. (2014). Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohesion. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 40, 459–478. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43049544>

<sup>38</sup>Lanzi, D. (2011). Capabilities and social cohesion. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 35(6), 1087–1101. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24232490>


<sup>39</sup>Koonce, K. A. (2011). Social Cohesion as the Goal: Can Social Cohesion Be Directly Pursued? *Peabody Journal of Education*, 86(2), 144–154. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/23048768>

<sup>40</sup>Chan, J., To, H.-P., & Chan, E. (2006). Reconsidering Social Cohesion: Developing a Definition and Analytical Framework for Empirical Research. *Social Indicators Research*, 75(2), 273–302. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27522534>

happy (Becchetti et al., 2014<sup>41</sup>; Hirschauer et al., 2015<sup>42</sup>; Ip, 2014<sup>43</sup>; Kroll & Delhey, 2013<sup>44</sup>; Tandoc & Takahashi, 2013<sup>45</sup>; Gandelman & Porzecanski, 2013<sup>46</sup>).

According to Eurofund and Siftung (2014)<sup>47</sup>, there are three main domains of social cohesive: Connectedness (which involves Identification, Trust in Institutions, and Perceptions of Fairness); Social relations (which involves Social networks, Trust in people, and Acceptance of diversity); and Focus on the common (which involves Solidarity and helpfulness, Respect for social rules, and Civic participation).

Figure 1: Domains of Social Cohesion



Source: Eurofund and Bertelsman Siftung, 2014

In addition, Langer *et al* (2014)<sup>48</sup> identified three pillars of social cohesion, which he articulated as the Social Cohesion Triangle: Trust, Inequality and Identity.

The first component in the social cohesion triangle is the extent of trust amongst people generally, and particularly across groups, and in relationship to the state. This is a powerful indicator of how cohesive society is—of the strength of the 'glue' that binds people together within a particular society. This element broadly reflects the North American perspective on social cohesion. Where trust across groups is low, conflict is more likely (Gambetta 1988) and economic progress can be impeded (Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Beugelsdijk et al. 2004). In both cases, a two-way relationship is probable. It is also possible that trust increases with greater per capita income as institutions improve. While these two-way relationships may make it difficult to ascertain causality, they do not have bearing on the validity of the SCI. Trust in state institutions is highly relevant, given the importance of the state both in shaping economic and social relationships, and people's lives more generally. Lack of trust in state institutions may lead to violent protests and uprisings and impede Social Cohesion.

<sup>41</sup>Becchetti, L., Massari, R., & Naticchioni, P. (2014). The drivers of happiness inequality: Suggestions for promoting social cohesion. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 66(2), 419–442. <http://www.istor.org/stable/43772872>

<sup>42</sup>Hirschauer, N., Lehberger, M., & Musshoff, O. (2015). Happiness and Utility in Economic Thought—Or: What Can We Learn from Happiness Research for Public Policy Analysis and Public Policy-Making? *Social Indicators Research*, 121(3), 647–674. JSTOR. <http://www.istor.org/stable/24721550>

<sup>43</sup>Ip, P.-K. (2014). Harmony as Happiness? Social Harmony in Two Chinese Societies. *Social Indicators Research*, 117(3), 719–741. JSTOR. <http://www.istor.org/stable/24720967>

<sup>44</sup>Kroll, C., & Delhey, J. (2013). A Happy Nation? Opportunities and Challenges of Using Subjective Indicators in Policymaking. *Social Indicators Research*, 114(1), 13–28. JSTOR. <http://www.istor.org/stable/24719522>

<sup>45</sup>Tandoc, E. C., & Takahashi, B. (2013). The Complex Road to Happiness: The Influence of Human Development, a Healthy Environment and a Free Press. *Social Indicators Research*, 113(1), 537–550. JSTOR. <http://www.istor.org/stable/24719428>

<sup>46</sup>Gandelman, N., & Porzecanski, R. (2013). Happiness Inequality: How Much is Reasonable? *Social Indicators Research*, 110(1), 257–269. JSTOR. <http://www.istor.org/stable/24718703>


<sup>47</sup>Source: Eurofund and Bertelsman Siftung, 2014

<sup>48</sup>Langer, Stewart, Smedts and Demarest, 2016

The second component in the social cohesion triangle is the extent of inequalities both horizontal (group) and vertical (individual). The inclusion of inequalities stems from the European approach. Horizontal (or group) inequalities (HIs) are particularly critical for SC in multi-ethnic societies because it is sharp inequalities between ethnic (or religious or regional) groups that usually fuel political conflict, often leading to violence (Stewart 2008; Cederman et al. 2011). Relevant here are not only perceived group inequalities but perceptions of fair or unfair treatment by the government. In addition, vertical inequalities, or inequalities among individuals, (VIs), are also relevant, since high and rising vertical inequality can undermine bonds among people (Uslaner 2008). One would expect less Social Cohesion in highly unequal societies since the feeling of belonging to a shared national project is likely to be less.

The third critical element of social cohesion in multi-ethnic societies is the strength of people's adherence to national identity with their group (or ethnic) identity. This component is important for multi-ethnic societies, especially those, such as in Africa, where national boundaries have not developed organically, and nations are not natural units but were created relatively recently by colonial powers. The strength of identities is related to the perceived importance of Horizontal Inequalities (HIs), since if group identities are relatively weak HIs may not be perceived at all, or if perceived, not regarded as important. People's perceptions of their identity are also relevant to social cohesion because group conflict is more likely if group identities are perceived as strong relative to national ones. Conversely, if people put major emphasis on national identities, it indicates that they regard themselves as involved in a shared national project. A socially cohesive society requires diversity and unity, with both group and national identity valued. However, where only group identities take strong precedence over national ones, national cohesion likely to be threatened.

Figure 2: The Social Cohesion Triangle



Source: Langer, Stewart, Smedts and Demarest, 2016

There has been a lot of effort to measure social cohesion. Different approaches have given rise to different kinds of indicators and empirical findings (Berger-Schmitt 2000; Duhaime et al. 2004; Fenger, 2012) such as objective and subjective elements evident in Fenger (2012)<sup>49</sup>. The objective component of social cohesion involves the tendency of individuals to connect with others and participate in political and civic activities while the subjective component refers to the perceptions that others can be trusted and relied upon in case of need. As noted by Eurofund and Stiftung (2014), there are three main indicators of social cohesion: social relations (which involves social networks, trust in people, and acceptance of diversity); focus on the common (which involves solidarity and helpfulness, respect for social rules, and civic participation); and connectedness (which involves identification, trust in institutions, and perceptions of fairness). In furtherance of the indicators of social cohesion, Africa Polling Institute (2019)<sup>50</sup> identified five domains of social cohesion as identity, trust, equity & social justice, participation & patriotism, and self-worth & future expectation.

<sup>49</sup>Fenger, M. (2012). Deconstructing social cohesion: towards an analytical framework for assessing social cohesion policies. *Corvinus Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 3(2), 39-54.

<sup>50</sup>Africa Polling Institute (2019): The Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey 2019.

Drawing from the literature reviewed above, the concept of Social Cohesion is reflected in and can be measured by capturing some of the following indicators: Identity, Trust, Equity & Social Justice, Participation & Patriotism, and Self-Worth & Future Expectation. Each of these components is discussed further in the following paragraphs.



### Identity

The Identity component of social cohesion sees the cohesiveness of a multi-ethnic society in terms of how individuals view their national relationship to identifying with a tribe or group to which they belong. A socially inclusive society encourages opportunities for growth and social mobility through the provision of strong policies that discourage marginalisation, and encourage the integration of minorities in the society, by creating the perception of being accepted with the feeling of belonging.



### Trust

The Trust component reflects the different perceptions of people towards the reliability of others. This is not only reflected among people but also in institutions. Trust strengthens unity and identification as well as a moral sense of solidarity. There are at least three levels of trust: Social Trust, Trust in institutions and Trust in politics. Social trust refers to trust in other people, Institutional trust refers to trust in organisations, and political trust refers to trust in politics and political institutions. Without trust, a society cannot attain cohesion.



### Equity and Social Justice

The Equity & Social Justice component reflects the acceptance of and compliance with established social order. A lack of social order results in anarchy where societal members' goals are no longer in harmony with the legitimate approaches to reaching the goals. Social Justice and Equity levels on the laws and policies of the government, the perception of fairness and equality amongst different groups in the society, the treatment of individuals and groups by the government and the trust of the people in the government.



### Participation and Patriotism

Participation & Patriotism as a component of social cohesion hinges on the willingness of individuals and groups to work together to ensure the growth of a society or an economy. Social cohesion is “a state of affairs in which a group of people demonstrate an aptitude for collaboration that produces a climate for change that, in the longer run, benefits all”<sup>51</sup>. The interests of individuals to participate in the political process for the progress of an economy are part of the questions to be expected when patriotism is discussed.



### Self-worth and Future Expectations

Worth is portrayed through subjective measures of quality of life. The measurement of life satisfaction, individual happiness and future expectation explicitly convey the aspect of worth as a component of social cohesion. Are citizens satisfied with the present life they live? Is what they currently undergo a sufficient measurement of their happiness?

## 2.3.2 Natural Resource Governance

Natural resources can be classified into non-renewable and renewable categories. For example, oil, gas, and minerals fall into the first category, whereas, forests, biodiversity, and water, are examples of renewable natural resources (United Nations, 1997)<sup>52</sup>. This review adopts the United Nations definition which sees natural resources as “natural assets (raw materials) occurring in nature that can be used for economic production or consumption”. It further explains that they are “naturally occurring assets that provide use benefits through the provision of raw materials and energy used in economic

<sup>51</sup>Ritzen, Jo (2001), Social Cohesion, Public Policy, and Economic Growth: Implications for OECD Countries. OECD Quebec working paper.

<sup>52</sup>United Nations (1997) Glossary of Environment Statistics, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 67,

<http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1740>

activity (or that may provide such benefits one day) and that is subject primarily to quantitative depletion through human use. They are subdivided into four categories: mineral and energy resources, soil resources, water resources, and biological resources” (United Nations, 1997).

Nigeria's vast, rich water and land resources are of immense economic, political, and social value. Community people have had age-long traditions of creating livelihood opportunities in their relationship to these resources. The creeks, land, rivers, seas, swamps, and forests, for example, provided rich sources of livelihood for communities, as they depended on these resources, and still do, for a wide range of what they needed for meeting daily social and economic needs. There are at least 35 specific natural/mineral resources of varying value to the government, companies and individuals. They include crude oil, gold, silver, coal, granite, iron-ore, barite, bitumen, gemstones, clay, feldspar, copper ore, zinc, dolomite, lead ore, limestone, phosphate, galena, gypsum, wolframite, kaolin, salt, quartzite, magnesium, fluorite, manganese, tar sand, columbite, diatomite, titanium, marble, and uranium. Others include talc, silica and tin ore. Out of all these resources, oil currently attracts the greatest attention to the government and the international capitalist establishment because of the role it plays in the economic life of the country and the profit-making ambitions of investors.

Natural resource governance and social cohesion issues in Nigeria, have been discussed differently in the literature at the intersection of struggles for control, access, ownership, uses the distribution of benefits, and the potential for social and economic development at the national and sub-national level. This is perhaps why the temptation for choosing crude oil as the subject of interest on issues of natural resource governance in Nigeria in many quarters such as academic conferences, policy debates, academic publications, research, and analysis, has remained high. The literature is crammed with suggestions that the dominance of government perspectives in the governance of crude oil is due to the importance the government attaches to the resource as a high revenue and foreign exchange yielding resource. Nigeria has progressively left agriculture as the main source of income and currency since it became an exporting country.

Natural resource governance implies the relationship between citizens and authoritative institutions concerning the control, access, and distribution of benefits which some scholars suppose has not been participatory and people-oriented (Brooks & Kurtz, 2016<sup>53</sup>; Annan & Edu-Afful, 2015<sup>54</sup>; Ovadia, 2013<sup>55</sup>; Akhaine, 2010<sup>56</sup>; Akinola, 2008<sup>57</sup>; Olarinmoye, 2008<sup>58</sup>;). The governance process implies a relationship between government and other actors interested in the resources as seen in their role in the formulation and implementation of rules, guidelines, regulations, policies, laws, and extraction of these resources.

The approach to the governance of oil in Nigeria has taken the form of appropriating key decision-making powers of ownership and control by the Federal Government through the formulation and implementation of laws, policies, rules, and regulations that lack provisions for adequate reflection of the interest of those at the bottom of society, especially those in the communities where the oil is produced, who regularly complain about the unintended negative consequences of industry activities on their environment and also complain about what they see as exclusion from legitimate involvement in the oil business. This approach is based on a policy objective that targets the collective benefit of using the resource to promote development. This pattern of governance also hinges on the perception of a need for uninterrupted production to serve the purpose of generating national income and foreign exchange needed for economic development and the provision of essential social services and infrastructure from the perspective of government.

<sup>53</sup>Brooks, S. M., & Kurtz, M. J. (2016). Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political 'Resource Curse'. *International Organization*, 70(2), 279–311. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24758326>

<sup>54</sup>Annan, N., & Edu-Afful, F. (2015). Confronting the 'Oil Curse': South African Institute of International Affairs; JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep25892>

<sup>55</sup>OVADIA, J. S. (2013). The Nigerian 'One Percent' and the Management of National Oil Wealth Through Nigerian Content. *Science & Society*, 77(3), 315–341. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24583641>

<sup>56</sup>Akhaine, S. O. (2010). Nigeria: Politics and the end of oil. *Review of African Political Economy*, 37(123), 89–91. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27860750>

<sup>57</sup>Akinola, S. R. (2008). Coping with Social Deprivation through Self-Governing Institutions in Oil Communities of Nigeria. *Africa Today*, 55(1), 89–107. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27666952>

<sup>58</sup>Olarinmoye, O. O. (2008). Politics Does Matter: The Nigerian State and Oil (Resource) Curse. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24483994>

### 2.3.3 Social Cohesion and Natural Resource Governance

Nigeria has been presented in the literature as a country that has not been able to properly govern its rich oil and gas resources in ways that protect the environment, and lead well to development. The country has not been able to instil enough trust in citizens and those in communities directly affected by the activities of companies and individuals in the oil industry (Busse & Gröning, 2013<sup>59</sup>; McFerson, 2009<sup>60</sup>; Uche, 2008<sup>61</sup>; Ukiwo, 2020<sup>62</sup>).

Ukoha Ukiwo (2020) explained the trend and classified it into generational regimes with each having implications for the cohesion of the country. The oil regimes before independence were marked by the interest, control, ownership and appropriation of oil. The policies then, like today, allowed for large-scale exploratory activities. The Nigeria Minerals Ordinance of 1914 gained control and ownership of all lands, waters, oil and minerals in northern and southern Nigeria in the British Crown. The Ordinance had provisions for the issuance of licenses for exploration of oil by the Crown or representative in Nigeria and provide a 50-50 split of production between the oil companies and the government (Ukiwo, 2020). The main provisions of that act were retained by the Petroleum Act of 1958 and the Mineral Acts of 1958.

The postcolonial state has known the tradition of the open quest for state control, ownership and appropriation of oil and minerals. The Petroleum Decree of 1969 (renamed the Petroleum Act of 1969). This Act gave the Minister of Petroleum enormous powers of control and exercise of ownership rights on behalf of the federal government, in matters of issuance of exploratory and prospecting licenses. It also provided for the involvement of the private sector and aboriginal peoples in the petroleum industry, as well as the powers of the minister in decisions regarding refining and distribution of products.

In the immediate post-civil war era (1967-70), Nigeria took steps to participate in the industry by signing its initial Participation Agreement and securing 35 per cent equity in international oil companies at the instance of the nationalization of British Petroleum. It was quickly brought up to 55 per cent of the equity and rose again to 60 per cent in 1960.

Second, the oil governance phase was marked by increasing awareness among local elites of communities on the front lines of exclusion from the oil sector. Elites' articulation of their grievances was based on a sound critique of the federal government, and it is bent on destabilizing the 50-50 formula in the sharing of benefits (derivation principle) from natural resources that characterized regimes before the emergence of oil as an important national revenue earner for the government. The regions shared the benefits of this formula and there were no frictions that threatened social cohesion. The 1960 Constitution (Constitution of Independence) confirmed this formula that the elites referred to in their articulation of injustice in the case of oil. The Petroleum Act of 1969 saw a reduction in the share of benefits going to states from 50 per cent to 45 per cent in favour of the federal government, which now has 55 per cent. This would mark the beginning of stronger resistance and resentment toward the federal government by the oil-producing state elites.

This reduction continued in the federal government's pursuit of better control and ownership of oil. The mobilizations against these cuts were based on perceptions of poor governance of the resource and injustice regarding the control, ownership and appropriation of profits. These grievances have increased and have gradually generated strategic responses from the federal government with the sole aim of reducing the power of threats to the resource. The Oil Mineral Producing Commission (OMPADEC), created in 1993, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), established in 1999, and the Ministry of Niger Delta are examples of specialised agencies the federal government has created to specifically address the needs of the oil-producing states in Nigeria.

<sup>59</sup>Busse, M., & Gröning, S. (2013). The resource curse revisited: Governance and natural resources. *Public Choice*, 154(1/2), 1–20. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23326390>

<sup>60</sup>McFerson, H. M. (2009). Governance and Hyper-Corruption in Resource-Rich African Countries. *Third World Quarterly*, 30(8), 1529–1547. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388333>

<sup>61</sup>Uche, C. (2008). Oil, British Interests and the Nigerian Civil War. *The Journal of African History*, 49(1), 111–135. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40206616>

<sup>62</sup>Ukiwo, U. (2020). Nigeria's Oil Governance Regime: In U. Ukiwo, A. Langer, & P. Mbabazi (Eds.), *Oil Wealth and Development in Uganda and Beyond* (pp. 309–330). Leuven University Press; JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k690.20>

The next oil governance regime was in part seen in the emergence of laws, regulations, and institutions as part of the response of the government to growing community agitations against environmental problems resulting from the activities of international oil companies. Agitators pointed to the failure of colonial laws and policies to prevent these environmental problems--oil spills and flaring. For example, petroleum laws in the years before independence and the immediate or fairly long post-colonial era took advantage of the meagre financial compensation for crops destroyed during exploratory and production activities. Protecting the environment was not considered essential in the development of these acts and regulations.

Protests by communities in Nigeria's oil-producing states for environmental protection against regular oil spills and gas flaring have intensified. Agencies and practices such as the National Oil Spill Detection Agency and Joint Investigation Visits (JIVs), and the Nigerian Extractive Transparency Initiative, have also emerged from the government's perspective. The government has taken the time to respond to many questions about its oil governance.

Nigeria's 2004 energy policy, National Environmental Policy and moribund Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA, replaced with Federal Ministry of Environment) and several piecemeal legislation in the post-colonial state of Nigeria, all came after several years of running the oil industry. The obvious implications include the governance of an industry with a significant impact on the environment and challenges to the control, ownership, and allocation of benefits.



## Natural Resource Governance in Nigeria

Governors of states in the South-South of Nigeria have been calling for ownership and control of crude oil and gas, in contrast to what currently obtains with the Federal Government as the sole owner of these resources. But a coalition of armed groups in the region recently responded, painting the Governors as lacking the legitimacy to make such a call or speak for the region. While not disputing the urgency of fiscal federalism and change in the way the oil is managed, they reproached the Governors for their failure to properly account for the 13 per cent derivation fund from the production of oil they have been receiving for decades without much to show in the lives of people in communities who directly suffer the environmental consequences of extractive activities. They, therefore, asked the Federal Government to pay the money to the communities and not the Governors. These issues, claims, and counterclaims around the oil provide a clue to how governance of the resource has continued to create resentment, tension, and grievances that have the potential for a large-scale face-off between groups. It also raises the question of whether natural resource governance contributes to or undermines social cohesion.

Without necessarily using the concept of social cohesion to frame analyses, scholars have suggested that oil and gas governance matters in achieving a socially cohesive Nigeria. The intersection of resource governance and contests over control, ownership, and distribution of benefits is critical for understanding social cohesion. One area of the gap in the literature is the lack of clear, unemotional, and objective policy prescriptions that privilege social cohesion goals. This may as well be contributing to the growing sense of marginalization, exclusion, and powerlessness in oil-related public decision-making. The net outcome of all this is the feeling that the present federal arrangement is fundamentally flawed with fiscal inequality. The government has continued to make efforts at checking and managing this trend through constitutional and statutory concessions with the 13 per cent derivation to producing states and establishing agencies to specifically address development issues in those states.

On the other hand, there are growing concerns about many issues on the part of communities, including the clean-up of places polluted by crude oil, access to legitimate oil business and adequate benefits from the resource. Existing laws, policies, regulations, and institutions governing extraction and the use of the resource in Nigeria centralize decision-making powers in the federal government and its agencies and makes no provisions for the inclusion of those prone to the environmental impact of the oil business.

The question, therefore, is about whether the governance of this resource matters for a socially cohesive Nigeria. This review addressed this question through a narrative literature review to highlight what is known, and by extension what needs to be known for policy. Although an identifiable comprehensive and coherent theory of social cohesion is presently



lacking, this review draws from the premise that resource governance has a crucial role to play regarding social cohesion, the threats posed, and what to do to hold the people together, in the context of a socially, ethnically, religiously, and politically divided society, where belonging to the political class seems access to decision-making centres on the distribution of resource benefits. And in this case, benefiting from the distributive federal arrangement through a monthly sharing of money generated from the sale of crude oil involves being in positions of authority at the local, state and federal government levels in the context of an overarching centralizing power of the federal government. The context, therefore, is the contests for control and decisions about the distribution of the benefits of the resource that clearly shows decisions around them are not producing social outcomes that promote a socially cohesive Nigeria at the level of communities, state and federal government (Busse & Gröning, 2013<sup>63</sup>; Ukiwo, 2020<sup>64</sup>; Wilson & VAN Van Alstine, 2014<sup>65</sup>).

#### 2.3.4 Social Cohesion and Gender

Gender is a multi-dimensional social construction, with distinct roles assigned to men and women in a specific society (Cuberes & Teignier, 2014)<sup>66</sup>. Gender stereotypes result in inequities in access to fundamental human rights, including nutrition, education, employment, health care, autonomy and freedom. “Gender inequity can be defined as allowing people to have different opportunities due to perceived differences based solely on gender issues” (Coffe & Bolzendahl, 2011)<sup>67</sup>. Moreover, “it is the biased treatment of members of a specific gender due to perceptions that they are inferior in their roles”. According to Makama (2013)<sup>68</sup>, “gender inequality refers to the disparity and discrimination in the rights, responsibilities and opportunities that all people should have, whether born male or female or not.” Gender inequality is a reality in most parts of the world, particularly in developing countries, where significant gaps between men and women are present in the labour market as well as in political representation or bargaining power in the household (Klasen & Lamanna, 2009<sup>69</sup>; Cuberes and Teignier, 2014). In line with this, Matthew et al (2020)<sup>70</sup> opined that gender inequality in terms of income, wages, skill, health, wealth and poverty have broadened the gaps in developing countries because women do not have access to and control over the benefit from economic opportunities and resources.

Moreover, inequality in access to resources, and education, may inhibit reductions in child mortality and fertility rates and prevent the expansion of the education of the next generation (Busse and Spielmann, 2006)<sup>71</sup>. As a result, Salau et al. (2018)<sup>72</sup> opined that major factors that break the chains of poverty are access to education, economic opportunities and resources and these leads to the transformation, advancement and progress of the economy. Studies such as Jones et al. (2010)<sup>73</sup> claim that the low status of women and girls in the household might result in reduced levels of educational attainment, low employment potential and job quality, increased maternal and infant mortality rates, and increased present and intergenerational poverty. More importantly, gender inequity may subject women and girls to legal discrimination and lead to social exclusion.

<sup>63</sup>Busse, M., & Gröning, S. (2013). The resource curse revisited: Governance and natural resources. *Public Choice*, 154(1/2), 1–20. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23326390>

<sup>64</sup>Ukiwo, U. (2020). Nigeria's Oil Governance Regime: In U. Ukiwo, A. Langer, & P. Mbabazi (Eds.), *Oil Wealth and Development in Uganda and Beyond* (pp. 309–330). Leuven University Press; JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvt9k690.20>

<sup>65</sup>Wilson, E., & Van Alstine, J. (2014). *Origins And Evolution Of Transparency In Resource Governance* (Localising Transparency, pp. 10–13). International Institute for Environment and Development; JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep01393.7>

<sup>66</sup>Cuberes, D., & Teignier, M. (2014). Gender inequality and economic growth: A critical review. *Journal of International Development*, 26(2), 260-276.

<sup>67</sup>Coffe, H., & Bolzendahl, C. (2011). Gender gaps in political participation across sub-Saharan African nations. *Social indicators research*, 102(2), 245-264.

<sup>68</sup>Makama, G. A. (2013). Patriarchy and gender inequality in Nigeria: The way forward. *European scientific journal*, 9(17).

<sup>69</sup>Klasen, S., & Lamanna, F. (2009). The impact of gender inequality in education and employment on economic growth: new evidence for a panel of countries. *Feminist economics*, 15(3), 91-132.

<sup>70</sup>Matthew, O., Adeniji, A., Osabohien, R., Olowande, T., & Atolagbe, T. (2020). Gender inequality, maternal mortality and inclusive growth in Nigeria. *Social Indicators Research*, 147(3), 763-780.

<sup>71</sup>Busse, M., & Spielmann, C. (2006). Gender inequality and trade. *Review of International Economics*, 14(3), 362-379.

<sup>72</sup>Salau, O., Osibanjo, A., Adeniji, A., & Igbinoba, E. (2018). An integrated dataset on organizational retention attributes and commitment of selected ICT and accounting firms. *Data in Brief*, 19, 1930–1936.

<sup>73</sup>Jones, N., Harper, C., Watson, C., Espey, J., Wadugodapitiya, D., Page, E., Stavropoulou, M., Presler-Marshall, E., & Clench, B. (2010). *Stemming girls' chronic poverty: Catalysing development change by building just social institutions*. Technical report, Chronic Poverty Research Centre, University of Manchester.



Various discussions of social cohesion arise from causes and consequences of violence, social upheaval, slow or negative economic growth, misallocation of aid, and failures to realise welfare gains from market-oriented economic reforms (Easterly et al. 2006<sup>74</sup>). Over the years, the term “social cohesion” has drawn a multitude of definitions from different specialists and practitioners (Green and Janmaat, 2016<sup>75</sup>; OECD Development Centre, 2011). While some initiatives emphasize 'shared identity and sense of belonging', others emphasize 'active civil society' or 'equality and social solidarity' (Green & Janmaat, 2016). The OECD Development Centre (2011) describes a socially cohesive society as a society committed to the well-being of all its members, minimizing disparities and avoiding marginalization. It entails local patterns of cooperation (Fearon et al., 2009)<sup>76</sup>, the affective bond between citizens (Chipkin and Ngqulunga, 2008)<sup>77</sup>, promoting harmony, a sense of community, a degree of commitment to promoting the common good, and the glue that binds society together (Colletta et al. 2001<sup>78</sup>; King et al, 2011<sup>79</sup>).

In recent years, it has become increasingly apparent that social cohesion is declining in both developed and developing countries. According to Grimalda and Tänzler (2018)<sup>80</sup>, social cohesion is mainly countered by factors of social division such as ethnicity, political parties, population pressures, drug abuse, poverty and inequality. Inequality continues to be one of the main factors affecting social cohesion in many cities worldwide. There is widespread agreement on the negative impact that high levels of inequality can have on a country's economic and social development. This is a major challenge for social cohesion for several reasons. The study by Wilkinson and Pickett (2009)<sup>81</sup> argued that inequality has a pernicious impact on levels of trust in society and, as such, it undermines social cohesion. Inequalities can be measured by several dimensions, such as income, geography and gender. Of interest and attention in this study are the problems associated with gender inequality that continue to thwart the cohesiveness of people in the countries of the global south and north. It is difficult to claim that society is socially cohesive when through gender discrimination and marginalization, 50 per cent or more of the population is denied their proper role and status in society (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016)<sup>82</sup>. In most countries in Africa, the scale of gender inequality and gender-based violence has assumed a monumental dimension despite the active stance taken in national policies and national plans by some of these countries to eradicate violence and inequality against women and children. For example, only 30 per cent of family farms in Rwanda are owned and run by women, even though they do most of the production work (UNCTAD, 2014)<sup>83</sup>. In Nigeria, despite the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1985 and similar local policies, such as the National Gender Policy of 2006, inequality still exists due to a myriad of cultural and structural challenges. Lesejane (2018)<sup>84</sup> says women are deterred from reporting abuse because of tradition and culture. It is in this context that this study seeks to deal with issues related to gender inequality in the context of social cohesion in developed and developing countries.

<sup>74</sup>Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion, institutions, and growth. *Institutions, and Growth* (August 2006).

<sup>75</sup>Green, A., & Janmaat, J. G. (2016). Education and social cohesion: a panglossian global discourse. *Handbook of global education policy*, 169-188.

<sup>76</sup>Fearon, J. D., Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2009). Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia. *American Economic Review*, 99(2), 287-91.

<sup>77</sup>Chipkin, I., & Ngqulunga, B. (2008). Friends and family: social cohesion in South Africa. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 34(1), 61-76.

<sup>78</sup>Colletta, N. J., Lim, T. G., & Kelles-Viitanen, A. (Eds.). (1999). *Social cohesion and conflict prevention in Asia. Managing diversity through development*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

<sup>79</sup>King, E., Samii, C., & Snilstveit, B. (2010). Interventions to promote social cohesion in sub-Saharan Africa. *Journal of development effectiveness*, 2(3), 336-370.

<sup>80</sup>Grimalda, G., & Tänzer, N. (2018). Understanding and fostering social cohesion. *G20 Insights. T20 Task Force on Global Inequality and Social Cohesion*.

<sup>81</sup>Wilkinson, R. G., & Pickett, K. E. (2009). Income inequality and social dysfunction. *Annual review of sociology*, 35, 493-511.

<sup>82</sup>United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2016). *Social Cohesion in Eastern Africa*. Economic Commission for Africa. Addis Ababa.

<sup>83</sup>UNCTAD, W. (2014). *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Review of Maritime Transport*.

<sup>84</sup>Lesejane, D. (2018). *Ender, Masculinities, and Social Cohesion*. Tearfund, United Kingdom.



## Gender Inequality and Social Cohesion

Various studies have been carried out on gender differences in social cohesion in developed and developing countries (McDaniel, 2003; Delpont, 2009<sup>85</sup>; Ashraf and Waqar, 2012<sup>86</sup>). For example, McDaniel (2003)<sup>87</sup> suggested that gender must be addressed to ensure the spirit of social cohesion. The study further points out that issues related to social cohesion focus on a growing sense of inequality compounded by increasing diversities. The importance of addressing gender differences in social cohesion was also echoed by Segalo (2015)<sup>88</sup> who stated that achieving social cohesion needs to be addressed from the “intersection”. The intersection in this context refers to gender inequality that continues to persist in accessing education and the silenced voices of many women who remain absent in the room when policies are made.

The study by Kelles-Viitanen and Shrestha (2011)<sup>89</sup> examined how women were excluded from the process and the results of sustained peace and inclusive development in Nepal. The study argued that despite commitments to end gender discrimination, gender-responsive policies and laws have not yet been implemented. The study found that gender was often equated with activities for girls and women rather than actions that address the relationship between men and women. They concluded that deeply entrenched cultural norms and practices are important factors that influence gender inequality, as women are seen primarily in their roles as wives and mothers. Similarly, the study by Hooghe and Stolle (2004) identified potential gender differences in commitment or willingness to engage in politics and civil society. The first factor according to the study is that women, in general, have fewer civic skills, as only a limited number of women occupy positions in the labour market that allow for their development, such as speaking in public or chairing meetings. The availability of time that can be spent on non-domestic activities has been identified as the second factor of gender differences in the willingness to engage in politics and civil society. The study stressed that women, who are more likely to be housewives, are socialized outside the public sphere. The third factor is related to parenting and childcare, especially when children are young. The availability of women for activities in public life is more limited, as women are more engaged in childcare than men. From these observations, it can be concluded that cultural norms and practices are key factors that affect gender inequality in social and political engagement.

Apart from social and political participation, gender differences occur in other ways, such as access to economic resources and education. For example, in European countries, it has been reported that there are still significant gender differences in employment or participation in political and other public spheres (Schmeets & Te, 2014)<sup>90</sup>. The European Commission (2000)<sup>91</sup> reported that the average earnings of women in the private sector were 28% less than men's or the share of women in the national parliaments of the EU countries, which on average amounted only to 18.6% in 1999. It was also reported that in Rwanda, only 30 per cent of family farms are owned and managed by women even though women do the bulk of the production work (UNCTAD, 2014)<sup>92</sup>. In the United Republic of Tanzania, wages for women are 63 per cent lower than for men (Wane and Morisset, 2012)<sup>93</sup>.

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<sup>85</sup>Delpont, E. (2009). Social cohesion and gender: Raising issues of human rights: Raising issues of human rights and policy frameworks relevant to women in Africa. Extraordinary lecturer COFI Forum on gender and social cohesion in Latin America and Africa. Centre for Human Rights of University of Pretoria, South Africa.

<sup>86</sup>Ashraf, D., & Waqar, K. (2012). Gender equality and social cohesion: Reflection on the experiences of strengthening teacher education in Pakistan.

<sup>87</sup>McDaniel, S. A. (2003). Social cohesion and gender: Reflections on tendencies and tensions. *Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie*, 43-50.

<sup>88</sup>Segalo, P. (2015). Gender, social cohesion and everyday struggles in South Africa. *Psychology in Society*, (49), 70-82.

<sup>89</sup>Kelles-Viitanen, A. & Shrestha, A. (2011). Gender Equality and Social Inclusion: Promoting the Rights of Women and the Excluded for Sustained Peace and Inclusive Development. Evaluation Report Prepared for United Nations Resident and

<sup>90</sup>Schmeets, H., & Te Riele, S. (2014). Declining social cohesion in the Netherlands?. *Social Indicators Research*, 115(2), 791-812.

<sup>91</sup>European Commission. Enterprise DG. (2000). European Competitiveness Report 2000: Working Document of the Services of the European Commission. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.

<sup>92</sup>ibid

<sup>93</sup>Wane, W., & Morisset, J. (2012). Is this a woman's world? Gender equality in Tanzania. *Africa Can End Poverty* (Accessed April 29, 2014: <http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/is-this-awomans-world-gender-equality-in-tanzania>).



In the area of education, several studies have illustrated how discriminatory practices and norms, such as early pregnancy or early marriage, gender-based violence, and restricted inheritance rights pose significant and enduring obstacles for girl child educational attainments. Field and Ambrus (2008)<sup>94</sup>, and Lloyd and Mensch (2008)<sup>95</sup> give evidence of connections between early marriage and lower levels of female education as a result of girl child not completing their education or getting pregnant. By the way, Alam and al. 2010<sup>96</sup> and Jones et al. (2010)<sup>97</sup> provide an overview of the negative consequences of sexual harassment and violence against girls' educational outcomes. This implied that persistent practices and social norms that limit girl child and young women's access to education also affect their educational aspirations negatively which in turn undermine their economic and social opportunities. As a result, in countries with discriminatory social institutions, academic achievement is more unequal.

## State of Social Cohesion and Gender Inequality in Nigeria

Over the years, lack of poor social cohesion has been a major challenge for many multi-ethnic nations, including Nigeria. In recent decades, the state of social cohesion in Nigeria has been under serious threat, crossing religious, ethnic and social divisions. This could be attributed to factors such as lack of confidence, social justice, exclusion, government abandonment and inequality (Africa Polling Institute, 2019)<sup>98</sup>. Gender inequality has been a major challenge to Nigeria's cohesion since its creation in 1914 (Umukoro, 2014)<sup>99</sup>. Despite decades of efforts to achieve equality (FRN 2006)<sup>100</sup>, women remain under-represented in the economic and social development space and policy of the country.

Several studies have investigated gender inequality in social and political participation, access to economic resources and education (Owoyemi and Olusanya, 2014<sup>101</sup>; Bako & Syed, 2018<sup>102</sup>; Lesejane (2018)<sup>103</sup>; Aderemi and Alley, 2019<sup>104</sup>; Idike et al., 2020<sup>105</sup>). Lesejane (2018) investigated current social norms around gender, particularly concepts of masculinities, and attitudes to and understanding of sexual and gender-based violence in six communities in the cities of Jos and Tafawa Balewa in Nigeria. The study found that both male and female participants embraced the notion of the superiority of men over women, by defining men as leaders in society and heads of their families. The study found that women are kept away from reporting when they have been abused due to tradition and culture. This was also emphasized by Ogunjuyigbe and Liasu (2007)<sup>106</sup>, who wrote that women or wives are seen as properties of their husbands and their husbands have the moral right to beat their wives as a form of correction for insubordination and doing something wrong as a result of tradition, culture and religious beliefs. In the case of rape, women remain silent because they see it as a social stigma if it comes to the public's notice.

<sup>94</sup>Field, E., & Ambrus, A. (2008). Early marriage, age of menarche, and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh. *Journal of political Economy*, 116(5), 881-930.

<sup>95</sup>Lloyd, C. B., & Mensch, B. S. (2008). Marriage and childbirth as factors in dropping out from school: an analysis of DHS data from sub-Saharan Africa. *Population Studies*, 62(1), 1-13.

<sup>96</sup>Alam, N., Roy, S. K., & Ahmed, T. (2010). Sexually harassing behavior against adolescent girls in rural Bangladesh: Implications for achieving millennium development goals. *Journal of interpersonal violence*, 25(3), 443-456.

<sup>97</sup>ibid

<sup>98</sup>ibid

<sup>99</sup>Umukoro, N. (2014). Democracy and Inequality in Nigeria." *Journal of Developing Societies*, 30 (1): 1–24.

<sup>100</sup>FRN (Federal Republic of Nigeria). 2006. National Gender Policy. Abuja: Federal Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development. [http://www.aacoalition.org/national\\_policy\\_women.Htm](http://www.aacoalition.org/national_policy_women.Htm)

<sup>101</sup>Owoyemi, O., & Olusanya, O. (2014). Gender: A Precursor for Discriminating Against Women in Paid Employment in Nigeria. *American Journal of Business and Management*, 3(1), 10-14.

<sup>102</sup>Bako, M. J., & Syed, J. (2018). Women's marginalization in Nigeria and the way forward. *Human Resource Development International*, 21(5), 425-443.

<sup>103</sup>ibid

<sup>104</sup>Aderemi, T., & Alley, I. (2019). Gender pay gap in the workplace: the case of public and private sectors in Nigeria. *Journal of Social and Economic Development*, 21(2), 370-391.

<sup>105</sup>Idike, A. N., Okeke, R. C., Okorie, C. O., Ogba, F. N., & Ugodulunwa, C. A. (2020). Gender, Democracy, and National Development in Nigeria. *SAGE Open*, 10(2), 2158244020922836.

<sup>106</sup>Ogunjuyigbe, P. O., & Liasu, A. (2007). The Social and Economic Determinants of Maternal Morbidity and Mortality in Nigeria. *African Journal of Population Studies*, 7, 16-21.

Political participation is also a factor in perpetual gender discrimination in Nigeria. According to a study by Oxfam (2017)<sup>107</sup>, Nigeria has the lowest share of women's MPs in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, Mark and Asheazi (2016)<sup>108</sup> noted that women in Nigeria are normally denied political positions of influence and as a result, there is a wide gender gap in Nigerian politics. This was also pointed out by Ezeifeke and Osakwe (2013)<sup>109</sup>, who wrote that women are usually set aside on national issues and are not hired for executive positions in government offices. Mofoluwawo (2014)<sup>110</sup> also highlighted that women are marginalized in Nigerian policy. The author further argued that discrimination against women greatly represents a waste of human resources as women constitute about half the population of Nigeria and play important roles in the economic development of any society.

Studies have also posited that the marginalization of women is also persistent in other sectors such as the economy and education in Nigeria (Owoyemi and Olusanya, 2014; Sam 2014; Anyoha et al. 2015; Adegoke, Adegoke, and Oyedele 2016). For example, Owoyemi and Olusanya (2014) noted that women are constantly confronted with enormous inequalities in Nigeria's labour market. That statement was also echoed by Anyoha et al. (2015)<sup>111</sup> who wrote that women have higher unemployment rates, fewer career options and lower salaries. In the education sector, it was reported that there are about 15% of women in the academic faculty reportedly experience harassment, discrimination, and, in some cases, violence (Johnson 2014)<sup>112</sup>. In furtherance of the sexual harassment faced by many women in the education sector, Bakari and Leach (2009)<sup>113</sup> also pointed out that women are not just marginalized but also sexually harassed by male lecturers and staff in Nigerian higher education institutions despite the complaints, the authorities took little or no action.

In terms of access to education and outcome, the inequality faced by women is evident as there are striking differences between men and women, rich and poor, and between rural and urban areas. The most marginalized are women from rural areas and the poorest quintile of the population (Oxfam, 2017). For example, it has been reported that 75.8 per cent of poor women in Nigeria do not attend school. This could be attributed to early marriage and further compounded by childbirth, which may lead to a physically traumatic experience for young mothers, perforating their reproductive organs and causing Vesical Vaginal Fistula (VVF). These and many more represent major challenges of gender equity in Nigeria and it, therefore, becomes a challenge to imagined cohesiveness when a group of people (especially women) are marginalized or underrepresented in social and political participation, access to economic resources, and education.

Gender inequality infiltrates every society but is particularly challenging in developing countries where political, economic, cultural, and religious problems afflict the society, impeding women's development and resulting in social exclusion and underdevelopment of affected nations. In Nigeria, the situation is unique because of patriarchal culture and religious norms that have a strong influence on society (particularly on the marginalization of women). Therefore, Nigeria is proclaimed as one of the most unequal societies in the world and continues to languish on the road to cohesion. To reverse this trend, it is urgently necessary to ensure equal access to participation and decision-making in the social, political, and economic life of the nation. This will ensure the inclusion of economically marginalized groups such as women and indigenous people in the promotion of a socially inclusive economy and society. Furthermore, advocacy and awareness-raising to raise awareness and address gender inequality is the way forward to achieve women's

<sup>107</sup>OXFAM. (2017). Inequality in Nigeria exploring the drivers. Oxfam International May 2017.

[www.oxfam.org/files/file\\_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-tax-havens-180116-en\\_0.pdf](http://www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/bp210-economy-one-percent-tax-havens-180116-en_0.pdf)

<sup>108</sup>Mark, M. S., and N. R. Asheazi. (2016). Mitigating the Environmental Impact of Poverty among Female Gender in Nigeria through Advocacy. *International Journal of Innovative Research and Development* 5 (1): 423–429.

<sup>109</sup>Ezeifeke, C. R., & Osakwe, N. N. (2013). Gender representation in the 1999 Nigerian constitution: A critical discourse analysis for socio-political equity. *Discourse & Society*, 24(6), 687-700.

<sup>110</sup>Mofoluwawo, E. O. (2014). Social, cultural and economic discrimination to women participation in African politics: The case of Nigeria. *International Journal of Learning and Development*, 4(1), 169-175.

<sup>111</sup>Anyoha, N. O., J. U. Chikaire, and R. N. Nwakwasi. (2015). "Effects of Gender Based Discriminatory Practices on Poverty Reduction and Women Empowerment in Ngor–Okpala Area of Imo State, Nigeria." *International Journal of Development and Emerging Economics*, 3 (1): 39–48.

<sup>112</sup>Johnson, A. T. (2014). Performing and Defying Gender an Exploration of the Lived Experiences of Women Higher Education Administrators in sub-Saharan Africa. *Educational Management Administration & Leadership*, 42 (6): 835–850.

<sup>113</sup>Bakari, S., and F. Leach. (2009). I Invited Her to My Office': Normalising Sexual Violence in a Nigerian College of Education. In *Buying Your Way into Heaven: Education and Corruption in International Perspective in Higher Education*, edited by Heyneman. Netherland: Sense Publishers.

empowerment and development. It is also important to create a framework for continuous reform of our law enforcement system to allow every Nigerian to engage others across the country with a sufficient guarantee of the right to seek redress whenever individual or group rights are infringed upon or agreements breached. This will go a long way in ensuring that there is justice for every offender whether man or woman, rich or poor, Muslim or Christian, farmer or herder, Northerner or Southerner in the country. Implementing these and other recommendations would bring peaceful co-existence and a foundation for the development of unique national consciousness in Nigeria and other developing countries.

### 2.3.5 Social Cohesion and Impunity

The term “impunity” has attracted a myriad of definitions from different specialists and practitioners over the years (Afflito, 2000<sup>114</sup>; Opotow, 2001<sup>115</sup>; Eke and Tonwe, 2016<sup>116</sup>; McGregor, 2017<sup>117</sup>). According to Afflito (2000), impunity is the waiver of responsibility, punishment, or legal sanction for perpetrators of illegal acts. Impunity occurs when crimes are not investigated; suspected offenders are not brought to trial; verdicts to convict are not reached despite convincing evidence that would establish offenders' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; those convicted are not sentenced or, if sentenced, their punishment is so minor that it is completely out of proportion to the gravity of their crimes; or sentences of those convicted are not enforced (Penrose, 1999<sup>118</sup>; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 2005). In other words, impunity exists when nobody is held responsible for violations of the law. Impunity, therefore, implies a political and social context in which laws against human rights abuses are ignored or perpetrators are poorly punished by the state (Muntingh & Dereymaeker, 2013<sup>119</sup>). According to McGregor (2017), impunity is especially common in countries that lack a tradition of the rule of law, suffer from corruption or that have entrenched systems of patronage, or where the judiciary is weak, or members of the security forces are protected by special jurisdictions or immunities.

There are three interconnected facets of impunity: structural, strategic, and political/psychological impunity (McSherry & Molina, 1992; Opotow, 2001). According to McSherry and Molina (1992)<sup>120</sup>, structural impunity implies institutional structures of the state, such as the constitutional authority vested in the army for internal security. Strategic impunity connotes specific procedures and structures adopted to prevent criminal investigation or prosecution, such as tampering with evidence and thwarting investigation, while political/psychological impunity refers to the manipulation of fear, distrust, and isolation among citizens (Opotow, 2001). In pursuance of the classification of impunity, Viñuales (2007)<sup>121</sup> identified the two-dimensional concept of impunity with causes or conditions as a first dimension and actors as a second dimension. The cause or condition is divided into structural and functional aspects. The structural aspects refer to all legal and institutional procedures that need to be taken to increase accountability from the ratification of a treaty or the revocation of an amnesty law to the building of better penitentiary facilities. The functional aspects of impunity are used to cover those cases where all institutional/legal structures are in place but they are simply not used, whether this inertia is itself legal or not. The second dimension of impunity concerns the status of those responsible for alleged acts. He also emphasized that the fundamental distinction between the two dimensions of impunity is between state and non-state actors.

<sup>114</sup>Afflito, F. M. (2000). Victimization, survival, and the impunity of forced exile: A case study from the Rwandan genocide. *Crime Law Soc. Change* 34: 77–97.

<sup>115</sup>Opotow, S. (2001). Reconciliation in times of impunity: Challenges for social justice. *Social Justice Research*, 14(2), 149-170.

<sup>116</sup>Eke, S. J., & Tonwe, D. A. (2016). Address causes not symptoms: engaging the festering culture of impunity from the dimension of fragility in Nigeria. *African Studies*, 75(1), 133-152.

<sup>117</sup>McGregor, K. (2017). Exposing impunity: Memory and human rights activism in Indonesia and Argentina. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 19(4), 551-573.

<sup>118</sup>Penrose, M. M. (1999, Fall). Impunity—inertia, inaction, and invalidity: A literature review. *Boston Univ. Int. Law J.* 17: 269–310.

<sup>119</sup>Muntingh, L., & Dereymaeker, G. (2013). Understanding impunity in the South African law enforcement agencies. *Civil Society Prison Reform Initiative*, Cape Town

<sup>120</sup>McSherry, J. P., and Molina Mejía, R. (1992). Confronting the question of justice in Guatemala. *Soc. Just.* 19(3): 1–28.

<sup>121</sup>Viñuales, J. E. (2007). Impunity: elements for an empirical concept. *Law & Inequality*, 25, 115.



## State of Impunity in Developed and Developing Countries

Ending pervasive impunity and ensuring that people and communities with legitimate grievances can access judicial mechanisms that address their complaints in an effective and efficient manner remain a challenge in many developed and developing countries. For example, Rochlin (2016)<sup>122</sup> assessed the state of impunity for human rights abuses against workers and unionized workers in Colombia. The study argued that impunity is socially entrenched in Colombia due to a historical legacy of a weak state, a concomitant lack of institutionalized conflict resolution mechanisms, and a lack of knowledge among the residents of the rural communities about human rights. The study concluded that while global entities can assist Colombia in its battle against impunity and human rights abuses, it is the Colombians themselves who need to re-strategize and apply positive pressure to reduce impunity and human rights violations in the country.

Jorgensen (2009)<sup>123</sup> attributed impunity in India to three major factors: permissive legislation that insulates security forces from legal consequences for human rights violations; multiple armed challenges that have spread the state's coercive resources thin and have compelled the state to delegate some of its coercive tasks to poorly disciplined and ill-trained irregular and paramilitary forces, and an inefficient legal system that historically has lacked the resources to handle citizen complaints against the military and police. The study stressed that impunity is further compounded in India by the fact that the victims of human rights abuses have usually been members of marginal groups who have lacked the financial, legal, political, and social resources to make successful complaints against state actors.

Muntingh and Dereymaeker (2013) evaluated the underlying structural and functional reasons behind de facto impunity in South African law enforcement. The study argued that the reasons for prevailing impunity in respect of rights violations perpetrated by state officials are attributed to the country's historical development and in particular the security forces inherited by the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 1994 and the failure of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to prosecute apartheid-era perpetrators of rights violations following the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The study concluded that transparency and responsibility are needed to fight impunity in the country.

In Nigeria, many studies have dealt specifically with the factors influencing the state of impunity in the country (Amnesty International. 2007<sup>124</sup>; Oguchi 2008<sup>125</sup>; Amnesty International. 2011<sup>126</sup>; Musa, 2013<sup>127</sup>; Eke, 2016<sup>128</sup>). For instance, Eke and Tonwe (2016) opined that relations between patrons and clients, a weak justice system, rule of law deficiency, corruption, and the abuse of special immunities all work together to create an environment that shelters impunity in Nigeria. Furthermore, the study situates the culture of impunity in Nigeria within the context of institutional constraints, such as inadequate manpower (both in strength and expertise), insufficient education and training, inadequate equipment, and poor conditions of service of the average policeman. The study also argued that the state of impunity in Nigeria has created untoward hardship for its citizens through unemployment, poverty, and terrorism. The study found that strengthening law enforcement and reforming the electoral process is key to addressing the problem of impunity in Nigeria. In a similar vein, Musa (2013) contends that no combat against crime, corruption and other social vices plaguing the country can either be credible or complete unless at the end of the day there is in place an independent, effective, and robust judicial system to count on.

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<sup>122</sup>Rochlin, J. (2016). The political economy of impunity in Colombia: the case of Colombian labour. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 16(2), 173-196.

<sup>123</sup>Jorgensen, N. (2009). Impunity and Oversight: When Do Governments Police Themselves? *Journal of Human Rights*, 8(4), 385-404.

<sup>124</sup>Amnesty International. 2007. *Nigeria: Impunity for Political Violence in the Run-up to the April 2007 Elections*. London: Amnesty International.

<sup>125</sup>Oguchi, A. 2008. 'Radio weblog', in J.A. Ayoade (ed), *Godfather Politics in Nigeria*. Abuja: International Foundation for Electoral System IFES

<sup>126</sup>Amnesty International. 2011. *Nigeria: Loss of Life, Insecurity and Impunity in the Run-up to Nigeria's Elections*. London: Amnesty International.

<sup>127</sup>Musa, Charles, (2013) *Judicial Overhaul Urgently Needed In Nigeria*, Premium Times, July 11, 2013

<sup>128</sup>ibid



Work by Trejo et al. (2018)<sup>129</sup> said the transnational variation of criminal violence in the new democracies is strongly dependent on the adoption by elites of transitional justice processes to address a repressive past. The study concluded that by breaking state impunity and redefining the rules of state coercion, transitional justice processes can make new democracies less vulnerable to large-scale criminal violence, even when the socio-economic conditions that favour such violence are present. A quick look at the studies discussed above showed that the emphasis was on impunity as procedures and structures were adopted to prevent criminal investigations or prosecutions. However, some studies have argued that impunity is a pathology of public life and a social phenomenon that goes beyond the simple reference to crimes that don't receive a legal sanction (Dworkin, 2000<sup>130</sup>; Rothstein, 2005<sup>131</sup>; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012<sup>132</sup>; Oxfam, 2013<sup>133</sup>; Le Clercq, 2018<sup>134</sup>). In a study conducted by Oxfam (2013), it was established that the relation between attributes of institutional design and levels of performance of the rule of law in context is characterized by the existence of deep social inequalities. Also, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argued that the existence of excluding and extractive institutions generates conditions that lead to economic failure and reproduces poverty and inequality over time, and at the same time, the conditions of social exclusion produced by the institutional design make it impossible for actors to access institutions or enjoy the benefits of development with equal opportunities.

Literature from authors such as Balogun and Obosi (2018)<sup>135</sup> and Ferroni et al. (2008)<sup>136</sup> have posited that social cohesion can be achieved through the strengthening of the common ties that binds society together such as the equitable distribution of the commonwealth, justice, having a common goal and vision for a community or region. It can also be achieved by reducing interpersonal income inequality and promoting balanced development among different communities in different geographic areas of the country (King, Samii & Snilstveit, 2010)<sup>137</sup>. In recent years, there is a growing perception that social cohesion is decreasing as a result of widening inequality between the rich and the poor, men and women, and religious bodies among others. Inequalities are drastically becoming one of the biggest challenges facing the world due to the disparities between the rich and the poor, especially in developing countries. Inequality is often an important factor in the violation of human rights, the weakness of the legal system and the absence of punishment for illegal conduct (Le Clercq, 2018). In other words, inequality leaves room for impunity.

Some noteworthy studies have highlighted the strong relationship between inequality and impunity. A good example of this is that of Le Clercq (2018) who hypothesized the correlation between impunity and inequality in Mexico. The study argued that what is relevant in understanding the complexity of impunity is that the existence of deep social inequalities establishes the context that leads to the erosion of the rule of law and generalized impunity. The study adds that once widespread impunity exists, it potentiates the vulnerability of those affected by conditions of marginalization and poverty. The study concluded that impunity represents a complex of social and institutional relations that is maintained by terrifying institutional conceptions, insecurity and socioeconomic inequality. In a similar vein, Dworkin (2000) opined that the legitimacy of a government depends on treating all citizens with equal consideration with the respect to their human rights and access to public goods and resources and that this consideration does not exist when richness is distributed in a profoundly unequal way within a country.

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<sup>129</sup>Trejo, G., Albarracín, J., & Tiscornia, L. (2018). Breaking state impunity in post-authoritarian regimes: Why transitional justice processes deter criminal violence in new democracies. *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(6), 787-809.

<sup>130</sup>Dworkin, Ronald (2000). *Sovereign Virtue*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

<sup>131</sup>Rothstein, Bo (2005). *Social Traps and the Problem of Trust*, New York, Cambridge.

<sup>132</sup>Acemoglu, Daron; James A. Robinson (2012). *Why Nations Fail*, New York, Crown Business.

<sup>133</sup>ibid

<sup>134</sup>Le Clercq, J. A. (2018). The Relationship Between Impunity and Inequality Globally and in Mexico. In *Risks, Violence, Security, and Peace in Latin America* (pp. 195-205). Springer, Cham.

<sup>135</sup>Balogun, S. K., & Obosi, A. C. (2018). Role of cultural identity and social cohesion in national development. *Nigerian Journal of Social Psychology*, 1(1).

<sup>136</sup>Ferroni, M., Mateo, M., & Payne, M. (2008). Development under conditions of inequality and distrust: Social cohesion in Latin America. *Intl Food Policy Res Inst*.

<sup>137</sup>ibid

The study of Githinji and Holmquist (2012)<sup>138</sup> argued that modern Kenya's history of economic and political inequality has resulted in a population whose very division makes it difficult for politicians to be disciplined. The study further stressed that when vertical and horizontal accountability is absent, narrow personal and local interests prevail, and politicians remain unaccountable to the nation as a whole and leading to levels of impunity and inequality.

Wilkinson and Pickett (2009)<sup>139</sup>, in an investigation that incorporates the analysis of inequality and its social dimensions beyond economic performance, warned that the deterioration of living standards that comes from the increase of inequality gaps tends to affect societies since it reduces the quality of life in a community, deteriorates trust relations between members of society, increases levels of violence and distorts the process of access to justice. Similarly, Stiglitz (2015)<sup>140</sup> points out that increasing inequality levels threaten democratic life and distort access to justice, among other things. From these perspectives, it can be inferred that the extreme concentration of richness results in the possibility for certain privileged groups to have improper influence in decision-making processes, impose their interest's agenda in the law-making process, and benefit from privileged treatment limited to power positions in the procurement of justice.

### 2.3.6 Social Cohesion and Corruption

Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. Concerning Nigeria, corruption could be conceptualized as an act of dishonesty or criminal activity to acquire illicit benefits at the expense of the citizens. Despite the existence of anti-corruption agencies such as; the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Fiscal Responsibility Act and recently, the whistle-blower policy, corruption has become one of the major challenges facing Nigeria today and has increasingly dampened the spate of development. Sometimes, corruption also manifests in nepotism and ethnicity in appointments and promotion in public offices. Unfortunately, corrupt practices in the country are not only exclusive to politicians but cut across civil servants, the private sector, individuals and society at large. The prevalence of corruption in Nigeria is evident, giving her consistent poor ratings among the top most corrupt countries in the world by Transparency International. In 2020, Nigeria scored 25 out of 100 points and ranked among the top corrupt countries in the world, and the second in West Africa after Guinea-Bissau; ranking 146 out of 179 countries<sup>141</sup>.

The magnitude of widespread corruption in the country no doubt poses a serious threat to national development, group identity, patriotism and social cohesion. Again, uncontrolled corruption could further exacerbate citizens' distrust of government, leading to disloyalty and a lack of support for national development. A greater source of danger and threat to national unity is when the masses perceive corruption as a ploy by the rich and politically connected individuals to exploit the poor. In the views of Okeke (2020)<sup>142</sup>, corruption and abuse of office have weakened the institution of government and have increasingly polarized the nation. This was further evident in the study by Adegboyega (2020)<sup>143</sup>, who opined that without the restoration of public trust and confidence in the fight against corruption, the social cohesion needed to resolve the seeming persistent problems of instability and disintegration in the country will remain unattainable. Plausibly, the negative consequence of corruption is huge and has contributed immensely to the nation's low human development and misery. Low human development impedes economic growth, increases poverty and weakens social cohesion.

<sup>138</sup>Wa Githinji, M., & Holmquist, F. (2012). Reform and political impunity in Kenya: transparency without accountability. *African Studies Review*, 53-74.

<sup>139</sup>ibid

<sup>140</sup>Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2015). *La gran brecha* (2015), México, D.F., Taurus.

<sup>141</sup><https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nga>

<sup>142</sup>Okeke, M., C (2020). Restructuring the Nigerian State for Sustainable Development. *Journal of accounting, business and social sciences*. 3 (2) 2672-4235.

<sup>143</sup>Adegboyega, O. O (2020). Public Morality as a Fulcrum for Social Cohesion and Development in Nigeria: *A Philosophical Approach*. *KIU Journal of Humanities*. 5(1): 37-48



The more worrisome is that the approach to fighting corruption has been perceived to be seriously politicized along with the political party, ethnic and religious lines and further aggravating ethnic and religious tensions, thereby threatening the social cohesiveness of the country. In some instances, there is the likelihood to bend the rule because of the ethnic or political affiliation of the person involved in the corrupt case. Thus, equality before the law is relegated to the back seat while sentiment becomes the determining factor for deciding who to prosecute. In Nigeria today, it is a widespread belief that the moment a person undergoing a corrupt trial aligns with the party in power, the person's corrupt charges are dropped immediately. These abysmal practices and setbacks have made Nigerians think that the fight against corruption is nothing but only hypocrisy and a tool to witch-hunt political enemies of the government. This is further evident in the views of Matthew Page, an Advisor with Transparency International, who stated that the anti-corruption fight by the current government of President Buhari had made some remarkable impacts, but the approach remained political and selective<sup>144</sup>. Some CSOs also share a similar opinion that the fight against corruption has been selective. As aptly captured by CISLAC, the rules do not apply equally to all citizens, as prominent personalities in politics and business cannot be prosecuted despite evidence of corruption against them<sup>145</sup>. Again, recent actions of the government have tended to cast doubt on the operation of its anti-corruption crusade and further created divisions across ethnic and religious cleavages. Some of these actions include discrimination in the choices of those to be arraigned for corruption, inconsistencies in the prosecutions of alleged corrupt senators and rep members of the ruling political party, dropping and closing cases of alleged corrupt ex-governors, senators and others who defect to the ruling political party, nomination and appointment of alleged corrupt ministers to head ministries, ignoring allegations of corruption based on ethnic or religious inclinations, etc. Undoubtedly, this abysmal trend began from President Obasanjo's administration, pervasive in President Jonathan's era and is intensified by the current President Buhari government, implying that the lopsided anti-corruption fight in the country has been persistent over the 19 years of existence of the anti-corruption agencies.

There is no gainsaying that all these unwholesome corrupt practices weaken social values of fairness, equity and common citizenship while breeding feelings of marginalisation and oppression that have fuelled inter-group animosity, suspicion, and intolerance and further polarized the country. Ogundiya (2009) stated that beginning from the fourth republic; the privileged elite has successfully disillusioned the psyche of the masses with the virus of ethnicity to the extent that when corrupt acts are unveiled and the perpetrators are under probe, it is customary in Nigeria to associate such probe with ethnic politics<sup>146</sup>. As witnessed in the country today, some people from the northern part of the country utilize every opportunity to defend corrupt individuals from the north, while some people from the south also act similarly. In most cases, corrupt individuals or their associates mobilize members of their ethnic groups to court to show solidarity during trials; thus, corruption is coated and celebrated by giving it an ethnic and religious identity (Abada and Onyia, 2020)<sup>147</sup>. However, where ethnic, religious and political boundaries coincide, rivalries, agitations and disunity become entrenched.

The foregoing may not be unconnected with the reason behind the emergence of different ethnic and separatist formations spread across the geo-political zones of the country with various agendas. Needless to say that no part of the country is currently immune from one form of agitating group or the other; ranging from the activities of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) in the South, Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the East, the Arewa Youth Consultative Forum (AYCF) and Boko Haram insurgency in the North, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in the West. Added to the civil unrest orchestrated by these formations is the ubiquitous issue of insecurity in the country. According to Efeurhobo and Fredrick (2020)<sup>148</sup>, the security challenges and incessant agitations threatening the peaceful co-existence in the country are partly a result of several years of corruption and marginalization; leading to social inequality and political exclusion, injustice and economic deprivation in the allocation and distribution of state resources. This imbalance has consequently led to agitation across the nation and the call for restructuring, thereby threatening national security and social cohesion.

<sup>144</sup><https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/anti-corruption-war-political-selective-ai-advisor/>

<sup>145</sup><https://www.thecable.ng/selective-prosecution-attack-on-whistleblowers-ti-lists-reasons-nigeria-dropped-on-corruption-index>

<sup>146</sup>Ogundiya I (2009) Political corruption in Nigeria: Theoretical perspectives and some explanations. *Anthropologist* 11(4): 281-292.

<sup>147</sup>Abada, M. I and Onyia F O (2020). Nepotism, Cronyism and Prebendalism: An Exploration of The Mores That Reinforce Corruption in Nigeria's Political System. *Global Journal of Political Science and Administration*. Vol.8, No.3, pp.1-13)

<sup>148</sup>Efeurhobo, D and Fredrick C. (2020). Restructuring and National Security for Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria. *UJAH Vol 21 No.3*

### 2.3.7 Social Cohesion and Polarization

There is no doubt that recent global developments point to the existence of a strong connection between polarization - whether it is ideological, economic or religious - and conflicts. And that polarisation now constitutes one of the key impediments to social and political progress.<sup>149</sup>

Polarization is not about political, social, cultural and religious diversity and pluralism as such. Rather it is about the fragmentation of society into antagonistic collectives perceived as opponents on existential questions over the future of society.<sup>150</sup> The term is therefore used to refer to a society that is 'divided into groups, with substantial intra-group homogeneity and inter-group heterogeneity' in, say, ethno-religious identity, power, income or wealth.<sup>151</sup> Polarization elicits the interest of scholars and policymakers mainly because it is linked to tension, rebellion and revolt in human societies. Karl Marx was perhaps the first social scientist to draw our attention to the idea of polarization as a fact of everyday existence in a capitalist society. Marx's treatise on capitalism and the development of capitalist society alluded to the polarization of the society along two conflict classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. According to Deutsch 'As the struggle proceeds, the whole society breaks up more and more into two hostile camps, two great, direct, antagonistic classes: bourgeoisie and proletariat. The classes *polarize* so that they become internally more homogenous and more and more sharply distinguished from one another in wealth and power'.<sup>152</sup>

The perspective that society is always split into camps and groups in perpetual conflict was further popularised by sociologists such as Simmel and Coser and political scientists like Gurr and Tilly.<sup>153</sup> That society is split into camps and groups (polarization) is not so much the problem. What is the problem is the rates and sources of inequalities existing within and among the contending camps and groups in society. Economists prioritize and concentrate on individual economic wealth, including income and wage distribution, to determine sources, levels and forms of inequality. In doing so, they pay greater attention to individual income distribution or vertical inequality as a basis for measuring inequality.<sup>154</sup> Vertical inequality lines individuals up vertically and measures inequality over the range of individuals rather than groups.<sup>155</sup> Sociologists and political scientists take their engagement with inequality beyond the individual or household. They emphasize inequalities among culturally defined groups, otherwise referred to as horizontal inequalities. Therefore, horizontal inequality defines deprivation and unequal distribution of resources and opportunities along culturally defined group boundaries as important triggers of conflicts, violence and wars.<sup>156</sup>

In the past, large-scale studies involving a large number of respondents seemed to have concluded that inequality does not encourage conflicts and wars.<sup>157</sup> Collier and Hoeffler found no statistically significant effect for inequality and other proxies for grievances. Fearon and Laitin arrived at the same conclusion as Collier and Hoeffler, that is, there appears to be no cross-national relationship between inequality and conflict onset.<sup>158</sup> As Sen and Frances noted, the failure of the studies to establish a positive relationship between inequality and conflict is due mainly to the fact that they have exclusively focused largely on economic inequality, usually measured by income.<sup>159</sup> To fully explore the inequality–conflict nexus, studies must transcend income distribution and begin to examine the multiple dimensions of horizontal inequalities – with political, economic and social elements and indeed vertical inequalities.

<sup>149</sup>Esteban, Joan-Maria & Schneider, Gerald. (2008). Polarization and conflicts: theoretical and empirical issues. *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 45 No 2 pp 141 – 141.

<sup>150</sup>[https://issuu.com/efus/docs/publication\\_bridge\\_en\\_pages/s/13483564](https://issuu.com/efus/docs/publication_bridge_en_pages/s/13483564) (accessed on September 9 2022).

<sup>151</sup>Esteban, Joan-Maria & Ray, Debraj. (1994). On the measurement of polarization. *Econometrica* Vol 62 No 4 pp 567 – 87.

<sup>152</sup>Deutsch, M. (1971). *Conflict and its Resolution* in C. G. Smith (ed.) *Conflict resolution: contributions of the behavioral sciences*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

<sup>153</sup>Simmel, G. (1955). *Conflict*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press; Coser, A. (1956). *The functions of social conflict*. Glencoe IL: The Free Press; Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. New York: Random House; Gurr, T. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Gurr, T. (1980). *A handbook of political conflict: theory and research*. New York: The Free Press;

<sup>154</sup>Russett, B. (1964). Inequality and instability: the relation of land tenure to politics. *World Politics* vol. 16 no. 3 pp 442–454; Sigelman, L & Simpson, M. (1977). A cross-national test of the linkage between economic inequality and political violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 21 No 1 pp 105–128.

<sup>155</sup>Østby, Gudrun. (2013). Inequality and political violence: a review of the literature. *International Area Studies Review*. Vol. 16 No. 2 pp 206–231.

<sup>156</sup>Stewart, F. (2008). *Horizontal inequalities and conflict: understanding group violence in multiethnic societies*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>157</sup>Fearon, James & David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review* Vol. 97 No 1 pp. 75–90; Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers* Vol. 56 No. 4 pp 563–595;

<sup>158</sup>ibid

<sup>159</sup>ibid

The point being made is that polarization has the potential of igniting fresh conflicts and fuelling existing conflicts, particularly when group differences are hemmed and consolidated by horizontal inequalities. Kofi Annan, former United Nations Secretary-General contends that Simple inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent conflict. What is highly explosive is ... horizontal inequality; when power and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways – for instance by race, religion or language. So-called 'ethnic' conflicts occur between groups which are distinct in one or more of these ways when one of them feels it is being discriminated against, or another enjoys privileges which it fears to lose.<sup>160</sup> Kofi Annan's submission corroborates Cohen's earlier position: Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the bizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups because these customs are different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men do, on the other hand, fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political or both.<sup>161</sup>

If social cohesion is conceived as the presence of social bonds, it then follows that a tense relationship must exist between social cohesion and polarization. In other words, the quest for social cohesion must always remain elusive in an atmosphere of polarization. But the interface of social cohesion and polarization does not present a unidimensional outcome.<sup>162</sup> A society might experience certain degrees of polarisation and yet enjoy some forms of social cohesion. For instance, a strongly polarized political landscape might exist within an overall cohesive society and a consensus on the norms and values of the democratic system. Switzerland is made up of three groups with different languages – French, German and Italian – which is reflected in the political and territorial structure. Despite these differences, all groups consider themselves to be equal parts of Swiss society (Social Cohesion). Although recent cases of immigration, especially the presence of Muslim religious symbols in Swiss society, have raised the question of polarization, Swiss multilingualism can be seen as an example of a public policy that accommodates diversity and pluralism and does not breed fragmentation and polarization.<sup>163</sup>

### 2.3.8 Social Cohesion and Peacebuilding

What is now known as peacebuilding is not a new phenomenon. External assistance for post-war rebuilding had clear antecedents in the reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan after World War II. However, the concept of peacebuilding gained popularity only recently, when it appeared in the 1992 UN document *Agenda for Peace*.<sup>164</sup> Before this period peace scholars had begun to think about peacebuilding and peace generally.

Johan Galtung, the renowned peace scholar, identified three approaches to peace; they include peacemaking (conflict resolution approach), peacekeeping (the dissociative approach) and peacebuilding (associative approach).<sup>165</sup> Peacebuilding seeks to identify structures of peace that remove causes of conflicts while offering alternatives to conflicts and wars in situations where they might occur. While peacekeeping and peacemaking are familiar buzzwords within the United Nations (UN) peace and security architecture, the idea of peacebuilding was incorporated into the UN lexicon only recently. In 1992, the UN Secretary Boutros Ghali, in his groundbreaking 'Agenda for Peace' statement defined post-conflict peacebuilding as 'actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse to into conflict'.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>160</sup> Østby, Gudrun. (2013). Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflicts. *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol 45 No 2 p 143.

<sup>161</sup> Stewart, Frances. (2000).

<sup>162</sup> [https://issuu.com/efus/docs/publication\\_bridge\\_en\\_pages/s/13483564](https://issuu.com/efus/docs/publication_bridge_en_pages/s/13483564) (accessed 3 September 2022)

<sup>163</sup> *ibid*

<sup>164</sup> Boutros-Ghani, Boutros. (1992). An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, New York: United Nations.

<sup>165</sup> Cited in Mani, Rama. (2002). *Beyond retribution: seeking justice in the shadows of war*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p 12.

<sup>166</sup> *ibid*

Defined this way, peacebuilding projects two objectives which are distinct yet related and complementary. Peacebuilding strives to achieve negative or positive peace. The former connotes an absence of direct violence such as cessation of hostilities, the latter seeks to remove cultural and structural violence.<sup>167</sup> In essence, negative peace aims at preventing relapse to overt violence whereas positive peace task of peacebuilding promotes national recovery by expediting the removal of the underlying causes of internal wars. To be successful and sustainable peacebuilding must simultaneously ensure the absence of open violent hostilities and deepen and consolidate peace in such a manner that relapse into hostilities will become ever-less probable. If peacebuilding does so consecutively it fails to achieve its objectives. It must do so simultaneously to be able to achieve its objectives.<sup>168</sup>

Lederach defines peacebuilding as 'a comprehensive term that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable peaceful relations and outcomes.'<sup>169</sup> Consequently, Lederach proposes a conceptual framework offering a comprehensive approach to the transformation of conflict that addresses the structural issues, social dynamics of relationship building, and the development of a supportive infrastructure of peace. Similar to Galtung and Boutros Ghali, Lederach stresses the associative, social and cultural aspects of peacebuilding.<sup>170</sup>

Much of the engagement of Boutros-Ghali, Lederach and Galtung with the idea of peacebuilding appears to focus on conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of peacebuilding. Their thoughts seem to be more focused and applied to large-scale intra-state conflicts. The small-scale and more localized conflicts in the countryside, home to 60 – 70 percent of the continent's population,<sup>171</sup> certainly did not fall into the categories of conflicts that preoccupied the thoughts of these leading thinkers of liberal peace. Boutros-Ghali was, indeed, obsessed with the large-scale intra-state wars that plagued several countries in the Global South, including the wars in Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Rwandan genocide, following the termination of the Cold War in the decades of the 90s.

Furthermore, states not only differ in terms of the conflicts they contend with, but they also display certain peculiarities in terms of how they are constituted, their histories and politics. For these reasons the UN General Assembly Resolution passed in 1993 stated that 'each situation in which post-conflict peace-building may be undertaken is unique and therefore should be considered on a case-by-case basis'.<sup>172</sup> Peacebuilding initiatives are often externally-driven and conform to western approaches to conflict management. The task of peacebuilding must therefore take into consideration the differences and peculiarities existing within and among states, particularly their local environments and seek to moderate overbearing external influences.<sup>173</sup>

Attempts to deal with these challenges have led to the identification and mobilization of local peace practices and traditional institutions as critical components of peacebuilding. In this connection, researchers have returned to the past to unearth and study everyday peace practices, local forces and agents of promoting peace between individuals, groups and communities. Other scholars have made a case for hybridization. Roger Mac-Ginty defines hybridization as the composite forms of social thinking and practice that emerge as the result of the interaction of different groups, practices and worldviews.<sup>174</sup> Indeed, peacebuilding has gained global acceptance as a critical tool for building peace, trust and social cohesion among peoples, communities and states of the world. Until recently, the obvious link between peacebuilding and social cohesion has attracted very little research interest. But the growing criticisms of post-conflict peacebuilding – some of which were highlighted above – and state reconstruction have become an important aspect of the peacebuilding toolkit, thus attracting the interest of researchers and policymakers to the social cohesion approach to

<sup>167</sup>Mani, Rama. (2002). *Beyond retribution: seeking justice in the shadows of war*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>168</sup>ibid

<sup>169</sup>Lederach, P. (1998). *Building peace: sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace.

<sup>170</sup>ibid

<sup>171</sup>Boone, Catherine. (2014). *Property and political order in Africa: land rights and the structure of politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>172</sup>Mani,

<sup>173</sup>Onwuzuruigbo Ifeanyi. (2011a). Old wine in new bottle: civil society, *iko mme* and conflict management in Southeastern Nigeria. *African and Asian Studies* Vol. 10 pp 306 – 322.

<sup>174</sup>Mac Ginty, R. (2011). *International peacebuilding and local resistance: hybrid form of forms of peace*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

peacebuilding. From the field of public policy, social cohesion migrated to the study of war and peace. Accordingly, Jane Jenson notes that social cohesion became a keyword in policy discussion because of the need to balance attention to post-conflict economic restructuring with caution about societal cohesion.<sup>175</sup> Social cohesion is therefore relevant to designing 'public policies and institutions that address the causes and effects of poverty, social exclusion, social distrust, and political marginalization that promote the occurrence of conflicts, violence and wars.

For Berger-Schmitt, social cohesion is preoccupied with reducing inequalities and strengthening social relations.<sup>176</sup> The goal of the inequality dimension of social cohesion is to promote equal opportunities, and reduce disparities and divisions in society by reducing, for instance, horizontal inequalities - that is inequalities among a social group – an important driver of conflict.<sup>177</sup> The social capital aspect is about strengthening social relations, interactions and ties. Strong state institutions are required to achieve these noble aspirations of social cohesion. None of the aspirations of social cohesion can be achieved in circumstances where state institutions are weak and non-functional. State institutions are made stronger because the desired development and peacebuilding outcomes can only be attained if state institutions are efficient and effective.<sup>178</sup>

As a result, initial peacebuilding research and initiatives aimed at state-building and reconstruction, power sharing and democratization.<sup>179</sup> Soon after, critics began to berate the initial approaches to peacebuilding. They observed that the initiatives were suffused with a liberal ethos and ignored local peculiarities and differences among states thereby homogenizing the approaches. Under this circumstance, peacebuilding became incapable of yielding the desired goals of building peace and social cohesion.<sup>180</sup> To ramp peacebuilding on the path of realizing peace and social cohesion, critics have recommended the refocusing of peacebuilding approaches towards individuals and groups, culture and substate forms of engagement.<sup>181</sup> It is in this context that social cohesion made its entry into the repertoire of peacebuilding, becoming a critical aspect of the peacebuilding framework.

Despite the appropriateness of the idea of social cohesion to the study of conflicts and wars and the design of peacebuilding mechanisms, social cohesion as peacebuilding is yet to be viewed with the seriousness it deserves. An academic analysis of social cohesion as peacebuilding has been applied generically. It has been deployed more to refer to the goal of rebuilding social trust and less to the range of tools likely to achieve this objective. Put differently, the scholarship on peacebuilding has not given adequate attention to social cohesion policies. The study of social cohesion as a critical tool of peacebuilding must be refocused on agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation and evaluation to connect objectives, policies, programmes and outcomes with the realities of post-conflict societies.<sup>182</sup>

## Leveraging Peacebuilding

Nevertheless, studies of communal violence and conflicts in Nigeria not only seek to dissect the causal factors but also explore peacebuilding mechanisms applied to return belligerent communities on the part of social cohesion.

A study of Aguleri and Umuleri communal conflicts in the Anambra East Local Government Area of Anambra State, South

<sup>175</sup>Jenson, J. (2007). Redesigning citizenship regimes after Neoliberalism. Ideas about social investment. Paper presented at International Sociological Association Annual Conference, Florence. <http://www.cccg.umontreal.ca>, accessed 8 December 2014.

<sup>176</sup>Berger-Schmitt, R. (2002). Considering social cohesion in quality of life assessments: concept and measurement. *Social Indicators Research* Vol. 58 No 3 pp 403–428.

<sup>177</sup>Stewart Frances. (2000). Horizontal inequalities: a neglected dimension of development. Working Paper 1. Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Oxford University. Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal inequalities and conflict: understanding group violence in multiethnic societies. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

<sup>178</sup>Brown Micheal & Zahar Marie-Joëlle. (2015). Social cohesion as peacebuilding in the Central African Republic and beyond. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* Vol.10 No 1 pp 10-24.

<sup>179</sup>Call, T. & Wyeth, V. (2008). Building states to build peace. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Jarstad, K. & Sisk, D. (2008). From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hartzell, A. & Hoddie, M. (2007). Crafting peace: power-sharing institutions and the negotiated settlement of civil wars. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

<sup>180</sup>Campbell, S, Chandler, D and Sabaratnam, M. (2011). A liberal peace: the problem and practices of peacebuilding. London & New York: Zed Books.

<sup>181</sup>ibid

<sup>182</sup>Brown & Zahar (2015)

Eastern Nigeria, found that lingering inequalities between the two communities, rooted in colonial experiences but fueled by the dynamics of contemporary politics, are responsible for the conflicts. During colonial rule, the Aguleri community received the first set of Christian missionaries who established churches and missionary schools in the community. Aguleri took advantage of this opportunity and equipped a good number of Aguleri with western education. Educated Aguleri men joined the colonial civil service and became leaders and prominent members of society. Umuleri had no such opportunities and made very minimal efforts to bridge the growing inequalities between Umuleri and her neighbour Aguleri. These inequalities came to complicate and fuel the land conflicts that ensued between both communities.<sup>183</sup>

None of the conventional (western) approaches applied by colonial and post-colonial governments could resolve the conflicts until the intervention of third parties who adopted local peacebuilding approaches to the conflicts. Relying on *Iko Mmee*, a tool of peace-building, the third parties (consisting of selected community leaders of Aguleri and Umuleri and chiefs of neighbouring communities) were able to halt the hostilities and bring the communities to the negotiating table. A Peace Committee was set to ensure that the outcomes of the negotiations were never violated but implemented to the latter. The committee also organized traditional festivals and ceremonies in which members of the Aguleri and Umuleri communities actively participated. Such meetings served to restore trust, social harmony and cohesion between the warring communities.<sup>184</sup>

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<sup>183</sup>Onwuzuruigbo, I. (2011b). Horizontal inequalities and communal conflicts: the case of Aguleri and Umuleri communities of Southeastern Nigeria. *Africa* Vol. 81 No 4 pp 567 - 87.

<sup>184</sup>Onwuzuruigbo (2011a)



Photo Credit: @Legit.ng

### 3.0 KEY OBJECTIVE

Nigeria is facing multiple and critical security challenges of corruption, inequality, insecurity, etc. in the country. The cases of farmer-herders clashes, marginalisation in the Southern region, banditry and Boko Haram in the Northern region cuts across the social, political, religious and ethnic divisions in the society and cannot be overlooked considering its far-reaching implicating effect on trust and disunity such as the call for secession among the Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups.

In addition, this study has become increasingly necessary especially now as we go into the 2023 general elections and given the oft none-issue based campaigns but such as are hinged on ethnoreligious sentiments that further divide for the benefit of the politicians and to the detriment of the country. Superficial fence-mending reconciliation is usually not enough to soothe nor mend the divide already created when flippant conversations pervade the landscape.

These issues cannot, therefore, be overlooked considering that discord/disunity may stall the attainment of developmental goals. The desire of the citizens to collectively work for the national good of Nigeria is thus dependent on the level of national unity.

It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to shed light on the current socio-economic and political dynamics in the country; and help shape policy that will promote social cohesiveness in Nigeria. In specific, it aims to:

- 01** To develop a nationally representative measurement for Social Cohesion in Nigeria;
- 02** To examine the state of Social Cohesion in Nigeria, in the light of recent happenings within the polity;
- 03** To conduct a Citizens Perception Survey in order to measure the concept of Social Cohesion through the lens of 13 Key Indicators, namely: Identity, Trust, Social Justice, Participation and Patriotism, Worth, Future, Gender Equity, Natural Resources Governance, Impunity, Corruption, Peacebuilding, Polarization and Coping Strategy;
- 04** To proffer recommendations to various stakeholders on how to strengthen the state of social cohesion in the country.





Photo Credit: @Nairaland Forum

## 4.0 | METHODOLOGY

For the 2022 Edition, the study applied a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods, with Citizens Perception Survey (CPS) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) adopted for primary data collection, respectively. The Survey Questionnaire and Interview Guide were designed by the research team and a methodology workshop was organized on 16<sup>th</sup> March 2022 in Abuja, after which a pilot survey was conducted to pre-test the survey tools. For the data collection all interviews were administered between 1<sup>st</sup> May and 30<sup>th</sup> June 2022, via face-to-face Household survey, using the Stratified Random Sampling Technique.

The interviews were conducted in five major Nigerian languages: English, Pidgin English, Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo. All 36 states and 109 Senatorial Districts in Nigeria were proportionately represented in the survey. The average time per interview was 25 minutes. All respondents were 18 years and above. Geographic quotas were assigned during the survey, which ensured that all senatorial district and state were proportionately represented in the sample. A total of 6 Local Government Areas (LGAs) were visited in each of the 36 states (2 LGAs per Senatorial District), except in the FCT where enumerators visited all Six Area Councils. A total of 7,245 respondents were contacted to participate in the survey across the country, with 5,178 interviews completed, representing a response rate of 71.5%.


Post-stratification gender and senatorial weights were applied to the data to enable representativeness to the national population, more accurate population estimates and reduce non-response bias. The weights assigned were in proportion to the 2006 population figures. The margin of error does not exceed plus or minus 3 percent at the mid-range with a confidence level of 95 percent. To further ensure that the sets of variables used for the index are reliable, a Reliability Test was conducted. The Cronbach's Alpha value was used to assess the reliability or interval consistency of the scale or test items that compose the index. In the analysis of the NSC Index and the key questions, results were compared between 2021 and 2022 to access possible changes that have occurred over time in the perceptions of Nigerians towards the focus assessment questions.

#### 4.1 Nigeria Social Cohesion Index

The computation for the Nigeria Social Cohesion (NSC) Index for 2022 was derived using 13 key indicators which include: identity, trust, social justice, participation & patriotism, natural resource governance, gender equity, impunity, corruption, polarization, peacebuilding, coping strategy, self-worth and future expectation. The result shows that the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index for 2022 is 39.6%. This score is below the 50% average, signifying that Nigeria is not socially cohesive. In addition, the result shows a 4.6% reduction when compared with the data from 2021 (44.2%).

The revelation that Nigeria is not socially cohesive may be connected to heightened insecurity crippling all regions of the country; and increasing polarization along ethnic, social, political, economic, and religious lines. In fact from the findings, the fault lines are getting deeper and widening, thereby further threatening the social fabric, unity and peaceful co-existence of the country.

**NSC Index 2022** is derived from the proportion of respondents that perceived 'average' and 'high' social cohesion in Nigeria, averaged over 13 indicators namely: Identity, Trust, Social Justice, Participation and Patriotism, Gender Equity, Natural Resource Governance, Impunity, Corruption, Polarization, Peacebuilding, Coping Strategy, Self-Worth and Future Expectation.



### Definition of Sub-Indices

	<b>IDENTITY</b> Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians.		<b>CORRUPTION</b> Perceived general level of reduced corruption in Nigeria, fight against corruption and reduce corrupt practices in access to Justice.
	<b>TRUST</b> Level of trust of Nigerians in the Government and Other Institutions.		<b>PEACEBUILDING</b> Resolving Nigeria's conflicts through peacebuilding efforts, FG deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts and rating of the FG in the area of peacebuilding.
	<b>SOCIAL JUSTICE</b> Feelings of 'equal protection of the nation's law on everyone' and 'access of all to civil justice'.		<b>POLARIZATION</b> Current level of general polarization (division), based on ethnicity, religion, and politics compared to the period before the current administration
	<b>PARTICIPATION AND PATRIOTISM</b> Cooperation with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria, and marriage between two different ethnic/religious groups.		<b>COPING STRATEGY</b> Government effort towards assisting Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges
	<b>NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE</b> Management of the funds/resources from the country's natural resources, such as crude oil etc.		<b>SELF-WORTH</b> Willingness NOT to relocate with family out of Nigeria if given the opportunity.
	<b>GENDER EQUITY</b> Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and participation of women in political activities.		<b>FUTURE EXPECTATION</b> Feelings about the future of being better.
	<b>IMPUNITY</b> Reduced human rights abuses, reported cases of human rights abuses, and reduced involvement of state agents such as the police and army in human rights abuses.		

Overall, with regards to the sub-indices of social cohesion, the result revealed that most Nigerians (92%) indicated a somewhat high level of participation and patriotism in the country, 84% expressed willingness to participate in the peacebuilding process, 69% are optimistic on the country's future and another 69% believed that there is average gender equity.




Figure 4: NSC Sub-indices, 2021 - 2022

**\*Index values** (presented in 1 decimal point) were the proportion of Nigerians that perceived an 'average' and 'high' positive direction in each of the indicators.

**CAV = Cronbach's Alpha Value.** This is a measure used to assess the reliability or internal consistency, of a set of scale or test items. Values less than 0.5 are usually not acceptable.

**NA = Not Available**

### 1. Identity Sub-Index (Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians)

Recent developments that pose an existential threat to the sovereignty of the Nigerian state tend to suggest that the Nigerian project may, after all, be a mirage, an elusive one. As such, many Nigerians are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the Nigerian dream of becoming a strong and virile nation. For this reason, the study focused on the 'Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians'. While 43% of respondents indicated positive recognition of their Nigerian identity and the unity of Nigerians, 57% thought otherwise. They showed negative recognition of their Nigerian identity and the unity of Nigerians.

When compared with the 2021 figures, respondents indicating 'Negative Identity' (53%) increased by 4% in 2022 (57%). The 47% of respondents who indicated 'Positive Identity' in 2021 decreased by 4% in 2022 (43%). The data showed an increase (4%) in the number of respondents who indicated negative recognition of their Nigerian identity and the unity of Nigerians.

**1. 'IDENTITY' SUB-INDEX**  
*(Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians)*




Figure 5: Identity Sub-Index

The Identity Sub-Index data was further disaggregated according to the feelings Nigerians have about their country. Data revealed that 43% of Nigerians feel truly proud of their country, but 57% feel disappointed in Nigeria. 13% feel Nigerians are much more united than they were 4 years ago whereas a vast majority of Nigerians (87%) think that the country is much more divided than it was in 2019.

A comparative analysis of the Identity Sub-Index data of 2021 and 2022 showed a decrease of 3% respectively in respondents' feelings of pride (46% in 2021, 43% in 2022) and unity of Nigeria (16% in 2021, 13% in 2022). Similarly, there is respectively another 3% increase in the feelings of disappointment (54% in 2021, 57% in 2022) and division among Nigerians (84% in 2021 and 87% in 2022). Nigerians feel more divided and less united in 2022 than they were 4 years ago. Accordingly, their sense of national pride is decreasing as feelings of disappointment in the country increase. This calls for concern for social cohesion in the country.

**1. 'IDENTITY' SUB-INDEX**  
*(Recognition of being a Nigerian and Unity of Nigerians)*




Figure 6: Questions that constitute the Identity Sub-Index

## 2. Trust' Sub-Index (Level of trust Nigerians have in the Government and Other Institutions)

Trust and good governance are mutually beneficial. This is because trust is required to achieve good governance in the same way good governance thrives on trust. An overwhelming proportion of respondents (78%) have little (47%) or no trust (31%) in the government and its institutions of governance. Only a few (22%) have some trust (20%) and a lot of trust (2%) in the government and institutions of governance. In 2021, 70% indicated little (48%) or no trust (22%) while a total of 30% had some trust (27%) and a lot of trust (3%) in the government. This shows a progressive increase in the level of citizens' distrust of the government and its institutions.




Figure 7: Trust Sub-Index

Further probe involved unbundling the Trust data. Respondents were required to rate the level of their trust (on a scale of 1-4, a lot of trust, some trust, little trust and no trust) in the government, leaders and other institutions.




Figure 8: Questions that constitute the Trust Sub-Index

84% have little (27%) or no trust (57%) in the National Assembly, little (20%) or no trust (63%) in the government of Buhari (83%), little (29%) or no trust (52%) in Local Government Chairman (81%), little (28%) or no trust (50%) in State Governments (78%) and other institutions of government like the Judiciary (78%), Nigeria Police (80%), Nigerian Army (64%), Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) (76%) and people of other ethnic groups. In addition, Traditional

Rulers recorded 57%, News Media (Radio, Television and Newspapers) scored 58% and Religious leaders 50%. 61% have little or no trust in people of other ethnic groups different from theirs. Citizens indicated a lot of trust and some trust in their religious leaders (50%), traditional rulers (43%) and News Media (42%) more than Buhari's government (17%), National Assembly (16%), Police (20%), Army (36%), EFCC (24%), Judiciary (22%), State Governments (22%) and Local Government Chairmen (19%). It is worth noting that one-half of the respondents have little or no trust in religious leaders (50%) and the other half have lots of trust and some trust in them (50%). One important revelation from the data is the absolute lack of trust in the government of President Buhari. Citizens appear to trust traditional rulers and religious leaders a lot more than the government. All of these point to the need for government to rebuild its relationship with citizens based on trust even as it strengthens religious and traditional institutions of governance and as critical stakeholders and mediators in the process of governance.

### 3. Social Justice Sub-Index (Feelings of 'equal protection of the nation's law on everyone' and 'access of all to civil justice')

Justice promotes equity and fairness in the distribution and access to political and socio-economic resources. The data on social justice shows that the majority of the respondents (62%) believe that there is a very low level of social justice in the country. 38% think that the level of social justice is high. In 2021, 66% assessed the level of social justice to be low whereas the remaining 34% indicated that it was high. Between 2021 and 2022, the feeling of high social justice improved by 4% (from 34% to 38%). The feeling of low social justice decreased by 4% (from 66% to 62%).

### 3. 'SOCIAL JUSTICE' SUB-INDEX

*(Feelings of 'equal protection of the nation's law on everyone' and 'access of all to civil justice')*




Figure 9: Social Justice Sub-Index

The Social Justice Sub-Index data shows that 72% of the respondents believe that there are persons above the law and 28% think that the law relates to individual Nigerians based on equality. While 71% indicate that only the rich and powerful can access justice, 29% believe all citizens can access justice when they so desire.

The data for 2021 shows that 75% of respondents feel that there are persons above the law, 25% believe that the law guarantee equal protection for all, 72% think that only the rich and powerful can access justice and 28% believes that all citizens can access civil justice when they do. These responses point to the weakness of the dominant justice delivery institutions and the challenges of securing justice in Nigeria. No wonder Nigerians are increasingly resorting to 'self-help' and 'jungle justice' as a means of settling a dispute and securing 'justice'.

### 3. 'SOCIAL JUSTICE' SUB-INDEX

(Feelings of 'equal protection of the nation's law on everyone' and 'access of all to civil justice')




Figure 10: Questions that constitute the Social Justice Sub-Index

### 4. Participation & Patriotism Sub-Index (Cooperation with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria, and marriage between two different ethnic/religious groups)

Levels of patriotism and citizens' participation tend to reinforce one another. As such, levels of political participation can be used to ascertain and even make projections about citizens' levels of patriotism. The data for the 'Participation and Patriotism Sub-Index' for 2022 shows that 92% of the respondents expressed a very high level of patriotism and participation. A paltry percentage of the respondents (8%) expressed a low level of participation. In 2021, 20% and 80% indicated low and high levels of participation and patriotism respectively. This shows an increasingly high level of patriotism and participation among citizens.

### 4. 'PARTICIPATION & PATRIOTISM' SUB-INDEX

(Cooperation with other ethnic group to work for a more united Nigeria, and marriage between two different ethnic / religious group / zones)




Figure 11: Participation & Patriotism Sub-Index



If the level of participation and patriotism is increasingly high, it is important to assess the willingness of individual Nigerians to be involved in inter-ethnic marriages and cooperate along ethnic lines to achieve the task of building a united Nigeria. 80% of the respondents are somewhat/extremely willing to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria while only 20% are somewhat/extremely unwilling to cooperate with other ethnic groups. Furthermore, 88% will support inter-ethnic marriages; 82% support marriage between two people from different geopolitical zones, for example, Southeast and Northeast, and 58% support marriage between two persons from different religions, for example, Islam and Christianity. 12% do not support inter-ethnic marriage and 42% do not support interfaith marriage. Only 18% do not support marriage between two people from different geopolitical zones. The 2021 data shows that 25% of respondents are somewhat/extremely unwilling to cooperate with other ethnic groups. 75% are somewhat/extremely willing to cooperate with other ethnic groups to work for a more united Nigeria. In the same vein, 86% against 14% support marriage between two people of different ethnic groups while 54% against 46% support marriage between two people from different religions, for example, Christianity and Islam. 82% approve of marriages across geopolitical zone such as someone from the Northeast marrying another person from the Northeast.

#### 4. 'PARTICIPATION & PATRIOTISM' SUB-INDEX

(Cooperation with other ethnic group to work for a more united Nigeria, and marriage between two different ethnic / religious group / zones)




Figure 12: Questions that constitute Participation and Patriotism Sub-Index

#### 5. Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index (Management of the funds/resources from the country's natural resources, such as crude oil etc.)

Although natural resources are important drivers of development, they are also potential promoters of conflicts which tend to stifle social cohesion and national development in several countries of the developing world. Governance of natural resources, to a large extent, determines a country's level of development and social cohesion. Respondents were requested to state their opinion about the governance of natural resources in Nigeria. Survey findings show that 54% assessed resource governance as poor, 43% assessed it as average and a meagre 3% thought it was good. The 2021 data shows that the situation has not changed much, 4% indicated good governance, 50% 'average' governance and 46% poor governance. There is a need to improve the governance of natural resources in a way that ensures equity and justice on the part of the government on the one and the natural resource-bearing communities on the other hand.

### 5. 'NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE' SUB-INDEX

(Management of the funds/resources from the country's natural resources, such as crude oil etc., and government response to oil spillage)




Figure 13: Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index

The study, in addition, focused on the government's management of funds derived from the country's natural resources. 65% think the funds are poorly managed, 25% feel just ok and 10% think the funds are well managed. An assessment of the response of the Federal Government to oil spillage showed that 53% think that the government's response is very poor and 34% think it is fair. Only 13% rate the response of the government to oil spillage as very good. One of the cardinal demands of proponents of Restructuring is the return of ownership and control of natural resources to states and communities where the resources are domiciled. 62% of the respondent do not at all trust the current Federal Government to transfer ownership of natural resources to states where they are domiciled. 34% have little trust in the present government while just 4% showed a lot of trust in the current government.

### 5. 'NATURAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE' SUB-INDEX

(Management of the funds/resources from the country's natural resources, such as crude oil etc., and government response to oil spillage)




Figure 14: Questions that constitute Natural Resource Governance Sub-Index

**6. Gender Equity Sub-Index (Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and Participation of women in political activities)**

In traditional African societies, the female gender made immense but outstanding contributions to building a peaceful society. There is, however, little or no appreciation of these sterling contributions, thus leading to the neglect of the female gender in the burgeoning discourse on the nexus of gender and development. In recent times there have been calls to incorporate gender equity in crafting and implementing policies targeting social cohesion and nation-building. An aspect of the study which investigated government efforts towards promoting gender equity and participation of women in politics unveiled the following: 15% of the study population indicated high gender equity, average gender equity (54%), low gender equity (27%) and no gender equity (4%). When these results are compared with 2021 data, the majority of the respondents indicated 'average gender equity' (59% in 2021 and 54% in 2022) for the two years. However, they also indicated 'high gender equity' (9% in 2021 and 15% in 2022), an increase of 6%. This shows that the government is beginning to make increasing efforts toward promoting gender equity and participation of women in political activities.

**6. 'GENDER EQUITY' SUB-INDEX**

(Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and Participation of women in political activities)




Figure 15: Gender Equity Sub-Index

Rating the effort of the Federal government towards promoting gender equity, 33% rated it poor, 21% very poor, 31% fair, 13% good and 2% very good. In terms of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence, 30% rated the current administration as poor, another 30% assessed government's efforts as fair, 24% think government performance is very poor, 14% and 2% indicate good and very good. Respondents rated the efforts made by the current administration to appoint women to political offices. On the one hand, 15% and 2% rated the effort of the government to be good and very good respectively. On the other hand, 32% and 31% assessed such efforts to be fair and poor. 24% rated the effort to be poor. Furthermore, the efforts of the present government to punish sexual and gender-based violence were rated. 30% describe it as fair, 29% as poor, 22% as very poor, 16% as good and 3% as very good.

### 6. 'GENDER EQUITY' SUB-INDEX

(Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and Participation of women in political activities)





Figure 16: Questions that constitute Gender Equity Sub-Index

Women's participation in politics is a strong variable for measuring the deepening and expansion of the demographic space in a polity. In this connection, an average of 48% of the respondents believe that women always participate in political rallies, contest and vote during elections, and hold political party leadership positions and political appointments in the government. Only a meagre average of 12% of the respondents reported that women never participate in political rallies, contest and vote during elections, or hold political party leadership positions and political appointments in the government.

### 6. 'GENDER EQUITY' SUB-INDEX

(Government efforts towards promoting gender equity and Participation of women in political activities)

#### Survey Questions that Constitutes the Index 2022 (Cont'd)



Perceived expected frequency of women participation in:

Figure 17: Questions that constitute Gender Equity Sub-Index (Cont'd)

**7. Impunity Sub-Index (Level of the seriousness of human rights abuses, unreported cases of human rights abuses, and involvement of state agents such as the police and army in human rights abuses)**

Impunity or lawlessness has become a recurring problem in everyday interaction in Nigeria. Not only the ruled but also rulers violate the rules they make. It is therefore pertinent that citizens assess the level of impunity in the country. Data shows that there is an average level of impunity in the country. In specific terms, 64% of respondents believe that there is an average level of impunity. 20% and 16% indicate low and high levels of impunity respectively. In the 2021 figures, only 1% thought the country had 'no impunity', 21% recorded low impunity, 63% indicated an average level of impunity and 15% indicated a high level of impunity. Even though most respondents rated the level of impunity as average (in 2021 and 2022), there is evidence that high impunity is increasing (15 % in 2021 and 16 % in 2022). After all, the culture of impunity has become so pervasive in Nigeria that most citizens now tend to see it as a norm.

**7. 'IMPUNITY' SUB-INDEX**

*(Level of seriousness of human right abuses, unreported cases of human right abuses, and involvement of state agents such as the police and army in human rights abuses)*




Figure 18: Impunity Sub-Index

To further interrogate the findings on the level of impunity, respondents were asked questions bordering on human rights violations in Nigeria. Over half of the respondents (60%) perceive human rights violations as a serious problem in Nigeria. For 10% of respondents, it is not a problem at all (1%) or a minor problem (9%). Regarding the level of unreported cases of human rights abuses, a greater portion of the population (44%) believe that unreported cases of human rights are high, 22% think it is extremely high and 10% record a low level of unreported cases. The extent to which state agents (police and military) perpetrate human rights abuses was also noted. Most of the respondents (49%) believe that the police and military men and women sometimes perpetrate human rights abuses, 16% think that state agents always do so while the opinion of 4% of the respondent is that state agents never perpetrate human rights abuses. On the whole, human rights abuse is not only a serious problem but complicated by the fact that sometimes state agents are involved in it which then makes it difficult to report the very huge number of human rights abuses in Nigeria.

### 7. 'IMPUNITY' SUB-INDEX

(Level of seriousness of human right abuses, unreported cases of human right abuses, and involvement of state agents such as the police and army in human rights abuses)




Figure 19: Questions that constitute Impunity Sub-Index

### 8. Corruption Sub-Index (Perceived general level of corruption in Nigeria, Fight against corruption, and corrupt practices in access to Justice)

Nigeria is known globally for its high levels of corruption. Several commentators have dismissed Nigeria as fantastically corrupt. The consequences of corruption are innumerable. In any case, corruption stifles development and promotes poverty and lack among citizens. The data below captures respondents' opinions on corruption in Nigeria. There is a consensus among respondents that the level of corruption is high. In 2021, 50% of respondents noted that corruption was high. In 2022, a greater proportion (62%) feels that corruption is still high. 5% (in 2021) and 2% (in 2022) posted low levels of corruption.

### 8. 'CORRUPTION' SUB-INDEX

(Perceived general level of corruption in Nigeria, Fight against corruption, and corrupt practices in access to Justice)




Figure 20: Corruption Sub-Index

In addition, a huge proportion of respondents (75%) feel that corruption has increased in the past year. Only 4% think otherwise, that is, corruption has decreased in the past year. 76% of respondents rate the anti-corruption initiatives of the present government as not only poor but also very poor. Very few (6%) think that the initiatives are good or very good. When respondents' opinion was sought on the frequency of securing justice without being corrupt, the following findings were recorded: 51% feel that this happens sometimes, 36% think it never happens and the remaining 13% note that it often or always. The concerns expressed by the majority of the respondents that the frequency of accessing justice without being corrupt never occurs or happens sparingly should be taken seriously because access to justice is critical to restoring citizens' confidence in the government and achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

### 8. 'CORRUPTION' SUB-INDEX

*(Perceived general level of corruption in Nigeria, Fight against corruption, and corrupt practices in access to Justice)*




Figure 21: Questions that constitute Corruption Sub-Index

### 9. Peacebuilding Sub-Index *(Resolving Nigeria's conflicts through peacebuilding efforts, FG deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts and rating of the FG in the area of peacebuilding)*

The threats to peace and security in Nigeria are not just enormous but a lot more complicated than they have been in the past. Efforts to return Nigeria on the path of peace and social harmony must transcend conflict management and include peacebuilding processes. To what extent is the government committed to the deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts among its belligerent groups? Given the current high levels of insecurity and conflicts in different parts of the country, the government needs to do more. This is reflected in respondents' assessment of the peace-building efforts of the government. 16% and 19% rate the government's deployment of peacebuilding efforts as low and high respectively. But 65% think that they are average.

### 9. 'PEACEBUILDING' SUB-INDEX

*(Resolving Nigeria's conflicts through peacebuilding efforts, FG deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts and rating of the FG in the area of peacebuilding)*




Figure 22: Peacebuilding Sub-Index

Findings from the field also indicated that the government needs to improve on peacebuilding, according to some of the respondents they opined:



*“We must be a symbol of peace as a nation. Religion tells us to be peaceful. For example, Islam is based on peace. We should know that we have to live peacefully with one another when we understand peace from that angle. We must live peacefully with one another because without peace, there will be no progress and development. The government must create a level playing ground for every one of us. Like I said, when there is justice, equity and fair play, there will be peace. Peace cannot be bought from the market” (A Traditional Leader, Edo State)*

*“Talking about the peace-building process in Nigeria, I will say that every Nigerian should first of all have the country at heart. One should have it in the heart that he or she is a Nigerian and will be here for Nigeria and do whatever he or she is doing for Nigeria. So, if one can give themselves to serve the country, another person's life would be affected positively. By so doing, people will feel like equals. And we should love the country and that love can be extended” (A Religious Leader, Adamawa State)*

*“Government's efforts in this peace-building process are very poor, to be honest with you. But except for my state. The reason why I exempted my state is simply that in my state at least you could see physically or hear that there is a peace commission in Kaduna state that has been charged with the responsibility of ensuring that they do maintain or contain peace within the state. And to be fair and honest to the peace commission and the state government generally, since the inception of the peace commission, there has been a drastic reduction in terms of ethnic crises throughout the state. Except for conflicts that are criminality driven such as banditry, cattle rustling, kidnapping, etc. Those are conflict driven by criminal motivation or criminal incitement” (A Traditional Leader, Kaduna State)*

More details from the data show that 58% of respondents agree and strongly too that Nigeria's recurring conflicts can be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts, 22% holds opposing opinion and the remaining 20% neither agrees nor disagrees with the claim that Nigeria's recurring conflicts can be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts. In this regard, 53% of respondents feel that government should often and always deploy peacebuilding approaches to deal with conflicts while 14% are opposed to the idea. For 53% of respondents, the government can sometimes use peacebuilding instruments and processes to mitigate conflicts. 52% rate the government's peacebuilding efforts as very poor, 14% say they are good, indeed very good and 34% rate the efforts as fair. All of these point to the need for government to energize its peacebuilding approaches and increasingly depend on them to resolve the many conflicts ravaging Nigeria.

### 9. 'PEACEBUILDING' SUB-INDEX

*(Resolving Nigeria's conflicts through peacebuilding efforts, FG deployment of peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts and rating of the FG in the area of peacebuilding)*




Figure 23: Questions that constitute Peacebuilding Sub-Index



**10. Polarization Sub-Index (Current level of general polarization (division), based on ethnicity, religion, and politics compared to the period before the current administration)**

Polarisation or diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion and politics should not be seen as an impediment or weakness. If anything, it should be perceived as a source of strength. After all, there is strength in diversity. The challenge, however, has always been how to reduce the level of polarization and then utilise it as a tool for building a strong and virile Nigerian nation. As can be seen from the data, there is a consensus among respondents that the level of polarization is high. The majority of the respondents (57%) indicate a high level of polarization in Nigeria. 30% and 13% reported low and average levels of division along ethnic and religious lines. From the findings, it is obvious that government needs to make concerted efforts towards reducing the level of polarization. While acknowledging existing ethnic and religious differences, government policies and legislation must be geared towards harnessing those differences to achieve national unity.

**10. 'POLARIZATION' SUB-INDEX**




Figure 24: Polarization Sub-Index

**11. Coping Strategy Sub-Index (Government effort towards assisting Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges)**

One of the primary functions of any government is to provide social goods and ensure the welfare of citizens. Even in times of economic depression, poverty and lack, the government is under a legal obligation to at least assist citizens to cushion the undesirable consequences of economic depression. Revelations of the 2022 study indicate that the government has made little effort to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges. 69% of respondents assessed the government low in providing citizens with coping strategies, 14% rated the government high and 17% think government performance in this area is average.

**11. 'COPING STRATEGY' SUB-INDEX**

*(Government effort towards assisting Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges)*




Figure 25: Coping Strategy Sub-Index

When asked about coping strategies among Nigerians to address economic hardship, the following comments were shared by the respondents:



*“They are just managing. Life has been challenging for people that have been displaced by insecurities. They are managing primary schools and other people’s houses. For example, some people would have up to 20 other people in their houses. There will be inconveniences. There will be a shortage of food and other amenities” (A Traditional Leader, Zamfara State)*

*“What we are trying to do is have food security. Inflation has made it so terrible that the money people have at hand is almost worthless. For the rest of them here in my community, we encourage people to get away from subsistence farming to commercial farming such that they will be able to cater for themselves and their families and have some to sell. What inflation has done is terrible” (A Traditional Leader, Anambra State)*

*“Well, if you ask me about coping strategy, do we really have a strategy? Okay! One of the coping strategies is that Nigerians have learnt to humble themselves and take anything available so that life will continue. Two years ago, when people faced a lot of crises, they did not farm and something happened. The land produced a lot of potatoes that year. Many Nigerians that did not eat potatoes learnt to start eating potatoes” (A Religious Leader, Kaduna State)*

**12. Self-Worth Sub-Index (Willingness NOT to relocate with family out of Nigeria if given the opportunity)**

It would appear that the general impression of Nigerians, especially the youth, is that Nigeria can no longer be the place to achieve their loft dreams and ambitions. This thinking has triggered Nigerians' massive interest in relocating to foreign lands. Hence the Self-Worth Sub-Index sought to measure citizens' perception of the willingness to migrate to foreign countries. 73% of respondents declared low self-worth while 27% declared high self-worth. In 2021 the same percentage of respondents (73%) indicated low self-worth and high self-worth (27%). This finding is quite surprising because levels of insecurity, unemployment, poverty and general hardship, acting as push factors, remain on the increase in Nigeria. Ordinarily, one would have expected an increase in the proportion of respondents who expressed higher levels of feeling low self-worth in 2022.

**12. ‘WORTH’ SUB-INDEX**

*(Willingness NOT to relocate with family out of Nigeria if given the opportunity)*




Figure 26: Self-Worth Sub-Index

### 13. Future Expectation Sub-Index (*Feelings about the future of being better*)

More investigations sought to gauge the feeling of a better future among Nigerians. 69% feel that the future is bright for Nigeria. 31% have a feeling of a bleak future. When juxtaposed with the 2021 study, 68% and 32% had feelings of bright and bleak futures respectively. Feelings are different from realities, even though they may sometimes be based on existing realities. Despite the expression of high hopes, Nigerian leaders must fashion out policies that will practically restore citizens' hope in Nigeria and effectively address the numerous political and socio-economic challenges that tend to push Nigerians away from Nigeria.




Figure 27: Future Sub-Index

## 4.2 Summary of Demographic Distribution



### Gender

A little over 51% of the respondents are male while 49% are female.



### Marital Status

35% of respondents are single, 61% are married, 3% are widowed and 1% are divorced or separated.



### Religious Affiliation

57% indicated that they are Christians, 42% are Muslim and less than 1% are devotees of traditional and other religions.



### Ethnicity

30% of respondents are Hausas, 22% and 18% are Yorubas and Igbos respectively. 31% represent other ethnic groups.



### Age Category

The Age Categories of the respondents include 18 – 35 years (54%), 36 – 60 years (42%), and 61 and above years (5%)



### Education

The distribution of respondents according to their level of educational attainment are as follows: No formal education (7%), Informal education (7%), completed primary school (13%), completed secondary school (45%), and completed tertiary education and above (29%).

**Occupation**

Most of the respondents are self-employed traders (23%), businessmen and women (22%), farmers and agriculturalists (14%), unemployed youths and adults (9%), students (8%), artisans (7%), government workers and civil servants (7%), professional worker (6%), members of the National Youth Service Corps (1%), religious leaders and missionaries (1%) and others (3%).

**Location**

52% of respondents reside in urban and 48% lives in rural areas.

**Geopolitical Zones**

Respondents distribution by geopolitical zones is as follows: 15% of respondents were drawn from the Northcentral geopolitical zone, the Northeast zone accounts for 14% of respondents, Northwest 26%, Southeast 12%, Southsouth 15% and Southwest 20%.

Table 1: Socio-Demographic Information

Variables		Number of Respondents	Percentage (%)
		5,178	100
		N	%
Gender	Male	2,631	50.8%
	Female	2,547	49.2%
Marital Status	Single	1,808	34.9%
	Married	3,167	61.2%
	Widowed	134	2.6%
	Divorced/Separated	69	1.3%
Religion	Christian	2,968	57.3%
	Muslim	2,166	41.8%
	Traditional/others	44	0.9%
Ethnic group	Yoruba	1,116	21.6%
	Hausa	1,572	30.4%
	Igbo	912	17.6%
	Others	1,578	30.5%
Age Category	18-35 years	2,769	53.5%
	36-60 years	2,151	41.5%
	61 and above	259	5.0%
Highest Education Attainment	No formal Education	363	7.0%
	Informal Education	349	6.7%
	Completed Primary School	685	13.2%
	Completed Secondary School	2,302	44.5%
	Completed Tertiary and above	1,479	28.6%



Occupation	Self-Employed Trader	1,192	23.0%
	Business Man / Woman	1,142	22.1%
	Farmer / Agric. Worker	735	14.2%
	Unemployed Youth / Adult	443	8.6%
	Student	405	7.8%
	Artisan	370	7.2%
	Govt. Worker / Civil Servant	368	7.1%
	Professional Worker	329	6.3%
	Youth Corper	38	0.7%
	Religious Leader / Missionary	26	0.5%
Average monthly income (in Naira)	Others	131	2.5%
	Less than N50,000	2,404	46.4%
	N50,001 – N100,000	1,506	29.1%
	N100,001 – N200,000	431	8.3%
	N200,001 – N300,000	108	2.1%
	N300,001 – N400,000	28	0.5%
	N400,001 – N500,000	6	0.1%
	Above N500,000	2	0.0%
Urbanization	Don't Know / Refused	694	13.4%
	Urban	2,704	52.2%
Geo-political Zone	Rural	2,474	47.8%
	North Central	751	14.5%
	North East	700	13.5%
	North West	1,324	25.6%
	South East	605	11.7%
	South South	776	15.0%
	South West	1,022	19.7%



Photo Credit: @Nairaland Forum



Photo Credit: Mayor Uto

## 5.0 SURVEY RESULTS


### 5.1 Assessment of Identity as a Component of Social Cohesion

The survey assessed the concept of 'Identity' as a component of social cohesion to gauge the extent to which Nigerians express feelings of attachment to their nation and the various ethnic groups to which they belong.

#### 5.1.1 Feelings of Nigerians about the Nation

Respondents were asked to identify statements that best capture their feelings about their country. Half of the respondents (50%) feel disappointed in Nigeria, 38% feel truly proud of Nigeria, 10% feel indifferent about their country and very few (2%) are not sure about their feelings. While comparing the findings with 2019 and 2021 data, we observed an upward of 20% and 1% in the feeling of disappointment in Nigeria, respectively. The trend analysis also reveals a 17% decline in participant pride for Nigeria between the 2019 data (55%) and the 2022 data (38%). This finding implies that the sense of pride in the country is increasingly declining among Nigerians.

**When you think about your country Nigeria, which of these statements best expresses your feelings?**



*Figure 28: How Nigerians Feel about the Nation*

The opinion of respondents was disaggregated into some socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age and geopolitical zones. The key findings revealed that respondents residing in the Southern zone feel more disappointed in Nigeria than those residing in the Northern zone. In particular, the South-South respondents (62%) followed by the South East (60%) and South West (58%) are more disappointed in Nigeria than the North West (35%) and North East (46%) respondents. The high levels of disappointment expressed by the South-South and South East respondents are attributable to political neglect and marginalisation in both zones to date. Despite the high level of insecurity and terrorism particularly ravaging the Northern zones, the North West (53%) and the North East (48%) respondents expressed the most pride for Nigeria compared to the respondents residing in the Southern zone. Participants of age 36-60 years (52%) and 18-35 years (50%) indicated more levels of disappointment than those aged (45%). The opinions of the youths are not surprising given that they constitute the highest population of unemployed Nigerians in the labour market who are marginally deprived of achieving their expectations and ambitions in Nigeria.

**When you think about your country Nigeria, which of these statements best expresses your feelings?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 2: Socio-Demographic of how Nigerians feel about the Nation by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Disaggregation by religion reveals that Christians (58%) significantly feel more disappointed in Nigeria than traditional and other religion worshippers (41%) and Muslims (40%). For urbanization, 52% of urban residents and 49% of rural residents feel disappointed in the country. Significantly, respondents with secondary education and above (52%) feel more disappointed than respondents with lower educational qualifications (44%).

**When you think about your country Nigeria, which of these statements best expresses your feelings?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 3: Socio-Demographic of how Nigerians feel about the Nation by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.1.2 Identification as Nigerian or Member of an Ethnic Group**

A total of 81% of the respondents prefer dual identity of Nigerian and ethnicity within which 35% feel more ethnic than Nigerian, 36% feel equally ethnic and Nigerian and 10% feel more Nigerian than ethnic. While 15% prefer to identify by ethnic group, 4% prefer to identify by nationality - Nigerian. Further analysis reveals a significant increase in the trend analysis. Perception between the 2019 and 2022 data revealed a 5% rise in ethnic identity perception, a 10% rise in identification with ethnic groups than as Nigerians, a 21% decline in equal identity (ethnic and national) and a 5% rise in identification with Nigeria than ethnicity. This finding depicts the implicating effect of weak nation-building by the Nigerian government to weld diverse ethnic sentiments and identities into a common national identity. As a result, more Nigerians feel more secure and fulfilled within their ethnic cocoons than they do with the Nigerian identity.



**If you had to choose between being Nigerian and being from your ethnic group, which of the following best expresses your feelings?**




Figure 29: Choices between being Nigerian and being from a Particular Ethnic Group

Further disaggregation by demography reveals that 51% of the respondent within the 18 - 35 age bracket 49% of the 36 – 60 age category and 50% of those at 61 and above feel a greater attachment to their ethnicities. 15% of the 18 – 35 age category, 14% of the 61 –above age group and 11% of the 36 – 60 age bracket feel more Nigerian than ethnic. 61% of respondents of the South East and 53% of the South-South respondents indicate a higher feeling of attachment to their ethnic identity. Also, 51% of South West, another 51% of North West, 57% of North Central and 25% of North East are attached to their ethnic identity. On the other hand, the North East (33%) stood out as the region having the highest feeling of Nigerian identity. It is evident from the findings that there is a strong relationship between perceived feelings of marginalisation and feelings of attachment to a particular identity. The South East zone finding is not surprising given that the people feel so strongly marginalised and hence cling more to ethnic identity. This feeling of alienation has stirred a rise in MASSOB and IPOB separatist agitations in the region. Similarly, the South-South finding reflects a feeling of alienation from the poor political will of the government to militate against environmental degradation caused by oil mining in the zone and canvass for greater control of oil and its resources by local communities in the region.

**If you had to choose between being Nigerian and being from your ethnic group, which of the following best expresses your feelings?**

**by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 4: Socio-Demographic on Choices between being Nigerian and from an Ethnic Group by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further findings reveal that traditional/other religious groups (69%) identify more with their ethnic group than Christians (52%) and Muslims (46%). Out of all the religious groups assessed in the survey, Muslims (15%) have a greater attachment to national identity than Christians (12%) or devotees of traditional/other religions (9%). There are no significant findings for urbanization and educational attainment. Despite government initiatives such as NYSC and sporting clubs to whittle down ethnic sentiments in the country, urbanites' attachment to ethnic identity remains strong. Generally, feeling Nigerian is still very low across all the variables.

**If you had to choose between being Nigerian and being from your ethnic group, which of the following best expresses your feelings?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 5: Socio-Demographic on Choices between being Nigerian and from an Ethnic Group by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

### 5.1.3 What Makes Nigerians Proud of Being Nigerian

Following the citizens' sense of identity in the country, the respondents were asked to indicate what makes them proud of their nationality. The findings showed that only a few of the respondents are mostly proud of the country's mineral resources (17%), good land, weather and agricultural resources (16%), peace-loving, hardworking and talented people (14%) and art and cultural heritage (14%). Other reasons that make Nigerians proud of their Nigerianess include delicious food and delicacies (10%), religious nature of Nigerians (9%), freedom of movement (7%), resilience and can-do-it spirit (6%) and home of tourism (6%). The trend analysis between 2022, 2021 and 2019 data reveals a sharp decline in the respondents' sense of pride for the nation. In particular, pride in the country's mineral resources which initially increased by 7% between 2019 and 2021 decreased by 12% between 2021 and 2022. Similarly, the respondents' pride in the country's art and cultural heritage significantly declined from 28% in 2019 to 14% in 2022. Furthermore, pride in the country's peace-loving, hardworking and talented people which increased by 7% between 2019 and 2021 significantly declined by 8% between 2021 and 2022. This finding indicates that the feeling of pride in the nation is dwindling and the factors enlisted in the table below are insignificant compared to the challenges facing the country.

Table 1: What Nigerians are most proud of in being Nigerian

	2019	2021	2022
We are blessed with mineral resource	22%	29%	17%
Our peace-loving, hardworking & talented people	15%	22%	14%
Our art and cultural heritage	28%	17%	14%
Our good land, weather & agricultural resources	10%	16%	16%
We are religious people	5%	4%	9%
Our resilience & Can-Do Spirit	0%	4%	6%
Our delicious food and delicacies	8%	3%	10%
Nigeria is a home tourism	7%	2%	6%
Freedom of movement	5%	2%	7%
Nothing to be proud of in Nigeria	0%	1%	0%

Data disaggregation by demographics reveals an insignificant finding for the gender category. While assessing the respondents' pride in mineral resources, we observed that it was mostly rated by respondents age 61 years and above (58%) and the North East participants (64%) compared to the other respondents within the respective categories. Similarly, participants aged 61 years and above and the North East respondents highly rated their pride in the country's good land, weather and agricultural resources (58% and 69% respectively) and peace-loving, hardworking and talented people (58% and 51% respectively).

**If there was one factor that makes you really proud of being Nigerian, what would that be?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	Total	Gender		Age Category			Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	18-35 years	36-60 years	61 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
We are blessed with mineral resource	51%	51%	51%	48%	54%	58%	49%	64%	46%	46%	51%	55%
Our good land, weather & agricultural resources	47%	46%	48%	45%	48%	58%	51%	69%	46%	41%	38%	41%
Our peace loving, hardworking & talented people	43%	41%	44%	40%	46%	47%	44%	51%	40%	43%	32%	47%
Our art and cultural heritage	41%	41%	41%	39%	43%	42%	36%	47%	39%	37%	37%	49%
Our delicious food and delicacies	29%	28%	30%	27%	31%	33%	27%	37%	25%	26%	30%	31%
We are religious people	28%	28%	28%	25%	32%	24%	26%	26%	40%	18%	12%	33%
Freedom of movement	20%	20%	20%	19%	21%	25%	17%	15%	22%	15%	20%	27%
Nigeria is a home of tourism	19%	19%	20%	18%	21%	26%	20%	25%	18%	15%	15%	23%
Our resilience & Can-Do Spirit	19%	19%	19%	17%	21%	24%	18%	10%	17%	14%	20%	31%
None/Don't know	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	1%

Table 7: Socio-Demographic of what makes Nigerians most proud being Nigerian by National Average, Gender, Age-Group &amp; Geo-Political Zone

Respondents' reasons for being proud of Nigeria were cross-tabulated with socio-demographic variables like urbanisation, religion and educational attainment. The highest number of those who are proud of Nigeria because of the country's good land, weather and agricultural resources (64%) mostly came from adherents of traditional and other religions worshippers. Within religious group analysis, we found that Traditional and other religious worshippers are more proud of Nigeria, particularly with its mineral resources (55%), good land, weather and agricultural resources (64%), peace-loving, hardworking and talented people (51%), art and cultural heritage (50%) and many other factors listed below.

**If there was one factor that makes you really proud of being Nigerian, what would that be?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**

	Total	Urbanization		Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Urban	Rural	Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
We are blessed with mineral resource	51%	51%	51%	54%	47%	55%	51%	51%
Our good land, weather & agricultural resources	47%	47%	47%	48%	45%	64%	51%	45%
Our peace loving, hardworking & talented people	43%	41%	44%	44%	40%	51%	43%	42%
Our art and cultural heritage	41%	42%	40%	42%	39%	50%	38%	42%
Our delicious food and delicacies	29%	31%	27%	33%	23%	64%	28%	29%
We are religious people	28%	27%	29%	24%	33%	32%	33%	26%
Freedom of movement	20%	18%	22%	21%	19%	27%	19%	21%
Nigeria is a home of tourism	19%	20%	19%	22%	15%	46%	19%	20%
Our resilience & Can-Do Spirit	19%	18%	20%	21%	16%	23%	18%	20%
None/Don't know	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	1%

*Table 8: Socio-Demographic of what makes Nigerians most proud of being Nigerian by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level*

#### 5.1.4 Unity and Division of Nigeria

Assessing the sense of unity and division in the country is imperative to inform the state of social cohesion. It is against this premise that the respondents were asked to evaluate and compare the current level of national unity/disunity with four years ago. The findings reveal that out of all the respondents, 10% feel that the country is much more united compared with 66% that feel that Nigeria is much more divided today and 20% opine that nothing has changed compared to four years ago. While assessing the 2019 and 2022 trend analysis, we discovered a 16% decline in the perception that Nigerians are much more united than four years ago and a 21% sharp perception increase that Nigeria is much more divided than four years ago. Nigeria as a much more divided country trend analysis may be attributed to the feelings of marginalisation, discrimination, heightened insecurity and unequal resource distribution in the country.

**Compared to four years ago, how united or divided would you say Nigeria is today?**




Figure 30: Extent of Unity or Division among Nigerians

Further analysis shows that the overall finding cuts across almost all the socio-demographic variables, so, there is no significant disparity for gender, age, urbanization and education categories except for geo-political zone and religion categories. For geo-political zones, the zone with the most significant perception of Nigeria being a much more divided country compared to four years ago was recorded in the North Central zone (84%), followed by South South (71%), South West (69%), South East (66%), North East (62%) and North West (50%). Very few respondents across the board particularly the North West respondents think that Nigeria is a much more united country.

**Compared to four years ago, how united or divided would you say Nigeria is today?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone (2022)**




Table 9: Demographic Analysis on the Extent of Unity and Division among Nigerians by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further analysis reveals that a higher proportion of Christian respondents (71%) opine that Nigerians is a much more divided country compared with 57% of Muslims and 59% of traditional and other religious groups. On the contrary, just a few proportions of the respondents particularly the Traditional and other groups of worshippers suggest that Nigeria has stayed the same for the past four years.

**Compared to four years ago, how united or divided would you say Nigeria is today?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 10: Demographic Analysis on the Extent of Unity and Division among Nigerians by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.1.5 Sources of Conflict in the Country**

Considering the incessant kidnapping, insecurity and killings in the country, it becomes pertinent to investigate the causes of conflict in this study to inform designing appropriate policies. From the result, the respondents acknowledge political party affiliation (18%), ethnic/tribal differences (17%), and religious differences (16%) as the top three causes of conflicts in Nigeria. A critical review of the 2019 and 2022 data shows a dramatic decline in the respondents' opinion of the causal factors in the table below. We, therefore, suggest that there may be other factors instigating conflicts in Nigeria other than the factors listed in the table below and which need to be investigated.

Table 1: Major Causes of Conflicts in the Nation

	2019	2021	2022
Ethnic / Tribal Difference	26%	21%	17%
Political Party Affiliation	29%	21%	18%
Religious Difference	23%	17%	16%
The difference in Social Status	10%	9%	9%
Access to Land	0%	9%	9%
Income Difference	5%	8%	8%
Educational Difference	3%	6%	6%
Age Difference	2%	5%	5%
Gender Difference	2%	4%	6%
Resource Control	0%	0%	7%
None/Don't know	0%	0%	2%

Disaggregation of national averages into gender, age category and geo-political zones shows that most respondents that identified political party affiliation as a cause of conflict are mostly from the South West (59%) followed by South South (55%), North Central (54%) and Northwest (51%) compared with other zones. Most of the respondents who noted ethnic and tribal differences as a cause of conflict are from the North East region (74%) compared to other zones. For the age category, while respondents aged 61 and above mostly attributed political party (62%), mostly the youths aged 18-35 years blamed ethnic/tribal differences (50%) and religious differences (46%) as the cause of conflict in Nigeria. For the gender category, there is no significant difference in the findings.



**Thinking about your community, which of these differences would lead to conflicts?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	Total	Gender		Age Category			Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	18-35 years	36-60 years	61 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Political Party Affiliation	51%	52%	49%	49%	52%	62%	54%	46%	51%	33%	55%	59%
Ethnic / Tribal Difference	48%	48%	48%	50%	46%	42%	57%	74%	47%	39%	44%	34%
Religious Difference	45%	45%	44%	46%	45%	37%	51%	82%	55%	26%	28%	26%
Access to Land	30%	30%	29%	28%	31%	36%	27%	37%	19%	27%	55%	22%
Difference in Social Status	25%	25%	25%	24%	25%	33%	26%	32%	22%	26%	18%	28%
Income Difference	22%	21%	23%	21%	21%	34%	21%	13%	21%	29%	23%	25%
Resource Control	20%	20%	21%	19%	22%	19%	21%	29%	15%	14%	28%	19%
Gender Difference	16%	16%	16%	15%	15%	29%	6%	10%	18%	28%	19%	14%
Educational Difference	16%	15%	16%	15%	16%	23%	16%	17%	14%	16%	11%	19%
Age Difference	13%	13%	13%	11%	13%	19%	5%	6%	15%	23%	13%	13%
None/Don't know	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	5%	2%	0%	0%

Table 12: Demographic Analysis of the Causes of Conflicts in Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further analysis shows that while there is no significant difference in findings for urbanization and educational attainment, this is not the case for the religion category. More Christians significantly attributed political party affiliation (53%) as the major cause of conflicts compared to Traditionalists/followers of other religions that significantly attributed the cause to ethnic and tribal differences (59%), a religious difference (59%), access to land (50%) and several other factors listed below.

**Thinking about your community, which of these differences would lead to conflicts?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**

	Total	Urbanization		Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Urban	Rural	Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
Political Party Affiliation	51%	52%	49%	53%	48%	45%	50%	51%
Ethnic / Tribal Difference	48%	49%	48%	50%	46%	59%	45%	49%
Religious Difference	45%	46%	44%	43%	48%	59%	46%	45%
Access to Land	30%	28%	31%	36%	20%	50%	27%	31%
Difference in Social Status	25%	26%	24%	27%	22%	50%	24%	25%
Income Difference	22%	22%	22%	23%	20%	32%	19%	23%
Resource Control	20%	20%	21%	23%	16%	28%	16%	22%
Gender Difference	16%	17%	15%	16%	17%	23%	15%	16%
Educational Difference	16%	16%	15%	15%	16%	32%	17%	15%
Age Difference	13%	13%	12%	12%	13%	33%	12%	13%
None/Don't know	2%	1%	2%	0%	3%	0%	4%	1%

Table 13: Demographic Analysis on the Causes of Conflicts in Nigeria by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

## 5.2 Assessment of Trust as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section assessed 'Trust' as a component of social cohesion. Overall, findings from the survey showed that trust in all components of government institutions has reduced compared to the 2019 and 2021 data.

### 5.2.1 Trust in Government and Institutions in Nigeria

Nigerians were asked to indicate their level of trust in some key institutions in Nigeria. Similar to the 2021 survey findings, a high percentage of the respondents indicated significant distrust in the institutions. In total, more than 6 in 10 of the respondents have zero trust in the Government of President Buhari while at least 5 in 10 of the respondents have no trust in the National Assembly (57%), Police (56%), Local Government Chairman (52%), State Government (50%) and the Judiciary (50%). While about 5 in 10 of the respondents have no trust in the EFCC (46%) and about 4 in 10 of the respondents have zero trust in the Army (36%). With some degree of variations, 68% of the respondents indicated trust in Traditional rulers and 72% have trust in religious leaders.

#### How much trust do you have for the following...




Figure 31: Extent of Trust in the Government and Institutions in the Nation

The lack of trust particularly in the government of President Buhari is attributable to the government's poor political will to salvage the economy from high poverty, inequality, inflation/cost of living, marginalization and other structural challenges facing the people. According to the following respondents,



*“The naira is as useless as toilet paper because of the kind of system of the political class... They have failed us. One may begin to wonder if this is all we can get from democracy” (A Religious Leader, Ekiti)*

*“...people are worried and are reading meanings to all these issues that do not augur well with the development of our society. When he came on board in the beginning, it took him almost 6 months before he could establish his cabinet. The first thing he did was that all the service chiefs and people in notable positions were his tribe's men and women. And when it is looked at from that angle, it makes one begin to wonder” (Religious Leader, Edo State)*



### 5.2.1.1 Trust in the Government of President Buhari

Furthermore, data trend on the extent of trust in the Government of President Buhari from 2019 to 2022 has declined. The survey finding shows a total of 42% decline in the respondents' zero trust in the current administration between 2019 and 2022. Similarly, respondents with some degree of trust in the current administration declined by a total of 42% between 2019 and 2022. The increased lack of trust in key institutions is perturbing and could further cause civil unrest and conflict in the country, especially as the 2023 General elections draw near. Overall, the finding depicts that most Nigerians do not trust President Buhari's government.

**How much trust do you have for the Government of President Buhari**




Figure 32: Trend in the extent of trust in the Government of President Buhari 2019 - 2022

### 5.2.1.2 Trust in the National Assembly

For the National Assembly, the 2019 data showed that 25% of respondents had 'no trust at all' in them compared to 57% in 2022 which is a total of 32% decrease in zero trust. While 42% said they had 'little trust' in the assembly members in 2019, the percentage declined to 27% in 2022 which is a total of 15% decrease in trust. In 2019, 28% had 'some trust' as compared to 13% in 2022. 5% had 'a lot of trust' with a slight difference at 3% in 2022. This finding thus signifies that Nigerians mostly have little or no trust in the members of the National Assembly.

**How much trust do you have for the National Assembly**




Figure 33: Trend in the extent of trust in the National Assembly 2019 - 2022



### 5.2.1.3 Trust in the Judiciary

The chart below showed the trend in the extent of trust for the Judiciary. In 2022 50% of the respondents have 'no trust at all' in the judiciary compared to 24% in 2019 which is a total of 26% decrease in sense of trust for the institution. While a total of 76% had some degree of trust in 2019, the percentage declined to 50% in 2022 which is a total 26% margin. The finding depicts Nigerians have little or no trust in the Judiciary.




Figure 34: Trend in the extent of trust in the Judiciary 2019 - 2022

### 5.2.1.4 Trust in the people of other Ethnic Groups

The statistical finding presented in the chart below shows the trend in the extent of peoples' trust in members of other ethnic groups. From the data, we observed that people with zero trust in other ethnic groups have fast declined by 20% while those with varying degree of trust has declined by a 20% margin. This finding implies that trust in other ethnic groups is fast declining and continuous ethnic marginalisation may continue to trigger ethnic rivalry and conflicts in Nigeria.




Figure 35: Trend in the extent of trust in People of other ethnic groups 2019 - 2022



The qualitative finding however partly confirms the diminishing level of trust among the people whereby while a proportion of the key respondents feel that ethnic trust and loyalty are currently the common practice, a few other respondents think otherwise. According to the following key respondents,



*“The country has been built as we can see today on ethnic loyalty first before loyalty to the nation and that is the fact (whether we like it or not, we have to accept this). Very many Nigerians give loyalty to their ethnic clan first of all before they give loyalty to the Nigerian nation-state” (A Traditional Leader, Kaduna State).*

*“Well, presently, I don't think there is any robust relationship amongst the ethnic groups that we have in the country. We are not seeing ourselves as one country but on the basis of our ethnicity” (A Traditional Leader, Ekiti State).*

*“We have seen a situation whereby ethnic nationalities are suspicious of one another especially when it comes to politics. Communities are jostling for one position or the other. So, that has created room for suspicion and mistrust and lack of confidence” (A Traditional leader, Plateau State).*

On the contrary, another key respondent feels that

*“In this part of the country, we are not divided and we are relatively peaceful such that we don't have problems of conflicts between different ethnic groups” (A Religious Leader, Zamfara State).*

The above finding thus reflects the presence and impact of trust on community interplay - interdependence and relationship - at the local level in Nigeria.

### 5.2.1.5 Trust in the people of other Religious Faith

Further analysis showed the trend in the extent of trust in people of other faith from 2019 to 2022. In 2022, 28% said they have 'no trust at all' in other faith compared to 11% in 2019. While 42% said they had 'little trust' in 2019 there was a reduction to 30% in 2022. 36% and 32% reported also having 'some trust' in people of other faith in 2019 and 2022 respectively. The view of having a lot of trust in people of other religious groups decreased from 11% in 2019 to 8% in 2021 but slightly increased to 10% in 2022. Overall, trust in people of other religions is fast diminishing with possible implicating effect on religious rivalry and conflicts in the country.




Figure 36: Trend in the extent of trust in People of other religious faith 2019 – 2022

While confirming the statistical findings, the qualitative finding reveals that the level of trust and association among Nigerians is diminishing as people would rather relate to or trust those they share similar political and socio-economic beliefs including religious faith. According to the following key respondents,



*“There is a divide in the relationship based on religious difference, political differences and ethnic differences. And it is an unfortunate thing. This is not the Nigeria we used to know” (A **Religious Leader, Edo State**)*

*“it is known that Nigerians identified themselves as brothers and sisters regardless of where one comes from or the religion one belongs to. All they know is that one is a Nigerian and the relationship was always good. But today, because of politics, economical advantage, struggles for opportunities, etc that is no longer the case” (A **Traditional Leader, Adamawa State**)*

Thus, Nigerians have a reasonable level of trust in people of other religious faith.

### 5.2.1.6 Trust in Religious Leaders

The statistical trend in the level of trust in religious leaders has slightly declined between 2021 and 2022. While there is a 6% increase in zero trust for religious leaders, there is also a total of 6% decrease in the degree of trust for Nigerian religious leaders in the country.




Figure 37: Trend in the extent of trust in Religious Leaders 2021 – 2022

While confirming the statistical data, the qualitative data reveals that community members listen to and trust their religious leaders. For instance,



*“Religious leaders are always trying their best in terms of sitting down to resolve issues always, and letting wrongdoers know their wrongs..... In terms of politics, the religious leaders call the youths to order so that they won't engage in electoral malpractices that could lead to violence and destruction” (A **Religious Leader, Zamfara State**).*



*“I will have to point out that the religious leaders have really tried. Many of them have been up and doing in challenging those in power and authority” (A **Traditional Leader, Benue State**).*

*“We control some bit of the masses; we tell them what to do and what not to do. We are not existing to fight the government of the day. We will always look at those policies that the government make and pray over them. We also pray for the leaders in government. And by praying from them, the masses will know that it's a way of respecting the leaders of the day. And they will also cue in respecting the leaders. So, we are doing our little best to make sure that the citizenry pays their taxes, respect the authority” (A **Religious Leader, Imo State**).*



Overall, Nigerians have an average level of trust in the Religious Leaders in Nigeria.

### 5.2.1.7 Trust in Traditional Leaders

On the extent of trust in traditional leaders, the trend shows a 5% increment in zero trust and a 5% decrease in the extent of trust in the leaders between 2021 and 2022. Those with little and some trust are beginning to have zero distrust in the traditional leaders as reflected in the 5% increment for 'No Trust at all'.




Figure 38: Trend in the extent of trust in Traditional Leaders 2021 - 2022

While confirming the statistical data for the extent of trust in Traditional leaders, the qualitative data revealed that the people trust and listen to their traditional leaders for dispute settlement among the community members. According to the following key respondents,



*“We are parents, no parent would want anything to touch his or her child(ren). That is how I don't want anything to happen to my subjects regardless of their religious and ethnic differences. As a leader, one has to do everything within his or her power to ensure that people get justice” (A **Traditional Leader, Adamawa State**).*

*“We usually talk to our people and they listen to us. Once there is a message that we need to pass across, I will call the Imam and other Traditional leaders and discuss with them to go and inform the people” (A **Traditional Leader, Taraba State**).*



The overall findings indicate that Nigerians have an average level of trust in Traditional Rulers.



### 5.2.1.8 Trust in the Media

The extent of trust in Nigerian media has not quite changed. The chart below shows a 1% increment in people's trust in the media between 2021 and 2022. Whereas the total degree of trust in the media declined by 1% with particular reference to a 3% decline in 'Little Trust' and a 3% increase in 'A lot of Trust' for the media. This shows that Nigerians have a lot of trust in the media than in the current administration.




Figure 39: Trend in the extent of trust in the Media 2021 - 2022

### 5.2.1.8 Trust in the Police

Regarding the extent of trust in the Police, the trend chart below shows a 4% increment in zero trust in the institution. Those with 'Little Trust' declined from 26% in 2021 to 24% in 2022 which is a 2% decrease in trust in the Police. Similarly, those with 'Some Trust' have decreased from 17% in 2021 to 15% in 2022. There has been no significant change in perception for those with 'A lot of Trust' in the Police for both years. This finding depicts one of the worst levels of trust in government institutions particularly the Police that ought to protect the lives and properties of Nigerians. It is not surprising that Nigerians have very little trust in the Police considering the rising cases of Police brutality/excessive use of force on civilians for instance.




Figure 40: Trend in the extent of trust in the Police 2021 - 2022



While confirming the statistical data, the qualitative data provide subjective views on the causes of distrust in the Police force and these are reportedly corruption, excessive use of force and police brutalisation of community members. According to the following key respondents,



*“Let's say, for instance, a crime is committed here and something gets missing in this compound. If that gets reported to the police, the police will come here and pick up everybody in this compound except the person that reported the case. In most cases, they will resort to threats, torture and abuses of all sorts. And in the course of these tortures, it's been known that so many people out of pain would have agreed to things that they did not do” (A **Traditional Leader, Anambra State**).*

*“Imagine one's child getting arrested for committing an offence. It is the person that goes to beg the police and pay money for the child not to go to jail” (A **Traditional Leader, Edo State**).*

### 5.2.1.9 Trust in the Army

The following analysis was gotten on the extent of trust for the Army between 2021 and 2022. In 2021, 32% said they had 'no trust at all' in the Army as compared to 36% in 2022. As of 2021, 30% said they had 'little trust' in the Army however this percentage slightly dropped to 28% in 2022. When it comes to having 'some trust' 28% of respondents in 2021 said they did as compared to 25% in 2022. While there was a little change in the percentage (10%) of those who said they had 'a lot of trust' in the Army in 2021 and 11% in 2022.




Figure 41: Trend in the extent of trust in the Army 2021 - 2022

Furthermore, the interview showed that people do not trust the Nigerian Army due to abuse of power and excessive use of force on the people. The key respondents opine that



*“If I would be honest, there are military men that don't know their work. They would arrest someone and won't give the person fair hearing but they will abuse the persons' rights” (A **Traditional Leader, Zamfara State**).*



“Let me start from the armed forces. They abuse their positions. Anyone with a small rank or office wants people to respect him or her for that. They don't know that their religion teaches that they should be there to serve and not to rule... Three days ago (a day before Sallah) at Ozuoba, some convoys of military men were on their way and a driver parked his car on the road. The driver was wrong but the soldier was supposed to calm down and tell the driver his wrong. The soldier used his gun to break the windscreen of the man's car” (A **Religious Leader, Rivers State**).



Nigerians thus have some level of trust in the Nigerian Army.

### 5.3 Assessment of Social Justice as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section evaluates the term 'Social Justice' as a key indicator of Social Cohesion to establish the people's perception of impunity, access to justice, equity and fairness towards ethnic and religious groups, etc in Nigeria.

#### 5.3.1 Feelings of Nigerians Regarding the Country's Laws

Under the Social Justice theme, the respondents were asked to express their feelings concerning the Laws of Nigeria. The findings reveal that about 7 in 10 of the respondents believe that there are persons above the Law in Nigeria (67%) while 26% of the respondents opine that the Law protects everyone equally. While drawing a trend analysis, we discovered that those with an impunity view slightly declined with a 3% margin between 2019 and 2022 data. Furthermore, those with the opinion that the Law protects everyone equally in Nigeria increased by a 6% margin between 2019 and 2022.

Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings concerning the Laws of Nigeria?




Figure 42: Feelings of Nigerians concerning the Laws of Nigeria

While exploring the respondents' subjective views, they pointed out how the laws guiding the society and the administration of justice favour a privileged few because they are considered 'above the law' in society and how poor governance practices are inhibiting receiving social justice in the country. The majority of respondents felt the law is mainly meant for the poor and 'unconnected' in the country. According to some of the respondents:



“Today you have people accusing the law enforcement agents of prompting or igniting the banditry issues in northern Nigeria. If you ask the bandits, they will tell you some of the reasons that prompted them into this particular action was the absence of justice in their cases” (A **Traditional Leader, Kaduna**).

“Well, we have seen the laws. The good (but in a bad sense) thing about Nigeria is that we have enabling laws in Nigeria. And we also have very wonderful government policies existing on paper. But when it comes to implementation, that is where we have problems” (A **Traditional Leader, Plateau State**).





Data disaggregation reveals an insignificant disparity between how the male and female respondents perceive the Laws of Nigeria with most of both genders similarly supporting the view that there are persons above the Law in Nigeria. For the age category, mostly the respondents particularly the aged (72%) perceive that there are persons above the Law in Nigeria. Based on geo-political zones, the majority of the respondents particularly the Southern zones comprising 79% of South-South, 79% of South West and 70% of South East respondents agree that there are persons above the Law in Nigeria. Whereas, 40% of North West, 34% of North Central and 30% of North East respondents opine that the Law was created to protect everyone equally in Nigeria compared to the Southern zone.

**Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings concerning the Laws of Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 14: Demographic Analysis on Feelings of Nigerians concerning the Laws of Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further demographic analysis on feelings of Nigeria by urbanization, religion and educational level shows the majority feels there are persons above the law in Nigeria: 69% and 65% share this view in both urban and rural areas respectively, majority of Christians (72%), Muslims (60%) and Traditional/other (77%) religious followers have the same view. Those with no formal/informal/primary education (60%) and secondary school and above (69%) expressed the same views.

**Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings concerning the Laws of Nigeria?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 15: Demographic Analysis on Feelings of Nigerians concerning the Laws of Nigeria by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level



### 5.3.2 Perception of Nigerians on Access to Justice

When asked how Nigerians feel about access to justice, findings from the field show that In 2021, 68% said only the rich and powerful can access justice compared to 66% in 2022. The 2021 and 2022 data show that there is no significant change in the view that all the citizens have access to civil justice when needed while those who were not too sure stood at 5% and 7% respectively.




Figure 43: How Nigerians feel about Access to Justice

For some of the respondents, social injustice has become so institutionalised in the system that many poor people suffer a great deal of injustice compared to the rich that buy the system. According to the following key respondents,



*“The courts in Nigeria are for the rich. At the end of the day, the court may even set the culprit free. Sometimes, a case that goes to court lingers for as long as 50 years. What sort of justice will be obtained in such a scenario?” (A **Traditional Leader, Benue State**).*

*“The implementation has been very poor. Just as I said earlier, the laws are there but implementation is poor. For instance, if there is a case of sexual harassment, you would discover that it is those that have the money that can afford a court case. And a lot of times when you go to the police station, the culprit is able to bribe his way and then becomes free” (A **Traditional Leader, Benue State**).*

*“That is possible for wealthy people. Where will a less privileged person run to in order to protect his or her rights? A policeman can come here and arrest you unlawfully. If that happens, where will you protect your rights? I can tell you that it is only wealthy and influential people that are given their rights. How can one protect his or her right as a less privileged person? That is why I said that the rights of wealthy and influential people do not get abused” (A **Traditional Leader, Rivers State**).*

The finding thus indicates a high level of inequality in Nigerians' access to civil justice.

National disaggregation of the data reveals majority of the respondents across the board agree that only the rich and powerful can access civil justice. It is mostly the aged (71%) followed by those aged 36-60 years that agree that the wealthy have access to civil justice. In the geo-political zone, it is the South West (79%) and South-South (78%) that mostly rated the view that only the rich and powerful can access civil justice in the country while the North West (41%) highly rated the view that all citizens can access civil justice when they need to.

**Which of the following is the most accurate description of access to justice in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 16: Demographic Analysis of How Nigerians feel about Access to Justice by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further demographic analysis on feelings of Nigeria by urbanization, religion and educational level shows the majority feel only the rich and powerful can access civil justice in Nigeria: 66% in both urban and rural areas share this view, majority of Christians (71%), Muslims (59%) and Traditional/other (63%) religious followers have the same view. Those with no formal/informal/primary education (62%) and secondary school and above (67%) also expressed the same views.

**Which of the following is the most accurate description of access to justice in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 17: Demographic Analysis of How Nigerians feel about Access to Justice by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

### 5.3.3 Perception of Fairness Towards Ethnic Groups and Religion

The following sub-sections assessed how much fairness the government exerts on religious and ethnic groups.

#### 5.3.3.1 Government's Fairness towards ethnic groups

Regarding the government's fairness towards ethnic groups, the majority of the respondents feel that the government is sometimes fair (56%), always fair (17%), often fair (13%) and never fair (14%). While assessing the trend analysis, we observed an 8% increment in always fair perception between 2019 and 2022 data; a 4% increase in sometimes fair perception between 2019 and 2022 data and a 6% decline in never fair perception. Overall, the trend analysis depicts that the government is considered fair in its relationship and interdependence with the ethnic groups.



### How often do you believe your ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal government?




Figure 44: Perception of Fairness towards Ethnic Groups by the Government

Despite the statistical finding about the government's fairness towards the ethnic groups, further interview indicates otherwise. The majority of the respondents interviewed believe the government has not been fair towards certain ethnic groups, they responded that the present government tends to favour a certain ethnic group over others. In the words of some of the respondents:



*“Another problem that we are facing in this country when it comes to unity is that some regions in this country have been marginalized. For example, the east has been marginalized and that has caused a lot of problems in this country as a result, the group called IPOB sprang up and has been causing trouble in the east by destroying properties and killing innocent souls. That is all over the news. The same thing happened in the south-west just recently where a guy called Sunday Igboho also started an agitation for the secession of "Oduduwa Republic". If the government don't try to bring everyone together as one, I don't think this inter-ethnic coexistence will hold for too long. But I think if we come together, there will be nothing like Biafra or Oduduwa agitation for secession” (A Traditional Leader, Anambra)*

*“We are not one. No matter the number of times you try to amend a torn cloth, it will still get torn at a point. Nigeria is already a torn country. From the beginning, we are not one but we were just fused forcefully together. It is a forceful marriage. And what I heard was that the marriage has a deadline. I think I heard that the years are over. So, let's sit down and let everybody decide for themselves. In a situation whereby some people see themselves as born to rule, who is then born to suffer? Who is born to be a slave? The inequality is clear” (A Traditional Leader, Taraba)*

National disaggregation of the data showed that the majority of the respondents support the sometimes view of the government's fairness towards their ethnic groups. In specific, there is no significant difference between how the respondents perceive the government's fairness for gender, age, urbanization and educational attainment categories compared with geo-political zones and religion. Respondents with the 'Sometimes' view was mostly indicated by North East residents (76%); the 'Always' view was highly rated by the South East respondents (34%).

**How often do you believe your ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal government?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 18: Demographic Analysis of government's fairness towards respondent's ethnic groups by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Demographic analysis on feelings of Nigeria by religion shows that the “majority of Christian (55%), Muslim (58%) and Traditional/other (32%) religious respondents indicate that government is sometimes fair towards their ethnic groups. While those with a 'Sometimes' view on the government's fairness were highest among the Christian and Muslim respondents, the Traditionalist and other religious groups held the least view (32%). The traditional and other religious groups held the most view about the government being always fair towards their ethnic groups compared to Christian (20%) and Muslim (12%) respondents.

**How often do you believe your ethnic group is treated unfairly by the Federal government?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 19: Demographic Analysis of government's fairness towards respondent's ethnic groups by National Average, Urbanization, Religion and Educational Level

**5.3.3.2 Government's Fairness towards Religion**

Regarding government fairness towards other religions, the finding shows that majority of the respondents believe that the government is sometimes fair (54%) compared to often fair (14%), always fair (15%) and never fair (17%). Nevertheless, the trend analysis revealed a total of 9% perception change in government fairness towards their religion and a 9% change for the government's unfairness towards religion. The overall finding thus implies that the Nigerian government is mostly fair towards the religious groups in the country.



### How often do you believe your religion is treated unfairly by the Federal government?




Figure 45: Perception of Fairness towards Religion by the Government

To further promote fairness towards religious practices to minimize religious conflict in the country, respondents suggest that the government should oversee how one religious group would not supersede other religious groups since Nigeria is a multi-religious country. According to a key respondent,



“There is nowhere God said they should force somebody to practice a religion. If the country could accept things as they were before not putting one religion over the other and imposing their will on others, there could be peace. If I don't want to be a Muslim and you want your state to be controlled by Islamic law, then let those that do not want to belong to that sect have their angle to practice their own life. Or the federal government should make it compulsory that no religion supersedes another. They should even let Christians, Muslims, pagans and traditionalists practice what they believe. No one should be above another.” (A **Traditional Leader, Benue State**).

Data disaggregation showed that across all the categories, the majority of the respondents support the view that the government sometimes promote fairness towards religious groups in Nigeria. Only less than 2 in 10 respondents opine that government is never fair towards the religious groups for gender, age and urbanization categories.

### How often do you believe your religion is treated unfairly by the Federal government? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 20: Demographic Analysis on government's fairness towards respondent's religion by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

It is mostly 2 in 10 of the North West respondents (26%), South West (21%), Muslim (24%) and those with less than Secondary school education (21%) indicated that the Nigerian government is never fair towards the religious groups in Nigeria.




Table 21: Demographic Analysis of government's fairness towards respondent's religion by National Average, Urbanization, Religion and Educational Level

To further promote religious fairness in the country, a key respondent suggests that:



*“There are many things that can be possibly done by the government. Like I said earlier, what our heroes' past did to achieve peace and unity was that they balanced everything in terms of political positions, resource control and management” .....Religious leader Plateau State*

The overall findings thus suggest that the Nigerian government is religion-tolerant and promotes fairness amongst all the religious groups in the country.

### 5.3.4 Perception of Efforts of Government to Promote a Sense of Inclusion for all Ethnic Groups

The study assessed the Nigerian government's effort at promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups and found that government effort is mostly perceived poorly (61%) by the respondents compared with 27% and 12% that perceive its effort fairly and good/very good. Furthermore, the trend analysis showed a 4% very poor/poor perception decline in government efforts between 2019 and 2022 data and a total of 4% change in positive perception of government efforts between 2019 and 2022 data. As outlined in the Nigerian constitution, the government must promote a sense of unity among the citizens, yet, the government is underperforming in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in Nigeria, unfortunately.

**How would you rate the efforts of the federal government in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in the country?**




Figure 46: Efforts of the Federal Government in Promoting a Sense of Inclusion

Disaggregation by gender showed a similar perception in the category. However, the aged (67%) and the Southern zone respondents particularly the South-South (76%) respondents highly rated the government poorly compared to the remaining group categories.

**How would you rate the efforts of the federal government in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in the country?**

**by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 22: Demographic Analysis of Efforts of the Government in Promoting Inclusion by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further data disaggregation showed that mostly the Christian respondents (67%) rated the efforts of the government poorly while the Traditional and other religious groups of respondents (48%) rated the government positively. Mostly the respondents with Secondary education and above (64%) rated the government poorly while respondents with lower qualifications (46%) rated the government positively.



**How would you rate the efforts of the federal government in promoting a sense of inclusion for all ethnic groups in the country?**

*by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level*




Table 23: Demographic Analysis of Efforts of the Government in Promoting Inclusion by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.4 Assessment of Participation and Patriotism as a Component of Social Cohesion**

This section explores the concepts of “Participation and Patriotism” as major indicators of Social Cohesion in Nigeria. It reports citizens' willingness to cooperate with others for a more united Nigeria, willingness to participate in the political process, willingness to join the military to defend the territorial integrity of the country, and support for inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages.

**5.4.1 Willingness to Co-operate with Other Fellow Citizens to Work for a More United Nigeria**

The study assessed the willingness of the citizens to cooperate to achieve a more united Nigeria. The data findings showed that the majority of the respondents (71%) are “Extremely/Somewhat” willing. In contrast, 18% said they are “Extremely/Somewhat unwilling” while 11% of the respondents are indifferent. For trend analysis, 6% increment change in the people's unwillingness to work with other ethnic groups to unify Nigeria between the 2019 and 2022 data. While there was a 10% decline in people's willingness to work together between 2019 and 2021 data, there is an 8% increment in willingness between the 2021 and 2022 data.

**How willing are you to cooperate with other ethnic group to work for a more united Nigeria?**




Figure 47: Extent Nigerians are willing to Work with Fellow Citizens for a More United Nigeria

The demographic analysis shows that mostly the aged (81%) compared to other age groups are willing to work together with other Nigerians to unify the country. Mostly the North Central (84%) and North East (87%) are willing to work with other Nigerians.

**How willing are you to cooperate with other ethnic group to work for a more united Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 24: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' willingness to work with Fellow Citizens for a More United Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further data disaggregation of respondents with the willingness to work together is highest among the Rural respondents (73%) compared with Urban residents (73%). Mostly the Traditional and other religious groups highly rated the willingness to collaborate with other Nigerians compared with Christian (72%) and Muslim (70%) respondents. While those with Secondary school education and above (72%) are more willing to collaborate with other Nigerians, most respondents with lower qualifications indicated unwillingness (23%).

**How willing are you to cooperate with other ethnic group to work for a more united Nigeria?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 25: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' willingness to work with Fellow Citizens for a More United Nigeria by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level



### 5.4.2 Willingness to Participate in the Political Process to Make Nigeria a Better Place

The findings showed that more than 6 in 10 are willing to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all. While 24% of the respondents are unwilling to participate, 11% of the respondents were indifferent. The trend analysis further showed a 5% decrease in the willingness of Nigerians, a 9% increase in the unwillingness of Nigerians and a 4% decline in indifference perception in the 2019 and 2022 data.

**How willing are you to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all?**




Figure 48: Extent Nigerians are willing to participate in political processes

Data disaggregation shows a variation in the respondents' perception except for gender, age and urbanization categories with insignificant differences. While assessing geo-political zone perception on the extent of citizens' willingness to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all, mostly the Northern zone residents highly indicated a positive willingness particularly the North-East (88%) and North Central (85%) compared to other zones. On the other hand, mostly the North West (34%), South East (35%) and South West (31%) are unwilling to participate.

**How willing are you to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 26: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' willingness to participate in political processes by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Furthermore, while mostly 37% of Christian respondents are extremely willing, mostly 49% of Traditional and other religious groups of respondents are somewhat willing to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all. Nevertheless, mostly 27% of Muslims are unwilling to participate compared to other religious groups.

**How willing are you to participate in the political process to make Nigeria a better place for all?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 27: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' willingness to participate in political processes by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.4.3 Willingness to Join the Military to Defend the Nigerian State**

The willingness of Nigerian citizens to join the military to defend the Nigerian state was assessed. The result showed a mixed perception of 42% are unwilling to defend the military by joining the army, 16% feel indifferent and 42% are willing to join. For the trend analysis, the data showed that more Nigerians are unwilling to participate which is an 8% increment while there is a 6% decrease in the people's willingness to join the Military to defend the country between the 2019 and 2022 data.

**How willing are you to join the military, if called upon, to defend the Nigerian state?**




Figure 49: Extent Nigerians are willing to join the Military

Data disaggregation showed that the majority of those who said they were extremely willing came from the North-Central (37%). This was followed by those who reside in the North-East (25%). The least in this response category were those who reside in the South-West (15%). On the contrary, the majority of those who said they were extremely unwilling to join the military to defend the Nigerian state were those who reside in the South-East (47%). This was followed by those who reside in the South-West (31%). Respondents between the age of 61 and above (38%) are extremely unwilling to join the military to defend the Nigerian state compared to the other age groups. Between males and females, 23% and 27% of the respondents are extremely unwilling to join the military to defend the Nigerian state, respectively.

**How willing are you to join the military, if called upon, to defend the Nigerian state?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 28: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' willingness to join the military to defend the Nigerian State by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further disaggregation of the data on the willingness of citizens to join the military to defend the Nigerian state showed similar and insignificant differences within the categories.

**How willing are you to join the military, if called upon, to defend the Nigerian state?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 29: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' willingness to join the military to defend the Nigerian State by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.4.4 Support of Inter-Ethnic and Inter-Religious Marriages**

The study assessed the level of support Nigerians exert for inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages in Nigeria.

**5.4.4.1 Support for marriage between two people from different Ethnic Groups**

We assessed the willingness of citizens to support inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages and compared them with the 2019 and 2021 data. The findings showed that more than 10 of the respondents would support inter-ethnic marriages while 12% were against the view. While assessing the 2019 and 2022 data, we observed an upward trend for those in support of the view which is a 9% change compared with a 9% downward trend for those against the view, respectively. The finding showed that most Nigerians do support inter-ethnic marriages.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage between two people from different ethnic groups**




Figure50: Willingness to support inter-ethnic marriages

Data disaggregation shows a proportionate and insignificant variation within the group categories. More than 8 in 10 of the respondents support inter-ethnic marriages within each category except for the South-East zone where 78% agree and mostly 22% oppose the view.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage between two people from different ethnic groups by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table30: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' support for interethnic marriages by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

The response of citizens to the question of whether they support marriages between two people from different ethnic groups based on where one resides, religion and educational level showed similar results in terms of affirmation. From the demographics, more than 8 in 10 of the respondents support inter-ethnic marriages within each group of category.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage between two people from different ethnic groups by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 31: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' support for interethnic by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.4.4.2 Support for marriage between two people from different Religions**

This study assessed the level of support for inter-religion marriage in Nigeria. The study found that at least 4 in 10 of the respondents do not support inter-religion marriage while about 6 in 10 of the respondents agreed (58%). Between the 2019 and 2022 trend analysis, we found that the percentage change of those against the view has slightly declined by 3% while those in support of the view increased by 3%. The overall findings showed that marriage between people of different religious faith is still a major problem in Nigeria.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage between two people from different religions (e.g., Christian and Muslim)**




Figure 51: Willingness to support inter-religious marriages

Disaggregation by gender showed that mostly the aged (69%) support inter-religion marriages compared with other age categories. Based on geo-political zones, the majority of respondents in support of inter-religion marriages were highest in South West (77%) zone compared with other zones while those with a contrary view were highest in the North West (56%) zone.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage between two people from different religions (e.g., Christian and Muslim)**  
**by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 32: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' support for interreligious marriages by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.4.4.3 Support for marriage across Geopolitical Zones**

Despite that, about 6 in 10 of the total respondents support inter-religion marriage, over 8 in 10 of the total respondents support marriages between geo-political zones.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage across geopolitical zones (e.g., South-East and North-East)**




Figure 52: Willingness to support marriages from different geopolitical zones

Data disaggregation across the categories shows that all the respondents shared similar views with a unique reference to the geo-political category where at least 7 in 10 of the respondents support marriages across geo-political zones in Nigeria. Overall, the majority of the respondents support intra-geo-political zone marriages. In Nigeria, religion and its tenets remain key elements in marital decisions about marriage for fanatical adherents from different geopolitical zones. This is not only about the two who want to be married, rather, the extended families often than not take most marital decisions between couples in Nigeria.



**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage across geopolitical zones (e.g., South-East and North-East)  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 33: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' support for marriages across different geopolitical zones by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further data disaggregation showed a similar perception within each category where at least 7 in 10 of the respondents agree to marriage within each group of category.

**Would you support marriage based on the following? Marriage across geopolitical zones (e.g., South-East and North-East)  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 34: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' support for marriages across different geopolitical zones by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

### 5.5 Assessment of Natural Resource Governance as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section explores citizens' perception of natural resource governance in Nigeria as a key element of social cohesion. It reports citizens' perception on the management of funds realised from the extraction of natural resources, availability of natural resources, and influences on corruption, prices of commodities, foreign exchange earnings, and derivation principle.

### 5.5.1 Citizens' Perception of Government's Efforts at Managing Revenues from Natural Resources

The perception of citizens was sought on the efforts of the government in the management of revenues from natural resources and the findings showed that only 10% of the respondents opined that the government has managed the funds very well while 25% feel the government's resource management effort is ok (25%). However, more than 6 in 10 of the respondents rated the government poorly.




Figure 53: Effort of the Government at managing revenues from natural resources

Further findings reveal displeasure over incessant politicking in government emanating from poor political will to maximise the nation's resources. According to some of the key respondents,



*“The score for me is very low. Right from inception till date. It was only when the regions were controlling their resources that they were able to do better. But today, you would discover that most of the people that come to the offices only think of how they will enrich their pockets before thinking of what they will do for the public. So, a lot of politicking is rubbing the country of the opportunity to become a great country. There is no leader that will be probed without discovering that such leader has one way or the other soiled his or her hand through corruption” (A **Traditional Leader, Benue State**).*

*“Well, I am not in government to know how they manage the funds but as a citizen, I speak from my knowledge. When this current administration came in place, they tried to do something and that was to hold somewhat of a town hall meeting to discuss how they'd do the budget and how they'd spend the budget. Having followed them for 10 years so far, I saw those town hall meetings as just gimmicks and processes of diverting citizens' attention from the most unfortunate drama and doing what is there” (A **Religious Leader, Kaduna State**).*

*“I am not too sure that the resources have been well-managed to the advantage of everybody. I told you earlier that I am one of those very few people that do not believe that this country has no money. It is the management of the money that is... Every month, the state goes to Abuja to collect a cheque from the federal allocation. Then each state is also involved in internal revenue generation. When you hear or see the budget that is being announced by the various states and then when you look at what is on the ground at the end of the year, you will begin to ask yourself if naira is so useless that we cannot achieve a lot of things. I think that we have not managed our resources well” (A **Traditional Leader, Edo State**).*



*“It is so disappointing to know that Nigeria is still borrowing as rich as the country is. We borrow to embezzle and not to improve infrastructure and other areas. So, that is why there is a problem because we don't save for rainy days. We don't project into the future and we cannot manage our resources properly. There is too much corruption in the system. Take for example what happened recently when they decided to pardon some of those governors that looted public funds. In other parts of the world, those people will be executed” (A Religious Leader, Edo State).*



Disaggregation of the data showed a proportionate perception within the group of categories including gender and age category except for the geo-political zone. Based on the geo-political zone, although all the zones mostly rated the government's effort poorly, particularly the South-South (83%) and South West (81%), however, mostly the North West rated the effort of the government 'Just OK' 38% and 'Very Well' 18% respectively. South-South zone rating is not surprising given the peoples' age-long agitations for the protection of water, soil, air and forest from oil spills and community development using internally generated revenue.

**In your opinion, how well does the government manage the funds that comes from the country's natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc)?**  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 35: Demographic Analysis of Efforts of the Government in managing funds from natural resources by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.5.2 Citizens' Perception of Availability of Natural Resources and the Increase of Corruption

We explored the respondents' perceptions to establish if natural resource availability could stimulate a further rise in corruption in Nigeria. From the survey findings, 38% of the respondents were positive about the effects, 40% think otherwise and 22% were indifferent. The 2021 and 2022 data shows the percentage of those that strongly disagreed and disagreed have remained unchanged compared to the slight 3% change for those that are indifferent in perspective, and a total of 5% change for those that agree and strongly agree.



**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can increase corruption?**




Figure 54: Perception of the availability of natural resources and increase in corruption

The demographic analysis by geopolitical zone showed that mostly the North Central (52%) and South-South (52%) respondents agreed that the availability of natural resources could increase corruption. Mostly the North East respondents (39%) feel indifferent about the statement. While the majority of North-Central (33%) disagreed with the statement, mostly the North-West (22%) and South-East (22%) respondents strongly opposed the statement.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can increase corruption?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 36: Demographic Analysis of Perception of natural resources towards corruption by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.3 Citizens' Perception of Availability of Natural Resources and Conflicts**

Respondents were also asked to give their opinion on whether they agree or disagree that the availability of natural resources can trigger conflicts in Nigeria. Overall, findings reveal that 43% of Nigerians affirmed that they “Agree or Strongly Agree” that the availability of natural resources can trigger conflicts in the country. On the other hand, 36% either “disagreed or strongly disagreed” with this statement.

**To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can trigger conflicts?**




Figure55: Perception of the availability of natural resources and conflicts

Data disaggregation showed that respondents residing in the South-South (56%), followed by North Central (47%) were the highest respondents who strongly expressed that the availability of natural resources can trigger conflicts in Nigeria.

**To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can trigger conflicts?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Figure56: Perception of the availability of natural resources and conflicts

**5.5.4 Citizens' Perception of Availability of Natural Resources and Increase in Commodity Prices**

Access to affordable commodities remains a crucial aspect of measuring the well-being of citizens. We assessed the respondents' opinions about the availability of natural resources that may cause an increase in commodity prices while comparing the responses with the 2021 data. A total of 47% of the respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed that the availability of natural resources would increase commodity prices in the country and this is a 2% change (increment) from 2021 data. 25% of the respondents agreed and 6% strongly agreed that natural resource availability has contributed to increased commodity prices, however, this is a 4% change (decline) from 2021 data.



**To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can lead to an increase in the prices of commodities in the country?**




Figure 57: Perception of natural resources towards an increase in the price of commodities

Further data disaggregation showed that mostly respondents age 61 and above 27% and mostly those residing in North-Central (38%) and South-South (35%) “Agree” that availability of natural resources can increase commodity prices in Nigeria. 39% of the North East respondents were mostly indifferent; South West respondents (33%) mostly disagreed, and mostly North West respondents strongly disagreed with the statement.

**To what extent do you agree with the statement that the availability of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) can lead to an increase in the prices of commodities in the country?**  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 37: Demographic Analysis of Perception on natural resources towards increase in commodity prices by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.5 Citizens Awareness of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) of 2021**

The level of awareness of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) of 2021 is very low. A total of 68% of the respondents said they are not aware of the Act while only 20% of the respondents are aware. Other respondents 'Don't Know/Refused' to answer (12%).

**Are you aware of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) of 2021, especially, the aspect of host community development?**




Figure 58: Citizens' awareness of the PIA (2021)

It is somewhat surprising that only at least 6 in 10 of the Southern zone respondents are not aware of the Act despite being oil-producing zones, unlike the Northern zone respondents who are more knowledge, particularly the North Central (81%) and North West (77%) respondents. Interestingly, 30% of South-South and 29% of South East respondents are mostly unaware of the Act.

**Are you aware of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA) of 2021, especially, the aspect of host community development?**  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 38: Demographic Analysis of awareness of the PIA (2021) by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

We assessed the impression citizens have about the Host Community Development Trust Fund provided by the PIA. 43% of the respondents agreed that the provision of the Host Community Trust Fund for host communities is fair. In contrast, 41% of the respondents said the trust fund is unfair to host communities while the remaining respondents simply said they “Don't Know/Refused” to answer (16%).

**What is your impression about the Host Community Development Trust Fund provided by the PIA?**




Figure59: Citizens' impression of the Host Community Development Trust Fund provided by the PIA

**5.5.6 Citizens' Awareness of Derivation Policy**

Following the respondents' level of awareness of the Act, respondents were asked about their knowledge of the derivation policy. The result showed that only 36% of the respondents are aware of the policy while 64% are unaware of the policy. The trend analysis between the 2021 and 2022 data showed a 1% change within each view. This finding implies that the policy is unpopular among the people and may limit its estimated benefits for the people.

**Are you aware of the 13% derivation policy? (Money given to oil producing states)**




Figure60: Nigerians' Awareness of derivation Policy

Data disaggregation revealed that mostly the female respondents (67%) are unaware of the policy compared to the male respondents (61%). Similarly, mostly the aged (72%) are unaware of the policy than other age categories. In the geo-political zone, it is mostly the South-South (47%) and South East (43%) respondents that are aware of the policy compared to other zones.



**Are you aware of the 13% derivation policy? (Money given to oil producing states)  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 39: Demographic Analysis of awareness of the Derivation Policy by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.7 Citizens' Perception of the Derivation Policy**

We assessed the impression of citizens about the 13% derivation policy in the sharing of oil money in Nigeria and found that the majority of the respondents are of the view that “It's unfair; they deserve much more” (59%). While 38% of the respondents feel that the sharing formula is ok, 3% feel that it is too much and should be reduced. The share of those with an unfair perspective increased by 14%, ok perspective declined by 12% and too much perspective declined by 6% in total.

**What is your impression about 13 percent derivation policy in the sharing of oil money in Nigeria?**




Figure 61: Nigerians' perception of the derivation policy

Based on the dominant impression that the 13% derivation policy is not adequate, we further assessed citizens' opinions based on the national average, gender, age category and geo-political zone. The results showed that the national average of 59% had people aged 61 and above mostly sharing the view that “It's unfair; they deserve much more.” The South-South (77%) has the largest number of citizens who believe “It's unfair, they deserve much more.”

**What is your impression about 13 percent derivation policy in the sharing of oil money in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 40: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' perception of the derivation policy by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.8 Trust in the Current Administration to Restructure the Country for Effective Management of Natural Resources**

We asked citizens the extent of trust they have in the current Federal Government to restructure Nigeria in a way that would give ownership and control of natural resources to the states where they are domiciled. The results showed that 62% of the respondents do not trust the Federal Government at all which is a 4% increment in perception from 2021 data thus implying that the degree of trust has declined. On the other hand, 34% of the respondents said “I trust them a little” and 4% trust the government which is a 4% decline in the level of those with trust.

**How much trust do you have in the current Federal Government to restructure Nigeria in a way that would give ownership and control of natural resources (such as crude oil, gold, bitumen, coal etc) to the states where they are domiciled?**




Figure 62: Extent of Trust in Nigerian Government to restructure

National disaggregation of the 62% of respondents that do not trust the government to restructure Nigeria was more domiciled across the categories, particularly the geo-political zones where the Southern zone highly rated distrust in the government. From the findings, mostly the Southern region, particularly the South-South (80%) followed by South West (76%) and South East (74%) acknowledge a high level of distrust in the federal government to restructure the economy in a way that would give ownership and control of natural resources to the states where they are domiciled. Nevertheless, 50% of North Central and 46% of North West respondents indicated little trust in the federal government.




Table 41: Demographic Analysis on Extent of Trust in Nigerian Government to restructure by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.5.9 Feelings about Sustainability of Resources in Nigeria

We asked citizens about their opinion concerning the sustainability of resources in Nigeria. The results showed that 60% of the respondents said “The government is doing too little to sustain natural resources.” On the other hand, only 24% said “The government is trying its best in sustaining natural resources.” The remaining respondents cannot qualify (16%) for the effort of the government.




Figure 63: How Citizens feel about sustainability of resources

Following the disaggregated data, the key finding showed that mostly the aged (66%) and South-South (73%) respondents opine that the government is doing too little to sustain natural resources. Whereas, mostly the North Central (31%) respondents feel that the government is trying its best while mostly the North East respondents (30%) could not qualify the efforts of the government.

**Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings about the sustainability of resources in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 42: Demographic Analysis of how Citizens feel about sustainability of resources by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.9.1 The role of Local Communities in Resource Sustainability**

We asked citizens if communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria. The result showed that a total of 60% of the respondents believe that communities have a role to play in the sustainability of resources in the country while 19% of the respondents disagreed with a degree of variations. Clearly from the findings, the majority of the respondents understand the importance of resource sustainability and the role of the community in promoting sustainable resources. If probed further, they may provide information on its implicating effect when poorly managed.

**Do you agree or disagree that local communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria?**




Figure 64: Citizens' perception of the role of local communities in resource sustainability

A significant finding from the disaggregated data showed that most of the respondents acknowledge that communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria.

**Do you agree or disagree that local communities have a role to play in resource sustainability in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 43: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of the role of local communities in resource sustainability by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.10 Sources of Oil Spillage**

Oil regions are currently plagued by external effects including water and air pollution of oil spillage over the years, so, it becomes imperative to assess the causes of oil spillage from the respondents. The finding showed that illegal oil mining and bunkering (64%) are the main causes of oil spillage, followed by oil companies (17%) and 19% of the respondents that do not know the cause nor refused to give a response. The finding thus indicates that the government needs to intensify more effort to curtail illegal mining and bunkering in oil-producing states.

**In your opinion, which of these is a regular source of oil spillage?**




Figure 65: Sources of oil spillage

**5.5.11 Perception of Oil Companies' effort in responding to oil spillage**

Having established the cause of oil spillage, it became imperative to assess the response of oil companies to environmental pollution in the area of operations. The finding showed that 61% of the respondents rated the efforts of the company poorly, 27% rated its effort fairly while only 12% rated its effort positively.




Figure66: Oil companies' effort in responding to oil spillage

**5.5.12 Perception of Federal Government effort in responding to oil spillage**

Concerning the issue of oil spillage and the response of oil companies to the problem, it becomes important to recognise the response of the federal government to the problem. From the findings, the study showed that 53% of the respondents rated the government poorly (33%) and very poorly (20%) 34% rated the government fairly and 13% rated the government positively. Overall, the majority feel that the response of the federal government is underperforming in this aspect.




Figure67: Federal Government effort in responding to oil spillage

Assessing further the perception of the respondents on the response of the federal government to oil spills based on geo-political zone, the study revealed that the majority of respondents that rated the government negatively were highest in the South South (69%) and South West (64%).



**How would you rate the response of the Federal Government to oil spillage?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 44: Demographic Analysis of Federal Government effort in responding to oil spillage by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.13 Citizens' Perception of Black Soot**

Considering the rise in black soot reports, this study investigated the causal factors in oil-producing states.

**5.5.13.1 Black Soot and burning of seized crude by Security Operatives**

The issue of black soot has become a significant problem in oil-producing states with far-reaching implications for health and the environment. It thus became necessary to confirm the cause of black soot. Findings showed that a total of 55% of the respondents believe that the burning of seized crude oil by security operatives increases black soot; 22% of the respondents think otherwise while 23% are uncertain about its effects. Overall, the finding depicts that the burning of seized crude oil pollutes the environment.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about black soot?  
Burning of seized crude by security operatives increases black soot?**




Figure 68: Perception of black soot and burning of seized crude

**5.5.13.2 Black Soot and Cleanup**

Furthermore, the study investigates if soot clean-up increases black soot. The findings presented in the chart below showed that a total of 20% of the respondents disagree that soot clean-up increases soot; 26% were uncertain, and 54% were positive that it worsens the level of soot in the area.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about black soot? Cleanup (the setting ablaze of crude oil sites by some oil contractors) increases black soot?**




Figure 69: Perception of black soot and cleanup

### 5.5.13.3 Black Soot and Health

Further investigation showed that a total of 57% of the respondents believe that black soot has an implicating effect on health in oil-producing communities. Whereas, 18% disagreed that it has an implicating effect on health while 25% were uncertain about its effect.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about black soot? Black soot is responsible for many of the health challenges in oil-bearing communities?**




Figure 70: Perception of black soot and health challenges in oil-bearing communities

### 5.5.14 Citizens' Perception of Illegal Mining

This study assessed citizens' perceptions of illegal mining in Nigeria.



**5.5.14.1 Illegal Mining and Banditry**

We assessed the opinion of the respondents on whether illegal mining promotes banditry. The results showed that over 6 in 10 of the respondents believe that illegal mining promotes banditry (64%) including 25% that strongly agree with the statement. On the other hand, 19% of the respondents disagree with the statement including 8% strongly disagreed that illegal mining promotes banditry in the country. Those indifferent to the perspectives were 17% of the respondents.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about illegal mining?  
Illegal mining promotes banditry**




Figure 71: Perception of illegal mining and banditry

Based on the geo-political zone, further analysis of the data on whether illegal mining promotes banditry revealed that mostly the respondents age 61 and above (68%), North Central (70%) and South South (71%) are positive that it promotes banditry.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about illegal mining? Illegal mining promotes banditry  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 45: Demographic Analysis of perception of illegal mining and banditry by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.14.2 Illegal Mining and Food Security**

The findings showed that illegal mining has a significant impact on food security whereby 58% of the respondents are positive with the statement. 23% of the respondents held a contrary view to the statement while 19% of the respondents were indifferent.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about illegal mining?  
Illegal mining affects food security**




Figure 72: Perception of illegal mining and food security

Demographic analysis of the perception of illegal mining and food security across the board showed that the majority of the respondents agreed that illegal mining affects food security. In specific, mostly 47% of South-South and 45% of North Central respondents agreed that illegal mining affects food security. Whereas, mostly North East respondents (35%) strongly agreed and North West respondents (20%) disagreed.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about illegal mining? Illegal mining affects food security  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 46: Demographic Analysis of the perception of illegal mining and food security by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.14.3 Perceived collaboration between Elites, Illegal Miners and Bandits**

We assessed whether elites collaborate with illegal miners and bandits. The results showed that out of all the respondents, 35% agreed and 28% strongly agreed with the statement while 10% disagreed and 7% strongly disagreed with the statement. 20% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement. Most of the respondents believe that elites collaborate with illegal miners and bandits.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about illegal mining? The elites collaborate with illegal miners and bandits**




Figure 73: Perception of collaboration between the elites, illegal miners and bandits

Demographic analysis of the perception of collaboration between the elites, illegal miners, and bandits by national average, gender, age group and the geo-political zone was further carried out. The key findings showed that the majority of the respondents agreed that elites collaborate with illegal miners and bandits across the board. In specific, mostly 43% of respondents aged 61 and above agreed with the statement. Geo-political zone findings showed that mostly North Central (48%) and South-South respondents (42%) agreed while mostly South West respondents (38%) strongly agreed. The national average was 35% for those who “Agree” that elites collaborate with illegal miners and bandits.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about illegal mining? The elites collaborate with illegal miners and bandits by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 47: Demographic Analysis of the perception of collaboration between the elites, illegal miners and bandits by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.15 Citizens' Perception of Climate Change in Nigeria**

We further assessed citizens' perceptions on climate change. The findings showed that 65% of the respondents consider climate change as a serious issue including 28% of the respondents that consider it a very serious problem in Nigeria. On the other hand, 20% feel that it is not a serious problem while 15% are uncertain.




Figure 74: Perception of climate change

When we analysed further based on the geo-political zone, we found that mostly the North East participants (44%) consider climate change as a very serious problem compared with North Central (47%) that perceive it as a fairly serious problem.




Table 48: Demographic Analysis of perception of climate change by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.15.1 Perception of Climate change as causes of Resource Conflicts in Nigeria**

We assessed citizens' perceptions of climate change as a cause of resource conflict in Nigeria. The result showed a total of 50% of the respondents do not agree that resource conflicts in Nigeria are mainly caused by climate change including 13% that strongly disagreed with the perspective. Nevertheless, 19% of the respondents including 3% of the respondents strongly agree that it affects climate change in the country. 31% of the respondents were indifferent about the causal factor.

**Do you agree or disagree that resource conflicts in Nigeria are mainly caused by climate change?**




Figure 75: Perception of climate change as the cause of resource conflicts

We further found that majority of the respondents who disagreed with the perspective that resource conflict is mainly caused by climate change are mostly those aged 36-60 years 40% and North Central residents (46%). The majority of the respondents with indifferent views were more dominant amongst the youths (33%), North East (38%) and South West (35%) zones.

**Do you agree or disagree that resource conflicts in Nigeria are mainly caused by climate change?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 49: Demographic Analysis on the perception of climate change as causes of resource conflicts by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.5.15.2 Federal Government efforts in reducing the consequences of climate change**

The efforts of the federal government to reduce the consequences of climate change were perceived as “Fair” by the majority of the respondents (37%). Some perceived government's efforts as very poor (18%), poor (33%), good (11%) and very good (1%).

**How would you rate the efforts of the federal government to reduce the consequences of climate change?**




Figure 76: Effort of the federal government in reducing consequences of climate change

When we analysed the data further, we found that citizens who fairly rated the government's effort were more dominant amongst the youths (39%) and the North Central zone (45%). The positive perception was highly rated by the aged (55%), followed by those aged 36-60 years (53%), South East (60%) and South-South (58%).

**How would you rate the efforts of the federal government to reduce the consequences of climate change? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 50: Demographic Analysis of effort of the federal government in reducing consequences of climate change by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.6 Assessment of Gender Equity as a Component of Social Cohesion**

This section examines citizens' perceptions of challenges around gender equity in Nigeria specifically addressing access to education, leadership, merit, etc.

### 5.6.1 Gender Equity and equal access to Education

This study assessed if boys and girls should have equal access to education. Findings from gender equity and equal access to education showed that the majority of the respondents support the view that boys and girls should have equal access to education. A total of 80% of the respondents including 46% strongly believe indicated that both genders must have equal access to education. Only 16% of the respondents think otherwise while 4% of the respondents were indifferent. This implies that the perception of equal access to education irrespective of gender is fast declining, particularly among those with a strongly agreed view.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Boys and girls should have equal access to education**




Figure 77: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and equal access to education

Further analysis showed that respondents that highly rated gender equity for access to education were more significant among those age 18-35 years (81%) and 36-60 years (80%) within the age category for geo-political zone, mostly North Central (91%) and South South (90%) respondents suggested that boys and girls should have equal access to education.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Boys and girls should have equal access to education by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 51: Demographic Analysis on Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and equal access to education by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.6.2 Gender Equity and Woman Leadership

Findings from the investigation on whether women should be allowed to lead in society including corporate entities and politics showed that the majority of the respondents believe that women should be allowed to lead across institutions. In specific. A total of 61% of the respondents held positive views including 37% that agreed and 27% that strongly agreed. 24% of the respondents held negative views including 10% that strongly disagreed that women should lead. The overall findings showed a total of 6% rise in agreed perception and 12% decline in disagreed perception. This implies that the percentage of those with a positive view has fast declined within a short period of 1 year.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Women should be allowed to lead in all, especially in the society, including in corporate entities, and politics**




Figure 78: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women's leadership

Further findings reveal that women are free to take positions in institutions but limited by religion in the occupation of leadership positions in the country. The following key respondents claimed that:



*“Yes, they are given the freedom to participate. But this is also hampered by religion; Islam is a religion that ensures that everyone has equal rights but it limits women when it comes to leadership positions because of the laws of her religion” (A Religious Leader, Zamfara State).*

*“For almost 300 years that America got independence, have we ever had a female president? It is just recently that they got a woman that is a vice president. You know what happened when a woman contested for the presidency the other day in the USA”.....Traditional leader Edo State*

The above findings thus indicate that religious belief is a major factor that is limiting women from undertaking leadership roles in our society.

Data disaggregation showed that the majority of respondents that agreed and strongly agreed were mostly females (68%), South-South (83%), North Central (74%) and North East (74%). Participants that mostly disagreed and strongly disagreed with women leading in society were highest among the male (27%), youths (24%), middle-aged (24%), North West (44%) and South East (34%).



**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Women should be allowed to lead in all, especially in society, including in corporate entities, and politics  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 52: Demographic Analysis on Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women leadership by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.6.3 Gender Equity and Merit**

Furthermore, the study investigated whether people should assume positions by merit rather than gender. The findings showed that 71% of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed while 16% of the respondents strongly disagreed and disagreed. 13% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. Overall, the findings showed that the perception of strongly agree significantly declined by 7% and agree perception increased by 6%.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female, and focus on other characteristics such as: qualification, competence, and track records etc.**




Figure 79: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and merit

To further buttress the view that positions should be assumed by merit only, key respondents suggest that:



“First of all, it is not mandatory and somebody must get a position because the person is feminine even when the person cannot manage”.....**Traditional leader Anambra**

Thus implying that people, irrespective of gender, should be allowed to occupy positions by merit only including qualification, competence and track records.

Assessing further the responses of the respondents by demography, we found that majority that agreed and strongly agreed are females (73%), the aged (79%), South-South (84%) and South-West (82%). While mostly those that disagreed and strongly disagreed are North West residents (33%).

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? We should stop thinking about whether people are male or female, and focus on other characteristics such as: qualification, competence, and track records etc.**  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 53: Demographic Analysis of Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and merit by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.6.4 Gender Equity and Women's Entitlement to Family Inheritance

The respondents were asked if women should be allowed equal entitlement to family inheritances and the study found that the majority of the respondents agreed (32%) and strongly agreed (28%) with the statement. 13% of the respondents strongly disagreed and 13% of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Between the 2021 and 2022 data, the percentage of those with strongly agree view has significantly declined by 9% and agree view has significantly increased by 6%, respectively.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity? Women should be allowed equal entitlement to family inheritances**




Figure 80: Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women's entitlement to family inheritance

Further investigation reveals that:



*“In Islam, humans are not responsible for giving the inheritance to anyone; the Quran has made such provision stating what should be given to who. Anyone that feels his or her rights has been denied, the person can take it to court to get justice” (A Religious Leader, Zamfara State).*

Data disaggregation revealed that respondents that believe that women should be allowed equal entitlements to family inheritances were highest among the females (66%) compared to males (53%), the aged (66%) compared with other age groups, and North East (77%), South-South (75%) and South West (75%) compared to other zones.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Women should be allowed equal entitlement to family inheritances  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 54: Demographic Analysis on Perception of Nigerians on gender equity and women's entitlement to family inheritance by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.6.5 Citizens' Perception of Efforts of the Federal Government at Promoting Gender Equity**

Investigation on government's effort at promoting gender equity reveals that more than 5 in 10 of the respondents rated the government poorly (32%) and very poorly (21%) while more than 1 in 10 of the respondents rated the government good (13%) and very good (2%). 32% of the respondents rated the government fairly. Trend analysis showed that the negative rating of the government performance increased by 4%, fair performance increased by 2% and the positive rating declined by 6%. Overall, the finding showed that the government is performing poorly at promoting gender equity in Nigeria.

**How would you rate the efforts of the Federal government at promoting gender equity in the country?**




Figure 81: Effort of the Current Administration in promoting gender equity

A demographic analysis of government efforts at promoting gender equity revealed that the majority of the respondents including the aged (56%), South East (68%) and South-South (69%) zone highly rated the government poorly compared to within group of categories.

**How would you rate the efforts of the Federal government at promoting gender equity in the country?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 55: Demographic Analysis of Efforts of the Current Administration in promoting gender equity by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.6.6 Citizens' Perception of Efforts of the Current Administration at Prohibiting Gender-Based Discrimination and Violence**

On the current administration's effort on passing laws and policy implementation to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence, the study found that the respondents rated the government very poor (24%), poor (30%), fair (30%), good (14%) and very good (2%). Overall, the trend between 2021 and 2022 data showed that negative ratings increased by 3% while positive ratings declined by 4% and fair ratings increased by 1%. This finding thus implies that the government is perceived to be underperforming in this aspect.

### How would you assess the current administration in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence?




Figure 82: Effort of the Current Administration in Implementing Policies on Discrimination and Violence

Similarly, key respondents poorly perceive the government's effort at the passage of laws and implementation of policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence. This is evident below where some of the key respondents implied that:



*“The implementation has been very poor. Just as I said earlier, the laws are there but implementation is poor. For instance, if there is a case of sexual harassment, you'd discover that it is those that have the money that can afford a court case. And a lot of times when you go to the police station, the culprit is able to bribe his way and then becomes free” (A Traditional Leader, Benue State).*

*“Let me speak more for Kaduna state. I have come to know the efforts put in place by the Kaduna State government (previous and current administration) to domesticate the child protection law. But there was so much politics about it; in fact, there was a serious divide between religious leaders because some felt certain provisions of the law were not proper. The current government have tried to see that some of those laws are past or domesticated. But when one also looks at some of the provisions, one could see that they still have issues” (A Religious Leader, Kaduna State).*

Further demographic analysis of the government's effort to the implementation of policies on discrimination and violence against women and girls indicates that while North Central (40%), North East (35%) North West (31%) and South West (31%) mostly rated the government's effort as “fair”, South East (42%) zone mostly rated its efforts poorly while the South-South (38%) believe it is “very poor”.

**How would you assess the current administration in the area of passing laws and implementing policies to protect women and girls from discrimination and violence?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 56: Effort of the Current Administration in Implementing Policies on Discrimination and Violence by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.6.7 Citizens' Perception of Efforts of the Government at Creating Opportunities for Political Appointments for Women**

When the respondents were asked to assess the current administration's effort at providing more opportunities for women to be appointed to political offices, the majority revealed that the government's effort has been "fair" (32%), poor (31%), very poor (20%), good (15%) and very good (2%). Overall, the chart below shows that the government has mostly been rated averagely for the last 1 year.

**How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at providing more opportunities for women to be appointed into political offices?**




Figure 83: Effort of the Current Administration for Women in Political Appointments

Contrary to the quantitative findings, we found mixed findings for the qualitative interviews whereby while a few of the key respondents claim that the government has not performed very well in providing more opportunities for women to be appointed to political offices, a few others claimed otherwise.



“Describing the participation of women compared to men, I'd say it is still very low. It is just few women that I can say have access to political office. The reason for this is that the women are always relegated to the background in every society. It is only when those in power decide to bring one or two women on board so that their party could have dominance over the other party that you'd see one or two women” (A **Traditional Leader, Benue State**)

“I know that the governor of my state (Kaduna state) has been one of the very few governors in this country that has promoted women's participation in politics generally. Even from the number of political appointments that he'd been dishing out to women, I think it is a sign of an encouragement to them that they can do it. And it is also giving them an opportunity to test themselves and have self-confidence as well as encourage themselves to participate. Like I said, if I were to score them, I'd score the state very much higher than the federal” (A **Traditional Leader, Kaduna State**).

“Women are given the opportunity to participate in politics when it comes to positions such as house of representatives and house of assembly. We have about three female commissioners in this present administration. We have commissioner for humanitarian service” (A **Religious Leader, Zamfara State**).



Further demographic analysis reveals that about half of all the respondents rated the effort of the government poorly across the group of categories. About half of the respondents equally rated the government fairly while a small proportion rated the government positively.

**How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at providing more opportunities for women to be appointed into political offices?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 57: Effort of the Current Administration in Creating Opportunities for Women in Political Appointments by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.6.8 Perception of Efforts of the Government at Prohibiting Sexual Violence Against Women

Respondents were asked to rate the effort of the Government to Prohibiting Sexual Violence against Women. From the findings, less than 2 in 10 of the respondents rated the government very good (3%) and good (16%); exactly 5 in 10 of the respondents rated the government very poor (22%) and poor (29%) while 30% rated the government fairly. When comparing the 2021 and 2022 data, we conclude that the government is underperforming in the prohibition of sexual violence against women.



**How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at punishing sexual and gender-based violence offenders?**




Figure 84: Effort of the Current Administration in prosecuting offenders of sexual violence against women

Similarly, the key respondents confirmed that the laws are not implemented to protect women or girls against sexual violence in the country, unfortunately. According to the key respondents,



“There are laws on violence against women and all that but the issue lies with the implementation, a girl gets raped and the person that did it is arrested but after a while, you will not hear anything about the case again so I think the government needs to do more” (A Religious Leader, Edo State).

“There are human rights organizations. When such abuses happen, they come in to help the victim when the victim has no one to stand for her. Human rights activists do their best towards ensuring that the victims of human rights abuse get justice” (A Traditional Leader, Adamawa State).

The demographic analysis also revealed that the majority of the Southern zone residents especially the South East (61%) rated the government negatively. On the other hand, mostly the North East (34%) and North West (27%) rated the government positively.

**How would you assess the efforts of the current administration at punishing sexual and gender-based violence offenders? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 58: Demographic Analysis of Effort of the Current Administration in prosecuting offenders of sexual violence against women by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone



### 5.6.9 Perception of Efforts of the Federal Government at Preventing the incidence of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Respondents were asked about the efforts of the Government at Preventing the incidence of Sexual gender-based Violence Against Women in 2022. A significant number of those surveyed rated the government's effort poorly (31%), followed by fairly (30%), very poorly (20%), good (17%) and very good (2%).




Figure 85: Effort of the federal government at preventing the incidence of SGBV

Similarly, the following key respondents noted:



*“I participated in the promotion of a bill called the VAPP (Violence Against Persons Prohibition) Bill. Which is more or less like all-encompassing. It had within it, components of Sharia law, components of customary and civil law and we fought tirelessly to lobby and ensure that the bill was being passed and thank God that it has been passed. That is one bill that one could rely on as a bill that can really surface and do all that is expected to be done in terms of protection of persons from violence” .....Traditional leader Kaduna State*

*“One thing is to enact the law and another thing is to implement it, sincerely speaking we have a lot of laws about domestic violence and what have you but how effective are these laws, even all these rape rape cases at first it will be loud everywhere but after a while everything dies down” .....Traditional leader Edo State*

### 5.6.10 Citizen Perception of Women's Participation in Politics

The study further assessed the level of women's participation in politics in Nigeria while specifically examining participation in political rallies, voting exercises during an election, contesting for political positions during an election, etc.

#### 5.6.10.1 Women's participation in political rallies

The 2022 data on respondents' perception of women's participation in political rallies showed that 38% of the women opine that women must always participate in a political rally compared with 44% of the people in the 2021 data which is a 6% perception decline. Participants with 'often views' declined from 23% in 2021 to 17% in 2022. While those with 'sometimes view' increased by 5% and 'never view' increased by 7% between the 2021 and 2022 dates respectively.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?  
Participation in a political rally**




Figure 86: Perception of Women's Participation in Political rally

From the key respondent's interview,  
 “Women in Nigeria would have been active participants in politics but of the prejudice we have about politics, the number of women that participate in politics is not reasonable. Every woman that wants to participate in politics is seen as someone that wants to join the gang of criminals. And we believe that she also has developed the attitude of criminals. She is either said to be flirting or chasing men”.....**Religious leader Kaduna State**

Concerning women's participation in a political rally, the geo-political zone with the highest number of respondents with always perspective was highest among the females (43%) compared to males (33%), and South-South (60%) compared to other zones.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Participation in a political rally  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 59: Demographic Analysis of Women Participation in Political rally by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

In addition, respondents with always view were highest among rural (40%) than urban (36%) residents, Christians (49%) than other religious groups and respondents with Secondary education and above (41%) than those with lower educational qualifications (28%). Most respondents with 'sometimes views' were highest among the Muslims (30%) and 'never view' was mostly rated by Muslim respondents (30%) and respondents with less than secondary school education (27%).

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Participation in a political rally by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 60: Demographic Analysis of Women Participation in Political rally by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.10.2 Women's participation in Voting Exercise during Elections**

On respondents' perception of women's participation in voting during elections, the findings revealed significant support for 'Always' participation (65%) which is a 3% increase from 2021 data. Those with often (17%) views in 2022 declined from 22% in the 2021 data.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Vote during elections**




Figure 87: Perception of Women's Participation in voting during elections

Similarly, a key respondent opined that:



“Women mostly participate when it comes to voting more than coming out for elective office, you know they have the number so you see them more in the voting process”.....**Religious leader Kaduna State**



Further analysis revealed that the majority of participants with the 'Always' view spread across all the group of categories, particularly in South-South (77%) and North East (72%) which recorded the highest rating.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Vote during elections by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 61: Demographic Analysis of Women's Participation in voting during elections by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

In the following group of categories, while respondents with 'Always' perspective were significantly evidenced among Christians (70%), and respondents with secondary school education and above (68%) compared to others within group categories, most respondents with 'Often' view were Traditional/other religious worshippers (38%).

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Vote during elections by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 62: Demographic Analysis of Women's Participation in voting during elections by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level



### 5.6.10.3 Women Contesting in Elections

The study enquired from the respondents about how often should women contest in elections. The majority of the respondents opine that women should 'Always' contest (48%) which is a 2% increase from 2021 data. Respondents with 'Often' view (23%) declined by 3% from 2021 data (26%). A few respondents supported the 'Sometimes' view (18%) while 11% of the respondents opine that women should 'Never' contest elections.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Contest during elections**




Figure 88: Perception of Women's Participation in contesting during elections

Contrarily, while a key respondent believes that women are not given the opportunity, a few others claim that women are not discriminated against contesting for political positions in the country.

The key respondent with a contrary view claims that:



*“We don't give the women the opportunity and support to participate in politics. We believe that women are just to stay at home. It is not supposed to be so. Women have a lot of things to do in politics” (A Traditional Leader, Plateau State).*

However, a few other key respondents believe that:



*“Women are given the opportunity to participate in politics when it comes to positions such as house of representatives and house of assembly. We have about three female commissioners in this present administration. We have commissioner for humanitarian service” (A Traditional Leader, Zamfara State).*

*“Well, in terms of provision of more opportunities for women to be appointed into political offices, I don't think that it is the responsibility of the government alone. We also have a role to play in society to ensure that women participate in government and politics. As an example, what the government (starting from the governor to other political elites) does is just to appoint and they would always appoint those that worked with them towards achieving the office they occupy. But society can also effect a change. We have women that are aspiring for offices that we can vote for into those offices” (A Religious Leader, Adamawa State).*

Further demographic findings on how often women should contest in elections revealed that most of the respondents with 'Always' perspective are females (53%) compared to male (42%), North East (67%) and South-South (62%). Most of the respondents with 'Often' view are North West (28%) and South-South (27%) residents. Respondents that highly rated against women from contesting in elections were mostly North West (17%) respondents.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Contest during elections by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 63: Demographic Analysis of Women's Participation in contesting during elections by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

The following disaggregation showed that the majority of the respondents that support women to always contest were highest among the Christians (57%) and those with secondary school education and above compared to other categories.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Contest during elections by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 64: Demographic Analysis of Women's Participation in contesting during elections by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.10.4 Women and Political Party Leadership Positions**

Respondents were asked about how often should women should hold political party leadership positions. The findings showed that 44% suggest that women should "Always" contest during elections and this is a 3% increment from 2022 data. 23% suggested 'Often' participation, 20% suggested 'Sometimes' participation and 13% suggested 'Never' opinion. The trend analysis indicates that those with 'Never' perspective increased by 4%, 'Sometimes' perspective decreased by 3% and 'Often' perspective declined by 4% from the 2021 data.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities? Hold political party leadership positions**




Figure 89: Perception of Women holding leadership positions in political parties

Despite the majority of the respondents' support that women should always hold leadership positions in political parties, a few key respondents feel otherwise based on religious beliefs. According to the respondent,



*“Going by what the Quran says, it said that we should not allow any woman to lead. When it comes to leadership, this country does not allow that. It is meant for men. That's why Allah said in holy Qura]; it says that men are the head and that women must obey and respect them. Even the prophet was against women leading. Can you allow a Muslim to lead you in prayer? I'm sure it is a no! Imagine asking a woman to lead the salaah. That is not possible. Islamically, women are not allowed to participate in politics but they can be appointed into some key positions such as ministers and others. In this present administration, we have some women that hold key positions such as the minister for finance, minister for women's affairs in the person of Paulin Tallen, etc. I think we should give them appointments and not lead us.....**Religious leader Plateau State***

Data disaggregation revealed that the majority of the female (49%) compared to male (37%) want women to always hold leadership positions in political parties. Similarly, mostly the North East (62%) and South-South (60%) support that women should always hold a leadership position in political parties. On the other hand, mostly North West (20%) respondents think that women should never assume such a position.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?  
Hold political party leadership positions  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 65: Demographic Analysis of Women holding leadership positions in political parties by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

In addition, while most Christian respondents (52%) suggest that women should always assume leadership positions in political parties, most Muslim respondents (20%) feel that women should never occupy the position. Most respondents with a secondary school education and above (46%) believe that women should always hold leadership positions in political parties while mostly those with lower qualifications (17%) feel that women should never take up the position.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?  
Hold political party leadership positions  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 66: Demographic Analysis of Women holding leadership positions in political parties by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.10.5 Women and Political Appointments in Government**

Respondents' views on how often women should hold political appointments showed that 46% agree that women should always take political appointments. 23% suggest that women should often take political appointments, 20% opine that women should sometimes take the appointments and 11% feel that women should never assume political appointments in government. In comparison to 2021 data, we observed a 3% increment in 'Always' perspective, a 5% decline in 'Often' perspective, a 1% decline in 'Sometimes' view and a 3% increase in 'Never' view that women should hold political appointments in government.



**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?  
Hold political appointments in the government**




Figure 90: Perception of Women having political appointments in government

Similarly, a number of the key respondents opine that the number of women holding political appointments in government is still very low, however, a few state governments are encouraging women to take up positions in government. According to a few key respondents,



*“I know that the governor of my state (Kaduna state) has been one of the very few governors in this country that has promoted women's participation in politics generally. Even from the number of political appointments that he'd been dishing out to women, I think it is a sign of an encouragement to them that they can do it. And it is also giving them an opportunity to test themselves and have self-confidence as well as encourage themselves to participate”.....**Traditional leader Kaduna State***

*“A lot has to be done for the women in terms of appointments. The percentage is still very low. In terms of elective positions, women have to come up. And the various political parties should give women at least 30 - 40% opportunities. But I don't think that we have up to 20%. How many women are at the national assembly for example? It has even reduced since the inception of this present administration”.....**Traditional leader Edo State***

*“I think this is one of the administrations that has done more in terms of appointing women into political offices. I earlier said that so many women were appointed to political offices in this administration. And I can say that the government need to do more in that regard. They should reserve special seats for women at the national and state houses of assembly. They should provide affirmative action for women in political parties' administration”.....**Religious leader Plateau State***

Demographic analysis showed that a significant majority of female respondents (50%) expressed support for women's appointment in government compared to male respondents (40%). In the same vein, more respondents from the North East (63%) and South-South (61%) expressed strong support for women's appointment in government. However, those that reject the view of women taking government appointments were highest among the North West respondents (17%).

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?  
Hold political appointments in the government  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 67: Demographic Analysis of Women having political appointments in government by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further demographic disaggregation showed that most Christians (54%) always want women to take government appointments compared to 6% that oppose the view. Similarly, 35% of Muslims want women to take the appointment compared to 17% that feel that women should refrain from such appointments. While 49% of respondents with secondary school education and above always want women to hold political appointments in government, 10% completely feel otherwise.

**On average, how often should women participate in the following political activities?  
Hold political appointments in the government  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 68: Demographic Analysis of Women having political appointments in government by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.11 Perception of Gender as a factor in Income Determination**

When asked whether respondents think gender should be a factor in determining income, the majority (82%) said "No" while 18% said "Yes".

**Do you think gender should be a factor in determining income?**




Figure 91: Citizens' perception of gender as a factor in income determination

A further look at the data by key demography showed that the majority of respondents who said 'No' had an average of 82% across the geopolitical zones of the country. Interestingly, more males (22%) than females (13%) opined that gender should be a factor in income determination. Similarly, mostly the North West (28%) and South East (23%) respondents feel that gender should be a determinant of income.

**Do you think gender should be a factor in determining income?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 69: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of gender as a factor in income determination by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.6.12 Citizens' Perception of Gender Equity and Income**

This section presents citizens' perceptions of gender equity and income in Nigeria.

**5.6.12.1 Male Gender and Higher Income**

The respondents were asked if the male gender should earn a higher income. Putting this into perspective about income equity, survey findings revealed that the majority of respondents (52%) said they “agree” or “strongly agree” that the male gender should earn a higher income, while 33% of the respondents opposed the statement. Only 15% neither agreed nor disagreed. This finding showed that most of the respondents prefer that men should earn more income.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Male gender should earn higher income**




Figure 92: Citizens' Perception of the male gender earning a higher income

Demographically, the findings showed that while most male respondents (30%) strongly agreed, mostly females (25%) agreed that males should earn more. Disaggregation by zone showed that the majority that agreed are mostly North Central (47%). The majority that strongly disagreed is South East (28%) respondents and disagreed are mostly those aged 61 years and above (19%). Mostly South West (37%) strongly agreed that males should earn more.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Male gender should earn higher income  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 70: Demographic Analysis of Citizens perception on male gender earning higher income by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

In addition, further demographic analysis revealed that mostly the rural residents (56%) support the male gender earning more than the female gender compared to mostly the urban residents (36%) that are against the such notion. Similarly, while mostly the Muslims (56%) and Christians (51%) highly supported that the male gender earns more, mostly the Traditional and other religious groups feel otherwise (50%).

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Male gender should earn higher income  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 71: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of male gender earning higher income by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.12.2 Female Gender and Higher Income**

Still, on gender equity, the respondents were asked if they agree or disagree that the female gender should earn a higher income than their male counterparts. From the findings, 33% of the respondents agreed (21%) and strongly agreed (12%); 42% of the respondents strongly disagreed (16%) and disagreed (26%); 25% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed. The findings show that about half of the respondents object to women earning a higher income in the country.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Female gender should earn higher income**




Figure 93: Citizens' Perception of the female gender earning a higher income

The view that women should earn a higher income than men was indicated with mixed thoughts. For the gender category, while mostly the female respondents believe that women should earn more income (41%), mostly the male respondents (50%) oppose the view, rather suggest that women should earn less. For the geo-political zone, mostly the North Central support the view that women should earn more compared to other zones while mostly the South East zone respondents (60%) prefer that women earn less.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Female gender should earn higher income  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 72: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of female gender earning higher income by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

In addition, 27% of urban respondents, 24% of rural respondents, 29% of Muslims, 26% of members of traditional and other religions, 24% of Christians, 26% of those with secondary education and above and 25% of those that do not have formal/informal/primary education mostly disagree that female should earn a higher income.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
Female gender should earn higher income  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 73: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of female gender earning higher income by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.12.3 Perception of family and the community when a woman earns a higher income**

Respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree about when a woman earns more income, and do the family and community benefits more. Findings revealed that 45% of the respondents agreed (28%) and strongly agreed (17%), 31% of the respondents strongly disagreed (10%) and disagreed (20%), and 25% neither agreed nor disagreed.



**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
When a woman earns higher income, the family and community benefit more**




Figure 94: Citizens' Perception of family and community benefiting more when a woman earns a higher income

The consensus that when women earn more, the family and community benefit more was significantly widespread across the demographics. For gender, mostly the male (38%) oppose the view compared to mostly the female (56%) that support the view that the family and community benefit more when women earn more. Mostly those aged 36-60 years think that the family and community do not benefit more when women earn a higher income. In the geo-political zone, the majority that supports the statement were highest among the North Central (61%), followed by North East (56%). Those that highly rated against the statement were the South East (40%).

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
When a woman earns higher income, the family and community benefit more  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 74: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of family and community benefiting more when a woman earns higher income by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Additionally, while mostly the rural residents (47%) support the statement, mostly the urban residents feel otherwise (31%) about family and community earning more when a woman earns a higher income. Mostly the Traditional and other religious groups (55%) were affirmative that the family and community are better off when the woman earns a higher income and mostly felt otherwise (41%) at the same time.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
When a woman earns higher income, the family and community benefit more  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 75: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of family and community benefiting more when a woman earns higher income by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.6.12.4 Perception of Family and the Community when a Man Earns Higher Income**

On the other hand, the respondents were asked if the family and community benefit more when the man earns a higher income. A total of 54% of the respondents agreed (31%) and strongly agreed (23%); while only 24% of the respondents strongly disagreed (8%) and disagreed (16%). 22% of the respondents were indifferent.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
When a man earns higher income, the family and community benefit more**




Figure 95: Citizens' Perception of family and community benefiting more when a man earns a higher income

Disaggregation by gender revealed that mostly the male (60%) were positive about the family and community is better off when they earn more. Geo-political zone findings showed that mostly the North Central significantly agreed that when males earn more, the whole family and community benefit more. Contrarily, mostly the South East (37%) opposed the view that family and community benefit more when men earn more.



**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
When a man earns higher income, the family and community benefit more  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 76: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of family and community benefiting more when a man earns higher income by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further disaggregation showed an insignificant perception in variation within urbanisation and educational attainment categories demographics below. Only religion category showed disparate views. It is mostly the Traditional and other religious groups that strongly disagreed (24%) that when a man earns more, the family and community benefits more. It is also the least group to agree with the view.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about gender equity?  
When a man earns higher income, the family and community benefit more  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 77: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of family and community benefiting more when a man earns higher income by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.7 Assessment of Impunity as a Component of Social Cohesion**

This section presents the results of the analysis of citizens' perception of the concept of Impunity, as a factor either promoting or hindering social cohesion in Nigeria. In particular, it focuses on issues regarding the respect, protection, guarantee, and promotion of human rights in Nigeria.



### 5.7.1 Feeling of Nigerians about Human Rights Abuses and Violations

Human rights abuses and violations are serious issues in Nigeria hence the need to establish if the circumstances have improved or worsened. When the respondents were asked about how serious the issue of human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria, the study found that about 6 in 10 of the respondents (58%) consider it a very serious problem, and 29% perceive it as a fairly serious problem and 9% think it is a minor problem. Overall, 96% of the respondents consider the issue of human rights abuses and violations as a problem in Nigeria. The trend showed that the problem has slightly worsened.

**How serious is the issue of human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria?**




Figure 96: Extent of Human Rights abuses and violations

Across the categories, all the respondents held similar views with little to no disproportion to the perceptions that human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria as worsened in Nigeria. Mostly those age 61 and above and 36-60 years consider human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria as a very serious problem. Similarly, mostly South South and South West highly rated the view as a very serious problem.

**How serious is the issue of human rights abuses and violations in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	Total	Gender		Age Category			Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	18-35 years	36-60 years	61 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
A very serious problem	58%	59%	56%	55%	61%	63%	42%	61%	45%	65%	71%	70%
A fairly serious problem	29%	29%	30%	31%	27%	28%	47%	29%	36%	19%	19%	21%
A minor problem	9%	9%	9%	10%	8%	5%	9%	3%	15%	11%	6%	6%
Not a problem	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	2%	0%
Not sure	3%	2%	3%	3%	3%	2%	1%	6%	2%	3%	2%	3%

Table 78: Demographic Analysis on Extent of Human Rights abuses and violations by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone



### 5.7.2 Likelihood to Report Human Rights Abuses to the Police

Considering the worsened state of human rights abuses and violations in the country, the respondents were asked about their likelihood of reporting the problem to the Police. A significant number of those surveyed (35%) said they were unlikely to report human rights abuses to the Police and the total number of people with such view has declined by 4% when compared with the 2021 data. Some of the respondents are 'somewhat likely' (32%) and very likely (24%) to report the problem. While somewhat likely view has declined by 5% between the 2021 and 2022 data, those that are very likely to report significantly increased by 9% between the 2021 and 2022 data.

**What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuses would report such cases of abuse to the police?**




Figure 97: Likelihood to report Human Rights abuses to the Police

Disaggregation reveals that respondents that are very likely to report the problem are highest in the North East (40%); those that would somewhat likely report are mostly in the North East (37%); respondents that would unlikely report are mostly North Central (44%) and South-South (44%), and those that will never report are mostly the South East (19%) and South-South (15%).

**What is the likelihood that victims of human rights abuses would report such cases of abuses to the police? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 79: Demographic Analysis on reporting Human Rights abuses to the Police by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.7.3 Likelihood to Report Human Rights Abuses to Community or Religious Leader

Furthermore, the study investigated the likelihood of reporting human rights abuses to the community or religious leaders. The study found that 8% would never report, 32% are unlikely to report, 36% are somewhat likely to report and 24% are very likely to report to the leaders. Overall, the total number of respondents that are very likely to report significantly increased by 9% while those that are somewhat likely to report declined by 5% and are unlikely to report declined by 4% when compared with the 2021 data.




Figure 98: Likelihood to report Human Rights abuses to a community or religious leader

By disaggregation showed that respondents that are most very likely to report are significantly more in the North East (42%); data of somewhat likely to report cut across the board similarly except for those aged 61 years and above (25%) who are the least to report to the leaders. While those that are unlikely to report are mostly the aged (43%), the least is the North East respondents (18%). Mostly the South-South (17%) respondents would never report to the leaders.




Table 80: Demographic Analysis on reporting Human Rights abuses to a community or religious leader by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further analysis showed that mostly the Tradition and other religious groups (33%) and Christians are very likely and somewhat likely to report the problem to the leaders, respectively. Whereas, mostly the Traditional and other religious groups (39%) are most unlikely to report to the leaders. Those that will never report are proportionate across the board.




Table 81: Demographic Analysis on reporting Human Rights abuses to a community or religious leader by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.7.4 Citizens' Perception of Unreported Cases of Human Rights Abuses in Nigeria**

We assessed citizens' opinions on levels of unreported cases of human rights abuses in the country. Overall, 66% of Nigerians said the cases of unreported human rights abuses in the country are “Extremely high” (22%) and “High” (44%). This result indicates that the problem has worsened considering the total percentage increase of 'High' perspective (4%) and 'Extremely High' perspective (7%) when compared with the 2022 data. Those with moderate views declined by 5% and low declined by 6%.




Figure 99: Extent of unreported cases of Human Rights abuses in Nigeria

Across geopolitical zones, the data showed a clear divide between the North and South zones of the country. In specific, more citizens from the South West (82%), followed by South East (76%) and South-South (70%) expressed strong feelings of unreported cases of human rights abuses, than respondents from the North Central (69%), North East (57%) and North West (48%).

**In your opinion, what is the level of unreported cases of human rights abuses in the country?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 82: Demographic Analysis on Extent of unreported cases of Human Rights abuses in Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.7.5 Likelihood Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuses to go Unpunished

When we assessed the likelihood of perpetrators of human rights abuses going unpunished, we found that the majority of respondents (69%) believe that it is very likely (38%) or somewhat likely (31%) for the perpetrators to go unpunished and not be convicted even when reported. On the other hand, 31% of the respondents surveyed think that perpetrators of human rights abuses would be punished and convicted if reported. This result implies an increasing trend for very likely responses and decreasing trend for somewhat likely, 'Unlikely' and 'Never' responses when compared to the 2021 data.

**What is the likelihood that perpetrators of human rights abuses, even when reported, may still go unpunished?**




Figure 100: Likelihood of perpetrators of reporting Human Rights abuses going unpunished

Digging further across key demographics, the data showed that within each category, mostly those aged 61 years and above (51%), South West (85%) and South-South (80%) respondents indicated that perpetrators of human rights abuses may still go unpunished.

**What is the likelihood that perpetrators of human rights abuses, even when reported, may still go unpunished?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 83: Demographic Analysis on Likelihood perpetrators of report Human Rights abuses to go unpunished by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.7.6 Perception of State Agent's Involvement in Human Rights Abuses

On whether state agents such as the police and military are perpetrators of human rights abuses, the survey revealed that 96% of the respondents opined that these state agents “Always” (16%) or “Often” times (31%) or 'Sometimes' (49%) involve in human rights violations compared to 4% of the respondents that think otherwise. Nevertheless, the trend analysis showed that the frequency by which state agents violate human rights has significantly increased from a 10% change in 'Sometimes' view to a 10% change in 'Often' view.

**How often would you say state agents (such as the police and military) are themselves perpetrators of human rights abuses?**




Figure 101: Perception of State Agent's involvement in Human Rights abuses

Disaggregating the data by demography showed that at least 9 in 10 of the respondents particularly gender, age and geo-political zone categories believe that state agents do abuse people's rights in the country. Most of the respondents across the categories believe that state agents sometimes abuse human rights as evidenced in the chart below.

**How often would you say state agents (such as the police and military) are themselves perpetrators of human rights abuses?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 84: Demographic Analysis of perception of state Agent's involvement in Human Rights abuses by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.7.7 Perception of Impunity among Government Officials**

The respondents were asked to ascertain the presence of impunity among government officials in President Buhari's administration. The study found that most of the respondents rated 'Yes' (59%) while 22% rated 'No' and 19% are uncertain. In comparison with 2021 data, the study found that the perception of impunity in this current administration has increased by 6% while the perception of those that think otherwise has decreased.

**In your opinion, do you think there is impunity among government officials in President Buhari's administration?**




Figure 102: Perception of impunity among government officials

Again, similar to the 2021 findings, the opinions of Nigerians regarding the level of impunity among government officials of President Buhari's administration differs across age groups and geopolitical zones. In terms of age groups, a larger percentage of Nigerians who are senior citizens (68%) think there is impunity among government officials. By geo-political zone, mostly the Southern zone particularly the South West (75%) highly rated the presence of impunity among the government officials of President Buhari's administration.



**In your opinion, do you think there is impunity among government officials in President Buhari’s administration?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 85: Demographic Analysis of the perception of impunity among government officials by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.7.8 How Nigerians Feel about Impunity in the current Administration**

Having established the presence of impunity in the government of President Buhari's administration, it became imperative to assess the level of impunity in his system of government, The findings showed that over 7 in 10 of the respondents perceive it as very high (77%) compared to 18% that feel it has remained the same, 4% that feel it is very low and 1% that are unsure of the level of impunity in this administration.

**If yes, please rate the level of impunity among government officials in the Buhari’s administration?**




Figure 103: Extent of impunity among government officials in the current administration

In the same vein, nearly every respondent rated it high, particularly those aged 61 years and above (81%), and South West respondents (91%).

**If yes, please rate the level of impunity among government officials in the Buhari’s administration?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 86: Demographic Analysis of the extent of impunity among government officials in the current administration by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.8 Assessment of Corruption as a Component of Social Cohesion**

This section presents the results of the analysis of citizens' perception of the concept of “Corruption”, as a factor either promoting or hindering social cohesion in Nigeria.

**5.8.1 Perception of Level of Corruption in Nigeria**

Respondents were asked to assess the level of corruption in Nigeria compared to the past year. Findings revealed that the majority of Nigerians (75%) believe corruption is increasing in the country. This result showed an increasing trend when compared with 2021 data (69%). 21% feel it has remained the same, however, the perception has declined by 5% when compared with the 2021 data.

**In your opinion, over the past year, how would you assess the level of corruption?**




Figure 104: Extent of corruption in the country

From the findings, many of the key respondents claim that corruption has become institutionalised in the system owing to the non-zealousness of the political leaders. According to a few key respondents,



“In 1983, Nigeria was described as a nation that has an international reputation for large-scale corruption. That was when Buhari overthrew the government of Shagari. Nigeria was described as a nation that has an international reputation for large-scale corruption. From that time to date, you can see how billions and trillions of dollars and Naira have been looted from this country by political leaders. But it is so surprising that nobody has been brought to book. When this government came to power, people thought that Buhari would fight corruption to a standstill but suddenly along the line, people discovered that this administration is very corrupt in so many areas” (A Religious Leader, Edo State).

“Wow! I would not know... Corruption has become a cankerworm that has eaten deep into the fabric of Nigeria. Corruption is practiced in faith places, in homes, in government offices and even on the road. Little children that are ordinarily supposed to be transparent are also corrupt. If one wants to know how bad corruption is in the Nigerian system, one should call a child and his or her friend. Give the child an amount of money and ask the child to go and share (into half) with his or her friend. That child won't give his or her friend 50% of that money. He or she won't tell the friend that they were asked to share the money. That is how terrible corruption is” (A Religious Leader, Kaduna State).

“Corruption is a very big issue. The root cause of most of the challenges that we are facing in Nigeria is corruption. Buhari came with the intention to fight corruption in the country. The actions he took initially were good ones but the problem that hampered his efforts was that they changed methods of corruption” (A Religious Leader, Zamfara State).

Further disaggregation of the data revealed that all the respondents shared similar views that corruption is increasing in the country and only the North West zone mostly indicated that corruption has remained the same (38%).

**In your opinion, over the past year, how would you assess the level of corruption?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 87: Demographic Analysis of the perception of corruption in the country by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.8.2 Citizens' Perception of Efforts of Government at Fighting Corruption

The government's effort at fighting corruption was rated very badly. 94% of the respondents rated the government's effort very poorly (45%), poorly (31%) and fairly (18%) while 5% rated it good and 1% rated it very good. Overall, there is a significant 13% increase in very poor and poor ratings; a 6% decline in fair ratings; a 6% decline in good ratings; and a 1% decline in very good ratings.

### How would you rate the effort of the Federal Government in fighting corruption?




Figure 105: Effort of the government in fighting corruption

Considering the high level of corruption, a few key respondents suggested reasonable avenues to address the problem in the country. According to the leaders,



*“The consequences include the fact that it hampers development. The country cannot move forward with corruption. And if corruption has to be checked, the first thing to be done is to check the cost of living by trying to improve the standard of living of the people. That is where the battle starts from. How do you expect a married person with three or four children to cope with a 10-thousand-naira monthly income? We have to think of how to deal with poverty before corruption” (A Traditional Leader, Benue State).*

*“I think that it is more complicated because the law is too flexible for people to manipulate. We've seen people that have actually committed the crime of corruption but when they are taken to court, they are given a slap on the wrist or they are freed entirely just because of one technical issue or other. As long as this remains, it will be a mirage when will continue to talk about how to stem the tide of corruption. Everybody has keyed into it” (A Traditional Leader, Edo State).*

Further disaggregation of the assessment that the government has underperformed in fighting corruption is mostly rated by the aged (84%), South West (86%), South-South (86%) and South East (82%).

### How would you rate the effort of the Federal Government in fighting corruption? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

	Total	Gender		Age Category			Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	18-35 years	36-60 years	61 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
Very Poor	45%	48%	44%	43%	48%	53%	42%	30%	32%	52%	61%	60%
Poor	31%	29%	32%	32%	29%	31%	35%	31%	36%	30%	25%	26%
Fair	18%	17%	18%	19%	17%	9%	20%	29%	21%	14%	10%	13%
Good	5%	5%	4%	5%	5%	5%	2%	7%	9%	3%	3%	1%
Very Good	1%	1%	2%	1%	1%	2%	1%	3%	2%	1%	1%	0%

Table 88: Demographic Analysis of the effort of the government in fighting corruption by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.8.3 Perception of Access to Justice Being Free from Corruption

Respondents were asked if access to justice is free from corruption in Nigeria. The findings revealed that about 4 in 10 believe that access to justice is never free from corruption compared with those that feel it is sometimes (51%), often (10%) and always (3%) free. Nevertheless, the trend analysis showed that the perception that access to justice has never been free from corruption increased by 10% while other views declined by 4% (sometimes view), 5% (often view) and 1% (always view), respectively. The findings thus showed that access to justice is not entirely free from corruption in Nigeria.




Figure 106: Perception on justice being free from corruption

Digging further through the demographics showed a similar proportion of perception within the gender and age categories. By geo-political zone, the findings showed that mostly the South East (48%) and South-South (62%) feel that access to justice is by corruption while mostly the Northern zone particularly the North East (72%) feel that access to justice is free from corruption in Nigeria.




Table 89: Demographic Analysis of the perception of justice being free from corruption by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

#### 5.8.4 Forms of Corruption prevalent in Nigeria

In assessing the most prevalent forms of corruption in Nigeria, survey data revealed that financial corruption (46%) is the most prevalent form of corruption. This was followed closely by political corruption (40%) and everyday/petty corruption (14%).




Figure 107: Forms of corruption prevalent in Nigeria

While further establishing the different forms of corruption, a key religious leader claimed that:



*“There are different forms of corruption. One of them is bribery. Exam malpractice is another form of corruption and it is common. We have students that bribe teachers and lecturers in school and it is not supposed to be so. There is a hadith of the prophet that says [00:48:35.04, quoting hadith]. “Whoever is involved in act of bribery or corruption is not part of us here on earth and hereafter”. So, I think it is important to stop all forms of corruption because it is not good. We should depend on Allah for assistance” (A Religious Leader, Plateau State).*

Across the demographics, the majority of the respondents highly rated financial corruption as the most prevalent in Nigeria. In specific, the male and female gender synonymously rated financial corruption as the age category. For the geopolitical zone, North East is the least region that rated political corruption (22%) and the most region that rated financial corruption (64%).




Table 90: Demographic Analysis of corruption prevalent in Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.8.5 Most Damaging Form of Corruption**

In addition, the respondents were asked about the most damaging form of corruption. A significant number (45%) rated financial corruption as the most damaging compared to 42% and 13% that rated political corruption and petty corruption, respectively. This finding showed that the three forms of corruption have an implicating effect but with varying degrees.




Figure 108: Citizens' perception of the most damaging form of corruption

Digging further, respondents that mostly rated financial corruption as the most damaging form of corruption is North East (63%). While respondents that mostly rated political corruption as the most damaging form of corruption are South East (55%). Mostly North West (20%) rated everyday/petty corruption as the most damaging form of corruption in Nigeria.

**In your opinion, which of these forms of corruption is most damaging?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 91: Demographic Analysis of Citizens' perception of the most damaging form of corruption by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.9 Assessment of Peacebuilding as a Component of Social Cohesion**

In this section, the survey explores the idea of peacebuilding as a component of social cohesion in Nigeria. It explores citizens' understanding and practice of peacebuilding, how local peacebuilding efforts can resolve local conflicts, the willingness of citizens to participate in local peacebuilding practices and gauges the extent to which the federal government deploys peacebuilding to resolve conflicts.

**5.9.1 Nigerians' Understanding of Peacebuilding Practices**

In gauging citizens' understanding of peacebuilding, respondents were asked what they understand of peacebuilding practices. Interestingly, the majority of Nigerians (48%) perceive peacebuilding as general actions carried out or taken to bring out peace among people. 20% understand peacebuilding as conflict resolution/peace management or building and 13% understand it to mean unity amongst everyone, coming together as one and coexisting.

**What do you understand by peacebuilding practices?**

2022




Figure 109: What Peacebuilding practices mean to Nigerians



Further findings reveal that:



*“Maybe peace building process is just about trying to see how one will be able to solve most of the conflicting issues that are lingering around in the countries that are the drivers of all these insecurities that we are talking about. Maybe it is talking about the grudges or discontentment of the Fulani herdsmen that have taken arms as bandits and kidnapers. Maybe it is about the discontentment of the Kanuris who are the main drivers of the Boko-Haram insurgency. Maybe it is about the issue of discussions or taken on issues that are promoting or driving ethnic conflicts throughout the country most especially in states like mine where ethnic conflicts do exist in a lot of the local governments in this state. It could mean a lot of things” (A Religious Leader, Kaduna State).*

*“Talking about the peace-building process in Nigeria, I will say that every Nigerian should first of all have the country at heart. One should have it in heart that he or she is a Nigerian and will be here for Nigeria and do whatever he or she is doing for Nigeria. So, if one can give themselves to serve the country, another person's life would be affected positively. By so doing, people will feel as equals. And we should love the country and that love can be extended” (A Traditional Leader, Adamawa State).*

A demographic analysis of what peacebuilding practices mean to respondents revealed that mostly 49% of male and 47% of female understands peacebuilding as general actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people. This is followed by 51% of 61 and above years, 48% of 18-35 years and 47% of 36 - 60 years respondents who exhibit the same understanding of peacebuilding practices. In terms of geopolitical zones, 56% each of North East and North West, South East (50%), North Central and South West (44% each) and South-South (38%) also understand peacebuilding as general actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people.

**What do you understand by peacebuilding practices?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**

	Total	Gender		Age Category			Geo-political Zone					
		Male	Female	18-35 years	36-60 years	61 and above	North Central	North East	North West	South East	South South	South West
General actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people	48%	49%	47%	48%	47%	51%	44%	56%	56%	50%	38%	44%
Conflict resolution/ peace management or building	20%	20%	20%	19%	21%	20%	36%	11%	11%	17%	23%	26%
Unity amongst everyone, coming together as one, co-existing	13%	14%	12%	12%	13%	13%	12%	16%	15%	4%	18%	8%
Discussions, talks, dialogues to bring peace among conflicting parties	2%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%	4%	1%	2%	2%	5%
Crisis prevention	2%	1%	2%	2%	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%	0%	1%	2%
Equality and equity	2%	2%	2%	3%	2%	2%	1%	5%	0%	0%	8%	0%
Setting rules, laws or regulations (by-laws) on peaceful co-existence	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%	2%	1%
No idea, don't know	12%	11%	13%	12%	13%	11%	5%	6%	13%	26%	8%	14%

*Table 92: Demographic Analysis of what Peacebuilding practices mean to Nigerians by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone*

Additionally, urban and rural dwellers (48% each) understand peacebuilding as general actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people. In the same way, 52% respondents of traditional and other religions, Muslim (51%) and Christian (48%) in addition to 50% of respondents who have no formal/informal/primary education as well as the 49% who have secondary education and above understand peacebuilding as general actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people.

**What do you understand by peacebuilding practices?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**

	Total	Urbanization		Religion			Highest Education Attainment	
		Urban	Rural	Christian	Muslim	Traditional/ others	No formal/ Informal/ Primary Education	Secondary Education & Above
General actions carried out or taken to bring about peace among people	48%	48%	48%	48%	51%	52%	50%	49%
Conflict resolution/ peace management or building	20%	21%	19%	22%	16%	18%	16%	21%
Unity amongst everyone, coming together as one, co-existing	13%	12%	13%	12%	13%	0%	11%	13%
Discussions, talks, dialogues to bring peace among conflicting parties	2%	3%	2%	2%	3%	9%	2%	2%
Crisis prevention	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%	5%	2%	1%
Equality and equity	2%	3%	2%	3%	1%	2%	1%	3%
Setting rules, laws or regulations (by-laws) on peaceful co-existence	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%
No idea, don't know	12%	11%	13%	11%	13%	14%	17%	10%

Table 93: Demographic Analysis of what Peacebuilding practices mean to Nigerians by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.9.2 Perception of how Local Peacebuilding efforts can resolve recurring conflicts**

An overwhelming majority of respondents (58%) agreed (41%) and strongly agreed (17%) that local peacebuilding efforts can be used to resolve recurring conflicts in Nigeria. On the contrary, 16% disagreed (16%) and 6% strongly disagreed with the opinion that local peacebuilding efforts can be used to resolve recurring conflicts in Nigeria. The remaining 20% neither agreed nor disagreed with the opinion.

**In your opinion, can Nigeria's recurring conflicts be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts?**




Figure 110: Perception of local peacebuilding efforts to help resolve conflicts

According to a key respondent,



*“Peacebuilding is a vital issue. The truth is that if anybody wants peace, the person has to work for it. No one can pay lip service to peace. People cannot meet in the afternoon and agree on something and some of them would meet some other people at midnight to do something contrary. So, that is the way I look at it. Peace is a give-and-take thing. There is compromise involved. It is important and the people you mentioned (traditional rulers and others) have roles to play and there is no question about that. But it is not a one-man show as there is nothing a single individual can do. Unless everybody involved agrees. If a traditional ruler calls community people to make peace today and then they go for another secret meeting in somebody's house to say regardless of the fact they respect him, they cannot stop what they have been doing and agreed to stop. There will be no peace. Peace requires that we all have to be involved with genuine intentions to make peace. It requires some compromise to be able to reach it” (A Traditional leader Edo State)*

Moving further, respondents' opinions on peacebuilding as a tool for mitigating conflicts were cross-tabulated with gender, age group and geo-political. In all, huge numbers of respondents including 42% male and 40% female, 52% of age 61 and above years, 42% of 36–60 years and 41% of 18-35 years age groups agree that Nigeria's recurring conflicts can be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts. Similarly, 56% of South-South, 52% of North Central, 42% of South East, 39% of South West and 39% of Northwest, and 23% of North East mostly agreed that local peacebuilding can be a tool for resolving conflicts in Nigeria.

**In your opinion, can Nigeria's recurring conflicts be resolved through local peacebuilding efforts?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 94: Demographic Analysis of Perception on local peacebuilding efforts to help resolve conflicts by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

### 5.9.3 Willingness to Participate in Peacebuilding Practices

Participants were asked if they would willingly participate in peacebuilding practices. The study found that at least 4 in 10 of the respondents are extremely willing (43%) to participate, 33% are somewhat willing, 9% are somewhat unwilling, 4% are extremely unwilling and 11% are indifferent to the idea of participating in peacebuilding practices. Overall, 76% are willing to participate in peacebuilding practices but to some varying degree of participation.

### How willing are you to participate in peacebuilding practices?

2022




Figure 111: Extent Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding practices

Again, respondents' opinions were crossmatched with their gender, age groups and geo-political zones. Gender and age categories held similar perceptions for each of the variables. The majority of the respondents are somewhat and extremely willing to participate in peacebuilding practice across the categories. The breakdown shows that mostly North East (64%) had the highest rating for extreme willingness.

### How willing are you to participate in peacebuilding practices? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 95: Demographic Analysis of the extent Nigerians are willing to participate in peacebuilding practices by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

#### 5.9.4 Gauging Federal Government Peacebuilding approaches in tackling conflicts

Findings from the frequency of the federal government's effort at deploying peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts revealed it is mostly 'Sometimes' done (53%) compared to 'Often' (19%), 'Always' (14%) and 'Never' (14%) done. The findings showed that the Nigerian government does take some peacebuilding efforts in tackling conflicts in the country.

**How often does the Federal Government deploy peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts?**




Figure 112: Gauging federal government peacebuilding approaches

Further investigation revealed that the majority of the respondents believe that the federal government sometimes uses peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts. In this regard, 61% of North East, 56% of North Central, 52% of South South, 52% of North West, 51% of South East and 49% of South West concur that the federal government sometimes uses peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts.

**How often does the Federal Government deploy peacebuilding approaches to tackle conflicts? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 96: Demographic Analysis on gauging federal government peacebuilding approaches by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.9.5 Efforts of the Federal Government in the area of Peacebuilding**

Respondents were asked to assess the efforts of the federal government in the area of peacebuilding. From the result, most of the respondents rated the federal government effort fairly (35%). A total of 52% of the respondents rated its effort poorly (33%) and very poorly (19%). Only 13% rated their effort good (12%) and very good (1%). Overall, the government is not taking significant efforts to proffer peacebuilding solutions.

**How would you rate the efforts of the Federal Government in the area of peacebuilding?**




Figure 113: How Nigerians rate the federal government in peacebuilding

According to a key respondent,



*“The government has done a lot. During the most recent crises in Plateau state, the government tried to call stakeholders from both religions and traditional rulers as well. They had a discussion with the government and the government tried to bring together peace-keeping stakeholders such as the vigilante groups, neighbourhood watch, policemen, etc. The government has tried a lot and there has been peace, and I know that it shall be a lasting one” (A Religious leader Plateau State)*

Disaggregating the data across social demographics shows that the opinions of respondents fluctuated between poor and fair performance. There is no significant difference in perception between how male and female respondents perceive government's effort at promoting peacebuilding. In the same way, mostly North Central (52%) rated government's effort as fair; mostly South West (68%) and South South (72%) rated government's effort negatively

**How would you rate the efforts of the Federal Government in the area of peacebuilding?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**





Table 97: Demographic Analysis of how Nigerians rate the federal government in peacebuilding by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.10 Assessment of Polarization as a Component of Social Cohesion**

This section of the study focuses on polarization as a component of social cohesion. It exposes the level of polarization in Nigeria from the perspective of ethnicity, religion, politics, etc.

**5.10.1 Extent of Polarization in Nigeria today**

Citizens were asked whether they agree or disagree that Nigeria is more polarized today than it was under the previous administration. Overall, more than half of the respondents (53%) affirmed that Nigeria is more polarized today than it was under the previous administration. However, 28% of respondents affirmed otherwise. 19% of the respondents were indifferent.



*Figure 114: What Citizens think about polarization*

A juxtaposition of the national averages with some socio-demographic variables, the results showed that a large proportion of respondents agree that Nigeria is more polarised today than it was under previous administrations. There is no significant difference between how male and female respondents comparatively perceive the nation's divide. However, mostly the senior citizens agree (40%) that Nigeria is currently more polarized than the previous administration. For geopolitical zone, mostly North Central (63%) and South South (69%) perceive that Nigeria is more polarized.




Table 98: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

A significant number of Christians (61%) and those with secondary school education and above (58%) mostly and positively rated Nigeria as a more polarized country today than it was under the previous administration. On the other hand, mostly the Traditional religious worshippers suggested that Nigeria is more united today than it was under the previous administration.




Table 99: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.10.2 Perception of Polarization based on ethnicity**

The study assessed if ethnicity is the cause of the current polarization compared to the previous administration and found that more than 6 in 10 of the respondents agreed (35%) and strongly agreed (27%) that ethnicity plays a role in division among the people. A total of 25% of the respondents disagreed (14%) and strongly disagreed (11%) with the claim that Nigeria is more divided based on ethnicity than in the period before the current administration. 13% neither agreed nor disagreed with the claim.





**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization? Nigeria is more divided on the basis of ethnicity than the period before the current administration**




Figure 115: Perception of polarization on ethnicity

Further investigations showed that the majority of the respondents agreed with the assertion that Nigeria is more divided based on ethnicity than in the period before the current administration. The key findings showed that the rate of those that agreed and strongly agreed is lowest in North West (39%) and highest in North Central (80%) and South-South (80%). While the zone that mostly disagreed and strongly disagreed is the North West (43%).

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization? Nigeria is more divided on the basis of ethnicity than the period before the current administration**  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone




Table 100: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization on ethnicity by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

In addition, mostly the urban (60%) and rural (65%) opine that ethnicity has a role to play in the current national divide compared to the previous administration. In the same vein, mostly the Christians (70%) support the view that ethnicity plays a role whereas those with disagreement are highest among the Traditional and other groups of worshippers (41%). Mostly 67% of respondents that have secondary education and 50% of those that do not have formal/informal/primary education agree that Nigeria is more divided based on ethnicity than in the period before the current administration.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?  
Nigeria is more divided on the basis of ethnicity than the period before the current administration  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 101: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization on ethnicity by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.10.3 Perception of Polarization based on religion**

Furthermore, the survey gauged the opinion of respondents on the extent to which religion is the current cause of polarization in Nigeria compared to the previous administration. The study found that more than 5 in 10 of the respondents agreed (32%) and strongly agreed (25%) that religion plays a significant role. Whereas, 26% of the respondents strongly disagreed (9%) and disagreed (17%) with the view. Only 17% neither agreed nor disagreed.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?  
Nigeria is more divided on the basis of religion than the period before the current administration**




Figure 116: Perception of polarization on religion

Cross-tabulation findings revealed that the respondents shared similar views for the gender category, For the age category, mostly the aged (64%) agreed and disagreed that gender is currently the cause of polarization in the country compared to the previous administration. Geo-political zone findings revealed that most of the South-South (80%) significantly agreed and strongly agreed on the role of religion while mostly the North West (42%) countered the role of religion in the current national divide.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?  
Nigeria is more divided on the basis of religion than the period before the current administration  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 102: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization and religion by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further analysis revealed that respondents shared similar views for the urbanization category. While examining religion findings, the data showed that mostly the Christians agreed (67%) with the role of religion as the cause of the current national divide compared to mostly the Traditional and other religious groups (51%) that countered such claims. Moreover, mostly rural residents (60%) and those with at least secondary education (62%) are positive that religion plays a role in the current country divide compared to the previous administration.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?  
Nigeria is more divided on the basis of religion than the period before the current administration  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 103: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization and religion by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level



**5.10.4 Perception of Polarization based on politics**

The study also assessed the role of politics in the country's divide and found that most of the respondents believe that politics plays a significant role. From the findings, a total of 6 in 10 of the respondents agreed (33%) and strongly agreed (27%) that the cause of polarization in the nation is politics. On the other hand, a total of 21% of the respondents asserted that politics does not play a significant role in the nation's divide. 19 % neither agreed nor disagreed compared to other respondents.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?  
Nigeria is more divided on the basis of politics than the period before the current administration**




Figure 117: Perception of polarization on religion

These averages were crossmatched with the gender, age group and geopolitical zones of respondents. Again, the majority of the respondents expressed their agreement with the claim that Nigeria is more divided based on politics than in the period before the current administration. For the geopolitical zones, mostly the North Central (74%) and South-South (77%) similarly asserted that politics is the underlying cause of national polarization. On the other hand, mostly North West (37%) countered the role of politics as a cause of polarization in Nigeria compared to the previous administration.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization?  
Nigeria is more divided on the basis of politics than the period before the current administration  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 104: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization and religion by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

When the data were disaggregated by socio-demographics, the result showed an unbroken trend of agreement with the claim that Nigeria is more divided based on politics than in the period before the current administration. The significant finding showed that mostly Christians (66%) and those with secondary education (63%) believe that politics is an underlying cause of the current divide in the country.

**To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about polarization? Nigeria is more divided on the basis of politics than the period before the current administration by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 105: Demographic Analysis of what Citizens think about polarization and religion by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.11 Assessment of Coping Strategy as a Component of Social Cohesion**

Given the current economic hardship, political instability and leadership deficit which have complicated Nigeria's security challenges, the study focused on the coping strategies of Nigerians. The major interest here is to capture the ways Nigerians cope with the challenges and assess the support and assistance offered by the federal government to Nigerians.

**5.11.1 How Nigerians rely on the government for support to cope with challenges**

The study assessed if Nigerians rely on the government for support to cope with the challenges. The findings revealed that at least 5 in 10 of the respondents do not (53%) rely on the government for support compared to 47% that rely on the government most of the time (27%) and all the time (20%).




Figure 118: How Nigerian rely on the government to cope with various challenges

The majority of those who claimed that they do not at all rely on the government for support is mostly the aged (58%), South-South (76%), followed by South West (63%) compared with other within categories. Those that mostly depend on government support are the North West (62%) and South East (59%).

**How often do you rely on the government for support to cope with the challenges of poverty & insecurity in Nigeria?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 106: Demographic Analysis of how Nigerians rely on the government to cope with various challenges by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.11.2 Ascertaining if the government is doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges**

Respondents were asked if the government was doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges. While a large proportion of respondents (37%) disagreed and 31% strongly disagreed, 13% agreed and 2% strongly agreed. 17% neither agree nor disagree. The overall findings depict that the government is not doing enough to support the people with the current economic challenges.




Figure 119: Citizens' perception of the government in assisting Nigerians to cope with economic challenges

Assessing by disaggregation showed that the respondents shared similar views in the gender category. Mostly the aged (71%) suggested that the government is not doing enough to support the people during this period. Similarly, the majority of South-South (82%) and South West (72%) asserted that government is underperforming.

**In your opinion, would you say the government is doing enough to assist Nigerians to cope with the present economic challenges?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 107: Demographic Analysis of the perception of government in assisting Nigerians to cope with economic challenges by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.11.3 How Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity**

This aspect of the study captured respondents' opinions about the best approaches adopted by Nigerians to cope with poverty and insecurity. As the chart shows, 44% depend on relatives, ethnic and communal groups for support, 41% depend on prayers, churches and mosques and 12% depend on the government for provision. Only 3% use other forms of coping strategies. The wide margin in findings showed that government is truly underperforming in providing social welfare initiatives and security for the people.

**In your opinion which of these approaches best capture the ways Nigerians cope with poverty & insecurity?**




Figure 120: How Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity

Due to the overbearing challenges, Nigerians have resorted to self-help in dealing with insecurity.



*“Self defence because the government has failed. The major thing for a government in any sane society is the security of the people; the lives and properties of the people. When government fails in that aspect, then they have failed. Trains are railways are being destroyed and people are being killed on the rail lines. Because there is no security, whatever facilities or infrastructures that are built will mean nothing. It is when people are alive and live in peace that they can enjoy those amenities. Everyone is afraid to travel by rail to Kaduna as it stands. So, what is the essence of the rail line that was built? (A Traditional Leader, Ekiti State).*

*“Nobody should think that soldiers can protect him or her; people should just keep praying. We cannot go to Dan Sadau from here unless if one knows the time when these bandits come out to operate and when they don't. All we do in this state is that we have been praying especially on Fridays in our mosques. We also tell the people to always pray for protection. That is the effort we make as religious leaders. People have come to understand that the government can do little or nothing to help the situation.” (A Religious Leader, Zamfara State).*

Probing deeper through sociodemographic variables, we found that most of the respondents depend on prayers, religious groups and immediate group of relatives, ethnic and community for support within gender and age categories. In addition, mostly North East (63%) depend on relatives, ethnic and communal groups for support.

**In your opinion which of these approaches best capture the ways Nigerians cope with poverty & insecurity? by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 108: Demographic Analysis of how Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further disaggregation showed that 44% of urban and 43% of rural depend relatives, ethnic and communal groups. Just as 42% of Christians, 40% of Muslims and 37% of Traditional and other religious groups depend on prayers, churches and mosques respectively, another 42% of Christians, 46% of Muslims and 37% of Traditional and other religious groups rely on relatives, ethnic and communal groups. Mostly those with formal/informal/primary education (47%) recorded that they look up to relatives, and ethnic and communal groups for succour while each of the 42% of respondents with secondary education and above relied on prayers, churches and mosques as well as relatives, ethnic and communal groups.



**In your opinion which of these approaches best capture the ways Nigerians cope with poverty & insecurity?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 109: Demographic Analysis of how Nigerians cope with poverty and insecurity by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level

**5.12 Assessment of Self-Worth as a Component of Social Cohesion**

This section presents the results of the analysis of citizens' perception of the concept of "Self-Worth", as an indicator for measuring social cohesion in Nigeria. In particular, it focuses on citizens' self-worth, given their understanding and perception of the current situation in the country. It also presents results on the consideration for migration within and outside the country, and the push factors driving Nigerians to relocate outside of the country.

**5.12.1 How Nigerians Feel About Their Lives**

Nigerians were asked to describe how they feel about their lives at the moment. In general, about 6 in 10 Nigerians surveyed feel "Extremely or Somewhat Dissatisfied" (63%) about their lives right now. These findings indicate a 7% and 18% increase when compared to 2019 and 2021 data. In addition, only a quarter of the surveyed respondents feel "Extremely or Somewhat Satisfied" (25%) with their lives which is a 15% decline from the 2019 data. The increasing level of dissatisfaction is unconnected to the myriads of challenges facing citizens in the country, ranging from poverty, poor healthcare and insecurity to low quality of life and unemployment, among others.

**As a Nigerian, how do you feel about your life as a whole right now?**




Figure 121: How Nigerians Feel About their Lives right now

When the data was disaggregated by demography, the result showed that more adult Nigerians aged 36-60 years (64%) and 18-35 (63%) years feel more dissatisfied with their lives, compared to other age groups. Across the geopolitical zones, the results revealed that most South-South (74%), North Central (70%), and South West (67%) significantly rated a poor level of dissatisfaction with their lives right now.




Table 110: Demographic Analysis of How Nigerians Feel About their Lives by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

**5.12.2 Opportunity to Relocate to another State in Nigeria**

The respondents were asked what state they would relocate to if given the opportunity. From the findings, the top three states are Lagos (18%), Abuja (16%) and Kano (10%). The selected states finding are similar to the 2021 data but with an increased proportion. The least three selected states are Ogun, Osun, and Sokoto.



**If you would consider relocating to another state in Nigeria, which state would that be?**

	2021	2022
Lagos	15%	18%
Abuja	13%	16%
Kano	8%	10%
Kaduna	5%	4%
Rivers	5%	5%
Oyo	3%	3%
Plateau	3%	2%
Anambra	2%	1%
Cross River	2%	2%
Delta	2%	1%
Enugu	2%	2%
Imo	2%	1%
Jigawa	2%	1%
Ogun	2%	2%
Osun	2%	2%
Sokoto	2%	1%
Other States	20%	20%
None	10%	9%

Table111: States Nigerians Consider relocating to

**5.12.3 Opportunity to Relocate Outside of Nigeria**

Citizens' views were sought on relocation outside Nigeria with family members when opportune. From the findings, about 7 in 10 respondents (69%) would seize a relocation opportunity with family members. This is a 4% and 30% increment from 2019 and 2021 data. Only 25% of the respondents chose not to relocate and this is a 2% and 36% decline from 2019 and 2021 data.

**If you had the opportunity to relocate with your family from Nigeria today, would you seize the opportunity?**




Figure122: The extent to which Nigerians are willing to relocate from Nigeria

Further disaggregation of the data revealed that most males (71%) than females (66%) are willing to relocate abroad with family members. The age category showed that mostly the youths (70%) and those aged 36-60 years would relocate with relatives when opportune. Interestingly, mostly Southern respondents are interested in relocating abroad with family members compared with Northern zone respondents. In specific, South West (84%), South-South (80%) and South East (78%) would mostly seize the opportunity with family members while most North Central (41%) would not relocate if opportune.

**If you had the opportunity to relocate with your family from Nigeria today, would you seize the opportunity?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 112: Demographic Analysis of Extent Nigerians are willing to relocate from the country by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Similarly, the majority of the respondents across urbanization, religion and education categories are willing to relocate abroad with relatives. In specific, most Christians (74%) than traditionalists (69%) and Muslims (61%) would seize the opportunity to relocate with their families outside the country. Mostly those with secondary education and above would seize the opportunity to relocate abroad (72%) compared to those with lower educational levels.

**If you had the opportunity to relocate with your family from Nigeria today, would you seize the opportunity?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**




Table 113: Demographic Analysis of Extent Nigerians are willing to relocate from the country by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level



#### 5.12.4 Major Reasons to Relocate

Citizens were asked to give the single most important reason for their willingness to relocate. Findings revealed that greener pasture (33%), followed by better job opportunities (28%) and better governance (11%) are the top reasons indicated by Nigerians. Other reasons identified by respondents include the need to give my children better life (10%), a suitable business environment (8%) and better security (7%). While the interest in better job opportunities has declined by 3% between 2021 and 2022 data, those seeking greener pastures increased by 3%. Interestingly, better security perception declined by 9% when compared with 2019 and 2021 data.

#### What would be the SINGLE most important reason for your relocation?

	2019	2021	2022
Better Job Opportunity	23%	31%	28%
Greener Pasture	26%	30%	33%
Better Governance	15%	12%	11%
Give my Children Better Life	8%	9%	10%
Better Security	16%	7%	7%
Suitable Business Environment	10%	7%	8%
To Learn More	2%	4%	2%
Others	0%	0%	1%

Table 114: Reasons why Nigerians want to relocate

#### 5.12.5 Countries Considered for Relocation

In the same vein, respondents were asked to identify the most preferred destination for relocation. The survey result shows that the United States of America (28%), the United Kingdom (15%) and Canada (14%) were the top three destinations of choice by Nigerians. This finding corroborates the findings from the 2021 survey. Other destinations of choice highlighted by respondents include Saudi Arabia (9%) and Dubai (8%) amongst others. Interestingly, Ghana (2%) is the only African country that made the top 10 countries that the respondents consider for relocation.

**Which country would you consider relocating to? TOP 10**

	2019	2021	2022
USA	28%	27%	28%
United Kingdom	10%	14%	15%
Canada	14%	13%	14%
Saudi Arabia	3%	7%	9%
Dubai (UAE)	6%	8%	8%
Ghana	3%	2%	3%
Australia			2%
Germany	4%	3%	2%
China	3%	3%	2%
France	1%	2%	2%

Table 115: Major Countries Nigerians consider relocating to

### 5.13 Assessment of Future Expectation as a Component of Social Cohesion

This section explores the concept of “Future Expectation” as a major indicator of social cohesion in Nigeria. It reports the hopes, aspirations and expectations of Nigerians concerning the future of Nigeria as a country. Delightfully, most Nigerians say they have better expectations for the country in the future.

#### 5.13.1 Future Expectations for Nigeria

In specifics, Nigerians were asked to choose which statement best expresses their feelings regarding the future of the country. Findings from the survey showed that 60% “believe the future will be much better than it is today”. On the other hand, 27% believe the future will be much worse; while 6% of surveyed Nigerians do not believe the future would change but will remain the same. While comparing with previous data, the study observed that the perception that the future would be much better than it is today declined by 6% between 2019 and 2022 data; the perception that the future would be much worse than it is today remained unchanged between 2021 and 2022 data, and perception that the future would remain the same declined by 4% when compared with 2022 data.

**Thinking about the future as a Nigerian, which statement best expresses your feelings?**




Figure 123: Nigerians' Perception of Future Expectations for Nigeria

Across socio-demographics, most of the respondents held similar views that the future would be much better than it is today. Responses from the geo-political zones revealed that most Nigerians from North East (71%), North West (68%), and South-South (65%) believe that the future of Nigeria would be much better than it is presently. However, more respondents from South East (42%) and North Central (34%) believe that the future of Nigeria would be much worse than it is presently.

**Thinking about the future as a Nigerian, which statement best expresses your feelings?  
by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone**




Table 116: Demographic Analysis of Nigerians' perception of Future Expectations for Nigeria by National Average, Gender, Age-Group & Geo-Political Zone

Further disaggregation revealed that more Muslims (67%) than Christian (54%) and Traditionalists (45%) opined that the future of Nigeria would be much better than it is today. Similarly, mostly those with no formal/informal/primary school education mostly (64%) believe that the future of Nigeria would be much better than today. Overall, the optimism about the future of Nigeria being much better than it is today cuts across urbanization, religion and educational levels.



**Thinking about the future as a Nigerian, which statement best expresses your feelings?  
by National Average, Urbanization, Religion & Educational Level**








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## 6.0 SUMMARY FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

## 6.0 Summary Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation

This section presents the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations of the study for key stakeholders in Nigeria.

### 6.1 Summary

This study measured social cohesion in Nigeria using 13 key indicators: identity, trust, social justice, participation and patriotism, natural resource governance, gender equity, impunity, corruption, peacebuilding, polarization, coping strategy, self-worth and future expectation.

All the indicators were investigated in the context of crucial national matters that relate to building social unity including citizens' engagement with the question of national identity and unity, citizens' perception of trust in the country, citizens' assessment of social justice, level of participation and patriotism and citizens' view on gender equity. Other issues involved in the analysis are citizens' views on the level of impunity, perception of corruption; citizens' assessment of natural resource governance, peacebuilding practices and strategies for coping with the increasing myriad of socioeconomic challenges facing citizens.

Overall, the Nigeria Social Cohesion Index of 39.6% and the Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2022) reveal that Nigeria is very below the social cohesion threshold, hence not a socially cohesive country. When compared to the 2021 Nigeria Social Cohesion Index of 44.2%, it is obvious that the unity that binds the citizens has dwindled by 4.6% perception thus indicating that the social cohesiveness has declined by issues bordering on identity, trust, social justice, participation and patriotism, natural resource governance, gender equity and impunity. Other issues are corruption, peacebuilding, polarization, coping strategy, the feeling of self-worth and future expectation.

From the key findings, we observed that Nigerians are very unhappy about the overall health of the nation probably due to the structural issues particularly inflation, unemployment, poverty, corruption and insecurity ravaging the country to date. While focusing on the issue of corruption, financial corruption appears as the most prevalent and damaging form of corruption in Nigeria. We observed that majority of the citizens are not aware of the derivation policy and the Petroleum Industry Act due to corruption, hence why the government is non-zealous about the management of natural resources in the country. These issues plausibly explain why many Nigerians do not trust the current government particularly to restructure the country and are very happy to relocate abroad, particularly UK and US with family members for a better job and greener pasture. It is thus not surprising that the citizens' sense of pride for the nation is dwindling to the extent that many would rather be identified more by ethnicity than as nationals of Nigeria.

The high level of impunity is another major issue as the majority of the citizens expressed worry that there are persons above the law, access to civil justice is not free from corruption and only the powerful upper-class echelon can access civil justice. This depicts a high level of inequality in the dispensation of the law and civil justice despite the fact that State actions are founded on "ideals of Freedom, Equality and Justice" as enshrined in the Nigerian constitution.

It is not surprising from the findings that corruption which has become institutionalised in the system is increasing with financial corruption being the most prevalent and damaging form of corruption in Nigeria. The availability and value of the nation's natural resources reportedly contributed to high corruption in the natural resources sector.

Furthermore, while the citizens attested that the government is doing too little to protect females from domestic violence and abuse, create political appointments and prohibit sexual violence against women many prefer that males earn more income than females despite the claim that the government is not doing enough at promoting equity in the country. Regardless of the potency of peacebuilding in managing local conflicts, it is rarely applied by the federal government to tackle the conflicts. Concerning coping strategies, Nigerians look up to their ethnic kins and religious groups more than the government for succour as they struggle to contain the consequences of an ailing economy and a rapidly collapsing security structure

Nevertheless, many of the citizens are still patriotic in their willingness to collectively work together and participate in politics for a more united Nigeria. They believe that the future of Nigeria would be much better than it is today.

## 6.2 Conclusion

Based on the generated Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey findings and Nigeria Social Cohesion Index of 39.6%, we established that Nigeria is a polarized country. The sense of unity, interrelationship and interdependence between the ethnic groups is fast dwindling and affecting the peace of the nation following the socio-economic and political challenges facing the country, yet the Nigerian government is reportedly doing too poorly at promoting a sense of inclusion among all ethnic groups in the country.

Most of the variables engaged to determine the level of social cohesion in the country revealed very low levels of social cohesion. Increasingly, Nigerians are polarised along ethnic and religious lines; in fact, the fault lines are getting deeper and widening every day. This portends very serious implications for the country. Nigerians, especially the youths, no longer have faith in their country. They are somewhat unpatriotic and even disloyal to their nation. This lack of patriotism is further aggravated by harsh economic realities, high unemployment rates, poverty and heightened insecurity.

The onerous task of leadership and governance is drastically simplified when a leader or government enjoys the trust of the citizens. Unfortunately, Nigerian governments rarely enjoy the trust of citizens who seem to put their trust more in traditional rulers and religious authority. The conduct of Nigerian leaders and governments, as the study reveals has robbed them of the trust of the led and the citizens. The disruptive but recurring strikes by labour unions in the nation's universities stem from the failure of Nigerian governments to observe the numerous agreements and contracts they have with the unions. To earn citizens' trust as a condition for building strong social cohesion, Nigerian governments must match words with action and be transparent in their dealing with citizens.

There is no doubt that high poverty rates constitute one of the biggest challenges to a peaceful and harmonious existence. Poverty increases inequality, social exclusion and vulnerability. Social exclusion, in turn, breeds civil unrest and insecurity as manifested in the activities of Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen, bandits and kidnapers. This situation cannot be attributed to inadequacy of policies – Nigeria boasts of policies capable of terminating many of the obstacles it currently faces - but rather the failure of past and present governments to insist on strict implementation, monitoring and evaluation of existing policies. The government has thus not been able to strictly apply policies that will harness the country's economic potential toward improving the welfare of citizens.

Nigeria's quest for social cohesion and economic development must be predicated on an equitable social justice system. But one of the major revelations of the study is the failure of government to run an inclusive government that accommodates ethnic and religious diversities and operates on the principles of equity, justice and rule of law. Many Nigerians perceive the justice system as only offering justice to the rich and placing the rich and powerful above the law, thereby inhibiting the principle of equality before the law. Unequal access to social justice robs the government of the trust of citizens and hinders social cohesion.

Lack of social justice is also implicated in the poor management of funds accruing to national resources. Poor management of funds means that communities hosting the resources do not receive their fair share of the funds. This promotes a feeling of injustice, alienation and deprivation among citizens who often respond by taking up arms against the state. Situations like this will always make the realisation of the ideals of social cohesion a mirage. Effective and unbiased revenue allocation formula is essential to strengthen the country's unity.

It is not surprising that corruption is still an institutionalised problem despite the establishment of several agencies charged with fighting corruption. Nigerians worry that the level of corruption is still very high and increasing. They also worry that government peacebuilding initiatives have remained low, despite the numerous conflicts that plague Nigeria. Worse still, they note that government is not active enough in terms of providing coping strategies to cushion the adverse consequences of corrupt governance, economic crisis, conflicts and general insecurity. There is no gainsaying that all these unwholesome corrupt practices weaken social values of fairness, equity and common citizenship while breeding feelings of marginalisation and oppression that have fuelled inter-group animosity, suspicion, and intolerance and further polarized the country. It is in this context that the need to strengthen existing policies and formulate new ones to attend to these obstacles cannot be overemphasized. Of course, the need to involve critical stakeholders such as traditional rulers, religious authorities, civil society organisations, etc in working out policies aimed at building social cohesion cannot be over-stressed.

### 6.3 Recommendation

In conclusion, the results and findings of the 2022 Nigeria Social Cohesion Survey (#NSCS2022) and Nigeria Social Cohesion Index (NSCI) of 39.6% remains below the average social cohesion threshold of 50%. The study highlights the weakening state of social cohesion in the country, occasioned by the deepening fault lines and increasing polarization along ethnic, religious, economic and political lines. These have been irked by the current spate of insecurity, harsh economic realities, growing trust deficit, deep-rooted perceptions of inequality and exclusion, and spiraling unemployment amongst others. Consequently, the following recommendation could help shape public policy in a bid to address factors weakening the state of Social Cohesion in Nigeria.

**The Nigerian Government:** Social Cohesion is imperative for government to operate successfully, and the absence of social cohesion may threaten the peaceful co-existence of citizens.

- i. There is an urgent need for government to strengthen existing policies, legislation and institutions, that help to create a sense of belonging, promote trust, foster good governance and provide a conducive atmosphere for citizens to thrive and fulfil their life aspirations. In this connection, Nigeria's legislation and policies on citizenship should be rejigged to encourage social and inclusive citizenship that de-emphasize indigeneity and discourage the exclusion of citizens based on indigeneity. Such unemployment and poverty alleviation programmes like the Nigerian Social Investment Programme (NSIP) and NAPEP should be revived and strengthened to tackle the problems of poverty, unemployment and underemployment.
- ii. There is need for government to adopt a hybrid of conventional and unconventional peacebuilding initiatives as the main thrust of its conflict management strategies. It is worth noting that state like Lagos and Oyo operate Alternative Dispute Resolution Centres, attached to the State Ministries of Justice. The Centres deploy a hybrid of conventional and local peacebuilding mechanisms of negotiations, remediation and arbitration to mediate on individual and group conflicts, and build peace among parties.
- iii. At the federal, state and local government levels, civil engagement and dialogues should be encouraged as part of the national life. This is to promote the culture of dialogue and negotiation, especially among individuals and groups who feel mistreated and nurse grievances against the state. In this connection, there is a need for a national dialogue involving the different ethnic nationalities and religious groups of the country to discuss their grievances and find lasting solutions to them. Because as the saying goes, 'It is better to jaw-jaw than to war-war'.
- iv. Government should take more stringent punitive measures against sponsors and elite collaborators of bandits and illegal resource miners. Purging the military and paramilitary agencies of government of "bad eggs" would also improve their role in the fight against banditry and resolve the insecurity problem bedevilling the country. A Truth Commission would be necessary to ensure justice to families that have been affected by the activities of bandits, insurgents and the likes. Creating a Social Cohesion Commission at the national and state levels of governance would also come in handy.
- v. The government should strengthen the activities of the anti-corruption agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) by eliminating corruption and impunity loopholes to facilitate an enabling corrupt-free and independent environment to effectively fight against corruption.
- vi. Government should ensure that all political appointments follow the principle of Federal Character and all citizens must be given equal access to opportunities in all aspects including employment, promotion wages/salaries, etc.

**Traditional and Religious Leaders:** These groups of institutions play a significant role in fostering social cohesion in Nigeria because the citizens cannot subsist without ethnic and religious tolerance.

- i. Religion and ethnicity play a huge role in fueling crises and civil unrest. The religious and traditional institutions are key instruments for resolving local conflicts in communities since many Nigerians have been found to trust these institutions, as they also identify strongly with their ethnicity and religious affiliations.
- ii. Government needs to fashion a constitutional provision that engenders clearly specified roles and responsibilities for the traditional institution in Nigeria. Government should collaborate with the traditional and religious leaders to design policy initiatives to resolve existing conflicts for a more peaceful interdependence and relationship at the community level.

- iii. It has been established that Nigerians trust traditional and religious leaders more than public officials and institutions. To absolve the problem of trust deficit, traditional and religious leaders should intensify efforts to mitigate against local conflicts, discrimination and hate speech, since they are closer to the people and earn more trust of the people than the government.
- iv. Furthermore, religious and traditional mechanisms of conflict management can be leveraged to foster peace at the grassroots. In view of this, the government should involve traditional and religious leaders in managing conflict and building peace.

**Civil Society of Nigeria (CSO):** The role of CSOs is to “help groups learn how to live together in peaceful co-existence”, especially in conflict-afflicted societies. Conflict and rivalry amidst other social issues are destroying trust and peaceful co-existence between groups in Nigeria.

- i. Through their activities, CSOs are in good stead to contribute to building community or national social cohesion in the nation because they are technically equipped to respond to local issues and facilitate a more cohesive society.
- ii. In collaboration with traditional leaders and religious authorities, CSO can create platforms for dialogue, mediation and monitoring peacebuilding. They can also provide direction in formulating social cohesion policies and legislations emanating from the government.
- iii. CSOs are enjoined to focus attention on key societal challenges that are engendering a less socially cohesive state – widespread poverty and limited economic opportunities, pervasive insecurity and impunity, growing civil distrust and division across ethno-religious lines, and deepening citizens apathy towards civil authorities, amongst others.
- iv. CSOs can also play a huge role in helping to rekindle public trust for civil authorities. While there's evidence to suggest that effective implementation of programmes and policies that improve the livelihood and wellbeing of citizens can help to rebuild trust; CSOs can guide government towards focusing on policies, programmes and projects that would have more impact on the lives of citizens, especially at the grass-root levels.

**Citizens:** The participation of citizens, particularly women and youths in governance is often mitigated by socio-economic challenges that they experience in the communities. Howbeit, every citizen has an important responsibility to play in promoting peaceful coexistence with neighbours and other community members.

- i. As previously highlighted, we encourage Nigerians to embrace a new National Identity that emphasizes the strengths of Nigeria and her people. One that is reflective of the country's past victories and successes focuses on the current achievements and expresses optimism for a brighter future.
- ii. Nigeria requires a concerned and responsible citizenry. That is citizens who take a keen interest in not only what happens to them but also what happens to their nations. Citizens who are driven by a common goal, and value system and eager to work out the kind of society they wish to live in and bequeath to future generations.
- iii. Citizens should engage their leaders and other critical stakeholders in dialogue and ensure they render an account of their stewardship. In doing so, emphasis should focus on contributions to social cohesion and building a strong and prosperous Nigeria.
- iv. Citizens should discourage statements and actions that can impede the peace and unity of the country, and avert conflicts, chaos and civil unrest; especially as the country gears up the next General Elections. Also, the trend of destroying and vandalizing public properties needs to stop.



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